ord, and had remained in the recorder's office from the date of its filing, but was never recorded, nor indexed. It was held that a subsequent purchaser was not affected with notice, on the authority of Barney v. McCarty.

By the Code of Iowa of 1851, Secs. 1211-1216, it was enacted that "no instrument affecting real estate is of any validity against subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which the land lies, as hereinafter provided." The recorder was required to keep

an entry book or index, the pages of which are so divided as to show, in parallel columns, first, the grantors; second, the grantees; third, the time when the instrument is filed; fourth, the date of the instrument; fifth, the nature of the instrument; sixth, the book and page where the record may be found; seventh, the description of the lands conveyed; in the manner following." (Here follows the form of an index.) It was further provided that: "The recorder must indorse upon every instrument, properly filed in his office for record, the time and hour it was so filed; and shall further make the entries provided for in the last preceding section," [i. e., in the index] "except the book and page where the record of the instrument may be found; and from that time such entries shall furnish constructive notice to all the world of the rights of the grantee conferred by such instrument. Every such instrument shall be recorded, as soon as practicable, in a suitable book to be kept by the recorder for that purpose, after which he shall complete the entries aforesaid, so as to show the book and page where the record is to be found." It will be noticed that this statute expressly required the entries in the index (except the book and page of record) to be made forthwith on filing the deed; and provided that "from that time, such entries should furnish constructive notice," etc.

In Calvin v. Bowman, 10 Ia. 529, and White v. Hampton, 13 Ia. 259, the recorder, in indexing a mortgage, inserted in the column of the index intended for the description of the land conveyed, simply the words, "see records," without any description. This was held not to vitiate the record as constructive notice. The same was held in Bostwick v. Powers, 12 Ia. 456, where, instead of a description of the property, the words, "certain lots of land" were inserted in the index. In the latter case it was urged that defendant, a subsequent purchaser, had not in fact examined the record, and that, the notice to him, if any, being purely constructive, the statute must be fully complied with to impart such notice. But the court say: "Whether a subsequent purchaser examines the record or not, he is nevertheless affected constructively with such knowledge as the index entries afford; and if their recitals are of such a character as that they would necessarily put a cautious and prudent man upon inquiry, he is bound to make such inquiry, and upon finding one or more incumbrances, shall be held to notice."

And they proceed to argue that if defendant had examined the index, and found the entry in question, he could not be excused for not turning to the book and page of the record referred to, to see if the instrument affected the property which he proposed to purchase.

But in Noyes v. Horr, 13 Ia. 570, where, in recording a mortgage covering two tracts of land, the recorder entered in the description column of the index the description of only one of the tracts, it was held that the record was not notice to a subsequent purchaser as to the omitted tract. And in Breed v. Conley, 14 Ia. 269, where the index entry described the land conveyed as in a wrong section, township and range, but added the words, "for description, see record," the record was also held insufficient to impart potice. And a fortiori, when there is a failure to index the instrument at all, the record will be ineffectual as notice. Gwynn v. Turner, 18 Ia. 1.

But in Barney v. Little, 15 Ia. 527 (decided the next day after Barney v. McCarty, and the opinion being also delivered by Dillon, J.), the court went to great lengths to sustain a defective indexing of a mortgage, under the act of 1851, as notice to a subsequent purchaser. In that case it appeared that, notwithstanding the express provisions of the code (stated supra) as to the character of the index to be kept by the recorder, no such index, nor any general index, was kept as to mortgages in the county in question for several years after the code took effect; that the mortgage in question, though duly recorded at length in the proper record-book, was indexed only in a separate index kept for that particular volume of records, which index specified only the names of mortgagors and mortgagees, and the page of the volume on which each instrument was recorded. It further appeared that, in indexing the mortgage in question, the page was erroneously entered as 596, while the mortgage was in fact recorded on page 546. It will thus be seen, that, besides the omission to keep a general index-book (instead of a separate one for each volume of records), which is clearly contemplated by the law, the index in question wholly omitted three of the items required to be entered, viz., date of filing, date of instrument and description of property; and gave a fourth and very material one (viz., the page of the record), incorrectly. Notwithstanding all this, the court held a subsequent purchaser, who was proved to have had no actual notice, affected with constructive notice. They say (p. 536): “Assuming the instrument to be one which may properly be registered, the law charges him (the subsequent purchaser) with a knowledge of all facts which an ordinarily careful examination of the records would have made him cognizant of. Having thus settled the rule which is to be applied, the court can not avoid the conclusion that, if the appellants in the case under consideration had made an ordinarily diligent, skillful and careful examination of the records, the mortgage in question would have been discovered to them. In the index they find an entry of

