trustee, or one claiming under him could make that defense, and not a stranger holding adversely to the mortgage; and the purchaser at the sale made upon said judg. ments can recover in ejectment against the purchaser at a subsequent sale made by the debtor's assignee in bankruptcy. Opinion by HENRY, J.-Hardwick v. Rickards et al. INDICTMENT-CRIMINAL PRACTICE.-It is not error in a court to refuse defendant a copy of the indictment in a murder case, when the record shows that such copy had already been furnished. A plea that one of the grand jurors which returned the indictment was not a freeholder or householder in the county where the indictment was found, and that defendant was in custody when the jury was sworn and had no opportunity to challenge the juror, or the array; and a plea that the record fails to show that the county court selected the grand jurors or either of them, and that five of the eighteen were not selected by the court, and five others who had been selected were not sworn on the jury, or discharged by the court, are not good pleas in abatement. State v. Welch, 33 Mo. 33; State v. Blakey, 18 Mo. 428; State v. Connell, 49 Mo. 282. The declaration of a little girl, nine years of age, made after the killing, and in presence of the body of deceased, that " Mr. Long (the deceased) had a knife in his hand," is inadmissible on the trial of defendant. It is not res gestæ, and the child is a competent witness. Where the jury boarded at the house when the homicide was committed, and were seen looking at the ground on which it occurred, this was no misconduct on the part of the jury, there being no evidence offered to show that they were looking at the ground with a view of understanding how the killing was done, nor that they conversed among themselves in regard to the ground. Opinion by HENRY, J.-State of Missouri v. Brown.

ABSTRACT OF DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.

January Term, 1877.

HON. ALBERT H. HORTON, Chief Justice.

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D. M. VALENTINE, Associate Justices. 66 D. J. BREWER,

PROMISSORY NOTE-WHAT IS SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF PROTEST.-Before an indorser can be held upon a note, it must appear that sufficient notice of protest was duly served upon him; and a finding that a notice, the contents of which are unknown, was served is not equivalent to a finding that a notice of protest, much less a sufficient notice of protest, was served. Opinion by BREWER, J.-Couch v. Sherrill.

TAX LEVY-EXCESSIVE-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT ACT. -1. Where the county commissioners of Sedgwick County, in levying taxes for the year 1874, levied for current expenses a tax of one per cent., which tax was all that they had any power to levy during that year for that purpose, and then, in addition to said tax, and apparently without any authority, they levied another tax of eight mills on the dollar to meet a deficit in the county revenue of the preceding year; Held, that the levy of said eight-mill tax was and is illegal and void. 2. Afterwards, on March 6. 1875, the legislature passed an act entitled "An act to legalize a certain levy of taxes," which act provides "that all levies of taxes heretofore made by the board of county commissioners of Sedgwick County, Kansas, in the year 1874, be and the same are hereby legalized." Laws of 1875, p. 6. Held, that said act does not make valid said eight-mill tax; that even after the passage of said act said eight-mill tax is not sustained or upheld by any law which distinctly states the object of the tax. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 4. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-A., T. & S. F. R. R. v. Woodcock. VOID DEED CONSIDERATION FOR AGREEMENT. — 1. Where H, a councilman and head man of the Ottawa Indians, makes a warranty deed to K, for $1,300, to certain lands patented to H under the first clause of article 3 of the treaty with said Indians, proclaimed July 28th, 1862, which deed is null and void at the time of its execution, and the said H, after he has become a citizen of the United States by the terms of the treaty, executes a quit-claim deed to C of the same land for the consideration of $200, and thereafter C delivers to H, voluntarily and without any consideration, a written agreement to the effect that he will notify certain parties, who claim to have title to said lands from H, that he has the same, and that he will offer to per.

fect their title thereto, but if said parties refuse and neglect to purchase the title of C within sixty days, then C is to be released from any obligation to convey the title to said parties: Held, that such agreement is a promise for which there is no consideration, and that it can not be enforced at law. Held, also, that such agreement, under said circumstances, is no defense to an action brought by C against the grantee of K to recover the possession of the real property deeded to C by H. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. -Clark v. Libbey.

