Mrs. Campbell's death occurred before the commencement of this action.

The court expressed the opinion that the deed contained no reference to the power given Mrs. Campbell in the will, and as she had a life estate upon which the deed could operate, the deed only carried the life estate and, therefore, the plaintiffs, who are the heirs of John P. Campbell, were entitled to recover, and the judgment accordingly was for the plaintiffs.

In examining the questions presented by this case, we may dismiss from further consideration all the parol evidence offered on the trial, of Mrs. Campbell's declarations in regard to her purpose and intentions in making the deed. The inadmissibility of such testimony is so well established that a citation of authorities is deemed unnecessary.

It seems to be established by all the authorities, both English and American, that in the construction of both wills and deeds, where there is both an interest and a power, the decisive question is as to the intent of the grantor or testator. Chancellor Kent says: "In con

struing the instrument, in cases where the party has a power and also an interest, the intention is the great object of inquiry; and the instrument is construed to be either an appointment or a release; that is, either as an appointment of a use in execution of a power, or a conveyance of the interest, as will best effect the predominant intention of the party." 4 Kent's Com. p. 336.

If we are at liberty to discard certain arbitrary rules, which have been established by the courts in England, and followed to a great extent in this country, to ascertain the intention of the donee of a power, and simply inquire, without reference to any rules on the subject, what was Mrs. Campbell's intention in making this deed, but one answer, we imagine, could be made. We might safely say, as Lord Wynford said in the House of Lords, when the Roake case came before it (1 Dow & Clark, 451), that nine hundred and ninetynine persons out of a thousand would say, on reading the deed, that the grantor did intend to convey a feesimple. We might go further and say that the remaining one of the thousand would come to the same conclusion. And it might be further observed, that Lord Wynford's suggestion, that the rules were bad rules, was recognized by the British Parliament, and some of them were abolished by 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 27, in which it was enacted that a general devise of real and personal property should operate as an execution of a power of the testator over the same, unless a contrary intention appeared in the will. 3 Kent, note, p. 332.

The intention of Mrs. Campbell to convey a fee-simple is declared on the face of the deed, and it is manifested by the most solemn assurance known to the law. But Lord Tenterden said, in the Roakes case, that "it is the better course to abide by general rules and principles, and not to be led aside by subtle distinctions and considerations of hardships in particular cases; otherwise one uncertainty will accrue after another, and the end will be inextricable confusion.

Recognizing the propriety of this remark, and not being aware of any legislation on the subject here, we proceed to inquire what these rules are, to what classes of cases they have been applied, and to what extent, if any, they apply to the case under consideration.

In Blagge v. Miles, 1 Story R. 426, the rules applicable to the construction of instruments by the donee of a power are stated to be these: 1. There must be some reference to the power; or, (2) a reference to the property, which is the subject on which it is to be executed; or (3), when the provisions in the will or other instrument, executed by the donee of the power, would otherwise be ineffectual, or a mere nullity; in other words, would have no operation except as an execu

tion of the power. The second of these rules would seem to apply mainly to wills, where there has been a specific devise of lands, or a specified bequest of personal property, which would only be good by reason of a power given to the testator to devise or bequeath, in which case, the naming of the subject-matter of the power is equivalent to a reference to the power itself, and when thus limited, it resolves itself into the third rule. And in regard to deeds and other instruments inter vivos, the property which is the subject of the power is necessarily referred to; and whether the deed will carry the whole estate under the power, or the limited estate which the donee may have, is left to be determined by other rules, so that the third rule stated by Judge Story seems to be a mere reiteration of the second.

The modern English cases appear to rest on a decision of Lord Thurlow, who said that, "to execute the power, it must be impossible to impute to the testator any other intention than that of executing it."

In the case of Doe v. Roake, first decided by Lord Chief Justice Best, in the Common Pleas (2 Bingh. 497), upon a review of all the authorities, and subsequently by the King's Bench (5 Barn. & Cress. 730), and finally by the House of Lords (1 Dow & Clark, 451), it was established that an express declaration of an intent to execute a power was unnecessary.

The judges, however, seem to have held that even if the testatrix meant to give the lands in controversy, it did not necessarily follow that she meant to execute a power which she had to give them.