a mortgage from their proposed grantor (Little), to Mason, purporting to be recorded on page 596. Turning to that page, they find, indeed, a mortgage to Mason, but from a different grantor. Reading that mortgage, it would be seen that it conveyed different lands from those which their grantor proposed to sell. This would and should provoke careful scrutiny. The index would be again referred to; and it would be seen that the next preceding entry is of a mortgage to the same grantee, on page 582. It would be found that page 596 is placed between 527 and 582, while all the other figures in the whole index, under letter L, ascend in regular numerical order from top to bottom of the page. To a competent examiner it would occur, that it was much more likely that a recorder should mistake a figure than the name of a party. Between the two pages last above-named, viz., at page 546, the mortgage referred to by the index would have been found, duly acknowledged and regularly recorded in its proper place and order." With deference to the learned court, and to the eminent judge who delivered this opinion, the decision has always seemed to us open to much question, and not to harmonize very well with the companion case of Barney v. McCarty. If the index be held to be an essential part of the record to impart notice (as it unquestionably is under the very special and precise provisions of the Iowa statute), it appears to us that purchasers, examining it, are at least entitled to have the entries therein made correct, as far as they go, so as not actually to mislead and deceive them, or be likely to do so; and that the court went quite far enough in holding (as in Calvin v. Bowman, and Bostwick v. Powers, ubi supra), that the mere omission of an item required to be entered in the index, such as the particular description of the property, would not vitiate, when the index, so far as it went, was correct and afforded the means to an examiner of infallibly obtaining knowledge of the instrument. But for a court to say judicially, when the index contained a gross misleading error, that a careful examiner would certainly have pursued the astute train of reasoning laid down for him in the opinion on the facts of this particular case, and to hold the luckless purchaser ex post facto affected with constructive notice for not having done it, appears to be carrying the doctrine altogether too far. Purchasers of lands in this new country are not bound, at their peril, to employ the most skillful and astute lawyers to examine the records for them. They are entitled to a substantial compliance with the plain and explicit requirements of the law, enacted for their benefit, as to what the records shall contain. Otherwise the recording acts, justly regarded as among the most beneficial laws on the statute-book, are converted into a mere trap for the unwary. The learned court, in laying down a line of investigation for the examiner of the title in question in Barney v. Little, reason backward, in the full light of all the facts as disclosed by the record before them. If they had begun at the other end of the inquiry, without

In an action on an administrator's bond, it is no defense on the part of a surety that he signed the bond on condition that the name of another person should be obtained as co-surety, and that the principal forged the name of such person as surety upon such bond. State v. Palter, 4 Cent. L. J. 85, approved.

Asbury, Cullenden & Cockrell, for defendant in error; C. E. Moorman, for plaintiff in error. Error to Johnson Circuit Court.

SHERWOOD, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court: It is not necessary to review the action of the court, in refusing to set aside the judgment by default, since we do not regard the matter which the affidavits contain as constituting any defense. The fact that the name of Milly A. McFarland, one of the apparent sureties on the administration bond, was forged, or that, when informed of such forgery by the administrator, the principal in the bond, after the acceptance of the bond by the proper officer, she did not inform those who had really signed the bond as sureties of the forgery, can not affect their previously incurred liability, or distinguish this case, in point of principle, from The State v. Potter (decided at the present term and reported 4 Cent. L. J. 85), since in this case, as in that, the bond was complete, and the condition upon which the sureties signed, unknown to the officers, and equally broken; in the former case, by failing to obtain the signature of a certain person as co-surety; in the latter, by a like failure coupled with the forgery of the name of the promised person.

We are unable, therefore, to make any substantial distinction between the two cases, and shall affirm the judgment. All concur.