APPEAL-CHANCERY PRACTICE. The appeal of a part of the defendants in a chancery cause does not bring up the cause as to other defendants, whose interests are distinct. Citing and following Young v. Young, (MS.), April term, 1874. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.—Nelson v. Trigg.

ADMINISTRATION-SITUS OF PERSONALTY.-An executor or administrator acquires, by his qualification in Tennessee, no right to personalty situated in another state; and if he bring such assets into Tennessee, his sureties there are not liable therefor. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.-Nelson v. Trigg.

REBELLION-BELLIGERENT RIGHTS-VOID CONTRACT.— A contract made July 5, 1864, between R., a citizen of Missouri, and T., a citizen of Louisiana, for the sale of cotton by T. to R., was null and void by reason of the war then flagrant; and a mortgage given contemporaneously by T. to R., to secure the delivery of the cotton, or the refunding of the money paid therefor, is also void. Opinion by McFARLAND, J.-Ruby v. Trigg.

ADMINISTRATION-REAL ASSETS-DOWER-DESCENT.1. The widow of an heir or devisee of realty can not have dower in such realty, where the creditors of the ancestor have instituted proceedings against it, as assets, before the death of the heir. The filing of a bill to reach lands as assets for the payment of debts makes them such assets. 2. Semble, that until the debts of the ancestor are in fact paid, the heir or devisee of the realty does not so far become owner thereof as to give his widow dower therein. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.-Nelson v. Trigg.

MUNICIPAL TAXES - RECOVERY OF, WHEN ILLEGALLY EXACTED CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION.-1. Municipal taxes, illegally exacted, may be recovered back by the tax. payer, if the municipal corporation acknowledged the same as a debt for which it is liable. 2. But the tax-payer will not, by the state courts, be allowed to set off such debt against a renewed assessment for the same tax, ordered to be collected in cash by the corporation, by a mandamus from the United States Circuit Court, even though the corporation be insolvent. Opinion by DEADERICK, C. J.— Lea v. City of Memphis.

DECEIT-BANK-CASHIER.-1. The essence of the liabil ity of the defendant, in an action of deceit by representations as to the solvency of another, by reliance on which the plaintiff was injured, is the purpose to influence the action of the latter by such representations, regardless of their truth. 2. It is questionable, if it would be the duty of the defandant to notify the plaintiff in case of a change in circumstances as to the third party's solvency, where all reside in the same town or city. 3. A bank is not liable for the act of its cashier in making such representations, unless it has authorized him to do such acts. Citing Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Co., 2 Law Rep. 265; Swift v. Jewsbury, Law Rep. (1874) 314. Opinion by FREEMAN, J.—Horrigan v. First National Bank of Memphis.

SAINT LOUIS, JUNE 8, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE fiendish attempts to wreck passenger trains for the sake of plunder, which are occasionally brought to light, seem to be on the increase. At the beginning of the present week a train was thrown from the track in this state, causing the death of three persons, and the condition of the track showed that it must have been the result of design. An unsuccessful attempt of the same kind was made last week in New Jersey. In Canada, at the present time, three men are awaiting trial for wrecking an express train and causing the death of the engineer and severe injuries to a number of the passengers. Where death ensues as the result of such a diabolical plot, the crime is murder, and herein the law is satisfactory. Whether, considering the number of lives at stake and the enormity of the offense, the attempt to throw a train off the track, for the sake of plunder or revenge, is as severely punished under our laws as it should be, we leave to the consideration of our legislators.

AN instrument which does not show upon its face that it is valid for the purpose for which it was created, it is held in Roode v. The State, 5 Neb. 174, can not be the subject of forgery if not genuine. The defendant was indicted for the forgery of a deed of conveyance which did not contain the statutory acknowledgment by the wife of the grantor, as required by the laws of the state in which it purported to have been made. The court held that, the instrument being void on its face, he could not be convicted of the forgery. In People v. Galloway, 17 Wend. 541, it is said of the statute in relation to forgery, that "it was made to protect men in the enjoyment of their property, and, if the instrument can by no possibility prejudice any one in relation to his estate, it will not be an offense within the statute." In Jones & Palmer's Case, 1 Leach, 405, Baron Egre said that an instrument, to be the subject of forgery, must "purport on the face of it to be good and valid for the purpose for which it was created." See also on this point, King v. Moffat, 2 Leach, 483; Smith v. Hunt, 13 Ohio St. 260; Carney v. Hopple's Heirs, 17 Ohio St. 39; Perdue v. Aldridge, 19 Md. 290.

