and this is precisely your doctrine also, if you distinctly understood it yourself.

On page 264 you say, our love, "considered simply as "love, may be strong or weak, sober or frantic, grave or gay. "All that depends, of course, upon the shape and size of its "own peculiar organs; but its constancy is the concern of an "entirely different faculty, which has a goodly organ of its own "in another region of the skull, and has no more connexion "with it, physically or metaphysically, than smelling has with feeling." All this you are pleased to designate as a strong case of absurdity. But on p. 265, after the observations just cited about love of children, love of parents, love of young women, &c., you continue," With regard to the con"stancy of these attachments, again, that was generally sup"posed to depend partly on the judgment or deliberation with "which they had been formed, and partly on what might be "called the firmness or gravity of the character to which they "belonged."-P. 265. Now, can any thing be plainer than that here you yourself admit the constancy to depend on something different from the affections themselves?-It depends, you say, "partly on judgment," and "partly on firmness or gravity of character:" and, if so, how can you possibly charge the Phrenologists with absurdity for saying, that constancy in love depends on Adhesiveness, acting along with Intellect, directing it to proper objects, and with Firmness, which produces steadiness or gravity of character? Does it not afford a strong presumption in favour of Phrenology, that, whenever you write sense concerning the mind, you fall, by inevitable necessity, and altogether unknowingly to yourself, into an exact accordance with its doctrines? Will you favour me by now reading p. 266 of the Review, commencing at the top, and ending two-thirds down? That passage certainly carries a sting; but if it does not prick its author, it is innocuous; for it has not touched the Phrenologists.

Memory is the next topic of your animadversions. You maintain that there is such a thing as a good memory in general;" and are very severe upon the phrenological theory of this function of the mind. Your doctrines, however, are so utterly disowned by experience and disproved by

facts, that I reckon it a mere waste of words to refute them. The phrenological doctrine is, that Memory is merely a mode of activity of the various intellectual faculties; it "implies a new conception of impressions previously received, " attended with the idea of past time, and consciousness of their "former existence, and it follows the order of the events as they happened in nature. Each organ will enable the mind to re"call the impressions which it served at first to receive. Thus, "the organ of Tune will recall notes formerly heard, and give "the memory of music. Form will recall figures formerly "observed, and give the memory of persons, of pictures, or of crystals, and produce a talent for becoming learned in matters "connected with such objects. Individuality will give the memory of facts, and render a person skilled in history, both na"tural and civil. A person in whom Causality is powerful "will possess a natural memory for metaphysics. Hence, there may be as many kinds of memory as there are Knowing and Reflecting Organs. As the recollection of facts and occur"rences is what is commonly meant, in popular language, by a great memory, individuals so gifted will generally be found "to possess a good development of Individuality, and probably "of Language to express them."-System of Phrenology, p. 393.

I presume you are aware that Dr Thomas Brown, no mean authority in metaphysics, has done away with Memory as a general faculty, and substituted for it his principles of relative suggestion. As to the organs, again, Dr Watts seems to have anticipated, by a very acute conjecture, the real philosophy of Memory. He says, "It is most probable "that those very fibres of the brain, which assist at the first "idea or perception of an object, are the same which assist also "at the recollection of it; and then it will follow that the meImory has no special part of the brain devoted to its own ser"vice, but uses all those in general which subserve our sensa"tion, as well as our thinking and reasoning powers."P. 18.

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You proceed:" It follows by necessary consequence, that "it is by the nose we remember smells, and by the eye that we "have memory of colours," and you then exclaim, “Can it "really be thought necessary to inquire into the alleged proofs " of propositions so manifestly preposterous?" You might as well have said that it is by the legs we remember a walk. But would any person reading your last remark suppose that the following sentence occurs in the work you are reviewing?"Whatever perceptions or impressions received from external

"objects can be renewed by an act of recollection, cannot depend exclusively upon the senses; because the organs of sense are not subject to the will, and never produce the impressions "which depend upon their constitution, except when excited by "an external cause."-System of Phrenology, p. 262.

You first object against Phrenology, that its faculties are too numerous, and then abuse it because they are too few. The re-statement of a simple proposition in physiology will suffice in answer to all you advance on these topics. Different functions are never performed by the same organ, and hence there are distinct nerves for hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, feeling; and you seem also to have heard of the discovery which Dr Spurzheim predicted before it was made, that there are nerves of voluntary motion apart from those of feeling; and you half admit Amativeness to be connected with the cerebellum. Follow out this principle then, and you will arrive at sound conclusions. There must be a distinct organ for every separate and primitive mental affection, however great or small the number may be. The number and nature of them is determined by the Creator; and even the Editor of the Edinburgh Review makes but a sorry figure in arraigning the wisdom of His institutions. If the same nerve does not both see and hear, neither is it probable that the same part of the brain will feel both Benevolence and Hatred. Whenever, therefore, you are able to point out clearly and definitely, an independent mental principle for which no organ has been discovered, you are certainly entitled to say that the phrenological system is still defective, which, you will observe, we also distinctly admit; or, on the other hand, if you point out a part of the brain which bears no relation in its size to the vigour of any known faculty, you are equally authorised to designate this as an organ of which the functions are not discovered.

