evidence as they may The officers in esti

appointed for that purpose upon such obtain, a different principle comes in. mating the value act judicially; and in most of the States provision is made for the correction of errors committed by them, through boards of revision or equalization, sitting at designated periods provided by law to hear complaints respecting the justice of the assessments. The law,in pre

scribing the time when such complaints will be heard, gives all the notice required, and the proceeding by which the valuation is determined, though it may be followed, if the tax be not paid, by a sale of the delinquent's property, is due process of law.

"In some States, instead of a board of revision or equalization, the assessment may be revised by proceedings in the courts and be there corrected if erroneous, or set aside if invalid; or objections to the validity or amount of the assessment may be taken when the attempt is made to enforce it. In such cases all the opportunity is given to the taxpayer to be heard respecting the assessment which can be deemed essential to render the proceedings due process of law."

§ 320. Hearing not required where valuation is fixed by taxpayer.

The principle, that due process of law in taxation does. not require a hearing, where from the nature of the case it can be of no service, was applied by the United States Circuit Court in Virginia to the case of an assessment of shares in national banks. Under the act the assessment was made upon the market value of the shares as reported to the assessor by the bank, and the act itself fixed the amount of the tax upon this market value, so that the tax bills were self-executing and enforceable by levy. The court said that, as the bank itself fixed the market value and the statute the amount of the tax, the assessor's duty was a mere

ministerial one, and therefore the case was within the principle declared by the Supreme Court in Hagar v. Reclamation District, supra, § 319.1

§ 321. Where amount of tax is dependent on valuation, hearing is required.

But the court said in the California Drainage Case that, where a tax is levied on property, not specifically but according to its value, to be ascertained by assessors upon such evidence as they may obtain, a different principle applies, and hearing at some stage is required. The legislature may prescribe the kind of notice, and the mode in which it shall be given, but it cannot dispense with it altogether. In some tribunal, or before some official authorized to correct errors, the owner must be afforded an opportunity to be heard in respect to the proceedings under which his property is to be taken or burdened, and this must be at some time before the tax or assessment becomes final or effectual, in order to constitute such procedure due process of law.2

While the imposition of taxes is in its nature administrative and not judicial, assessors exercise quasi judicial power in arriving at the value, and opportunity to be heard as to value should be given and is given under all just systems of taxation.3

While this principle that some opportunity for hearing is necessary in taxing according to value, has been declared, it is noticeable that in no case has the Supreme Court declared the tax procedure of a State wanting in respect to the requisite notice and hearing, though numerous cases of

571, 1. c. 580.

1 People's National Bank v. Marye, 107 Fed. Rep. 2 A leading case is Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183. See also Jackson, J., in Scott v. Toledo, supra, § 312, and Field, J., in Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pac. R. R., supra, § 311; Gatch v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa 718.

3 Palmer v. MacMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 669.

alleged want of due process of law in assessment or collection of taxes have been presented to the court.

In several cases however the State courts have declared tax procedure void under the Fourteenth Amendment as wanting in this particular. Thus, in Virginia,1 a city charter providing for an assessment for the city tax distinct from the assessment for the State tax and making no provision for correction or review of the city assessment, and a statute of Maryland,2 requiring distillers and warehousemen to report spirits on hand, which were then valued by the official, but allowing no hearing or appeal, were both held void under the Fourteenth Amendment as wanting in due process of law. A statute of Ohio, providing for the summary seizure and killing of unlicensed dogs, was also held void as authorizing the taking of property without due process of law.3

§ 322. Notice and hearing in inheritance taxes.

It was held in Iowa, that, as realty passing by will or inheritance vests immediately in the heir or devisee on the death of the owner, a law providing that real estate subject to an inheritance tax should be appraised after the appointment of an executor or administrator and the tax calculated on the appraised value, the property to be sold in the event of the tax not being paid by the person entitled to the estate, was unconstitutional as depriving the heir or devisee of property without due process of law, in that it authorized the fixing of the appraisement for taxation without notice or opportunity to be heard.

But the inheritance tax law of New York was held not

1 Heth v. Radford, 96 Va. 272; Evans v. Fall River Co., 9 So. Dak. 130.

2 Monticello Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 90 Md. 417.

3 Fagin v. Ohio Humane Society, 6 Nisi Prius 357.

4 Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290.

open to this objection, as it made sufficient provision for notice and hearing in determining the value of the estate.1

§ 323. Opportunity for rehearing or appeal to courts not required in valuation.

In some States, as in New York, the proceedings of a board of assessors or board of review in the valuation of property may be reviewed by certiorari or other form of procedure. The absence of such an opportunity however does not constitute want of due process of law. The taxpayer is deemed to have his day in court in the matter of the valuation of his property, if he is allowed an opportunity for hearing at any stage before the tax becomes final, whether before a quasi judicial board, or before any other tribunal provided by the State for the determination of such questions. It is no objection that the procedure is summary.

Neither does due process of law require any rehearing or retrial. The Supreme Court said in the Indiana railroad cases: 2A hearing before judgment, with full opportunity to present all the evidence and the arguments which the party deems important, is all that can be adjudged vital. Rehearings, new trials, are not essential in due process of law, either in judicial or administrative proceedings. One hearing, if ample, before judgment, satisfies the demand of the Constitution in this respect." It was contended in this case that the valuation fixed by the board was not announced until shortly before adjournment, and that no notice was given of such valuation in time to take any steps for the correction of errors. But the court said that was immaterial, as one hearing before judgment was all that could be asked.

1 In re Fuller's Estate, 71 N. Y. Supp. 40; see also Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, 125 Mich. 487.

2 154 U. S. 426; McLeod v. Receveur, 71 Fed. Rep. 455.

§ 324. Ruling of State court that hearing is required is conclusive.

While a party is entitled to a hearing as of right, that is, it must be given him as a matter of law, and not as a matter of favor, the construction by the State court of the State statute that such hearing is allowed by the statute is conclusive upon the Supreme Court.1 In this, as in other cases, it is the statute as construed by the State court which must deny due process of law. Even where the statute itself makes no provision for a hearing, and the State courts hold that the taxpayer is entitled to it by virtue of the Constitution construed with the statute, the statute and the Constitution will be construed together, and there will be no denial of due process of law.2

§ 325. Personal notice of fixed public sessions of revision boards not required.

The requisite notice need not however be personal. It is sufficient that the board of review or other revising authority holds its sessions at stated times, when parties so desiring can be heard in relation to their assessments. Thus the court said in the Kentucky Railroad Cases,3 that the meetings of the board of equalization were public and not secret. The time and place of holding them were fixed by law, and therefore there was in law both notice and hearing.

In another case,4 involving assessments of national bank shareholders, the court said, 1. c. page 466: "It is true the

1 See Indiana Railroad Cases, supra, § 243.

2 Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 1. c. 334.

3 Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; see also State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, l. c. 609.

4 Merchants' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; American Transit Co. v. Thomas (Colo.), 63 Pac. Rep. 410; Streight v. Durham, 10 Ok. 361.