tions could be with prudence undertaken. On the 14th of September, however, the port and town of Granville were successfully attacked by sir James Saumarez. The pier was demolished, and many vessels intended for the invasion of England were destroyed. On the same day the town and fort of Dieppe were bombarded by captain Owen, in the Immortalité frigate, with the Theseus and Sulphur bombs under his command. The Dutch ports, from Zandvoort, in the vicinity of Haarlaer, to Scheveningen, were also severely bombarded on the 28th of September, and many vessels were destroyed. These attacks, though not productive of any serious consequence, were not improperly made at this period of the war. While England was threatened with invasion by a pigmy flotilla, it was politic to keep up the dread which her navy had inspired, and to show that we were active and vigilant at every point. Such is the detail of the few naval and military exploits which the nature of the war and the circumstances of Great Britain warranted her government in undertaking. When we consider these circumstances, we shall be surprised that so much was effected, rather than that not more was attempted. When we consider that the enemy, with only a narrow channel between the two countries, was actually possessed of a military force of nearly half a million of men, chiefly ve teran soldiers, and in the highest state of discipline, which he daily threatened to disembogue upon our shores; when we remember that he had all the small-craft of France, Holland, and the Netherlands at his absolute disposal, in which he might have embarked them; when we recollect that he had but this one object in view, and nothing to divert his attention from it, we confess we cannot but admire the wisdom and vigour of those counsels, by which his plans for our destruction were rendered abortive. The administration, which in the midst of these perils was still enabled to act even in the offensive in different quarters of the globe, was, by a most singular and audacious perversion of language, termed weak and inefficient: be it so. To that weak and inefficient administration we are convinced we are indebted for our present security; and when the transactions of almost any year in the British annals come to be compared with those we have been narrating, we honestly believe, that, all circumstances candidly considered, the year 1803 will not sink in the comparison. We cannot close these remarks without a just compliment to the unparalleled cou. rage and perseverance of our blockading squadrons, and parti. cularly to that gallant veteran ad. miral Cornwallis, who, in the most tempestuous season in the memory of man, kept the sea in defiance of a more formidable enemy than the navies of France and Holland; and destroyed effectually the naval force of our enemies, by keeping them in a state of ruinous inaction, breaking their spirits, and defeating all their hopes. The close of our annual narrative is generally followed by some remarks on the political state of Europe. A period more fertile in important speculation than the present could not have presented itself. It is not merely to France and Great Britain, or to their future destinies, that we have to extend our views; it is to Europe, perhaps to the world. The mad career of the French revolution is finished; and the result must have disappointed every friend of freedom in every quarter of the globe. We saw many things to disgust us almost from the first in that calamitous transaction; but that it should terminate in a despotism more oppressive than even the darkest ages exhibit, we could not have supposed. He who has perused our volumes with even tolerable attention, will see that we have never been too deeply enamoured of republicanism. In the fairest and In the fairest and most promising periods of the French republic, we cautiously discouraged the comparison between our own state and that of France before the revolution*; and we lifted up our voice against those pernicious theories and opinions, which would have promoted a similar experiment in this country. Yet, while unstained by blood, undisgraced by the atrocious murders which afterwards succeeded, we confess we were not adverse to seeing the trial made in a country like France, where, public liberty seemed to have nothing to risk, and where the situation of the people we scarcely suspected could have been changed for the worse. We are not deterred by a false shame from confessing that we have been completely deceived and disappointed. The French character has appeared altogether inconsistent with the enjoyment of liberty; and perhaps the situation of a people is only to be ameliorated by slow and almost imperceptible grada tions; the step from entire subor. dination to the enjoyment of civil freedom in all its branches is perhaps too violent for the human intellect; and the effort to transform slaves into freemen is as arduous, as we trust the converse will always be found, to change freemen into slaves. The ardour for political innovation on a large scale, that which regards the form of government and of the, civil constitutions of nations, will doubtless receive a check from the event of the French revolution; but it may be questioned whether the established governments of Europe will yet be rendered more secure. A successful usurpation is perhaps a more dangerous precedent than even a successful revolution. In the lat ter, the passions of the many must be interested and engaged; in the former, those only of a few. By the example of Bonaparte, every fortunate commander may hope to climb, by the aid of the military, to the summit of human authority; the steps may not be the same, but the end, and not the means, will be in the contemplation of an ambitious mind. The immense military force of France, and the desire manifested by its government of domineering over the rest of Europe, is anc ther circumstance scarcely less formidable. France must be an object of jealousy to other powers; and wars may succeed, not less. from their fears, than from her encroachments. In the mean time, it is melancholy to contemplate the successive destruction of all those lesser independent states, who by their union or their courage de See the preface to our volume for 1791. fended various ranks and classes of men; we see nothing but soldiers and their chiefs. Within our own remembrance the military establishment of every nation in Europethose, we mean, who still retain their rank among nations-has been trebled at least. Such a state of things cannot be permanent. Either the powers of Europe must unite to crush the ambition of France, or they must become parties to their own downfal. Should victory attend their union in the doubtful and dangerous conflict, still a permanent peace may not be the consequence. The flame of ambition once enkindled, its progress is uncertain. Unfortunately, the people will always suffer for the wickedness of their governors—— "Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi." |
