A

I. The Directors of the Poor of Bedford county notified the Overseers of Licking Creek township to remove an insane inmate of the Bedford County Almshouse, but they failed to do so. bill was presented to them for the maintenance of said inmate, which they refused to pay. HELD, That the plaintiff was entitled to recover. -Poor Directors of Bedford County v. Poor Overseers of Licking Creek Township, 196.

2. An insane person is within the meaning of the Act of 1836.—Ib.

3. Where there has been a removal and an acceptance without appeal, the district accepting is liable to the district removing for costs and charges.-Ib.

DISTRIBUTION.

ASSIGNED ESTATE.

1. The 3d section of the Act of 1872, does not give a lien on chose in action in favor of wages claimants; the lien is limited to such property as is subject to seizure and sale on execution.Jones' Appeal, 255.

2. Moneys received from the insurance of a woolen mill must be distributed pro rata among all creditors; the wages of operatives in the mill are not entitled to a preference in such distribution.-Ib.

3. The proceeds of a crop of wheat, growing at the time the labor of operatives were performed and severed, by sale or otherwise, before the real estate is sold, is properly applicable to the payment of their wages, in preference to the lien of a judgment on the land. That the severance was produced by the sale of a receiver will not affect the rule.-76.

4. It seems that the proceeds of a grass crop, grown after claims for wages had accrued, should however, be awarded to lien creditors in their order.-Ib.

5. It seems, also, that the proce‹ ds of old iron, which had formed a part of the machinery of a mill destroyed by fire, should be distributed as real estate.-Ib.

DECEDENT'S ESTATES.

6. The income or dividend from bank stock was bequeathed to the testator's widow for life. She died June 3, and a dividend was declared on the 29th of the same month. HELD, that her estate was not entitled to any portion of the same.-Ross' Estate, 131.

EXECUTION.

7. In the distribution of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of real estate, if the defendant has waived the benefit of the exemption laws in three judgments, he cannot claim it as against a judgment creditor in whose judgment there is no waiver; Pitman's Appeal, 12 Wr. 315 followed -Weaver et al. v. Steacy et al., 205.

8. A claim for taxes, under the Act of June 2, 1881, (P. L, 45), must state what taxes are claimed and when levied, and also in all other respects must conform strictly to the Act of assembly. As the requirements of the Act were not observed in this case, the claim was not entitled to priority of payment allowed by the Act.-Ib.

9. Where a party is clearly entitled to the balance of the fund for distribution, the Court will not subject it to the costs of an audit, but will order the sheriff to pay such balance over to the party legally entitled to it.-Ib.

DIVIDENDS.

CLAIM TO.

1. As a general rule, nothing earned by a corporation can be regarded as profits until it shall have been declared to be so by the corporation itself, acting by its board of managers. The fact that a dollar has been earned gives no stockholder a right to claim it until the corporation decides to distribute it as profit; Morris' Appeal, (2 Norris 266) followed.-Ross' Estate, 131. DIVORCE.

ALIMONY.

I. A woman living in a state of adultery has no claim upon her husband for support, and where this is shown clearly the court will refuse an application for alimony pendente lite.-Miller v. Miller, 28.

COUNSEL FEES.

2. The wife petitioned for divorce on the ground of desertion; the husband's answer simply denied the allegation of the petition: HELD that she was entitled to a reasonable allowance for counsel fees, etc.-Miller v. Miller, 28. GROUND FOR. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8.

WHEN VACATED.

3. A decree of divorce obtained by fraud and collusion, will always be vacated if brought to the notice of the court promptly, and before the rights of others have intervened; but when many years have been allowed to elapse, during which a second marriage has been contracted by the guilty party, and children have been born to him who would bastardized by the annuling of the divorce, it will not be disturbed, unless the record shows that there was no cause of action.-Firmin v. Firmin, 58.

DRIVING. NEGLIGENCE, I, 2.
DRUNKENNESS. JUDGMENT, 8.
EASEMENT.