THE English law journals are severely criticising a growing habit in the judges of that country, of interrupting counsel during the course of their arguments, and making comments upon the acts and sayings of other judges and courts. "No case is heard in the present day," says the Law Times, "without an amount of judicial interposition unVol. 4.- No. 23.

recalls a former chancellor's advice to judges, which it thinks must have passed out of memory in modern judicial quarters: "Patience and gravity of bearing," says Bacon in one of his essays, "is an essential part of justice; and an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to find that which he ought to have heard in due time from the bar; or to show quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence or counsel too short, or to prevent information by questions, though pertinent. The parts of a judge in hearing are four,-to direct the evidence; to moderate length, repetition, or impertinency of speech; to recapitulate, select, and collate the material points of that which hath been said; and to give the rule of sentence. Whatsoever is above these is too much, and proceedeth either of glory and willingness to speak, or of impatience to hear, or of shortness of memory, or of want of a stayed and equal attention. Let not the counsel at the bar chop with the judge, nor wind himself into handling of the cause anew after the judge hath declared his sentence; but on the other side, let not the judge meet the cause half way, nor give occasion to the party to say his counsel or proofs were not heard." The Law Times is of opinion that the reporters have a very responsible duty to perform in preventing reckless conversation from the bench from reaching the public eye.

WE HAVE received a number of inquiries from lawyers and others in regard to the following paragraph, which has been going the rounds of the country press:

Judge Field, of the United States Supreme Court, decided not long since that legal notices required by law to be printed in certain localities could not be published in a paper having a patent outside. The law required that notice of surveys should be printed in the paper nearest the land; and a notice was published in a paper, one side of which was printed in San Francisco, when the land was near Santa Barbara, which, the judge held, did not satisfy the law. He said a paper was published from the office at which it was first printed for circulation, no matter where it was sent afterward to be distributed.

We understand that some such a decision was rendered by Judge Field at circuit; but at the present writing we have not seen the decision, and have no means of knowing its exact scope. This much we feel warranted, however, in saying; that the newspapers who do not use what are termed "patent outsides," deceive themselves if they think the courts of the country are going to lay down such a principle. The ruling which Judge Field is said to have rendered may have been a correct one under the statute which governed that particular case; but it certainly would not be good under the statute of this state. If a newspaper is published within a particular county, that is, issued from a post-office within that county for circulation, and if that part of such a paper which relates to local affairs is collected and edited there, it can make no possible difference that one side of

the paper was printed outside of the county, as, for instance, in St. Louis or Chicago. Papers thus printed are superior in all respects to the ordinary country newspapers which are got up entirely at home, and, being superior, they are able to command a larger circulation, and are better mediums for the publication of legal notices. The AttorneyGeneral of Missouri has, we understand, given an opinion, that the publication of a legal notice within a paper printed upon a patent outside is a good publication; and, unless there is something peculiar in the statute, to suppose that the courts will hold otherwise, is to assume that they will divest themselves of common sense, and shut their eyes to the progress of the age.

A NEW ZEALAND court was recently rather puzzled by the following combination of circumstances: One McKay was charged before a magistrate with rape. The evidence of the prosecutrix and her witnesses established the commission of the offense. The prisoner being remanded for a few days, on his being again brought before the magistrate, it was found that since the previous examination of the witnesses he had married the prosecutrix. He was, however, committed for trial to the ensuing sittings of the supreme court. The assize judge, in charging the grand jury, found great difficulty in deciding whether or not the case should go to the jury for the purpose of their finding a bill. Though subsequent assent would, he thought, be very strong evidence that she was not altogether unwilling in the first instance, still, if the crime had been committed, the fact that the woman had forgiven it and married the offender could not do away with the crime. The crime had been committed against the public, and it was not in the power of a private person to condone it. A murdered man, in his dying moments, may forgive his murderer; but the murderer, if convicted, will be hanged notwithstanding. Another difficulty presented itself in regard to the evidence. The common-law rule is, that neither husband nor wife are competent witnesses for or against each other in criminal cases; but it has been held that the wife is a competent witness against her husband in respect of any charge that affects her liberty or person. The peculiarity here was, the marriage occurred subsequently to the offense. The case most nearly resembling it was where a woman had been forcibly carried away and married. There the better opinion seems to be that, notwithstanding the marriage is valid, and has been ratified by subsequent cohabitation, the wife is a competent witness. Lord Hale, however, in such a case, was of opinion that, had the woman lived with the man for any considerable time, and assented to the marriage by a free cohabitation, she should not be admitted as a witness against her husband. After a lengthy consideration of the case, and having examined the wife on the voir dire, the judge held that her evidence was inadmissible, and the prisoner was thereupon discharged.

