state in which parties had no residence-fendant, which caused the following

I. On September 26, 1921, there was an order made by the court of quarter sessions, No. 4. September term, 1921, requiring David Miller, the petitioner, to pay for the support and maintenance of his wife, Lucy S. Miller, until the further order of the court.

2. On November 21, 1921, the said David Miller presented his petition Petition re-der made upon him to pay for the suppraying the court to revoke the said orport of his said wife six dollars per week.

further action or proceedings in that ac- she did not appear by counsel in the dition for divorce.

vo.ce proceedings

* * *

The 8. The petition now before us shows opinion continues: "That the court in that the said David Miller, ignoring and Nevada was without jurisdiction to enneglecting his procedure in this court, ter a decree against an absent defendant, and in the court of common pleas of this under such circumstances, which would judicial district, went to the State of Ne-be binding on such defendant, is settled vada and obtained a divorce from his by many authorities and is the law of this said wife, Lucy S. Miller. state. Whatever effect with respect to

9. The records show that said David the marriage relation the decree may Miller and Lucy S. Miller were married have in the state where it was entered, it in Airville, York County, Pennsylvania, is not recognized as having any validity in 1894. The matrimonial domicile of to affect property rights of the divorced the said David Miller and his wife, Lucy wife whose domicil has continued in this S. Miller, was always in the State of state. The court of Nevada had not jusPennsylvania at the time and long prior isdiction and, if without jurisdiction, to the 26th day of September, 1921, the there was no vitality to its judgment time the Court of Quarter Sessions of which could affect the rights of the first the Peace of York County, Pennsylvania, wife: Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. made an order of maintenance on said 562; Estate of Fyock, 135 Pa. 522; Platt's App., 80 Pa. 501. David Miller in favor of the said Lucy S. Miller, as recited in our first finding In the case of John W. Haddock vs. of facts, and, at the time the court of Harriet Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (26 S. the State of Nevada granted him the di- Ct. 525), it was decided that, "The mere vorce mentioned in our eighth finding of domicil within the state of one party to facts, the said Lucy S. Miller continued the marriage does not give the courts of to reside in said York County and State that state jurisdiction to render a decree of Pennsylvania, and did not live or have of divorce enforceable in all the other a residence anywhere in the State of Ne-states by virtue of the full faith and vada.

In deciding the case at bar, it is hardly necessary to review all the authorities cited by the petitioner's counsel in his brief and argument. It is sufficient to state the rule adopted in this State, as expressed by Mr. Justice Henderson, in rendering the opinion of the Superior Court in Grossman's Appeal, 67 Pa. Supr. Ct., 367-369. The circumstances of that case, as stated by Judge Henderson, are essentially similar to the circumstances of the case at bar. "John S. Grossman was a resident of Butler County, Pennsylvania, and was married to Laura Croll in 1885. They lived there together as husband and wife until the 13th day of January, 1911, when they entered into an agreement of separation. Thereupon, the husband went to the State of Nevada and on the 17th day of November, 1911, filed a complaint for a divorce in the second judicial district of that state, which case was so proceeded with that a decree of divorce was entered on the 24th day of January, 1912. The cause of action did not arise in Nevada; Mrs. Grossman never was in that state;

credit clause of the federal constitution against a non-resident who did not appear and was not constructively served with notice of the pendency of the ac

tion."

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Duncan vs. Duncan, 265 Pa. 464, decided (quoting the syllabus): "A divorce granted in another state, where the parties never resided together, and for cause not arising therein, is of no validity here, unless the respondent appeared to the action, or in some way recognized the alleged divorce."

In the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Simpson said (page 469), "It neither averred nor proved they (the husband and wife) ever lived together in Nevada, or that she ever recognized the alleged divorce.

Under such circumstances, even if granted, it would be of no validity in this state: Colvin vs. Reed, 55 Pa. 375; Reed vs. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Haddock vs. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562.”

In reviewing the authorities, we can find none which negatives the doctrine announced in the above cited decisions rendered by the United States Supreme

Court and the Supreme and Superior
Courts of this state.

The case of Commonwealth vs. Parker, 59 Pa. Supr. Ct. 137, differs from the case at bar in that, in that case, the wife voluntarily appeared in the court of another state where the husband had brought proceedings in divorce, filed an answer and resisted and fought the proceeding, thus recognizing the jurisdiction and authority of that court.