NOTE. This case is identical in principle with State v. Potter. The bond was signed by the surety, relying upon the promise of the principal to obtain an additional surety. This the principal failed to do; so far, this and the Potter case are alike. The fact that the principal forged the name of the promised surety, made it no worse for the other surety, than it would have been if the name had been wholly left off. The case would have been wholly different, if the principal had first forged the name of one as surety, and then obtained the signature of another on the faith of it, as was done in Seely v. People, 27 Ill. 173; where it was held that the surety so signing was not bound. This last case was cited by Judge Sherwood in State v. Potter with apparent approval, and it was shown to be entirely in harmony with the doctrine there announced.

A TWENTY years' lawsuit is a rather expensive luxury. About twenty years ago, one Edward Roberts brought a suit against James Hill, in the New York Superior Court for $182 claimed by him to be due for goods sold and delivered. Last week the case came finally for trial, when a verdict was rendered for $2,096.58-principal, costs and interest.

COUNTY WARRANTS.

SHIRK v. PULASKI COUNTY.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, April Term, 1877.

Before HON. JOHN F. DILLON, Circuit Judge, and HON. H. C. CALDWELL, District Judge.

1. COUNTY WARRANTS-TRANSFERABILITY.- Warrants issued by counties in Arkansas are not commercial paper free from legal and equitable defenses in the hands of a subsequent holder, but such holder takes them subject to such defenses.

2. WARRANTS ISSUED FOR EXCESSIVE SUM.-Under the legislation of Arkansas, warrants for more than the sum actually due a claimant, in order to make the warrant worth in money the amount of the debt due from the county, are void as to the excess, and may be defended against accordingly. The act of the county authorities in auditing the claim and issuing the warrants is not conclusive as a judicial determination upon the parties.

3. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES the court treated the holders of such warrants as the equitable assignee of the valid legal claim of the payee, or of the holder's propor. tionate share of such claim where several warrants were issued therefor, subject to any payments the county may have made to any holder of a warrant representing a portion of such claim.

4. THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, as to calling in warrants "in order to cancel, re-issue and classify the same," construed.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the

court.

Mr. Kimball and Mr. Rose for the plaintiff; Mr. Brown for the defendant.

DILLON, Circuit Judge, CALDWELL District Judge, concurring:

This is an action upon a great number of county warrants issued at various times and of various classes, by the defendant county. Some of these are warrants that were rejected by the county court, under the "calling in" order of April 19, 1875; some are warrants which were not presented under that order; some are warrants presented nnder that order and rejected by the county court; and some of the warrants rejected, and some of the warrants re-issued under that order, were what is popularly known as "five to one or ten to one" warrants. Upon consideration of the demurrer to the answer, which has been fully and ably argued on both sides, the court rules the following propositions:

1. That the order of April 19, 1875, made under the act of February 27, 1875, (Laws 1875, p. 189), requiring all outstanding warrants and scrip, issued by the defendant county prior to October 30, 1874, to be presented to the county court on or before the 30th day of July, 1875," in order to cancel, re-issue and classify" the same, was unauthorized and void. Following the decision of the supreme court of the state in Parcel v. Barnes & Bro., 25 Ark. 261, the act of February 27, 1875, above referred to, can only operate on warrants issued after that act went into effect. The general law on this subject (Gantt's Digest Laws of Ark., Sec. 614) prohibits such "calling in" orders oftener than once in three years. It is admitted on the record that there was a previous call by the defendant in July, 1873, requiring warrants to be presented by the 1st day of October, 1873; and the above-mentioned order of April 19, 1875, was within that period. For these reasons we hold that the order of April 19, 1875, was beyond the authority of the county court and void. We feel more assured of the correctness of this conclusion, since the

counsel for both parties conceded that this was the true view; at all events it was not seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the county.

2. It results as a corollary from the foregoing proposition, that the legal rights of the holders of county warrants, issued prior to October, 30, 1874, were in no manner affected by the order of April 19, 1875. All action under it by the connty court was coram non judice, and this irrespective of the question as to the effect of the county court not being in session on the 30th day of July, 1875, the time fixed and limited by the "calling in" order for the presentation of the warrants. Therefore, whether the holders of warrants, issued prior to October 30, 1874, failed to present them under the order of April 19, 1875, or presented them and they were rejected, or presented them and received re-issued warrants,—their rights are in no wise affected by what was done under that order. They were not bound to present them under that order; the county, by virtue of that order, had no legal power to reject them; and the warrants re-issued under that order derived no validity from the order of re-issue, which they did not before possess.