This position is controverted by Sir Ed. Sugden, whose opinion may be regarded as a very high author. ity, since his work on Powers was sanctioned by him after he attained a position on the bench, under the title of Lord St. Leonards. His remarks are: "The principle attempted to be established, viz., that there must not only be an intention to dispose of the property, but also to dispose of it under the power, was strongly observed upon in argument at the bar of the House of Lords, and the author, who had to sustain the decision, felt himself unable to support the doctrine advanced in the judgment. If the intention to pass the property can be collected, it will pass under the power, although the donee supposed it would work by force of his interest. There is no conflict; he intends the property to pass, and thinks he has all the interest in it, whereas he really has only a power. The intention governs, and the power will support the disposition."

Mr. Chance, whose treatise on Powers was subsequent to that of Sir Ed. Sugden, seems to concur with Sir Ed. Sugden on this point. Referring to Sir Ed. Clare's case, which is a leading authority, upon which all the English courts base their opinions, he observes: "There are, indeed, in the case, dicta apparently to this effect: that if the instrument refers not to the power, and can have some effect by means of the interest of the party, though not all the effect which the words seem to import, still the interest shall not operate as an execution of the power-the intention being thus contravened. It appears quite clear, however, at this day-and a refererence to the authorities will, it is apprehended, show that it has been considered clear for nearly two centuries-that the rule is not thus confirmed; indeed, it may well be asked why, admitting that the intention can be discovered to pass, all the intention should not prevail in the one case as well as in the other? What rule of law or construction would thereby be violated? The above position is not necessary to the decision of the case, and upon looking more closely into the point, the difficulty of the case put in Sir E. Clare might be in clearly ascertaining the intention."

The doctrine in Clare's case (6 Coke R.), though in the main followed in England, and made the basis of subsequent decisions, was, however, modified, or rather extended, by Lord Chief Justice Parker, in Tomlinson v. Dighton, 10 Mod. 36. In that case the chief justice says: "Suppose a woman, seized of an absolute estate for life, with a power to make a lease for three lines or twenty-one years; she marries and then she and her husband join in making the lease, and the husband and wife both die before the lease is expired; here, though the husband in right of his wife, and she in her own, are possessed of an estate for life, and therefore can, as owners, make a lease; and there appears no intention of the parties (imagining, perhaps, that they should outline the lease) that this lease should be made by virtue of the powers, yet, because the lease, supposing it made by them as owners, can not have all the effect the parties intended, for some of it would have, viz-it would be a good lease during the lives of husband and wife, and yet, because it can not have all, it shall be esteemed made by virtue of the power."

Upon this case, Sir Ed. Sugden remarks: "Notwithstanding Sir Ed. Clare's case, an intent, apparent upon the face of the instrument, to dispose of all the estate, would be deemed a sufficient reference to the power to make the instrument operate as an execution of it, inasmuch as the words of the instrument can not be otherwise satisfied."

In the case of Blake v. Marnell, 2 Ball & Beatty, 35, the question was not very unlike the one put by Chief Justice Parker, in Tomlinson v. Dighton. Blake, who had a life-estate in certain lands, was empowered to borrow £1,500 on the credit of the lands. Having contracted a debt to the amount of £744, he executed by deed to his creditor a rent charge for £150 per annum, until the debt was paid. Blake died the year after this rent-charge was made, and the question was whether the deed was an execution of the power, or was derived from the life-estate, and consequently terminated at Blake's death. Lord Redesdale, before whom the case first came on demurrer, observed that "all cases of voluntary executions of power are entirely beside the present case; for when a person voluntarily executes an instrument which may have an effect under a power to charge property, he must demonstrate that he meant to execute that power; but when a person acts for valuable consideration, he is understood in equity to engage with the person with whom he is dealing to make the instrument as effectual as he has power to make it, and whenever that is the case, I do not see anything in any of the authorities to raise a doubt that it shall have that effect, so far as the person executing it has power to give it that effect, and whenever the nature of the instrument is contrary to what the power prescribed, but demonstrates an intent to charge, it shall have the operation of charging in that form which the power allows."

Lord Chief Justice Manners, who finally determined the case, after intimating some doubt as to the rule in Sir Ed. Clare's case, and conceding that Lord Chief Justice Parker's opinion, in Tomlinson v. Dighton, threw some doubt upon it, declares that, "to the cases of creditors and purehasers, the doctrine laid down in Sir Ed. Clare's case would not apply."

