 | Peter Alexander - 1985 - 362 страници
...is, of course, how we can know even that our ideas stand for the reality of things. As he says 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but...has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things. (IV.iv.3) He already hints... | |
 | Peter Smith, O. R. Jones - 1986 - 304 страници
...sense or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding. (II.ix.4) It is evident the mind knows not things immediately,...only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them ... The mind ... perceives nothing but its own ideas. (IV.iv.3) It is therefore the actual receiving... | |
 | Michael Ayers - 1993 - 708 страници
...senses. Like Descartes, he at one point introduced his doctrine by means of a pretended scepticism: 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but...has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things. But what shall be here... | |
 | Vere Claiborne Chappell - 1994 - 354 страници
...Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea" (E II.viii.8: 134), from which he infers that '"Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but...only by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them" (E IV.iv.3: 563; see also E IY.xxi.4: 721). Thus, the representation of things is always at best indirect,... | |
 | Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka - 1994 - 328 страници
...things are not present to the understanding. As for the second question, Locke raises it himself: ‘Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but...has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things. But what shall be here... | |
 | Nicholas Wolterstorff - 1996 - 276 страници
...presuppose our having ideas which are representations of non-mental entities. "'Tis evident," he says, "the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them" (iv,iv,3; "things" here is to be read as "non-mental things").i3 i5 On whether Locke held a representational... | |
 | Michael Huspek, Gary P. Radford - 1997 - 440 страници
...understanding" raises questions about how we could refer to things. "It is evident," Locke writes, that "the mind knows not things immediately, but only by...has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things" (288). Locke's (1924)... | |
 | Edward Pols - 1998 - 188 страници
...than Locke, who accepts this part of Descartes's doctrine but rejects Descartes's rationalism: 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but...has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things. But what shall be here... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - 1999 - 452 страници
...about them. But how can we do this if the immediate object of knowledge is an idea? 'It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by...has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here... | |
 | John Sallis - 2000 - 262 страници
...the human understanding. Locke's formulation of the problem could not be more direct and succinct: "It is evident the mind knows not things immediately,...has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here... | |
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It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. 