A PERSON who has no interest in another's life can not purchase or take by assignment an insurance policy on such life. It is against public policy, and not authorized by law. This principle has been recently applied by the Supreme Court of Kansas to the case of The Missouri Valley Life Insurance Company v. Sturges. The facts of the case, so far as it is necessary to state them, were substantially as follows: On March 16th, 1870, one Haynes procured from the defendant an insurance policy on his own life for the sum of $2,000. The premiums were made payable quarterly on the 16th days of March, June, September and December of each year during the continuance of said policy, and the amount of each premium was $37.58. On May 8th, 1872, Haynes assigned said policy to the plaintiff Sturges, who had no interest in the life of Haynes. The insurance company assented to said assignment. The plaintiff Sturges afterwards paid the premiums on said policy. On January 30th, 1873, Haynes died, and Sturges brought action against the company on the policy. The court held that he could not recover. In the case of Ruse v. The M. B. L. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 516, it is said, that "a policy obtained by a party who has no interest in the subject of insurance is a mere wager policy;" and "policies without interest, upon lives, are more pernicious and dangerous than any other class of wager policies; because temptations to tamper with life are more mischievous than incitements to mere pecuniary frauds." Mr. May says, in his work on Insurance, that "all the objections that exist against issuing a policy to one upon the life of another, in whose life the former has no insurable interest, exist against his holding such policy by mere purchase and assignment from another. In either case the holder of such policy is interested in the death, rather than in the life, of the insured. The policy of the law forbids such speculations based on the continuance of human life. It will not uphold a practice which incites danger to life, and it substantially declares that no one shall have any claim under a policy upon the life of another, in whose life he had no insurable interest at the time he acquired the policy, whether the policy be issued to him directly from the insurer, or whether he acquired the policy by purchase and assignment from another. If he may purchase a policy on the life of another, in whose life he has no interest, as a mere speculation, the door is open to the same practice of gambling, and the same temptation is held out to the purchaser of the policy to bring about the event insured against, as if the policy had been issued directly. It is, in fact, an attempt to do indirectly what the law will not permit to be done directly." There are a large number of cases holding that, in order to enable any person to procure an insurance policy on the life of another, such person must have an insurable interest in the life of such other; and it has even been held that such interest must, in some sense. be pecuniary, and not founded merely

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upon relationship. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Patrick Hogan, Supreme Court of Illinois, 3 Cent. L. J. 817. In this case the policy was issued to John Hogan, on his own life, for the benefit of his son, Patrick Hogan, who had no pecuniary interest in his father's life, and it was therefore held that the son had no insurable interest in his father's life, and therefore that he could not recover on the policy after his father's death. The case of The Franklin Insurance Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, is identical with the case at bar, in all its essential particulars. In that case Cone procured an insurance policy on his own life, and then, with the consent of the company, assigned said policy to Hazzard, who had no interest in Cone's life. The court held that Hazzard could not recover on the policy after Cone's death.

