Book V.

1773.

The bargain for the de

his own.

cover him. Justice, too, or something not easily distinguished from justice,.
spoke on the same side: Seeing, in the first place, that the Emperor had a right
to the provinces, both in his quality of sovereign of India; and also by the
peculiar concession and grant of the English Company, if not in express terms
for, most certainly in consideration of, his not absolutely necessary but highly
useful grant of the duanee of the three great and opulent provinces of Bengal,
Bahar, and Orissa: And, in the second place, that he could not, by any fair
construction, be deemed to have forfeited any right by the surrender of the pro-
vinces, an act which was in the highest degree involuntary, and therefore not
But these considerations were a feeble balance against the calls of
want, and the heavy attractions of gold. To secure Allahabad and Corah
against the possession of so dangerous a power as the Mahrattas was the
acknowledged policy of the British government; and it was alleged, that the
Emperor was unable to protect them. But it is certainly true, that the
Emperor was not less able at that time than he was at the time when they
were first bestowed upon him; or than he was at any point of the time during
which they had been left in his hands. It is equally true, that the inability of
the Vizir to secure them was just as certain as that of the Emperor; since
there is the confession of the Governor, that he was unable to protect even his
own dominions, without the assistance of the English; and that every exten- *
sion of his frontier rendered him more vulnerable and weak.
There was,
however, one difference; the Vizir could give money for them, the emperor
could not; and in this, it is probable, the whole advantage will be found to
consist. That the English strengthened their barrier by giving to a crude native
government a vast frontier to defend, instead of combining against the Mah-
rattas the forces of the Rohillas, the Emperor, and the Vizir, will hardly be
affirmed by those who reflect how easily the balance among those powers might
have been trimmed, or who know the consequences of the arrangement that was
formed. For a sum of money Corah and Allahabad were tendered to the Vizir.
That he was delighted with the prospect of regaining a territory, for which, a
few years before, we have seen him incurring the infamy and guilt of perfidy
and murder, perpetrated against a near kinsman, we need not doubt. About
terms there appears to have been no dispute: For the sum of fifty lacs of rupees,
of which twenty lacs were to be paid in ready money, and the remainder in
two years by payments of fifteen lacs at a time, the provinces in question were
added to his dominions.

The acquisition of those provinces made an apparent change with regard to

CHAP. I.

1773.

the Rohillas at first con

the Rohillas in the views of the Vizir. If we may believe the representation of the President; whose representations, however, upon this subject, are so full of management and ambiguity, that they are all to be received with caution; the Nabob struction of represented himself unable to meet the pecuniary obligations under which the acquisition of both territories would lay him to the English Company; and cealed from the Council, desired for that reason to suspend his attack upon the Rohillas. It was agreed, and from the however, between him and the President, that whenever the time convenient rectors. for the extirpation of that people should arrive, the assistance of the English should not be wanting. The difficulty of fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company, if they were ever alleged, did not detain him long.

From the meeting at Benares, the Vizir and President parted different ways; the former to the Dooab, and Delhi, to reduce, during the absence of the Mahrattas, some forts and districts which were still held for that people; the latter, to lay before his colleagues, and to transmit to his employers, such an account of the transactions at this interview, as was most likely to answer his ends.

In his report to the Council at Fort William, the President confined himself to the agreement respecting Corah and Allahabad, and the allowance for such troops as might hereafter be employed in the service of the Vizir. The agreement respecting the Rohillas, which it had been settled between the President and Vizir might be conveniently kept out of the ostensible treaty, was wholly suppressed. With a view to the future, it was politic however to explain, that the Vizir showed at first a desire to obtain English assistance for the seizure of the Rohilla country; it was politic also to state the pretexts by which the expediency of that assistance might best appear to be established. Adding, that for the present, however, the Vizir had laid aside this design, he subjoined the following declaration: "I was pleased that he urged the scheme of this expedition no further, as it would have led our troops to a distance;"* though we have it from his pen, that he "encouraged" the Vizir to the enterprise, as what promised to be of the greatest advantage to the Company.

In the letter of the President dispatched from Benares to the Directors, announcing the result of his arrangements with the Vizir, all intelligence of the project for exterminating the Rohillas is suppressed.

Upon the return of Mr. Hastings to Calcutta, he effected an object, of which, from the important consequences, with which it was attended, it is necessary to give some account. The correspondence with the country powers had frequently

*Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 19.

Court of Di

1773.

Hastings allowed by his Council to

agent with the

Nabob of

Oude.

BOOK V. been carried on through the military officers upon the spot. The power thus conveyed to the military, Mr. Hastings had represented as inconvenient if not dangerous; and one object of his policy had been to render the head of the civil government the exclusive organ of communication with foreign powers. He now stated to the Council the concurrence in opinion of the Vizir and himself, that an place a private agent, permanently residing with the Vizir for the communication and adjustment of many affairs to which the intercourse of letters could not conveniently apply, would be attended with important advantages: And he urged the propriety of granting to himself the sole nomination of such an agent, the sole power of removing him, and the power of receiving and answering his letters, without communication either to the Committee or Council. To all these conditions the Council gave their assent; and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, with an extra salary, was sent as private agent to attend the residence of the Vizir, and to communicate secretly with Mr. Hastings.*

Fulfilment of

destruction of

the

the Vizir.