You, however, say, that, "If a separate faculty and organ "is insisted on for every separate and distinct perception or idea, (this is your statement, and not that of the Phrenologists,) “we

really see no reason for not having an organ not only for every "shade of colour, but for every diversity of quality by which

"external objects are distinguished-for the smoothness of oil "as distinguished from the smoothness of water-the soft"ness of silk as different from the softness of wool-or the roughness of a second-day's beard from the roughness of "a rough-cast wall. Our thoughtful readers," you continue, "will see at once how deep this goes into the whole theory." In answer, I observe, 1st, That the Phrenologists do not assign a separate organ to each "distinct perception or idea;" the olfactory nerve serves to smell both balm and assafœtida, because both are smells; and the organ of Colour to perceive both "the red of a rose" and "the blue of the sky," because both are colours. Secondly, there is an organ for every real " diversity of quality by which external objects "are distinguished;" for example, there is one organ for perceiving Colour, and another for perceiving Size; and these distinct organs, so far as we can guess at final causes, appear to have been instituted by the Creator, just because the mental affections excited by these qualities are altogether distinct; the notion of the size of St Paul's not being in any degree a modification of the notion of its colour. This may appear to you very absurd; but in point of principle it is not more so than the institution of one set of nerves to move the hand, and another set to feel with, after it is put in motion. Thirdly, you must have had a poor notion of the discrimination of your "thoughtful readers," when you imagined that they could not discover that "the smoothness" of oil is not a different quality from "the smoothness" of water; because smoothness is just smoothness, softness is softness, and roughness roughness, whether occurring in oil, water, or a beard.

On pages 274, 5, 6, you are facetious on the faculty of Concentrativeness; but the whole appearance of absurdity which you have given to that subject owes its existence to your erroneous representation of it. In the System of Phrenology it is stated again and again, that the faculties and organs were discovered by observation, and not invented. On page 77, under the title "Concentrativeness,” it is said, that "Observation proves that this is a distinct organ, because "it is sometimes found large, when the organs of Philoprogeni

❝tiveness and Self-esteem, lying below and above it, are small, "and sometimes small when these are large." The ideas of Dr Gall and those of Dr Spurzheim, concerning the faculty connected with it, are then stated, after which my own observations are mentioned; as these differ from the ideas of Dr Spurzheim it is said. "From this and some other objections of Dr

Spurhzeim, which I pass over without comment, I am con"vinced that he has not correctly apprehended the quality of "mind which I designate by Concentrativeness. This must no " doubt be my fault; but it affords a good reason for not prolonging disputation." The concluding paragraph is as follows: The leading objects of these discussions is to enable "the reader to form an idea of the mental quality, if it be such, " intended to be designated by Concentrativeness, so that he "may be able to decide on the function of the organ by his own "observations. It acts along with the feelings as well as with "the intellect. Abstract reasoning is not admitted in Phre"nology as proof in favour of any organ of faculty; and "I have observed, that, by leading the mind insensibly to "adopt a conclusion for or against particular ideas, it produces "a tendency to seek support for opinions rather than truth, "and thereby retards the progress of accurate investigation. "The function is stated as only probable, and stands open for "further elucidation."-System of Phrenology, p. 84.

Now, in this discussion the only point given out by Dr Gall, Dr Spurzheim, and myself, as certain, is the existence of the organ; and we all state the faculty connected with it as undetermined. Our views regarding the faculty are not so irreconcilable as you seem to imagine; but assuming, for the sake of argument, that they are at utter variance, what conclusion do we arrive at? Does Dr Gall say that his faculty is determined? Does Dr Spurzheim assert that a different power is proved to be connected with the organ, and do I maintain that a third mental quality is ascertained to be situated there? If we did, then you would have good ground for questioning the soundness of our observations and inductions. But the very opposite is the fact-Dr Gall states the function as unascertained, Dr Spurzheim mentions it as " only conjectural,”

In point of fact, it has been shewn in an able Essay in the Phrenological Journal, vol. III., p. 191, that Concentrativeness includes Inhabitiveness, and that there is no inconsistency in the views advanced in regard to this faculty.