THE Court also referred to the case of The State v. Winner, decided by it at a previous term, and not yet reported. The facts which were disclosed there sufficiently show the wisdom of the rule adopted by the courts in these cases. Two persons, named respectively McNutt and Winner, in pursuance of a previous design and arrangement, procured an insurance policy on the life of McNutt for the sum of $5,000, in the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and then, in order to make it appear that McNutt had been subsequently murdered by robbers, and thereby that the insurance money had become due, killed one Seiver, on December 25th, 1873, at Wichita, Kansas. Seiver arrived at Wichita about the midnight of December 24th of the year last named, to work for Winner and McNutt, who were then partners in the painting business at Wichita. The last-named parties met him at the train, took him immediately to their rooms, and, after having stupefied him with whisky and laudanum, set the building on fire and burned him to death, and so burned the body that it was past recognition. This was done so as to lead people to believe that McNutt had been killed, and that the lifeless body of Seiver was that of McNutt. McNutt immediately left the state secretly, and went to an obscure village in Ray County, Mo., and there shaved off all his whiskers, colored his hair, and changed his name, so as to be unknown. Winner remained at Wichita, and gave out that McNutt and himself were alone in their rooms on the night of the 25th of said December; that they were there attacked by robbers; that he (Winner) was badly injured and McNutt killed, and that the lifeless body found in the burning building was that of his partner McNutt. Afterwards both of the parties were arrested, and in 1874 were convicted of murder in the first degree, for the homicide of Seiver. Winner took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas, and, at the July term of the court for 1876, the judgment was affirmed. Both MeNutt and Winner are now confined, under sentence of death, in the penitentiary of the State of Kansas.

THE Vacancies in the Federal Courts, caused by the death of Judge Emmons and the resignation of Judge Davis, are still unfilled.

THE LIEN OF A TAX AGAINST REALTY AND PERSONALTY.

Is a tax assessed against an individual or a corporation in respect of personal property a lien upon such property, without the aid of an express statute or constitutional provision making it such? And if so, is it a lien which is paramount to all other liens of private persons or corporations, irrespective of the date at which it attaches? An examination of the adjudicated cases bearing upon this question will, we think, show that, while the weight of authority is that a tax is not a lien even upon real property without the aid of an express statute or constitutional provision making it so, there are cases to be found in conflict with this principle. But an extensive and diligent search through the English and American cases shows that no such doctrine in respect to the character of a tax laid upon personalty, has ever been suggested.

The fact that many statutes, both in England and the United States, declare taxes to be a lien upon property, real and personal, in particular cases, would seem to indicate that taxes do not constitute such a lien at common law. Several excise acts in England, such as the 7th and 8th Geo. IV., cap. 53, and 3 Geo. IV, cap. 95, § 10, gave the king a lien upon the goods and chattels of the subject for the payment of his duties; but where no such statute existed, the English books contain many cases where the king's debt gave way before the subject's lien, and where the subject's prior lien ousted the subsequent lien of the king. In these cases the debts in question were not the king's private debts, but portions of the public revenue. It is true that the king had, in certain instances, in the collection of his debts a right of preference over the subject; but in modern times the king's own court of revenue, the Court of Exchequer, had limited his prerogative until it was confined merely to this; that if the king's execution and the subject's execution came into the hands of the same sheriff, the king's execution should be preferred, and the king should be first paid out of the money made by the sale of the debtor's goods, unless the goods had been sold under the subject's execution before the king's execution reached the hands of the sheriff. Rex. v. Stoper, 1 Price, 614; Butler v. Butler, 1 East, 238; Swain v. Morland, 1 B. & B. 37; s. c. 3 Moore, 740. But the reports of the Court of Exchequer contain many cases in which the king's extent, the writ by which the debts of the Crown were levied upon the property of the subject,—was postponed to liens raised by contract or by the operation of the common law in favor of the subject. Thus, an equitable mortgage, created by the delivery of title-deeds, created a lien which was preferred before the debt of the Crown, although the king's debt accrued in consequence of the mortgagor having been a defaulter in the collection of the king's revenue. Casberd v. The Attorney-General, 6 Price, 411. "If," said Lord Chief Baron Richards, in delivering the judgment of the court in this case, "we find that the plaint

iffs are equitable mortgagees, of course they are entitled to be paid before the Crown, if their title is in point of time superior to that of the Crown.”