3. As to "five to one" or "ten to one " warrants socalled. In many cases the county court (according to the answer, which is to be taken as true on the demurrer), for legal fees to county officers the amount whereof was definitely fixed by statute, and for the support of paupers, and for work and labor in respect of matters which were county charges, issued warrants for five or ten times the legal fees of the officers, or the money or currency value of the support of the paupers or work and labor done for the county.

The reason for this was the depreciation of warrants and the corresponding difference between money and warrants. The statute of this state, at the time the warrants were thus issued, contained the following provisions applicable to this question:

"SEC. 601. It shall be unlawful for any board of supervisors to allow any greater sum for any account, claim, demand, or fee-bill against the county, than the amount actually due thereon, dollar for dollar, according to the legal or ordinary compensation for services rendered, materials furnished, salaries or fees of offcers, or to direct the issuance of county warrants upon such accounts, claims, demands, or fee-bills, for more than the actual amount so allowed, dollar for dollar.

"SEC. 602. Before any account, claim, demand, or fee-bill shall be allowed by any board of supervisors, said board shall require the person or persons, or their legal representatives, claiming the same to be due, to attach to said account, claim, demand, or fee-bill, an affidavit that the same is just and correct, and that no part thereof has been previously paid; that the services charged for, or materials furnished, as the case may be, were actually rendered or furnished, and that the charge made therefor does not exceed the amount allowed by law, or customary charges for similar services or materials, dollar for dollar; which account, claim, demand, or fee-bill, together with the affidavit thereto, shall be filed with the county clerk, and kept in his office for the term of ten years, and the same shall be subject to inspection by any member of the grand jury of the county, at each term of the circuit court, or by the prosecuting attorney of the circuit.

"SEC. 603. In all cases the board of supervisors shall require an itemized account of any claim presented to them for allowance, sworn to as required by the preceding section, and may in all cases require satisfactory evidence, in addition thereto, of the correctness of the account, and may examine the parties and witnesses on oath touching the same, and shall have power to compel the production of all books, accounts, papers or

documents which may be necessary in the investigation of any matter coming properly before them and within their jurisdiction.

SEC. 604. Boards of supervisors are hereby prohibited from auditing and allowing to any officer any fee or allowance not specifically allowed such officer by law; and in no case shall constructive fees be allowed to or paid officers by any county of this state.

"SEC. 605. Whenever any allowance shall be made by a board of supervisors, and an order therefor entered upon the records, the county clerk shall, when requested by the person in whose favor such allowance has been made, issue a warrant for the amount of such allowance, which warrant shall be in the following form: " (Here follows the form of the warrant.)

It is our opinion that the effect of this legislation is to prohibit the county from issuing a warrant for any greater sum, than such sum as would pay "the amount actually due" the creditor in money, "dollar for dollar; "a dollar in warrants for each 100 cents of his demand.

It is probable that even without such direct prohibition the county court, unless expressly authorized, would have no such power. And so the point has been adjudged. Foster v. Coleman, 10 Cal. 278.

4. It is insisted, however, by the warrant-holder that the auditing of claims by the county court or by its predecessor, the board of supervisors, and the issuing of a warrant for the amount found due a claimant, is a judicial act and a judicial determination of the question of the county's liability, which is binding on both the claimant and the county, unless reversed on appeal or set aside in some direct manner; and as a consequence, that the liability of the county on warrants, or the consideration therefor, can not be inquired into collaterally or by way of defense to an action on the

warrants.

The statute of this state gives the county court power "to audit, settle, and direct the payment of all just demands against the county." (Gantt's Dig., Sec. 595). The claimant may appeal from the allowance or refusal to allow, but it has been decided that the county can not. Chicot Co. v. Tilghman, 26 Ark. 461.

