praise, as he obtains by the wrath of man, for this very reason he must will the exist ence of man, and not only so, but that he exercise the wrath, which is to be the instrument of such praise. If it be essential to Deity to desire the fullest display of himself, and his character is not fully displayed without an exhibition of his mercy, (all which is perfectly agreeable to scripture,) it is essential to him to chuse that sin should be in the world; for what room for mercy can there be, where there is no sin, nor desert of wrath? And if it be his will that there should be sin, that he may make known the riches of his. glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, it is his will that his own law should be broken, for this is implied in his willing the existence of sin; and I may add further, that his willing the exist ence of sin is also implied in his determining to glorify himself as a God of grace. There: is no grace without sin, and no sin without: a violation of law, and no law without re-. quirements. The case comes exactly to this ; if, in every point of view, it is contrary to the will of God, that his law should be brok en, it is also contrary to his will to have any occasion for glorifying his mercy, or for showing forth the greatest excellencies of his nature. But, says the objector, how ridicul. ous must that being appear, who, with sol emn formality, lays his injunctions upon subjects, and, at the same moment, secretly desires that they may be disregarded, and this

for the purpose of giving him occasion to punish? In reply, I would ask, whether it is ridiculous for God to chuse the best possible end for the motive of his government, or, when chosen, to pursue it in the wisest possible method; or whether it is ridiculous for him to consider the expression of his compassionate and gracious nature as the best end of government. If there be nothing ri diculous, or improper, in such a supposition, then it is not ridiculous, nor any how objec tionable, that he should institute a law, and, for the reason assigned, chuse that it should. not be uniformly kept; for this is one of the necessary steps towards the manifestation of the divine attribute of mercy. I know, that for any man, parent or ruler, to act as stated in the objection, would be absurd and unjustifiable; but this would not be on account of any injustice in it towards the person commanded, or over whom the au thority was exercised; but because no good end could be aimed at, as an incentive to such conduct. But I trust I need not here repeat the observation, which has already been made, in substance, that we have no right to place men in God's stead, and infer from the rights and prerogatives of the one what is proper for the other. There is no sort of parallel between a man's relation to other men, and his relation to God. Why did the Deity make man in his own image, and make a law for him to be the measure of his rectitude or guilt? Was it not to pre

pare the way, and open the door, for the most complete discovery of his own perfections? If so, and, in order to this, sin must enter into the world and prevail, so as to give mercy an opportunity to officiate; the final end of the law could not have been answered, if it never had been broken. And certainly it is not derogatory to the character of God to use his own law and all the subjects of it, so as to bring about the end, for which he made them. If it is consistent for God to value his own character, as a merciful being, it is consistent for him to take measures to bring it into view; and then it is consistent for him to or dain and bring about those moral actions in his creatures, which alone call for the exercise of mercy; and then, again, it follows, that he is chargeable with no self-opposition, or inconsistency, for requiring men to be holy, at the same time his hand is concerned in bringing into being those exercises, which are positively sinful. It is all in that order of things which is absolutely necessary to render his glory complete, that he may be the object of universal admiration and complacency to the rational world.

2. It will be objected against our doctrine, that it sets the bible against itself.

I answer, that it is much safer to interpret one scripture, which needs interpretation, so that it will harmonize with another, which is explicit; than it is to resort to a violent exposition of one to make it agree

with the construction, which we put upon another. It cannot be denied, that there are texts of scripture, which, in direct terms, assert the dependence of all creature agency on that which is divine. Now, are there any which expressly deny this? or peremptorily assert what is obviously contrary to it? Many texts are mentioned, as operating a gainst our doctrine, such as the following: "O that they were wise, that they under. stood this, that they would consider their latter end! What could I have done inore for my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild. grapes ? Woe unto thee, O Jerusalem ! wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be? O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that kill est the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thee as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings and ye would not. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that he turn and live. Who will have all men to be sav ed and come to the knowledge of the truth." Such scriptures as these, it is contended, contradict the supposition of God's having any direct agency in bringing men into a state of guilt and condemnation. But are they as explicit in contradicting the sentiment, as the following is in establishing it? "So then hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." How

do texts, which express God's willingness that all men should be saved, and that he has no pleasure in their death, and that he uses the most proper means for their salvation, prove that he has no interference, or inflü ence, in causing them to become vessels of wrath fitted to destruction? If they prove any thing inconsistent with our doctrine, it is conceived they prove more than any judicious, or considerate, person would avow. When it is said, "O that they were wise,” &c. does God mean, he would make them wise if it were in his power? Again, is it the meaning of these words, "What could I have done more for my vineyard, that I have not done in it ?" that almighty power could not have made the church more pure? No person will dare so to limit the holy One. And if Christ would have protected Jerusa lem, had she been faithful to her God, does this certainly imply, that no divine influence had been used to fit her for the doom, which she was about to suffer? It is certain, that God has no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but does this prove, that every possible divine exertion is made to prevent the destruction of sinners; but the work proves too great for omnipotence to grapple with, and God himself is obliged to submit, though he does it with reluctance? A thought so irreverent can never be admitted. The foregoing texts only point out to us the things, which are, in themselves, good, and desira ble on this account; and do, by no means,