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suggested to him in consequence of recollecting relations which he had previously traced or observed, or in conse quence of recollecting the order in which such objects or phenomena were presented to his mind. A person who has both Lower and Upper large will, on the contrary, manifest an uncommon facility in recollecting both individual phenomena or events, and the order in which such phenomena or events occurred or were presented to his mind. In illustra tion of our principles, we take the liberty of availing ourselves of the example which Mr Combe quotes from Shakspeare, in page 279 of his System.We allude to Mrs Quickly's speech to Falstaff! She is reminding him of his promise of marriage, and says," Thou didst swear to me "on a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my dolphin-chamber at the "round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitsun"week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening his father to a singing-man of Windsor; thou didst swear to me then, "as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my "lady thy wife. Canst thou deny it ?-Did not goodwife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Gossip Quickly? coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar, telling us "she had a good dish of prawns; whereby thou didst desire to "eat some; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green "wound; and didst not thou, when she was gone down stairs, "desire me to be no more sol familiarity with such poor people, "saying that, ere long, they should call me madam? And didst "not thou kiss me, and bid me fetch thee thirty shillings? I put ut thee now to thy book-oath; deny it if thou canst.. Here," Mr Combe remarks," is a surprising variety of trivial "circumstances connected by no link but that of the order of "their occurrence." But Mr Combe does not distinguish be tween the power of recollecting the individual events and that of recollecting their connexion with each other. Ac cording to our views of the mind, we remember individual phenomena or events by a distinct power from that by which we remember their connexion or order of occurrence. If a character such as Mrs Quickly had possessed Upper Individuality large, with the Lower moderate, these minute circumstances would have been suggested to her rather by recollecting the order of their occurrence than by directly recollecting the circumstances themselves; and, in consequence,

there would have been awanting that vivid and distinct con ception of each minute circumstance which so strikingly marks her character throughout -0 gicod or

We next proceed to show the connexion which Upper Individuality has with the reflecting faculties, and shall simply state the abstract principle, and give a few examples by way of illustration. We maintain, then, that Upper Individu ality remembers the relations which the reflecting faculties trace or observe either in external nature, or between external nature and the mind itself. When we speak of phenomena, we refer to those of mind as well as matter; and our doc trine is this, that all unconnected phenomena are taken cognizance of by Lower Individuality,-that the reflecting facul ties observe or trace relations between these phenomena, and that these relations are stored up by Upper Individuality.

Causality simply traces or perceives the relation of cause and effect between phenomena; Comparison compares objects or phenomena; Wit perceives the difference between phenomena or ideas; and Upper Individuality remembers all the relations which these powers have traced or observed. An individual, therefore, who has all the reflecting organs large, if his Upper Individuality is small, however quickly he may trace relations between phenomena stored up in Lower Individuality, will be much inferior in memory of relations to the man who has the reflecting powers only full, with Upper Individuality large, supposing the condition of cæteris paribus to hold in regard to the other powers of both. So much for the connexion which Upper Individuality has with the reflecting faculties. We may here notice the manner of the operation of Upper Individuality in regard to Ideality, which seems to hold a place between our intellectual powers and sentiments. Mr Combe, in his chapter on Ideality, seems to be of opinion that this power confers the sentiment of beauty, and is accordingly necessary to the conception of the sublime. This view of Ideality we admit to accord strikingly with the fact,-When a person with this

organ large looks on a beautiful landscape, he perceives nothing externally which a person with the organ small does not perceive, but he feels the emotion of beauty in his own mind with a degree of vividness which the other cannot feel. Every thing he looks on has a degree of exquisiteness and perfectibility about it which a person with the organ small cannot experience. The individual object and the feeling, as separate and distinct phenomena, are remembered by Lower Individuality; but how do we remember the relationship between the object and the feeling? At the time when the external object is perceived and the sentiment of beauty is felt, it is Causality which perceives the relation of cause and effect, as between the external object and the sentiment of beauty, and it is Upper Individuality which remembers this relation. We may thus recollect both the object and the feeling or emotion separately by means of Lower Individuality, but we remember the relation in which they stood to each other by means of Upper Individuality,—or, in other words, we remember that the perception of the object excited the vivid emotion described. This influence of Upper Individuality in reference to Ideality is borne out by observation. We have visited Westminster Abbey, St Paul's, and many other public places in London, where busts of poets are to be found, but in vain, to discover one very deficient in Upper Individuality. Most of them have it very full, some only full, but none have it small.