There is nothing peculiar in the legislation of Arkansas in the matter of auditing claims and issuing warrants therefor; and it has been decided in many states, and repeatedly, that such settlements have not the force of judicial judgments which estop or conclude either the claimant or the county.

Among the many cases on this subject, the following are cited as directly in point. Webster County v. Taylor, 19 Iowa, 117, 120 and cases cited; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; Clark v. Polk Co., 19 Iowa, 248; School Dist. v. Lombard, 2 Dillon C. C. 493; Keller v. Leavenworth Co., 6 Kas. 510; Goodnow v. Ramsey Co., 11 Minn. 31; Dillon, Munic. Corp., Sec. 412 and cases cited; The Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 477. Many more cases might be cited, but it is hardly necessary. The true rule is this: Within the limits of their power as conferred by statute, the action of the county court in determining the amount due a creditor of the county in the absence of fraud or, perhaps, mistake, binds the county; but the county court can not bind the county by ordering a claim to be paid which is not made a county charge by statute, or by allowing more than the statute distinctly limits, or by an allowance in the face of a statute prohibition. Any other principle would ruin municipalities and counties; and the danger which would result from it is well exemplified in this case, where ten dollars have been allowed for one, and where it is said the officers of the defendant county have in this manner issued $400,000 of warrants within a few years, which are yet outstanding.

5. This practice having so long obtained, and these warrants having been issued and passed freely into circulation without objection, they are, doubtless, in many cases in the hands of parties who have received them for value in good faith. Each holder is the equitable assignee of the valid, legal claim of the payee or of the holder's proportionate share of such claim, where several warrants have been issued therefor, subject to any payments the county may have made to any holder of a warrant representing a portion of such claim.

We have some doubt as to whether the holder of these "five to one" or "ten to one" warrants can recover on them even thus far; but under the circumstances we see no injustice which a recovery to this extent and subject to these limitations can work to the county; and it is but just to the present holders of the warrants who may have taken them in good faith and for value;a result which would have been avoided, if the county or the people had promptly stopped, as they ought, this bad business.

Wherever the original claimant could have recovered against the county, there is no inconsistency in subrogating the holder of warrants issued for such a claim to the rights of the payee. And such a principle was in reality adopted in School Dist. v. Lombard, 2 Dillon C. C. 493, by Mr. Justice Miller; for there is no substantial difference in the rights of the parties, whether the county files a bill in equity to cancel a warrant for illegality, or is allowed for that reason to make a defense thereto.

A judgment on the demurrer to the answer will be entered in conformity with these views. JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.

This was a criminal action for fornication and adultery. The cohabiting was admitted and a special verdict found, that in 1873, while both defendants were domiciled in North Carolina, they, with intent to evade the laws of North Carolina forbidding the intermarriage of whites and blacks, were married in South Carolina, according to the forms of the law of that state, and that such a marriage was not prohibited by that law; then they returned to the state of North Carolina.

Upon this verdict, his honor in the court below, Judge Schenck, rendered judgment for the state, and the defendants appealed.

Attorney-general Kenan, for the state. Jno. L. Bailey, Jr. (with whom were Shipp & Bailey), for the defendants, cited: 1 Bish. on M. & D., §§ 371-389; Med

For the report of this and the following case we are indebted to W. H. Bailey, Esq., Charlotte, N. C.

way v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193.

RODMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The defendants in this case were domiciled in North Carolina before and at the time of their marriage in South Carolina, to which state they went for the purpose of evading the law of North Carolina which prohibited their marriage, and they immediately after the marriage returned to North Carolina, where they have since continued to reside.

To quote from the opinion of Lord Cranworth, in Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. 193: "There can be no doubt of the power of every country to make laws regulating the marriage of its own subjects; to declare who may marry; how they shall marry; and the consequences of their marrying." It is not necessary to say that a marriage, contracted in another state between residents of this state without the rites and ceremonies required in this state, will be void, even though the parties left this state for the purpose of evading those rites. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 416. As to the formalities of the marriage, the lex loci will govern.

But when the law of North Carolina declares that all marriages between negroes and white persons shall be void, this is a personal incapacity which follows the parties wherever they go, so long as they remain domiciled in North Carolina.

