BOOK IV.

1757. The French

attacked.

Clive's orders

to return to

Madras.

The English force advanced; while the scruples of Admiral Watson, under the great accession of force, were vanquished by some supposed contradictions in the letters of the Subahdar; and the opposition of the Subahdar was suspended by his apprehension of the Afghauns. On the 14th of March, the detachment from Bombay having joined the English army, hostilities commenced. The French defended themselves with great gallantry: The Nabob roused at last, and eager to prevent their fall, sent peremptory orders to the English to desist; and even put a part of his army in motion: But the fire from the ships was irresistible, and the reduction of the fort anticipated the effects of his intended resistance. The resentment of the Nabob was checked by his remaining dread of the Abdallees; and he still courted the friendship of the invaders: He, however, eluded their request to give up all the other French factories and subjects in his dominions; and afforded protection to the troops who had escaped from the fort of Chandernagor.

The time was now arrived when, according to his instructions, Clive ought no longer to have deferred his return to Madras. He himself, in his letter to the Select Committee, dated the 4th of March, had said, respecting Watson's objection to the treaty of neutrality; "This leads me to consider seriously the situation of the Company's affairs on the coast, and the positive orders I have received from the President and Committee at Madras, to return at all events with as great a part of the forces under my command as could possibly be spared.” * The situation of the Company's affairs on the coast," that is, in Carnatic, was indeed in no small degree alarming, if they remained without the protection of their military force, sent for the restoration of the settlements in Bengal. The Presidency of Madras had not left themselves troops sufficient to make head against the French even then in the country; and it was known at Madras, before the departure of Clive, that, in consequence of the ex

Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Becher :-Mr. Becher gave his opinion for a neutrality, Major Kilpatrick, for a neutrality;-he himself gave his opinion for the attack of the place; Mr. Drake gave an opinion that nobody could make any thing of. Major Kilpatrick then asked him, whether he thought the forces and squadron could attack Chandernagor and the Nabob's army at the same time?—he said, he thought they could; upon which Major Kilpatrick desired to withdraw his opinion, and to be of his.-They voted Mr. Drake's no opinion at all; and Major Kilpatrick and he being the majority, a letter was written to Admiral Watson, desiring him to co-operate in the attack on Chandernagor." Report, ut supra. There is something ludicrous in voting a man's opinion to be no opinion; yet the undecisive, hesitating, ambiguous propositions, of men who know not what resolution to take, cannot in general, perhaps, be treated by a better rule.

* Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. vi.

pected hostilities, a powerful armament was destined by the French government CHAP. III. for India; and without doubt would make its first landing in Carnatic. On the 1757. other side Clive beheld an opening for exploits, both splendid and profitable, in Bengal; overlooked all other considerations; violated his instructions, and remained.

The French, who had collected themselves at Cossimbuzar, became the first Disputes with Suraja Dowla. subject of dispute. Instead of yielding them up, on the repeated solicitations of the English; the Nabob furnished M. Law, who was the head of the factory at Cossimbuzar, with money, arms, and ammunition, and sent them into Bahar; Clive, to the great displeasure of his new ally, threatening, and even preparing, to detach a part of his army to intercept them. By the author of the Seer Mutakhareen, we are told, that M. Law, before his departure, revealed to Suraja Dowla the disaffection of his principal officers; the connexion which they would be sure to form with the English for his destruction; and the necessity of retaining the French about his person if he wished to preserve himself from that deplorable fate. The persons, however, who meditated his ruin, and who saw the importance of removing the French, pressed upon his mind the impolicy of quarrelling with the victorious English on account of the vanquished and fugitive French. He therefore dismissed M. Law, telling him, "that if there should happen any thing new, he would send for him again."-" Send for me again?" answered Law, "Be assured, my lord nawab, that this is the last time we shall see each other; remember my words,-we shall never meet again; it is nearly impossible.” *