After what we have stated in regard to the function of Upper Individuality with reference to Ideality, it will not be necessary to go into detail in order to show its connexion with the other sentiments and feelings. We may observe generally, that Upper Individuality gives the power of recollecting the relation in which we stand to external objects calculated to excite our sentiments or feelings; Causality perceives the relation of cause and effect as between these objects and our sentiments or feelings, and Upper Individuality retains the relation so perceived. If a single example is pro

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duced contradictory of these principles, we will readily, abandon them; but we are certain, from the observations which we have made, that they accord with the laws of nature, and, without claiming the least indulgence, we freely submit them to the severest scrutiny.

In illustration of our principles, we beg leave first to refer to the cerebral development of the Right Hon. Richard Brinsley Sheridan, a cast of whose head is to be found in the collection of the Phrenological Society. That individual, without large reflecting powers, contrived, if not to outstrip, at least to equal the most remarkable of his contemporaries by the splendour of his eloquence and the brilliancy of his wit. Now, it will be observed, that the largest of his intellectual powers are the Individualities, both of which are in him decidedly large. If our opinions on the subject of the Individualities are correct, this celebrated person had a wonderful aptitude for storing up in his mind all the phenomena which came under his observation, and an equal aptitude for recollecting the order in which they occurred or were presented to his mind. Accordingly, with moderate powers of penetration, he pos sessed a minuteness and accuracy for detail which has seldom been equalled, and we may safely say never surpassed. His mind seldom led him to deep or intense reflection, but he was perpetually observing, and consequently acquiring knowledge. He surveyed only the surface, of things, but his survey was comprehensive and accurate. Accordingly, his knowledge of men and manners, without being profound, is accurate, being drawn from the stores of a boundless memory. The reflecting powers of Sheridan were not, however, very deficient, and by means of them he traced relations for himself, and compared and contrasted these relations with those which he had previously stored up in his mind. Hence it is, that with Wit, or the perception of difference moderate, by the aid of his Upper and Lower Individualities, he possessed a brilliancy and vividness of conception altogether peculiar to himself. Being largely endowed with, that

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faculty by which he remembered accurately all the relations either of difference, or of any other kind which he had either traced or observed himself or derived from reading, or other. wise, he could avail himself of them when an occasion presented itself. Such too, we believe, is pretty nearly the cha racter of Sheridan, as given by Mr Moore. But it is useless to dwell upon the character of an individual.

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Pope the poet, a bust of whom is to be seen in Mr O'Neil's, Canongate, has Upper Individuality very full, with the Lower moderate. His writings are remarkable for their abstract didactic character, and for nakedness in his illustrations drawn from phenomena. Dryden, a bust of whom is to be seen in Westminster Abbey, has, on the contrary, Lower Individuality very full, and Upper not so full, and his writings are characterized by a vivid conception of phenomena.

We are told by the biographers of Pope, that when an idea struck him he immediately committed it to paper.''' When he went upon a visit to any of his friends, it was punctually required that his writing-box should be set upon his bed before he rose; and Lord Orford's domestic related, that in the dreadful "winter of Forty she was called from her bed by him four times in "one night to supply him with paper, lest he should lose a thought." -Johnson's Life of Pope.

According to Pope's development, and to our principles, he remembered phenomena not directly, but by recollecting the relations which he had traced or observed among them; they were suggested to him through the medium of these relations, and not directly remembered. He accordingly found it necessary, when any phenomena were suggested to him illustrative of his subject, to jot them down, because he wanted a facility in recalling phenomena directly." Accordingly, Dr Johnson, in analyzing the characters of Pope and Dryden, very justly remarks, that in acquired knowledge "the superiority must be allowed to Dryden, whose education was more scholastic, and who, before he became an author, had been "allowed more time for study, with better means of information. His mind has a larger range, and he collects his images and illustrations from a more extensive circumference of science.