And we conceive that it is immaterial whether they left the state with the intent to evade its law or not, if they had not bona fide acquired a domicile elsewhere at the time of their marriage. Story Confl. of Laws, § 65; Williams v. Oates, 5 Ire. 535. In Brook v. Brook, above cited, Lord Campbell says: "It is quite obvious that no civilized state can allow its domiciled subjects or citizens, by making a temporary visit to a foreign country, to enter into a contract to be performed in the place of domicile, as contrary to religion or to morality, or to any of its fundamental institutions."

In that case an Englishman casually met in Denmark the sister of his deceased wife, and married her there. As such marriages are prohibited between English subjects, it was held void.

A law like this of ours would be very idle, if it could be avoided by merely stepping over an imaginary line. There are cases to the contrary of this conclusion, decided by courts for which we have great respect. They are cited, and the whole question is learnedly and earnestly discussed by Bishop, 1 Mar. and Div. § 371-389; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193.

It seems to us, however, that when it is conceded, as it is, that a state may, by legislation, extend her law prescribing incapacities for contracting marriage over her own citizens, who contract marriage in other countries by whose law no such incapacities exist, as Massachusetts did after the decision in Medway v. Needham, the main question is conceded, and what remains is of little importance. Nothing remains but the question of legislative intent, to be collected from the statute. About the intent in this case we have no doubt.

a negro and a white person domiciled there, will be held valid in North Carolina when such persons remove into the latter state, notwithstanding that such a marriage is in terms declared void by a statute of North Carolina.

This was a criminal action for fornication and adultery, tried before his honor, Judge Schenck, at August term, 1876, of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County.

Under the direction of his honor, the following special verdict was found, namely: Pink Ross is a negro man and Sarah Ross a white woman. Pink Ross is a native of South Carolina, and resided there until August, 1873. Sarah Ross was a resident and citizen of North Carolina up to the time of the marriage between her · self and the other defendant. In May, 1873, the defendant, Sarah Ross, then Sarah Spake, went to Spartanburg, S. C., for the purpose of marrying the other defendant, and with the intention of evading the laws of North Carolina prohibiting marriages between persons of color and white persons.

The defendants were married in South Carolina, according to the laws of that state, in May, 1873. They lived in that state until August, 1873, as man and wife, when they removed to Charlotte, N. C.

It is argued by the counsel for the state, and the court finds as a fact, that the law of South Carolina does not forbid marriages between white persons and persons of color.

It is admitted that, after their coming to North Carolina, they bedded and cohabited together as man and wife, within two years before the finding of the bill of indictment in the case.

Upon consideration whereof, his honor, being of opinion with the defendants, rendered judgment accordingly, from which ruling the solicitor for the state appealed.

Attorney-general Kenan, for the state; J. L. Bailey, Jr. (with whom were Shipp & Bailey), for the appellees.

1. Marriage must be everywhere deemed to be constituted, when it is constituted by the law of the domicile. There can not be a question about it. 1 Bishop on M. & D. § 355; State v. Patterson, 2 Ire. L.; Morgan v. McGhee, 5 Humph. (l'enn.) 13, as to Indians.

2. His honor finds the law of South Carolina to be the same as to marriage, as that declared in the celebrated opinion of Lord Stowell. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 416.

3. The right of persons to migrate, carrying with them the marital relations legally formed in the coun try whence they remove, has always been recognized by the comity of nations; but in these United States, as between the states, such right no longer rests in comity, but is enforced as one of the guarantees of American citizenship. Const. U. S. art. 4, sec. 2 (1).

RODMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The defendants were indicted for fornication and adultery, in living and cohabiting together without being lawfully married. The cohabitation is admitted. Their defense is that they were lawfully married.

The facts found by the special verdict are these: The defendant, Pink Ross, is a negro man, and the defendant, Sarah, a white woman. Pink Ross is a native of South Carolina, and resided there until August, 1873. Sarah Ross was a resident and citizen of North Carolina up to the time of the marriage between her self and the other defendant. In May, 1873, the defendant, Sarah Ross (then Sarah Spake), went to Spartanburg, South Carolina, for the purpose of marrying the other defendant, and with the intention of evading the laws of North Carolina, prohibiting marriages between persons of color and white persons. The defendants were married in South Carolina, according to