Lord Clive, in his statement to the House of Commons, said, "that after Plan for the dethronement Chandernagor was resolved to be attacked, he repeatedly said to the Committee, of Suraja as well as to others, that they could not stop there, but must go further; that, Dowla, by debauching his having established themselves by force, and not by consent of the Nabob, he servants. would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs-of his intentions, many upon record; and that he did suggest to Admiral Watson and Sir George Pococke, as well as to the Committee, the necessity of a revolution; that Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the Committee agreed upon the necessity of it; † and that the management of that revolution was, with consent of the Committee, left to Mr. Watts, who was resident at the Nabob's ca

* Seer Mutakhareen, i. 762.

+ Captain Brereton, who was Lieutenant with Admiral Watson, declared in evidence, "that he had heard Admiral Watson say, he thought it an extraordinary measure to depose a man they had so lately made a solemn treaty with." Report, ut supra.

BOOK IV. pital, and himself; that great dissatisfaction arising among Suraja Dowla's troops, Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the person to place in the room of Suraja Dowla, in consequence of which a treaty was formed."*

1757.

son.

A complicated scene took place, which it would be little instructive to unfold,† of plotting and intrigue. The first proposals were made by an officer named Yar Khan Latty; and they were greedily embraced; till intimation was received that Meer Jaffier Khan was inclined to enter into a confederacy for deposing the Subahdar. This was a personage of much greater power and distinction. He had been married at an early period to the sister of Aliverdi, and held a high rank in his army. Between him and Aliverdi had not been always the best understanding; and Meer Jaffier had at one time entered into a project of treaBut the interest of the two parties taught them to master their dissatisfaction; and at the death of Aliverdi, Meer Jaffier was paymaster-general of the forces, one of the highest offices in an Indian government. Suraja Dowla hated Meer Jaffier, and was too ignorant and headstrong to use management with his dislikes. Shortly after his accession, Meer Jaffier was removed from his office, and remained exposed to all that might result from the violent disposition of the Subahdar. According to the constitution however of an Indian army, in which every General maintains his own troops, a considerable portion of the army belonged to Meer Jaffier; and this he exerted himself to increase, by enlisting as many as possible of the adventurers, with whom the nature of Indian warfare made the country abound.

In manufacturing the terms of the confederacy, the grand concern of the English appeared to be money. "The Committee really believed," says Mr. Orme, "the wealth of Suraja Dowla much greater than it possibly could be, even if the whole life of the late Nabob Aliverdi had not been spent in defending his own dominions against the invasion of ruinous enemies; and even if Suraja Dowla himself had reigned many, instead of only one year." They resolved accordingly not to be sparing in their demands; and the situation of Jaffier Khan, and the manners and customs of the country, made him ready to promise whatever they desired. In name of compensation for losses by the capture of Calcutta, 10,000,000 rupees were promised to the English Company, 5,000,000 rupees to English inhabitants, 2,000,000 to the Indians, and 700,000 to the Armenians. These sums were specified in the formal treaty. Over and beside

* Report, ut supra.

+ It has been done with exemplary minuteness and patience by Mr. Orme, ii. 149-175. ‡ Orme, ii. 153.

1757.

this, it was resolved by the Committee of the Council, that is, the small number CHAP. III. of individuals by whom the business was performed, that a donation of 2,500,000 rupees should be asked for the squadron: and another of equal amount for the army. "When this was settled," says Lord Clive,* " Mr. Becher (a member) suggested to the Committee, that he thought that Committee, who managed the great machine of government, was entitled to some consideration, as well as the army and navy." Such a proposition, in such an assembly, could not fail to appear eminently reasonable. It met with a suitable approbation. Mr. Becher informs us, that the sums received were 280,000 rupees by Mr. Drake the Governor; 280,000 by Colonel Clive; and 240,000 each, by himself, Mr. Watts, and Major Kilpatrick, the inferior members of the Committee. † The terms obtained in favour of the Company were, that all the French factories and effects should be given up; that the French should be for ever excluded from Bengal; that the territory surrounding Calcutta to the distance of 600 yards beyond the Mahratta ditch, and all the land lying south of Calcutta as far as Culpee should be granted them on Zemindary tenure, the Company paying the rents in the same manner as other Zemindars.

