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There was Mauleverer, who plays at chess

Eternally. His only happiness,

When Death throws wide to him the mystic portals
Into the realms unseen,

Will be, with rook and queen,

Alfyn, and knight, and pawn, to challenge the immortals.

And now, beside the breathless hyaline,
His moves mysterious on the squares entwine;
While opposite, a creature like a fairy,
White-wristed, golden-tressed,

Whose thoughtful glances rest

Upon the unfathomed game, in a profound quandary.

But far more numerous they, whose merriment
Is 'mid the odorous hay. În swift descent
Their many-twinkling feet along the turf
Pass merrily; their glee,

If boisterous were the sea,

Would drown the ceaseless surges of the sinuous surf.

They toss the hay-wreaths in the liquid air;
They chase each other; merry children, fair
As if this earth had never known a stain,
Sing many a pleasant carol,
Weave ruddy flower-apparel:

Surely the days return of Saturn's peaceful reign.

Amid the revellers, lo there stood the greyest
Old wrinkled dreamy leathern algebraist

That ever pondered subjects half absurd;
These wild sports got the start of his
Quaint subtilty and artifice,

And there he stood amazed, like some shy alien bird.

He knew the courses of the planets well;

An absolute and perfect oracle

Concerning Ophiuchus and Orion :

But human nature seems

To him a thing of dreams

Him 'twould befit to dwell in Alpha of the Lion.

Here comes the Rector. Purple stars of clematis
O'erhang the rectory's mullioned grey extremities,
Close by the river. There of old, while he
Pored o'er Exonian letters,

I strove to link love's fetters,

O happy Ada mine, about myself and thee.

And when were any twain whom smiling May
Chased through the whispering woodlands, day by day,
Strewing sweet violets ankle-deep around,

Blind to the joy which lies

In deep soft loving eyes

Deaf to the songs wherewith Love makes this earth resound?

MORTIMER COLLINS.

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THE GOVERNMENT, THE DEPARTMENTS, AND THE WAR.

To every earnest politician and all intelligent members of the community should be such-the State of the Nation at the present time must be matter of deep concern. We believe that we only give expression to a solemn truth when we say that a general feeling of apprehension prevails as to the future of these countries- a sort of undefined distrust of our ability to hold our high place among the kingdoms with honour for any long time to come. This panic-for it is almost a panic-exists among all parties. It has found utterance in public meetings by the pens of pamphleteers — through the press,-and has even been the burden of remarkable orations within the walls of Parliament. Not that those speakers and writers think the empire has commenced that decline to which evil prophets have de signated it; but the country has lost heart, and is more apprehensive than complaining. If this fear for the future be exaggerated, it is not without justification. The disasters which have overtaken our army in the Crimea the mismanagement of the home administration the anomalous state of political sects - the apparent absence of sagacious statesmanship, and the grave errors lately committed by rulers undeniably convicted of incapacity,all combine to depress the public mind, and to open the mouths of those to whom the language of discontent is more genial than effort to remove its cause. The man who is too ready to relax the tone of his mind in presence of difficulties never succeeds in life; the people compelled to acknowledge the existence of evils among themselves should only dwell upon them to ascertain their character and extent, that the proper cure may be discovered. At the present moment we are taking the opposite and less wise course. We are desponding, when we need to be up and doing when every effort should be put forth to discover the seat of the disease and its every ramification, to the end that a fitting remedy may be found.

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The horizon of our country is, indeed, wrapt in storm-clouds, through

