compounded of the incipient syllables of the first three words of the writ, Recordari facias loquelam. These whimseys of language are noticed to show the necessity of etymological investigation for estimating the force of words; and they may also show the neces→ sity of etymologists not depending wholly on the knowledge of words in their radical acceptation, but acquainting themselves with the history of their changes; always bearing in mind what etymologists commonly forget, that custom is the law of language, etymology but the commentary, enabling us more clearly to ascer tain what the law of custom is. Mr. Taylor affords a specimen of this forgetfulness in telling us, that a broad family would be as sound an expression as a large family,' because he conjectures that broad is etymologically connected with breed.

This error, too, pervades the whole of Horne Tooke's admirable work, so happily denominated Exeα ПITEρоevla, and so conceitedly Diversions of Purley.' But in him it is not only the source of false reasoning, but the vehicle of personal spleen, of party politics, and of causticity of temper, thus embalmed, with all their foulness, in a book which must live while language lasts.* A citation may be necessary to justify such censure; and it will also elucidate the tendency of that too rigid adherence to etymology which we wish to expose.

Johnson is as bold and profuse in assertion as he is shy and sparing in explanation. He says that right means "true:" again, that it means "passing true judgment;" and "passing a judgment according to the truth of things" again that it means "happy:" and again, that it means "perpendicular:" and again, that it means " in a great degree." -All false, absurd, and impossible.'-Tooke, vol. ii. p. 5. 4th ed. And in the next page he adds,

but seek no farther for intelligence in that quarter; where nothing but fraud, and cant, and folly, is to be found: misleading, mischievous folly; because it has a sham appearance of labour, learning, and piety.' And all this because Johnson had not confined himself to the radical meaning of right, which Tooke had discovered to be derived from rectum, that which is ruled or ordered; though Johnson had explained' his bold and profuse assertions' by neither shy' nor sparing' citations from Locke, Shakspeare, Addison, Bacon, &c. and though his professed object was to explain how words were used by writers generally allowed to be of good authority, not merely how they were originally employed.

6

We are glad to learn that a publication is in forwardness, of a single octavo volume, in which all the etymological information of Tooke's two quartos will be comprised; but excluding the needless multiplicity of examples elucidating the same point; and wholly omitting every trait of personal virulence or political animosity. Horne Tooke's book in its original shape will always keep its place in our libraries; but an abridgment of this sort will be extremely useful for our schools.

The

The same overweening love of etymology is not unfrequent in Mr. Taylor, though exhibited in a different form from that here exemplified ;—namely, in attempting distinctions between words which have in reality no currency in England, but proceed only from the mint of his own imagination, as in the article

and numerose.'

numerous

'The Latin word numerus (he rightly says) signifies not only number but measure: it is applied both to arithmetical and syllabic reckoning. In the one sense it is Englished by the substantive number, in the other sense by the substantive numerus; "the adjective of number is numerous, the adjective of numerus is numerose.'

Now, this is not explaining synonymes, but creating them by his own authority, and without the plea of necessity; for instead of this aukward distinction among the similar endings of numerus, numerose, and numerous, we have already rhythm and rhythmical, to express either the measured melody of verse or the cadence of harmonic prose. Mr. Taylor's fancies are sometimes so pretty, that we regret to find them only fancies; and sometimes so whimsical, that we regret they were ever produced.

Path (he observes) is a footway, where one paddeth;' (by the way he does not here avail himself, as usual, of his northern learning; for he supposes path derived from some etymon left by the Romans in Britain,' whereas it is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon petthian, worn with the feet). Track,' he says, is from the Italian traccia, a hunter's term for the line of footsteps left on the ground by game; the temporary path of an animal:''road is a horse-way, ground ridden upon;' and a street is a paved road (via lapidibus strata), which being most frequent in towns, the word commonly suggests a road passing between rows of houses:' hence we say the track of purity, as if its vestiges were narrow, and evanescent; the path of virtue, as if it were trudged in only by humble natures, the road to power, as if those were lordly mounted who attempt it; and the streets of libertinism, as if where men are crowded, vice is welcome.'

What pity that all this pretty appropriation of phrase has no sanction from the common law (the only law) of language! This is not to direct us to the proper way, but so to cover all with flowers, that we cannot distinctly discern the direction of any. That Mr. Taylor, in common with other etymologists, should sometimes be pleased with an ingenious conjecture of his own, to a degree in which the reader cannot sympathize, is not to be wondered at; but we do wonder that such self-complacency should have led him to a forgetfulness, not merely of delicacy, but of decency, in discussing one of his articles. In works of anatomy, or metaphysics, where every object of physiological research may be expected to be adduced, the reader has no right

to

to complain of the introduction of any topic necessary to the elucidation of these important subjects; but, while following an author in the department of the belles lettres, to come suddenly on the grossest filth, is like meeting with sewers in a public garden. We hope Mr. Taylor will expunge the passage to which we allude, in his next edition; or, if he think the conjecture too important to be suppressed, let him veil it in the obscurity of a dead language, that may show there is something which ought to be concealed, and that those, only, who seek, may find. We could wish also to see the next edition purified from some blemishes of affected phraseology; such as a shire of the heavens,' 'habituality,'' actuality,'' spokenness,' 'maw-wallop,' &c. A writer of real elegance and learning should leave petty singulariNor would we ties to those who are at a loss for any distinction. have him waste his powers in correcting the blunders of the illiterate in explaining the difference between vein and artery; human and humane; sumptuous and sumptuary; astronomy and astrology; general and universal; lie and lay, &c.: this is the business of the pedagogue; and it is trenching on the province of the lexicographer to define envoy, president, plenipotentiary and ambassador; ambrosia and nectar; print, cut, copper-plate, &c. The office of the synonymist is not to expose the gross errors of the ignorant, but to fix the vagueness of classic composition. And for this office Mr. Taylor seems well qualified, by a nicely discriminating perception of the shades of meaning superinduced by custom, even where the ground of etymology is the same; and by a competent knowledge of languages where their assistance is required especially of those northern dialects which form the warp and the woof of English, and on which the flowers of Greece and Rome have been embroidered. In our own tongue he is master of all its powers; truly conveying that strong and distinct view of objects to others, in which his perspicacity exhibits them to himself. A few examples will justify our opinion, and enter

tain our readers.