In the King v. Smith, Wightwick, 34, decided in the Court of Exchequer in 1810, the question arose and was twice argued, whether a simple contract-debt of the Crown would bind the lands of the debtor in the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the king's debt and without fraud or covin. The question arose on an extent and inquisition thereunder against Col. Loft, who had received from the king's paymaster-general a large sum of money for his levy of troops, and who had pocketed it. "The question which arises on these pleadings," said Lord Chief Baron McDonald, "was stated fairly and explicitly to be, whether a simple contract-debt is such a lien or charge upon the estate of the king's debtor as shall bind his lands in the hands of his assignee for a valuable consideration, without notice and without fraud, the debt not having been recorded till after the conveyance." And after an extended review of the precedents bearing upon the question, it was held that it was not, and judgment was accordingly given against the king. So in the case of Rex v. Humphery, McClel. & Younge, 173 (Exchequer Chamber, 1820), it was declared after elaborate argument and great deliberation that the lien which a wharfinger has upon goods for arrears due him as such wharfinger would prevail against the king's extent. The court was "clear of all kind of doubt" upon the question. "The Crown in this instance," said Graham, B., "has no means of coming at these goods but from Emerson (the defendant), and Emerson, having placed the goods with his wharfinger, could by no possibility get at them without paying the general balance. The Crown, by virtue of its extent, succeeded to the interest of Emerson. The utmost length to which you can carry its right is to consider that the interest of the debtor had been assigned to it; that is always the assumption that is made in these extents; the deed is considered as quasi assigned. Then, is not the necessary consequence of the Crown standing in the place of the debtor this,-that it can have nothing more than he had? You can not carry a stream higher than its fountain-head. You can not make a derivative title mount higher than the title from which it is derived; and the Crown can have nothing more assigned to it than what Emerson (the debtor) had the power of assigning. What is that? His interest in the goods subject to Humphery's claim. The Crown had the right of taking these goods out of the wharfinger's possession on terms of paying him his balance. It is the duty of a court of justice to advise the king to do what is just and right. * Now it would appear to me to be a perfect injustice to decide against this defendant; for what was the situation of Humphery (the wharfiinger) before this extent issued? He had a double security; he had the personal claim against Emerson, and, what is infinitely better, a security by pledge; for I can not distinguish this case from that of a pledge, the

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law of which is perfectly clear. It is plain he has a double security-the personal security against the bankrupt (Emerson), and the more substantial security of the actual possession of the goods. Shall it be said, then, that the Crown, by virtue of any privilege, shall be enabled to take from this man his better security, namely, these goods, and drive him to the doubtful security of a claim against a ruined man? It would be a downright act of injustice, and I hope I have the concurrence of the rest of the court in saying so." So in King v. Lee, 6 Price, 369 (Court of Exchequer, 1819), it was distinctly decided that factors, to whom goods had been sent for sale and who had accepted bills of exchange drawn on them by their principal to the amount of their value, had a lien on such goods and their purchase-money, available against the Crown, where the goods or money had been seized by the sheriff under an extent against the principal for a debt due to the Crown. A somewhat singular illustration of the doctrine that the king's title was, under an extent, merely a derivative title from that of his debtor, is afforded by the case of King v. Tapping, McClel. & Younge, 544. A lease contained a clause of re-entry in case the term of years granted should be extended or taken in execution. Before the end of the term the sheriff entered the premises under a writ of extent against the lessees, at the suit of the Crown, held an inquisition and seized the lessees' interest in the land. It was held, first, that this proceeding was a taking in execution within the latter clause of the conditions of the lease, and that the term was thereby determined, and forfeited to the lessor, and second, that, though the Crown had a lien which would attach from the teste of the extent, it was only commensurate with the interest of its debtors, and this interest having been determined by the taking in execution the Crown's title was determined by the same event.

The cases where the subject's lien prevailed over the debt of the king were, of course, cases of bona fide liens. Where fraud intervened, or where the person claiming the lien had been guilty of a clear violation of duty, and was therefore unable to come into court with clean hands, he was not allowed to set up his lien against the king. Such was the case of Broughton v. Davis, 1 Price, 216, where the king was allowed a preference over an equitable mortgagee expressly upon these grounds.

From the American decisions on the question, whether a tax assessed in respect of real property is a lien upon such property paramount to all other liens, without the aid of a statute, but little aid can be derived. The common law places real property in this respect upon an entirely different footing from personal property, A judgment at common law was a lien which bound the debtor's realty. United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124; Barton v. Smith, 13 Pet. 479; Taylor v. Thompson, 5 Pet. 358; Massingill v. Downs, 7 How, 760. But it has no such effect upon the debtor's goods. Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 179. So the assess