Lord Manners observes further: "Where a tenant for life, with power of leasing, grants a lease for an absolute term; there, although he may eventually have an interest co-extensive with the lease, yet the courts have invariably referred it to the power, in order to give complete validity to it, as in Campbell v. Leach, Amb. 640; King v. Melling, 1 Vent. 225, and many other cases that might be referred to. So here the deed provides that the grantee shall have so

much of the rents until the debt and costs are satisfied; this might have been effected in the life of Blake, nevertheless it shall, to give validity to the grant, be referred to the power, and is a good charge by virtue of such power."

The case of Wade v. Paget (1 Bro. Ch. R. 364) is declared by Sir Edward Sugden to be a remarkable case, and, according to his version of it, the inclination of the courts in England, to give effect to a settlement in consideration of marriage (which is a valuable consideration), is clearly manifested. In that case, the power given in the first settlement was not referred to; but the settlor recited that he was seized in fee and conveyed as owner, and yet the power was held to be well executed, because the intention was plain to transfer the fee. Yet it was clear that the settlor did not intend to transfer under the power, because he recited his own seizin of a fee. The result was, as Sir Edward Sugden states, that, if the estate be conveyed, and the settlor's interest will not support the settlement, it will be deemed an execution of the power, although the settlor mistook his power and recited that he was seized in fee of the estate and conveyed it as owner. 1 Sugden, 419.

The result of these cases under the singularly subtle and artificial mechanism of the English settlement law is, that if a person has both a power and an interest, and he creates an estate which will not have an effectual interest in point of time, if it be fed out of his interest, it shall take effect by force of the power, whether referred to or not. 1 Sugden, 418.

If the remarks of Lord Redesdale, and subsequently of Lord Manners, in Blake v. Marnell, are to be understood literally, it is difficult to withdraw the pres ent case from the operation of the rule therein established, as it is clear that the defendants were purchasers for value. But Mr. Chance remarks in regard to the reasoning and decision in Blake v. Marnell, that some expressions occur in that case intimating that a difference might arise according as the parties claiming should be volunteers or not, and he supposes that these remarks were made on the idea that the execu tion of power was a defective one, and consequently courts of equity would always interfere in cases of defective execution, where purchasers were concerned, but not in favor of volunteers. 2 Chance, 1622. Nothing of this,kind, however, appears in the report of the case.

But we may be excused from following these cases, under the English settlement laws, to what we might think their legitimate conclusions, and decline to apply the judgment of Lord Redesdale and Lord Manners, and the Lord C. J. Parker and Lord St. Leonards to the facts of the present case, in view of our previous decision in Owen v. Switzer, and that it will not be necessary for us to assume a comprehension of the intricacies and subtleties of English settlements concerning which Chancellor Kent's observations are forcible and striking. "The doctrine of uses, trusts, and powers," "observes Chancellor Kent, "is the foundation of those voluminous settlements, to which we, in this country, are comparatively strangers, and which in practice runs very much into details embarrassing by the variety and complexity of their provisions. Powers are the mainspring of this machinery. The doctrine of settlements has thus become in England an abstruse science, which is, in a great degree, monopolized by a select body of conveyancers, who, by means of their technical and verbose provisions, reaching to distant contingencies, have rendered themselves almost inaccessible to the skill and curiosity of the profession at large. Some of the distinguished property lawyers have acknowledged that the law of entails, in its recent mitigated state and great

comparative simplicity, was even preferable to those executory limitations upon estates in fee. Settlements, with their shiftive and springing uses, obeying at a remote period the original impulses, and varying their phases with the change of persons and circumstances, and with the magic wand of powers, have proved to be very complicated continuances; and sometimes, from the want of due skill in the artist, they have been potent engines of mischief, planted in the heart of great landed estates. Those domestic codes of legislation are usually applied to estates which necessarily require, under the English law of descents, very extensive and complex arrangements, and which can well bear the weight of them. They seem to be indispensable, in opulent communities, to the convenient and safe distribution of large masses of property, and to the discreet discharge of the various duties from the domestic ties; and the evils are probably, after all, greatly exaggerated by the zeal and philippics of the English political and legal reform

ers."