The Vizir in the mean time had made himself master of several places in the Dooab; advanced towards Delhi with a show of great friendship to the Emperor; assisted him with money; sent a force to assist his army in wresting Agra from the Jaats; and having thus laid a foundation for confidence, began to intrigue for the sanction of the Emperor to his intended attack upon Rohilcund. A treaty was negociated, and at last solemnly concluded and signed, by which it was agreed that the Emperor should assist with his forces in the reduction of the Rohillas, and in return should receive a share of the plunder, and one half of the conquered country.†

On the 18th of November, about two months after their interview, the Vizir

Hastings' pro- wrote to the President, demanding the promised assistance of the English for the Rohillas the destruction of the Rohillas. Mr. Hastings appears to have been thrown claimed by into some embarrassment. The suddenness and confidence of the call corresponded but indifferently with the terms on which he had given his colleagues to understand that the communication on this subject rested between him and the Vizir. His abilities in making out a case, though singularly great, were unable to produce unanimity; and it was not till after a long debate, that a decision in favour of the expedition was obtained. The assistance was promised, on the very terms concerted and settled between him and the Vizir; and yet this President had the art to persuade his colleagues, and joined with them in a decla

* Hastings' Report, App. No. 19, ut supra; Letter of 17th June, 1744, App. No. 25. +Francklin's Shah Aulum, p. 54. Letter of Col. Champion; Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 45; and the treaty itself, App. No. 27. Scott's Aurungzebe s Successors, p. 259, 260.

ration to their common masters, that these terms were so favourable to the CHAP. I. English, and so burdensome to the Vizir, as to render his acceptance of them improbable, and therefore to leave but little chance of their involving the English government in a measure which the principal conductors of that government were desirous to avoid.*

1774.

In the month of January, 1774, the second of the three brigades into which Destruction the Company's army in Bengal was divided, received orders to join the Vizir; performed. and Colonel Champion, now Commander-in-Chief, proceeded about the middle of February to assume the command. On the 24th of February the brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizir; and on the 17th of April the united forces entered the Rohilla dominions. On the 19th Col. Champion wrote to the Presidency, that the Rohilla leader "had by letter expressed earnest inclinations to come to an accommodation with the Vizir; but that the Nabob claimed no less than two crore of rupees." After this extravagant demand the Rohillas posted themselves on the side of Babul Nulla, with a resolution of standing their ground to the last extremity. And early on the morning of the 23d, the English advanced to the attack. "Hafez," says the English General, with a generous esteem, “and his army, consisting of about 40,000 men, showed great bravery and resolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets. They made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns, being so much better served than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance; and where they were closest, was the greatest slaughter. They gave proof of a good share of military knowledge, by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time, and endeavouring to call off our attention by a brisk fire on our centre. It is impossible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed. Numerous were their gallant men who advanced, and often pitched. their colours between both armies, in order to encourage their men to follow them; and it was not till they saw our whole army advancing briskly to charge them, after a severe cannonade of two hours and twenty minutes, and a smart fire of musketry for some minutes on both flanks, that they fairly turned their backs. Of the enemy above 2,000. fell in field, and amongst them many Sirdars. But what renders the victory most decisive is the death of Hafez Rhamet, who was killed whilst bravely rallying his people to battle. One of his sons was also killed, one taken prisoner, and a third returned from flight to day, and is in the hands of Sujah Dowla."

* Fifth Report, ut supra, App. Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25.

Book V.

1774.

In passing to another character, the General changes his strain. "I wish," says he, "I could pay the Vizir any compliment on this occasion, or that I were not under the indispensable necessity of expressing my highest indignation at his shameful pusillanimity; indispensably, I say, because it is necessary that administration should clearly know how little to be depended on is this their ally. The night before the battle, I applied to him for some particular pieces of cannon, which I thought might prove of great service in the action; but he declined giving the use of them. He promised solemnly to support me with all his force, and particularly engaged to be near at hand with a large body of cavalry, to be used as I should direct. But instead of being nigh me, he remained beyond the Gurrah, on the ground which I had left in the morning, surrounded by his cavalry and a large train of artillery, and did not move thence till the news of the enemy's defeat reached him." Then, however, his troops began to be active, and effectually plundered the camp; "while the Company's troops, in regular order in their ranks, most justly" (says their commander) "observed, We have the honour of the day, and these banditti the profit.” *

This action, in reality, terminated the war. Though Fyzoolla Khan, with his treasures and the remains of the army, had made good his flight toward the mountains, the whole country, without opposition, lay at the mercy of the Vizir; and never probably were the rights of conquest more savagely abuse d. Not only was the ferocity of Indian depredation let loose upon the wretched inhabitants, but as his intention, according to what he had previously and repeatedly declared to the English government, was to exterminate the Rohillas, every one who bore the name of Rohilla was either butchered or found his safety in flight and in exile. †

*Letter of Col. Champion to the Hon. Warren Hastings, &c. 24th April, 1774; Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 26.

+"The inhumanity and dishonour," says Col. Champion, in his letter of June 12, 1774," with which the late proprietors of this country and their families have been used, is known all over these parts; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immense size. I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery; and my requests to the Vizir to show lenity were frequent, but as fruitless as even those advices which I almost hourly gave him, regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which I am now constrained to declare, that though he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of his promises, nor cease to overspread the country with flames, till three days after the fate of Hafez Rhamet was decided."In another letter he says, "Above a lack of people have deserted their abodes in consequence of the defeat of Hafez." Ibid. App. No. 27. In another, "The whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described." That the President was perfectly aware of the designs of the Vizir,