I. Where rain water has been accustomed to flow evenly from the lands of one over those of his neighbor, mere user will not give to the latter the right to have the even flow maintained. -Malin v. Worrall, 161.

2. A land-owner cannot so change the natural confirmation of his land as to throw in a body, upon his neighbor's land, water which has been accustomed to flow evenly over the surface.-Ib. EQUITY.

BILL IN.

J. A., as surety for B., paid a judgment recovered against them. B's wife to indemnify A., assigned two judgments which she held against B. Upon the distribution of B's assigned estate, A. received a dividend on the two judgments and also on his claim against B by reason of his payment of the debt on which he was surety. Afterwards, E., assignee for A., attached B's legacy under D's will and received a sum much larger than the original debt. B. and wife then filed a bill in equity, alleging that the assignment of the judgments by the wife to A was fraudulent; or if not, that she was entitled to receive from A. and E., or either of them, the amount received by them over and above the original sum of money paid by A. as surety for B. and praying that the whole of the moneys received by A. and E., or all received by them in excess of the amount paid by A. as aforesaid, be decreed to be paid to the wife of E. HELD, on demurrer, that a bill in equity will not lie in this case.-Bierbower et ux. v. Laird & Bentzel, 71.

2. The plaintiff knew, or was bound to know, when the annual dues were payable, and the usage of the company, and his reliance of receiving such notice, are no excuse for non-payment. Ib.

3. The declarations made by the agents could not add to the original contract a condition to the effect that if he did not get notice he need not pay.-Ib.

4. A Mutual Life Insurance company is under no obligation to give notice to its members of the time of payment of premiums or annual dues.-Ib.

BENEFICIARIES.

5. Where it appears from the by-laws of a beneficial association that its object was to perpetuate a fund for the relief of the widows and orphans of its members, the words heirs and legal representatives, as used in its by-laws, and the certificate of insurance issued by it, are construed to mean children.-Meyer's Estate, 166.

6. The Odd Fellows' Endowment Association issued a certificate of life insurance to J., which provided that the amount which would become due thereon at his death should be paid to his wife E or her legal representatives. She having died prior to her husband, leaving two children to survive her and he having remarried and left his second wife to survive him. HELD, that the children were entitled to the fund.—1b.

CONSTRUCTION OF.

7. Ambiguous words in a policy of insurance will be construed most favorably to the insured. -Burkhard v. Traveler's Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 147.

8. Stepping off the platform of a car through a hole left in the floor of a bridge for repairs, is not a "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger" within the meaning of an accident insurance policy, when the train had stopped on the bridge on a dark night, and the hole was not visible, and the assured had no notice of or reason to apprehend such danger. Exposure to a hidden danger without any knowledge of it does not constitute a voluntary exposure to it.—Ib.

9. Neither does such an act violate the condition of the policy against "walking or being on the roadbed or bridge of any railway.' The intent of this language is to exempt from responsibility for injuries to the assured from trains moving thereon, and not to avoid liability for injuries resulting from being on bridges unsafe in themselves.—Ib.

10. In the certificate of life insurance in suit, the company covenanted and agreed in consideration of certain payments and assessments, "at the expiration of sixty-days after proof of the death of Jacob W. Leidig to pay or cause to be paid unto Susan Leidig his wife, or their heirs and legal representatives the sum of three ($3.00) dollars for every $1,000 the maximum sum of benefit actually in force in this association upon the decease of the said Jacob Leidig, and upon which the mortuary assessments are paid; provided the amount so paid shall not exceed the maximum sum of three thousand dollars." HELD, by the Court belom and affirmed by the Supreme Court that the burden of proof was not upon the plaintiff, but upon the defendant, to show, that there were "$1,000 maximum sums of benefits actually in force in the defendant company upon the decease of the insured

and upon which mortuary assessments are paid. -Susan Leidig v. The New Era Life Association of 1876, of Philadelphia, Pa., 135.

11. It was for the jury to determine whether the applicant had "read or heard read all the answers in the application."-Ib.

EVIDENCE.