'To uncover, to discover, to detect: to uncover is Saxon, to discover is French, and to detect is Latin, for the same action of removing a cover; but to uncover is merely to take off the covering; to discover is to lay bare that which was covered; and to detect is to lay bare that which the covering was to have concealed. To uncover a bed: to discover a person in the bed: to detect a person who ought not to be in the bed.'

Effective, efficient, efficacious; effectual. Causes, which have usually a share in producing a given effect, are called effective; which have actually a share, are called efficient; which have a large share, are called efficacious; which have a decisive share, are called effectual.'

These

These are examples of just distinction, where etymology, alone, would have produced nothing but confusion. The following are examples where etymology alone could have enabled the author to have so accurately estimated the relative forces of the words

'Distinction, diversity, difference, discrimination:-separation, by the touch (dis and tango) makes a distinction; by turning apart (dis and verto) makes a diversity; by carrying asunder (dis and fero) makes a difference; by affixing a mark (dis and crimen) makes a discrimination. Distinction, therefore, is applied to delicate variations; diversity to glaring contrasts; difference to hostile unlikeness; and discrimination to formal criticism.'

• Attractions, allurements. Attractions draw (ad and trahere), allure. ments beckon (ad and leurrer), toward the possessor: attractions are natural, and allurements are contrived, invitations. The attractions of beauty. The allurements of coquetry.'

When etymology gives no light of its own, it may reflect it from history :

To recall, to repeal, to revoke, to call back. To recall is English, to repeal is French (rappeler), and to revoke is Latin (revocare), for the same idea to call back. Our conversation is English; we recall our directions to servants, and other family arrangements. Our laws are French; we repeal acts of parliament, and exiles of the state. oratory is Latin; we revoke a panegyric, a denunciation, a promise, or a threat. To repeal is legally, and to revoke is solemnly, to recall. We recall things, we call back persons.'

Our

The reader, while admitting the general accuracy of this comparative statement, will probably have observed how etymology has misled the author, in saying we repeal exiles of the state;' for though some of our old writers, who affected learned diction, (and one of the most notorious of these was Shakspeare,) may be cited in defence of the expression, yet it is not modern English. And though the last-quoted distinction be generally just, it ought to have been qualified: for though we usually recall things, we sometimes recall a messenger; and though we usually call back persons, we sometimes call back a promise or assertion. Of the terse distinctions of Mr. Taylor we must confine ourselves to one example:

• Honour, glory, fame. A love of honour is the pursuit of that contiguous praise which raises us in the value of those with whom we associate a love of glory is the pursuit of that diffusive praise which raises us in the value of the community to which we belong a love of fame is the pursuit of that lasting praise which raises us in the value of successive generations of men. The voice of honour is loud sounding; of glory, far sounding; of fame, long sounding.'

Mr. Taylor has contrived, by elegant ingenuity of illustration, sometimes to clothe even the dry bones of philology with beauty.

The

The following is given to exemplify the distinction of 'clock and dial,' (which, by-the-bye, a synonymist had nothing to do with,) but would have served better to elucidate the difference of annalist and historian :

The annalist Muratori resembles a clock; always exact, distinct, complete; his chapter finishes when the year strikes; and he points out the little or the great figures in the area with an equally gradual impartiality. The historian Roscoe has illustrated, but flattered the Medici; his pen, like the gnomon of a sun-dial, notices no hours but the serene.'

We could, with pleasure to ourselves and our readers, multiply our extracts from this work; but we must recollect that another yet claims our attention; and conclude by expressing our hope that Mr. Taylor may be induced to apply, to the further illustration of British synonymy, the powers which so eminently qualify him for the task; and that he will consider as proofs of our admiration of those powers the hints we have presumed to give for their still more successful application.

After having said so much, we are almost afraid to enter on Mr. Crabb's volume of eight hundred double-columned, largeoctavo pages; but the general subject has already been discussed; and we have only to notice how far we think this author has succeeded, or failed, in accomplishing what we have stated to be, in our opinion, the business of the synonymist. The preface teaches us to expect something very superior; the reason assigned for undertaking the subject being, that we have not a single writer who has treated it in a scientific manner adequate to its importance.'

What the scientific manner of synonymy is Mr. Crabb has not directly informed us; nor have we been able to collect it from his practice. If alphabetical order be considered as a scientific arrangement, it is one of the most incommodious that could have been devised; for instead of a general alphabetical index, referring at once to the page where each word may be found, we must turn through the bulky volume, till the word is found in all the dignity of Roman capitals-PREMEDITATION, for example; and when found, another set of capitals is referred to in another part of the volume, FORETHOUGHT; there we are sent to seek FORECAST; and at FORECAST we are desired to consult FORESIGHT; and after being thus bandied about, we are at length favoured with the author's sentiments on PREMEDITATION. Besides this inconvenience in consultation, is that of useless enormity of bulk frequently, for instance, more than half a column is occupied by these lines of Roman capitals; and how often these referees may become referors is alarming to consider. We have heard of an apothecary, in whom the business was hereditary, boasting to his

father