Conceding, then, that there might be, and perhaps should be, some hesitation in treating the present case as falling within the principle of the cases cited, we pass on to the consideration of the principal point discussed at the bar in this case, in which it is supposed to be distinguishable from the case of Owen v. Swebster.

Mrs. Campbell describes herself as "Executrix of the estate of John P. Campbell, deceased," and signs her name to the deed as "Louisa T. Campbell, Executrix." So far as the efficiency of the deed is concerned, those words are mere descriptio personæ, mere surplusage, and the conveyance would operate as well without them as with them. She had no power to convey as executrix, for no such power was contained in the will. The clause in the will which uses the term, "my just debts first to be paid," would hardly be construed as an implied power given to the executrix to sell land for the payment of debts, since our statutes sufficiently provide for such sales, and the testator had given his wife an express power to raise money by the sale of his lands, to meet family expenses, of which she was to judge, and the decisions in England, and in some of our states, on such a clause, would hardly apply, though doubtless here as well as elsewhere a testator may authorize his executor to sell lands for the payment of debts, and where such authority is expressly given, in a will, it may supersede or be substituted for the specific modes provided by our statute to insure the payment of debts, either out of the personalty or real estate of a decedent.

The fact that Mrs. C., as executrix, had no power to convey, leads to the inquiry why such designation was affixed to her name, both in the beginning and end of the conveyance. It certainly implies that there was a will, of which she was executrix, and that her conveyance was in some way authorized by such will. Whether she was donee of a power to raise money by a sale of land of her deceased husband, as his widow or executrix, was doubtless a point upon which she was as ignorant as the lawyer to whom she intrusted the writing of the deed. She was expressly authorized to raise money for the support of herself and her children, by a sale of any of the lands belonging to her deceased husband. In all these lands the will gave her a life estate, which in wild lands in the interior of Missouri, at the date of the will, might not have been of sufficient value to have attracted her attention. Her intention was obviously to convey an absolute title. A life estate of an old lady in unimproved lands would hardly have been salable, unless under execution. The deed purports to convey an ab

solute title. It refers to the will which gave the grantor this power, though it does not refer to the power.

We think it very doubtful if any reference to the power was necessary in this case, as the manifest intent was to convey a fee simple, but without so determining, and we have no hesitation in declaring that very slight circumstances would justify an application of the deed to the power, and not to the estate (for life) which the grantor had. The reference to the will, though indirect, was sufficient. The judgment is reversed.

NOTE.-There is little which may be added to the careful and elaborate research contained in the foregoing opinion. It will, perhaps, be a matter of professional regret that the circumstances of this case required, or rather permitted, the distinguished judge to hesitate about distinctly over. ruling the case of Owen v. Switzer, 51 Mo. 322. Had such a conclusion been declared, it would certainly have been the logical and inevitable result of the principles upon which this decision is based.

When it is borne in mind that the avowed object of interpretation in all these cases is to discover the intention of the donee of the power, in executing the instrument; and that, in such pursuit, the courts have been crippled by "these arbitrary rules, which have been established by the courts in England and followed, to a great extent, in this country," it will be understood that this case is a great advance in the right direction.

"If this question of intention were to be demonstrated by the ordinary mind, it might be said that the commonest and best way to find out what a grantor intends, is to read what he says, and then credit him with meaning it. If, when holding a life estate, with power to convey the fee, he declares that he conveys the fee, it is only fair to conclude that he meant to do it. Simple and irresistible as ' such a deduction would seem, it by no means follows that it is the universal teaching of the courts, some of which have, for many years, persisted in taking observations of the sun through a smoked glass, upon the juridical theory, that the telescope is rather an innovation.

The doctrine taught by the principal case, as we understand it, is that, where there is vested in one a power coupled with an interest, his conveyance, making no reference to the power, shall be held to pass only the interest, provided that will satisfy the terms of the conveyance; otherwise, the power may feed the conveyance. And hence, that, because a life estate does not satisfy a deed in fee, the power to convey the fee shall be deemed executed.

In Owen v. Switzer, it was held that, although the conveyance might be partially inoperative, if confined to the interest, yet, in the absence of all reference to the power, it must be so construed; at the same time, it is there conceded that, if the conveyance would be wholly inoperative, it would, without reference to it, be held an execution of the power.