12. In a suit on a policy of insurance in a Mutual Aid Association, plaintiff proved notice to defendant to produce the application on which said policy was issued. Defendant failed to do so, alleging that the application was part of the records of another case, which was now before the Supreme Court. HELD, affirming the Court below, that the policy must be admitted in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of the application.-Fidelity Mutual Aid Association v. Leidig, 37.

13. The President of the Association in a letter written to the plaintiff's attorney stated that they did not "contest the claim, nor refuse to pay it up to this time, but prefer to await developments," and defer payment until another suit now pending against the companies on the same loss had been determined. HELD, affirming the Court below to be a distinct admission of notice of the loss, and waiver of proof otherwise necessary.-Ib.

JURISDICTION. See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, IO.

14. Suit may be brought in the county where the subject of the risk insured against was domiciled or located, and the summons may be served on the company in any other county of the Commonwealth in the manner provided by the original Act of April 24th, 1857.-Spangler v. The Pennsylvania Mutual Aid Society, 33, and Quinn v. Fidelity Beneficial Society, 34.

15. The Acts of April 24, 1857, and April 8, 1858, refer to actions commened in courts of record only.-Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Hesty, 89

B

16. A. was insured in York in the defendant company, which had its office in Lehigh county. Afterward, she assigned the insurance to B., then moved to Baltimore and died there. brought suit against the defendant company in York county, the writ being directed to the Sheriff of Lehigh county, and by him served on the defendant.-HELD that the service must be set aside.-Spangler v. Keystone Mutual Benefit Association, 73.

17. The Act of 1857 permits suit to be brought in the county where the property insured is located; this is a tantamount to saying where the property insured is destroyed. The place where the loss occurs determines the jurisdiction, for then only does the right of action accrue. in life insurance, the place of death is the place of loss, and the suit must be brought in that forum.-Ib.

RIGHT TO SUE.

So

18. Where insurance companies have paid losses upon property destroyed by fire through the alleged negligence of a third party they may bring suit against the wrong-doer, in the name of the assured, without his consent, and the assured cannot prevent such use of his name, or, by a release to the defendant, defeat the action. -Kennebec Ice and Coal Co. v. Wilmington and Northern R. R. Co., 59.

19. In such case the insurers are not obliged to wait the pleasure of the assured whether he will bring suit.-Ib.

20. Seven insurance companies, having paid losses upon the property of K., which was burnt through the alleged negligence of W., instituted suit in the name of K., but without K.'s consent Warrants of attorney having been filed, executed by the several insurance companies a rule was taken by defendant to show why proceedings should not be stayed until a letter of attorney was filed executed by K. An answer to the rule was filed showing the payment of the losses by the insurance companies, and the refusal of K to institute suit or join in the suit as instituted, or authorize the use of K.'s name as plaintiff. HELD, That the warrants of attorney filed were sufficient.—Ib.

WAGER POLICY.

21. A policy of life insurance was issued to J., a son of the assured's daughter-in-law. J. assigned it to G. who paid the assessments, &c., and upon the death of the assured received the amount of the policy. Suit was brought by the administrators of the assured to recover the amount received by G. less assessments and dues paid by him. HELD, That plaintiffs were entitled to recover.-Gilbert v. Moose's Administrators, 143.

22. A gambling policy will not be enforced in this state.-Ib.

23. The proceeds of the policy could not go to J. or his assignee, since he had no insurable interest.-Ib.

24. The dictum of Sharswood in Insurance Co. v. Sleau, 2 Casey 189, does not apply to this case, for that is only applicable to a case where the policy is bona fide, and founded on an insurable interest.-7b.

25. H., the beneficiary in a mutual policy, assigned the same to third persons, who had no insurable interest. These assignees paid all assessments, and at the death of the insured, claimed the amount of the policy from the Association. Before payment, H. notified the Association that he claimed the amount of the insurance as heir-at-law of the insured, and contested the assignment on the ground of the assignees having no insurable interest, and the entire transaction being a speculation, and brought suit against the Association. HELD, That H. was estopped from setting up such a claim, he having entered into the arrangement of his own accord, and executed an assignment under seal to that effect.-Hettinger v. United Brethren Mutual Aid Society, 39.

