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original, but simply to adapt it to a purpose for which the book is in the main admirably suited; they are intended, as nearly as was possible, to be such additional explanations as the editor conceived that the author would have himself made, if he had had in view, while preparing the book, the purpose to which it is now applied.
The practice of studying such a work as this by formal questions, the answers to which pupils commit to memory, cannot be too severely censured. There seems, kowever;:to be something necessary as a guide to the contents of the page, both for the pupil in reviewing the lesson, and for the teacher at the recitation.
That minute and familiar acquaintance, not only with the doctrines taught in the lesson, but with the particular contents of every page and paragraph, so essential in enabling the teacher to ask his questions with fluency, very few teachers have the time to secure. The editor has accordingly added an analysis of the page in the margin. This analysis is given, sometimes in questions, and sometimes in topics or titles, which can easily be put by the teacher into the form of questions if he pleases; or what will perhaps be better, they can, at the recitation, be given to the pupil as topics, on which he is to state in substance the sentiments of the author.
PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR.
In a former work, the author endeavored to delineate, in a simple and popular form, the leading facts relating to the Intellectual Powers, and to trace the principles which ought to guide us in the Investigation of Truth. The volume, which he now offers to the public attention, is intended as a sequel to these Inquiries; and his object in it is to investigate, in the same unpretending manner, the Moral Feelings of the Human Mind, and the principles which ought to regulate our volitions and our conduct as moral and responsible beings. The two branches of investigation are, in many respects, closely connected; and, on this account, it may often happen, that, in the present work, principles are assumed as admitted or proved, which, in the former, were stated at length, with the evidence by which they are supported.
He had two objects chiefly in view when he ventured
this investigation. The one was to divest his inquiry of all unprofitable speculation, and to show that the philosophy of the moral feel ings bears directly upon a practical purpose of the highest moment,—the mental and moral culture of every rational being. The other was to show the close and important relation which exists between this science and the doctrines of revealed reigion, and the powerful evidence which is deriver, for the truth of both, from the manner in which they confirm and illustrate each other. These two sources of knowledge cannot be separated, in the estimation of any one who feels the deep interest of the inquiry, and seriously prosecutes the important question—what is truth? If we attempt to erect the philosophy of morals into an independent science, we shall soon find that its highest inductions only lead us to a point beyond which we are condemned to wander in doubt and in darkness. But, on the other hand, by depreciating philosophy, or the light which is derived from the moral impressions of the mind, we deprive ourselves of a most important source of evidence in support of revelation. For it is from these impressions, viewed in connection with the actual state of man, that we learn the necessity, and the moral probability of a revelation; and it is by principles existing in the mind that we are enabled to feel the power of that varied and incontrovertible evidence, by which revelation comes to the candid inquirer with all the authority of truth.
INTRODUCTION BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR.
NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF THE MORAL FEEL-
Division of the Mental Powers into Intellectual and Moral .
light of Conscience, and of Divine Revelation
FIRST TRITHS IN THE SCIENCE OF THE MORAL FEELINGS.
Analogy between First Truths, or Intuitive Principles of
Belief, in Intellectual, and in Moral Science
sions arising out of each other, by an obvious chain of re-
just or unjust, right or wrong; and a conviction of