The distinction here made between the partial failure and the entire failure, to satisfy the terms of the instrument, making the former to pass the interest only, and the latter an execution of the power, is impossible to be maintained upon principle.

A partial failure to satisfy the terms of the conveyance defeats the intention there manifested, just as an entire failure would; the difference is only in the degree to which the intention is defeated. And where the object is to discover and give effect to the intention to be gathered from the face of the instrument, a construction which fails to give it operation, not partially, but entirely, according to its terms, is illogical, and ought to be unlawful.

The policy of the common law was to take every man's grant, so as to pass such an interest as should be deemed most advantageous to the grantee.

And where the grant is impossible to take effect, according to the letter, then the law makes such a construction, that the gift by possibility may take effect. Coke on Lit., 183 b, 146 b, 301, 302, 313; Van Horn's Lessee v. Harrison, 1 Dall. 148. And in Standen v. Standen, 2 Ves. Jr. 589, it was held, that if there is no other property to answer a part of the terms used, except that over which there is a power, it will be deemed well executed, because it is necessary to satisfy all the words of the conveyance.

The same general doctrine has recently been held by

some of the most eminent American judges. In Bishop v. Remple, 11 Ohio St. R. 277, a testator devised all his property, which might remain after the payment of his debts, to his wife, with full power to have and to hold, to sell and convey, the same during her natural life. In construing a general warranty deed, just such as was under consideration in the case of Owen v. Switzer, it was held, that while the widow might have a life estate, with power to convey the fee, yet the deed was a good execution of the power, although making no reference to it, because it purported to convey the fee, which could only be done by virtue of the power. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have, with some exceptions, maintained the same views. In Miller v. Meetch, 8 Penn. St. R. 417, where there was a limited estate coupled with a power of absolute disposition, vested in an executor, it was remarked by Bell, J.: "Nor is there any. thing in the position, that, as an individual, the executor was, at the time of the conveyance, seized in his own right of a fee-simple in a moiety of the land. Here the deed purports to convey the whole of the tract. This, without more, would be sufficient to indorse it with rigor, as an execution of the power to sell." So Judge Story, in delivering the opinion in Keefer v. Schwartz, 47 Penn. St. R. 503, said: "It is said, indeed, that there must be an intention to execute the power, but the existence of such an intention is inferred from the gift of property, which the testator was incapable of giving, except in execution of the power *** here the intent, that the property should go to the vendee of her executors, is plain, and therefore the intent to execute the power, of which she was donee, is equally plain, if its execution was necessary to give effect to her principal intent."

The true test to be applied in this question of interpretation is very forcibly expressed by Judge Sharswood, in Drusadow v. Wilde, 63 Penn. St. R. 170: "It is only when the words of the instrument may be satisfied, without supposing an intention to execute the power, that it is no execution." J. P. E.

BOOK NOTICES.

REPORTS OF THE LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE CASES, Determined in the Courts of America, England, Scotland, and Canada, down to September, 1876. With notes and references. By MELVILLE

M. BIGELOW, of the Boston Bar. New York: Published by Hurd & Houghton. Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1877.

This fifth volume of Mr. Bigelow's useful collection of Life and Accident Insurance Cases is constructed upon the same plan which we have heretofore noticed in these columns as being peculiar to the former volumes of the series. The cases are arranged under the titles of the several states, according to alphabetical order. Alabama heads the American list, which closes with Wisconsin and the United States; after which come a case from Canada, several from England and one from Scotland. We have before mentioned the respect in which we think this arrangement inferior to that followed by Mr. Bennett in his collection of Life Insurance cases, which is upon a purely chronological order. Less inconvenience will result to the student and the practitioner from Mr. Bigelow's adherence to his original plan, in this fifth volume, than in some of the previous ones; for the cases here collected have generally arisen since 1873 and 1874; though we observe that from two states are here reported cases dating in 1872, from another a case decided in 1869, and from England nine cases out of sixteen here reported date prior to 1873.