In the case at bar, the wife never by any act recognized the authority of the court in Nevada, and never lived in that

state.

We cannot find, and we are loath to believe, that any law exists which will sanction or legally sustain such reprehensible conduct as the records and the testimony show was indulged in, in the case at bar, by the petitioner. The testimony shows that he was married in York County, Pennsylvania, to Lucy S. Miller, in 1894; that they lived together as man and wife in that county for sixteen years, when in 1911 he abandoned her. His said wife sued him for her support; the court in York County ordered him to pay toward the support of his said wife; he made a motion for re-hearing in the same In the case of Thompson vs. Thomp-court; a short time after that he entered son, 226 U. S. 551 (33 S. Ct. 57), it ap-a suit for divorce against his said wife in pears that the parties were married in the Court of Common Pleas of said York the State of Virginia and had a matri-County, Pennsylvania. When his wife monial domicil there, and not in the Dis- resisted said action of divorce by filing trict of Columbia, or elsewhere. The her answer denying the charges conhusband had his actual domicil in that tained in his libel, in said Court of Comstate at all times until and after the conclusion of the litigation. The divorce proceedings were carried on in the state of his matrimonial residence, and the divorce obtained by him overcame the order of maintenance made by the court in the District of Columbia, where the wife had gone after marriage and away from her matrimonial residence.

In the case at bar, the husband (the present petitioner) deserted the matrimonial residence and went to Nevada for the purpose of separating from his wife,

and obtained a decree of divorce in that state while his action for divorce was still pending, and resisted by his wife, in

this state.

mon Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, he abandoned the suit in Pennsylvania and obtained a decree of divorce in a state where he had never lived with his wife, where she never was, and where he knew she could not appear.

Under the authorities we have cited, we must conclude that the alleged divorce granted by the court of Nevada, under the circumstances of this case, is not valid as against the jurisdiction of this court.

And now, March 9th, 1925: The rule granted in this case is dismissed, and the prayer of the petition is refused, at the costs of the petitioner.

INDEX

OF CASES REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME

ABATEMENT.

Insolvency-Petition for receiver Death of insolvent-Abatement of proceedings-Act of June 4, 1901.

-MOONEY'S INSOLVENCY, 82

ACCOMMODATION MAKER.

Promissory notes Accommodation maker-Want of consideration-Suffi ciency of evidence to establish defenseQuestion for jury.

-SCHLOUGH ET AL. V. YETTER, 153

ACCOUNT.

Decedents' Estates Administration account-Source of money in hands of administrator-Authority of administrator to sell real estate.

-ESTATE OF GEORGE W. FARQUHAR, 20

ACCOUNTING.

account-Source of money in hands of administrator-Authority of administrator to sell real estate.

-ESTATE OF George W. FARQUHAR, 20

ADOPTION.

Adoption-Living parents--ProtestAct of May 28, 1915, P. L. 580.

Where the parents are living, an affirma

tive decree for the adoption of their child

by another is conditioned upon their consent, save only where the parental right must, on due proof, be deemed to have been forfeited for drunkenness, profligacy, etc., or neglect to provide for the child.

ADOPTION OF EVELYN MARION WATERS, 16 AFFIDAVIT.

Practice, C. P.-Appeals from justice Pleading Plaintiff's statement Striking off- Affidavit-Acts of April

Equity-Accounting-Adequate rem-14. 1921, P. L. 144, and May 14, 1915,

edy at law.

-KELLER V. KELLER, 37

ACTIONS.

Res adjudicata-Salary-Payments-Separate actions-Conclusive as to subsequent installments.

-HULSMAN V. BROOKLINE DISTRICT NO. 506,
ETC. 64

ADEMPTION.

P. L. 483.

-KUREY V. KOCZENOCZ, 51

Plaintiff's statements-Need not contain matters of defense-Affidavit raising question of law-Practice Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483.

-WAGNER BROS. CO. V. DOUGLAS, 131

Pleading and practice motion to amend after entering judgment for part of clim-Affidavit to amended state

ment.

Will-Ademption of legacy given for COURY, ETC. V. STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE

Decedents' Estates Administration lien-Affidavit of defense - Practice