army takes

For effecting the destruction of Suraja Dowla it was concerted, that the The English English should take the field; and that Meer Jaffier should join them at Cutwa, the field. with his own troops, and those of as many of the other commanders as it should be in his power to debauch. When the English arrived at Cutwa, no allies, however, appeared: Letters were received from Moorshedabad by some of the natives in the camp, stating that the conspiracy was discovered, and that Meer Jaffier had obtained his pardon, on condition of aiding the Nabob with all his resources against the English. Instead of Meer Jaffier and his troops, a letter from Meer Jaffier arrived. In this it was stated, that the suspicions of the Nabob had been raised, that he had constrained Meer Jaffier to swear fidelity on the Koran; that it had thus become impossible for Meer Jaffier to join the English before the day of battle; but that it would be easy for him, in the action, to desert the Nabob, and decide the fortune of the day. The mind of

* Evidence before the Committee, Report, ut supra.

+ Ibid. These latter receipts were the occasion of a dispute. "Upon this being known," said Clive, (Report ut supra) "Mr. Watson replied, that he was entitled to a share in that money. He (Clive) agreed in opinion with the gentlemen, when this application was made, that Mr. Watson was not one of the Committee, but at the same time did justice to his services, and proposed to the gentlemen to contribute as much as would make his share equal to the Governor's and his own; that about three or four consented to it, the rest would not."

1757.

Book IV., the English commander was disturbed. The treachery of Meer Jaffier could not be regarded as improbable; and "he thought it extremely hazardous" (to use his own words)" to pass a river which is only fordable in one place, march 150 miles up the country, and risk a battle, when, if a defeat ensued, not one man would have returned to tell it."*

In these difficulties he called a council of war. "It is very rare," says Mr. Orme, "that a council of war decides for battle."† Clive himself says, "that this was the only council of war that ever he held, and if he had abided by that council, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company." The singularity is, that in the council Clive himself was of the same opinion with the majority, and by delivering his opinion first, which was far from the usual practice, had no doubt considerable influence in determining others: yet that afterwards he disregarded that decision; and took upon himself to act in direct opposition to it. The army was ordered to cross the river the next morning; and at a little past midnight arrived at Plassy. §

At this place a part of the army of the Subahdar had been intrenched for a considerable time; and the Subahdar himself had reached it with the remainder of his forces the evening before the arrival of the English. The army with which he was now to contend for his power and his life consisted of 50,000 foot, 18,000 horse, and fifty pieces of cannon. Of the English force, 900, including 100 artillery-men and fifty sailors, were Europeans; 100 were Topasses; and 2,100 Sepoys. The battle was nothing but a distant cannonade. This was maintained during the greatest part of the day, and sufficed to terrify the Subahdar, who, by the advice of those who desired his ruin, issued orders of preparation for retreat. Upon this Jaffier Khan was observed moving off with his troops: Clive was then convinced of his intention to join him. He now, therefore, ordered the English to advance, and attack that part of the line which still maintained its position. The knowledge of these two events determined the mind of the Subahdar, who mounted a fleet camel and fled with 2,000 attendants. No further resistance was offered; and the English entered the camp at five o'clock, having, by the assistance of a weak and vicious sovereign, deter

Evidence, ut supra.

+ Orme, ii. 171.

Evidence, Report, ut supra.

§ Scrafton (Reflections, p. 90,) says, that the Colonel's resolution was founded upon a letter he received from Jaffier in the course of the day. Orme, who loves a little of the marvellous, says, "that as soon as the council of war broke up he retired alone into the adjoining grove, where he continued near an hour in deep meditation; and gave orders, on his return to his quarters, that the army should cross the river the next morning." ii. 170.