1778. Book V. war, its fortifications had been restored with great diligence; and it was defended by a garrison who availed themselves of all its advantages. The English opened their batteries on the 18th of September, with the fire of twenty-eight cannon and twenty-seven mortars; and carried on their approaches with unremitting vigour; but the vigilance, activity, and enterprise of the garrison, compelled them to caution; and, together with the rains, which fell in torrents, retarded their operations. Towards the middle of October, having pushed a gallery on the south side into the ditch of the fort, having made a breach in one of the bastions, destroyed the faces of the two that were adjacent, and prepared a bridge of boats for passing the ditch; having also destroyed the face of the bastion on the opposite side of the town, and constructed a float for passing the ditch, they resolved to make the assault in three places at once; on the south side, on the north side, and towards the sea, where the enemy had run out a stockade into the water. All the marines, and 200 seamen, were landed from the ships. On the day first appointed for the assault, so much rain unexpectedly fell, as to swell the water in the ditch, blow up the gallery on the southern side, and damage the boats belonging to the bridge. The loss was diligently and speedily repaired. But M. Bellecombe, who had accomplished all that an able governor could perform to retard the fall of the place, resolved not to throw away the lives of the gallant men who had seconded his endeavours, and the day before the intended assault proposed a capitulation. The English, by the generosity of their terms, and the liberality of their whole procedure, showed their high sense of the honour and gallantry of the enemy whom they had subdued. The garrison were allowed to march out with all the honours of war; and, at the request of M. Bellecombe, the regiment of Pondicherry was complimented with its colours. After a delay of some months the fortifications were destroyed. Expedition against Mahé. The French now retained in India nothing but Mahé, a small fort and settlement on the coast of Malabar. On the 27th of November, the question of its reduction was agitated in the Council; when the pride of driving the French entirely out of India enhanced the apparent advantage of the conquest. The difficulties were not inconsiderable: The march of the troops over land, from one side of India to the other, was long and hazardous: The disposition of the native chiefs, through the territory of whom it would be necessary to pass, was not in all cases ascertained to be friendly: The constitution of Europeans would be apt to fail under the difficulties of the march: There was 1779. not shipping sufficient to convey the expedition by sea: It was at the same CHAP. V. time apprehended that Hyder Ali would view the enterprise with jealousy and dissatisfaction; and not regarded as impossible that he would directly oppose it. The importance however, of having no such talents as those of Frenchmen to cope with in India; and of not leaving to them a place to which either troops or stores could be sent, though both Hyder and the Mahrattas had very convenient places with which they would have gladly accommodated them, appeared of sufficient magnitude to induce the Presidency to brave all dangers in undertaking an expedition against Mahé. Towards the end of December, it was planned, that the European portion of the expedition should be conveyed by sea; that the Sepoys should march over land; that they should rendezvous at Anjengo; and Colonel Brathwaite receive the command. On the 4th of February intelligence was received at Madras, of the disaster sustained by the army of Bombay, on its march to Poona. The danger to which this event might expose the expedition, now on its way to Mahé, underwent deliberation in the Council; but the confession of weakness, which would be implied in the recall of the troops, and the supposed importance of accomplishing the object in view, decided the question in favour of perseverance. Intelligence of the resolution of Hyder to resent the attack produced a hesitation; and the importance was discussed of gaining the friendship of that powerful chief by renouncing the enterprise; but after a short suspension, the design was resumed; and Colonel Brathwaite was instructed to anticipate resistance by velocity of completion. The expedition encountered far less difficulty than there was reason to expect: No opposition was made to the march: The fleet and the troops arrived safely at the place of rendezvous: And Mahé, which was strongly situated, but totally destitute of supplies, surrendered on the 19th of March before a cannon was fired. It was occupied by the English till the 29th of November, when, Colonel Brathwaite's detachment being ordered to Surat to reinforce General Goddard, the fort was blown up.* Before Colonel Brathwaite was enabled to comply with his orders, and embark for Surat, he received a requisition from the chief and factory at Tellicherry for the assistance of the whole detachment. That settlement had drawn upon itself the resentment of Hyder by protecting a Nair chief who had incurred his displeasure. By the influence of Hyder a number of the surrounding Nairs were incited to attack the settlement; which was closely pressed, at the time of the * First and Second Reports of the Committee of Secrecy; also the Annual Register for 1779 and 1782. 1780. BOOK V. evacuation of Mahé. Not conceiving that he could be justified in leaving Tellicherry in its perilous situation, Colonel Brathwaite moved with his detachment to its support. In consequence of the detention of those troops, the Council at Madras resolved to send another detachment to the assistance of Goddard; which were embarked in the months of January and February, 1780.* History of Hyder Ali continued. In 1774, the divisions among the Mahratta chiefs afforded to Hyder an opportunity, which he dexterously and vigorously improved, of turning the tide in his affairs. He recovered speedily the territory which he had lost. He diligently employed the interval of repose which succeeded, in restoring order to his country, improving his revenues, augmenting the number and improving the discipline of his troops. His power soon appeared to be rapidly on the increase; and afforded alarm to the English, who, by their evasion of the treaty of 1769, were conscious of the hatred they had inspired; and were now jealous of a connexion between him and the French. He continued to extend his dominions and increase his power, with little interruption, till the latter end of the year 1777, when the Mahrattas and Nizam Ali combined to chastise him. The Mahrattas, under Hurry Pundit and Purseram penetrated into the Balagaut country, with an army of 50,000 men; but upon the approach of Hyder, who hastened to oppose them, they retreated into the district of Adoni, where they came to an engagement on the 5th of January, 1778, and sustained a