I. A petition was presented by the children of A., deceased, alleging that the judgment originally given by B. to C. was to secure moneys which C, as guardian of said children, had loaned to B; that the judgment had been assigned by C. to the present equitable plaintiffs, and praying the Court to set aside said assignment and that the judgment be decreed for the use of said children. HELD, That the judgment being to C. absolutely and having no ear-marks on it so show the presence of any secret equities, and there being no evidence that the assignees had notice of such equities, the assignment will not be disturbed. -Socks v. Socks, 66.

AUTHORITY TO ENTER.

2. The following indorsement on the abstract of proceedings in a judgment in the Common Pleas, viz.: "I authorize any attorney or prothonotary to enter judgment against me for the within amount," is sufficient to authorize the entry of judgment.-Cooper v. Shaver, 109.

DEFECTIVE.

3. In the absence of actual notice of a judgment, the defective entry on the records by the introduction of an initial letter is not recorded notice, and a judgment thus defectively entered will be postponed to a judgment properly entered.-King v. King and Miller, 54.

4. B. held a judgment, entered against J. T. M. in 1871; K. recovered a judgment against J. M. in 1872, both in fact, against the same defendant. The defendant's name was J.M. He took his title in this name, and so signed all legal papers excepting the bond to B. K. had no knowledge of B.'s judgment. In a distribution of the fund produced by the sale of the real estate of J. M., HELD, that the judgment of K. is entitled to the proceeds to the exclusion of that of B.-Ib.

5. Had K been aware of the judgment held by B, he would have been postponed.—Ib.

6. The omission of the middle letter in the name of a defendant, in the entry of a judgment is fatal to the lien as against subsequent judgment creditors, not having actual notice, and whose judgments are properly entered.-Perkins & Miller v. Nichols, 113.

7. Where the middle letter is omitted from each of two judgments, the fact that the initial is inserted in the index of the latter judgment will not give it priority over the other.-Ib.

OPENING OF.

8. The note with warrant of attorney to confess judgment, and upon which judgment was entered against the defendant, was signed by him when he was in a drunken spree, and on a petition to open such judgment he testified that he had no knowledge of signing such note. The plaintiff was unable to show clearly the defendant's indebtedness to him, to the amount of the judgment. HELD, to be sufficient cause to send the case to a jury.-Marshall v. Hale, 6.

9. On a rule to open a judgment, unliquidated damages arising from a contract not a part of the judgment in controversy cannot be introduced to reduce the amount of the judgment. -Caffrey v. Carle, 189.

10. The act of April 15th, 1869, does not require the evidence of a party in interest, though the only evidence on his side should be corroborated to make it effective.-Anthracite B. & L. Association v. Lyons, 103.

II. M. borrowed a certain sum of money from K. and gave therefor a judgment note. This note was signed by M., and afterward by mistake, by K., who was also the payee in the note. It was finally signed by W., as surety. Judgment was entered on the note, when K. asked to have his name stricken off as one of the defendants. To this W. objected, averring that he only signed the note as joint surety with K., and M. being solvent the striking off of K's name would render W. alone liable for the whole amount. The Court below (WICKES, P. J.) struck off K's name and refused to allow the judgment to be opened as to W. HELD, affirming the Court below, that K's name was properly struck off.-Weller's Appeal, 153.

115.

14. The assignee of a part of a judgment sought to revive the lien, to the extent of the equitable interest, by sci. fa., reciting the judgment in the name of the legal, to the use of the equitable, plaintiff and naming the amount assigned. HELD that the recital of the amount was a fatal variance

and that the judgment was not revived, in whole or in part.-Ib.

15. Where the legal plaintiff is properly named the addition of the equitable plaintiff may be treated as surplusage.-Ib.

the

16. Where the sci. fa. recites the original judgment against the defendant and his assignee, "terre tenant in possession, defendants, variance is more important, and, coupled with a variance in amount has weight as indicating hat thet sci. fa. and the original were based upon different transactions.-Ib.