In respect to the character and importance of the questions involved in the cases decided, this volume is scarcely inferior to any of its predecessors. The question of the effect of the late civil war upon contracts of life insurance is considered, not only in the Statham case lately decided in the Supreme Court of the United States, the Atwood and Hendren cases from 24 Gratt. 'Va.), and the last instalment of the Hillyard case

from 37 N. J., but also in the case of Smith v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., from this Journal, vol. 1, p. 76, and in Bird v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., not elsewhere reported except in the Weekly Notes. The last named case is an exceedingly well reasoned opinion of Cadwallader, J., in the U. S. Circuit Court for Pennsylvania, in which the question of a revival of the contract after the war is settled, by granting relief in equity against the forfeiture, upon the principle of making of full compensation in money. In Martin v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., p. 514, (from 9. Heis. Tenn.), policies of insurance were set aside as void ab initio for fraud of the insurer's agent in making extravagant promises as to dividends; and this at the suit of the insured who paid the premiums, without making the beneficiaries parties. The late Chief Justice Nicholson in this case declined to permit the Hebrew religion of the complainants to detract from the weight of their evidence.-Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Goodall, p. 422, passes upon the questions arising from a mutual mistake between the contracting parties as to the age of the insured. This is one of five useful cases here reported, decided in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, and which, though previously printed, have not been largely circulated, and would not be likely to reach the general practitioner, except through the medium of Mr. Bigelow's collections of cases. Such facts as these at once justify and approve the plan of these special reports. We observe that a note informs us that an appeal was taken in the Goodall case; and in another note we are told of a reversal by the Supreme Court of Ohio of a second case, and the ground of reversal is stated. But in the others of the five cases named, and in still many others, we find ourselves left in the dark as to whether the decision of the inferior court here reported was final, or was appealed from. We must urge upon Mr. Bigelow the propriety and importance of giving his readers in all such cases the facts that will enable them to judge, whether or not the decisions of the inferior courts which he reports may be regarded as authoritative expositions of the law.

Upon the prolific subject of misrepresentation, a large number of the cases here collected, treat, led by the celebrated cases in the U. S. Supreme Court, of Jeffries in 22 Wall. and France in 1 Otto, where the question of the materiality of the representations is held to be settled by the contract of the parties, and a strict compliance with the statements of the application is required. But these are statements made in answer to questions propounded by the insurer. So the distinction becomes quite interesting, which is made in Buell v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., p. 473, in which the U. S. Circuit Court for Ohio held that voluntary statements of the insured in his application, not responsive to any question, though proven to be wholly untrue, did not bring the case within the rule in Jeffries' case.

The English cases will be found to possess peculiar interest for American insurance lawyers. In several cases, the amalgamation and consolidation of life companies are considered. Green v. Ingham, p. 662, and Alletson v. Chichester, p. 668, are cases where an assignee in bankruptcy of the insured contests the right to the policy with a voluntary prior assignee; and notice to the insurer of the assignment to the lat ter is held necessary to his title. Tredegar v. Windus, p. 700, is a peculiar case. The beneficiaries under a policy filed a bill to have it declared valid in equity, asserting that it had become void at law. This bill was dismissed upon hearing; and afterwards the beneficiaries sued at law upon the policy. An injunetion was granted to restrain the last-named action.

A novel and interesting case is Globe Mut. Life Ins.

Co. v. Reals, p. 308, from 50 How. R. R. (N. Y.), where a policy had been delivered fraudulently by the insurer's agent, without payment of the premium, and during the severe iilness of the insured; and a bill in equity to have the policy delivered up and canceled was sustained upon demurrer.

But we cannot hope to do justice to this volume by any citations of cases which our space will permit. Other points in insurance law, of no less interest and importance than those above referred to, will be found by the careful student.

Of the 117 cases here reported, 19 are from the State of New York alone; a fact which evinces the important position whieh the courts of that state occupy in respect to questions of insurance law, and one which should lead those courts to the greatest care and most studious exactness in their rulings upon the many new points that are controverted in the increasing insurance litigations of the day.

Mr. Bigelow's citations are necessarily made very largely from the legal journals and periodicals; and we notice with pleasure that this journal has furnished him the largest number of such cases; and in many instances the compiler has found his cases reported only in this journal. But our gratification that our editorial note to the case of Russum v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., v. 3, p. 275, was found worthy a place in this volume, is somewhat marred by observing that several very ugly typographical errors, which had crept into that note, by reason of the "total depravity of inanimate things" from which even a printer's case is not exempt, but which we promptly corrected in the next issue of the JOURNAL, have been perpetuated by our friend, and are here embalmed, in all their grotesqueness, in the handsome typography of the Riverside Press.