defeat. Though Hyder was deeply exasperated against the Presidency of Madras for application for their continued evasion of treaty and refusal of assistance, he was induced by the state of affairs to make a fresh proposal in 1778. Harassed, by the hostilities of the Poonah government, he had been well-pleased to support a pretender in the person of Ragoba: The English were now involved not only in disputes with the Poona ministers, but actual operations for the re-instatement of that ejected chief: And in the beginning of July, 1778, Hyder, through his resident at Madras, made a new overture towards an alliance with the English; offering his assistance to establish Ragonaut Row in the office of Peshwa; and requiring only a supply of arms and military stores for which he would pay, and a body of troops whose expenses he would defray. The opinion of the Presidency appears to have been, that such an arrangement might be useful; more particularly to prevent the formation of a connexion between Hyder and the French: They even acknowledged their belief, that had not the treaty of 1769 been evaded, Hyder never would have sought other allies than themselves. The Hyder renews, in 1778, his an alliance with the Eng lish. * First Report, ut supra, p. 56. 1780. Supreme Council, to whom reference was made, approved in general of an CHAp. V. alliance with Hyder; but being at that time zealous to form a connexion with the Rajah of Berar, they directed a modification of the terms in regard to Ragoba, whose cause, they said, was supported, not as an end, but a means, and a means now deemed subordinate to the successful issue of the negotiation with Moodajee. A friendly intercourse subsisted between Hyder and the French. He had Hyder offended by the exbeen supplied by them with arms and military stores. A number of adventurers pedition of that nation commanded and disciplined his troops. And they were united by against Mahé, a common hatred of the English power. A desire to save appearances, however, constrained Hyder to congratulate the English upon the reduction of Pondicherry. But anticipating the design of attacking Mahé, he gave early intimation of the resentment with which he would regard any such attempt. Mahé was situated in the territory of a petty prince on the western coast, who, with the other petty princes, his neighbours, were rendered tributary to Hyder, and ranked among his dependants. The merchants of various nations, it was declared by Hyder, had settlements, and performed traffic, in his dominions; and all of them, as if they were subjects of his own, he would resolutely defend. To soften his animosity, and prevent a rupture, which the dread of his power, and above all, his apprehended union with the French, clothed in considerable terrors, there was sent to his presence, in January, 1779, a person who, though empowered to declare the resolution of attacking Mahé, should assure Hyder of the desire which the Presidency felt to study his inclinations, and to cultivate his friendship. The messenger was received with but little respect, and the invasion of Carnatic was threatened, as the retaliation for interfering with Mahé. At that particular moment, Hyder was engaged in the conquests of Gooti, of Carnoul, and Cudapah; the former belonging to the Mahratta chieftain Morari Row; the two last to their respective Nabobs, dependants of the Subahdar; and thence was hindered from taking effectual measures to defeat the expedition against Mahé. But the Presidency were now convinced of his decided aversion; and were informed of his intention to make peace with the Mahrattas, for enabling him the more completely to carry into execution his designs against the English. Their thoughts were called to the necessity of preparation; and they saw nothing but dangers and difficulties in their path. The Nabob, as he informed them, and as they knew well without his information, was destitute of money; and as destitute of troops, on whom, either for numbers or quality, any reliance could be placed. Their own treasury was impoverished. And if the cavalry of Hyder 1780. Bazalut Jung, gagement with Book V. should enter the country, neither could the revenues be collected, nor provisions be procured. More alive than they to the sense of danger, the Nabob urged the necessity of making peace with Hyder, by stopping the expedition to Mahé; or, on the other hand, of making terms with the Mahrattas and the Subahdar. Hyder and the So far from attempting to conciliate either Hyder or the Subahdar, the Presi Nizam join in dency formed with Bazalut Jung the arrangement which has been already unless he an- described, respecting the Guntoor Circar and military assistance, and which, in nulled his en- the highest degree, alarmed and exasperated both. The detachment, which the English. under Colonel Harpur was sent to the assistance of Bazalut Jung, attempted to proceed to Adoni, through a part of Cudapah, which Hyder had lately subdued. His troops barricaded the passes; and the detachment, afraid of being surrounded, was obliged to march back and wait for subsequent orders. Hyder not only assured Bazalut Jung, by writing, that he would not permit the English, whom he described as the most faithless and usurping of all mankind, to establish themselves in a place so contiguous to his country, and so important as Guntoor; but in the month of November he sent a body of troops into the territory of that Prince, took possession of the open country, and joined with Nizam Ali his brother, in threatening him with instant ruin, unless he broke off all correspondence with the English. In this emergency Bazalut Jung was constrained to forbid the march of the English detachment; and to request the restoration of Guntoor, as the only means of pacifying his brother and Hyder, and averting his fate. The question respecting the circar came under deliberation of the Council on the 30th of December; when the decree was passed, that it should not be restored. Though its importance was considerable; because situated as it was between the territories of the Nabob, or, more properly speaking, of the English, in Carnatic, and the four Northern Circars, it completed the communication between their northern and southern possessions, and, by placing in their hands the port of Mootapilly, deprived Nizam Ali of all connexion with the sea, reduced him to the condition of a merely inland power, and in particular closed the channel by which French supplies could easily reach him; yet the embarrassment, created in the Council, by the bargain they had concluded with the Nabob, for a ten years' lease of that circar, contributed not less, it would appear, than all other inducements to the resolution which they formed. war with Anticipating a Under the apprehensions which the resentment and preparations of Hyder Hyder, the inspired, the Presidency, at the end of October, had represented to the Supreme Presidency of Council the prospect of rupture with that chieftain, the dangerous magnitude of Madras re |