17. Where the equitable owner of a part of a judgment seeks to revive it, to the extent of the equitable interest, the equitable owner of another part cannot, by a suggestion filed extend the lien to both.-Ib.

18. Nor can the defendant extend the lien, by appearing to the sci. fa. and confessing judgment after five years have elaped and the land has been sold by an assignee.-Ib.

19. The quitable owner who issued the sci. fa. and subsequently judgment creditors, have standing to object to such proceeding, and it is not going behind the record for an auditor to inquire into it to determine the question oflien—Ib. JURISDICTION. INSURANCE, 14-17. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 8-10.

QUALIFICATIONS OF.

3. N. was a resident at the time his name was put in the jury wheel; he moved to Baltimore, with the intention of remaining if he liked it, if not to return. He did return, and served as a juror. HELD, That he was not disqualified.— Com. v. Stokes, et al., 187.

4. M. declared under oath that he understood what the witnesses testified to and what the Court said in the charge to the jury. HELD, To be properly qualified to act as a juror.-Ib. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

ATTACHMENT.

1. Where a guarnishee in his answer denies any indebtedness to the defendant as an individual or principal, but admits that he has had dealings with him as agent, the answer will prevent judgment against the garnishee.-Houpt, Garnishee v. Lewis, 52.

2. When the answer denies indebtedness to the defendant as a principal, a claim by the defendant to have the fund set apart to him under the exemption law will not conclude the garnishee, nor alone warrant the entering of judgment against him.—Ib.

3. It is competent for the plaintiff notwithstanding the answers of the garnishee, to require the issue to be tried before the justice; and if the record shows a trial, the court cannot, on certiorari, review the correctness of the justice's

conclusions from the evidence.-Ib.

4. It is possible, also, that upon the day of the hearing the plaintiff might cause additional interrogatories to be served upon the garnishee, and require him to answer them.-Ib.

5. The verbal statements of the garnishee, made in the presence of the justice, after his answers have been delivered, and when not under

oath, and which are not irreconcilable with his former answers, will not authorize the justice to disregard his former answers, and to enter judgment against him.-16.

6. Practice before justice of the peace in cases of attachment execution, considered.—Ib. CROSS-SUITS.

7. M. brought suit against S. before a Justice of the Peace and obtained judgment by default. Afterward S. brought suit against M. before another Justice. On the hearing M. offered in evidence the record of the former suit, as a bar to plaintiff's recovery in the present case. The evidence was rejected, and judgment entered against the defendant. HELD, on certiorari, that the neglect of the present plaintiff to bring in his claim as set-off in the first suit was a bar to any subsequent action, and the proceedings must be set aside.-Shetter v. Metzgar, 8.

JURISDICTION.

8. The affidavit that the title to lands will come in question in an action before a justice of the peace, under the Act of March 22, 1814, may be made by the attorney for the defendant, and the jurisdiction of the justices thereby ousted.— Acker v. Moore, 190.

9. In an action before a justice, the plaintiff's demand was for "five dollars and twenty-five cents damages, by reason of defendant's not repairing plaintiff's gun as by him agreed to do, and receiving pay for it. HELD, that the justice had jurisdiction.-Klinetob v. Roth, 95.

10. The act of April 5, 1873, in regard to foreign insurance companies, does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace so as to permit them to direct process to a constable of another county.—Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Hesty, 89.

MISCONDUCT.

II. It is misconduct on the part of a magistrate to omit to inform a party who has given bail for an appeal, and paid the costs, that an affidavit is also required to perfect the appeal. -Swallow v. Red Ash Coal Co., 86.

RECORD. See MUNICIPALITY, 3-6.

12. The Justice's summons was "being in plea of settlement of book account." HELD, That the claims and credits shown in the record not being like actions against bailiffs, receivers, partners or trustees, the exceptions to the summons must be dismissed.-Metzgar v. Shetter, 7.

13. Where the transcript is in other respects regular, and there has been a trial on the merits aud the judgment is less than one hundred dol