RECENT LEGISLATION.

MISSOURI LEGISLATURE-SESSION OF 1877.

AN ACT to amend section 2 of chapter 27 of the general statutes of Missouri, entitled "Of County Surveyors."

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. That section 2 of chapter 27 of the general statutes of Missouri be, and the same is, hereby amended so as to read as follows: Sec. 2. The clerk of the county court shall certify the election of county surveyor in the same manner as other elections of state and county officers, and the person elected shall be commissioned by the governor; and in case of any vacancy by death, resignation, or otherwise, it shall be filled by the county court.

SEC. 2. There being now a vacancy in the office of county surveyor in at least one county in the state (Pulaski), this is deemed an emergency; therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 24th, 1877.

AN ACT to restrain domestic animals of the species of horse, cattle, mule, ass, swine, sheep or goat from being herded on land other than that of the owner of such herd, and to restrain such animals from running at large in the City of St. Louis and in the County of St. Louis.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. In pursuance of a notice legally published in the City of St. Louis and in the County of St. Louis, the tenor of which is as follows:

To all whom it may concern: Take notice that we,

the undersigned householders, ten of the City of St. Louis and ten of the County of St. Louis, will apply to the Twenty-ninth General Assembly of the State of Missouri for the enactment of a local or special law to restrain domestic animals, consisting of the species of horse, cattle, mule, ass, swine, sheep or goat, from running at large or outside the inclosure of the owner or owners thereof, or being herded on land other than that of the owner of such herd, in the City of St. Louis and the County of St. Louis, and to provide for the arresting, impounding, safe-keeping and sale of the same when so found running at large or being herded, the redemption thereof before or after sale, the disposal of the proceeds of any such sale, the defining the duties of officers and others under the said law, the fees for such performance and penalties for failure to perform the same. Ferd. Meyer, E. G. Obear, Jas. M. Carpenter, Everett W. Pattison, James B. Geggie, William W. Music, John F. Long, J. E. D. Couzins, Wm. E. Burr, John G. Priest, Wm. C. Kennett, Thomas J. Sappington, B. F. Thomas, H. W. Leffingwell, Wm. T. Essex, H. I. Bodley, A. G. Edwards, Chas. W. Murtfeldt, M. P. Reveley, D. M. Grissom, John Belleville, Henry T. Mudd, Henry W. Williams. St. Louis, February 15th, 1877. It is hereby enacted that in the City of St. Louis and in the County of St. Louis, it is unlawful for any animal of the species of horse, cattle, mule, ass, swine, sheep or goat, to run at large or outside the inclosure of its owner, or be herded on land other than that of its owner, and whenever any such animal shall be found so running at large or outside the inclosure of its owner, or being herded on land other than that of its owner in said city or county, it shall be lawful for any citizen of such city or county to arrest the same and deliver it forthwith to the constable of the ward or township or any marshal of any city or town in which it was arrested, and such constable or marshal shall receive and take charge of it, and it shall be the duty of every constable or marshal of such city or town, upon information given him by any citizen of such city or town, and the duty of every constable of said county, upon information given him by any citizen of said county that any such animal is running at large or outside the inclosure of its owner, or being herded contrary to the provisions of this act in the respective localities to arrest the same, and to take all such animals (whether arrested by him or by a citizen) without delay before some justice of the peace within the jurisdiction of such constable or marshal, which justice shall record the size, color, age, sex, marks and brands and any peculiarity of such animal, by which its owner would more readily recognize it, and when said description is so entered, it shall be the duty of such justice to issue a notice returnable in four days, directed to all whom it may concern, reciting the fact that such animal has been arrested and impounded in accordance with this act, and containing the description of such animal, and that the same will be advertised for sale if not redeemed within four days from the date of such notice, one copy of which notice shall be posted in or near the office of such justice by the constable or marshal, and another copy of such notice shall be served by the constable or marshal on the owner or owners of such animal, if they be known, in like manner as a summons in a civil suit, and another copy of such notice shall be by him delivered to the officer having charge of stray books in his jurisdiction (and be by him immediately recorded in his book of strays), and return such notice to such justice.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of such justice, on the return day of such notice, the same or another notice issued by such justice having been first returned executed by such constable or marshal, unless such ani