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which scarcely a weak gleam of hope struggles. But we may exaggerate the darkness of the prospect, dark though it be. It is bad enough to have lost 25,000 men for the gaining of two triumphs, which were not victoriesat least 20,000 of whom perished of neglect (it is literally so !);—it is bad enough to be forced to believe that mal-arrangement, or the total want of arrangement, involved the flower of our armies in a terrible struggle with privations, which terminated in unnecessary and ignominious death ;-it is bad enough to have to confess that, after a twelvemonth of campaigning, we are little nearer our object, and little better prepared to advance toward it; it is bad enough to find that the alliances we had hoped for have failed us; — but, in addition to this, it is worst of all to discover that the most venerable and respected leaders of our national affairs who hold their positions by right of service rendered the State in times past - have manifested their total inadequacy to the magnitude of their present task; and that to a foreign potentate, only a few years raised by popular election to the precarious throne of an unstable empire, we are primarily indebted for much of the success we have attained in the field, as well as much of the firmness we have evinced in the bureau. But, on the other hand, it is right to remember that there are signs in the heaven whose import is cheering. Beyond the warring clouds. which clash and break upon each other above our heads, there is a serener sky; and, the gloom once riven, its genial peacefulness will glad the nations. Even now there are encouragements around us. All is not evil in the Russian war and its as yet dis mal consequences. Who can tell what amount of lasting good may spring from the alliance with France, which has been so deeply baptised in blood, and sealed by the close sympathy of a common purpose affecting the interests of both countries so intimately? Who can tell what future Providence has prepared for the Lands of the Prophet, to which the events of to-day are the

avenue? Who can tell what effect the present disturbance of old compacts and relations may soon have on the central kingdoms of Europe? Whatever changes occur, as the results of the existing struggle-either in France, or in Turkey, or in Germany, or even in Britain-there must be progression, there must be the more intimate union of the kingdoms, by the weakening of despotism and the extension of that genial sympathy among agreeing peoples which is the only valuable basis and bond of alliances. Such considerations are fraught with hope, and go far to diminish our regrets for past misfortune. But it is further to be borne in mind that we contend for triumph in the cause of humanity; we labour to overleap the fences of a barbaric autocracy; and if we succeed, as ultimately we shall, the death-blow will be given to the most elaborately established tyranny the world has ever seen. History, indeed, affords no parallel to the present war, in its object, in the extent of its influence, or the momentousness of the issues involved in its success. Russia subdued, there never will be another Russia. The ambitious designs of Russia effectually checked, Muscovite tyranny must keep within its old barriers, and the empire of the great Peter cease to domineer in European counsels. With this consummation of the existing conflict, oppression of the kind existing under Nicholas, and transferred to Alexander, cannot pass beyond its limit, and no iron will can ever bid it advance again, either to the billows of the northern ocean, which proclaim man's freedom as they are shattered against the coast of the Sea-Kings, or the rippling waves of the Mediterranean, as, calmed beneath a glowing sun, they expand peacefully on the shores of the South.

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The last cheering aspect of the time is that one to which, in these paragraphs, we have to devote more particular attention. The experience of war we have had this past eventful year has undeniably discovered to us-somewhat rudely, but wholesomely weak points in our national character, in our military and civil administration, in the hereditary accidents--if we may so say of our Government. Those defects made patent, we may learn to apply a remedy, and reap such amount of profit from our chastisements as to transmute them into blessings.

Of these defects we may usefully advance a word.

That the appointment of the Sebastopol Committee was a wise step, its proceedings have fully proved. We place little value on their Report. The Evidence is of chief interest. The facts elicited are important in the highest degree. They will yet be, we may add they will soon be, the basis of extensive reforms. They are, as it were, the diagnosis of the national disease. It is a mistake to suppose the inquiry to be strictly a Sebastopol Inquiry. It takes a wider range. Beyond its revelations respecting the mismanagement of the earlier months of the war, it has entered upon a survey of the entire sys tem of our military departments, and in this view we must especially regard it valuable. To investigate why the army did not receive reinforcement till after Inkermann, and then only 6,500 men-why huts necessary six weeks before had not arrived in the Crimea at the middle of December-why the cavalry perished by a blunder at Bala. klava-why that town became a chaos under the disorganising talents of its commandant-why the Turkish hospitals were pest-houses, places to propagate disease rather than sanitaria, is of little comparative moment, since we cannot bring back the thousands sacrificed to incompetency, and can scarcely hope to punish the guilty officials by whose fault they perished. We know all the cause, all the consequence, in its bitter aggravatedness; our question now is-What really were the various sources of the mischief, and how best may they be approached so as to be removed?

It is contended, on the one hand, that men have been to blame; on the other, the onus is laid upon systems. Truth requires us to say-both. Incompetent officials and imperfect plans constitute the fertile source of all national evil. Unfortunately this is proved amply enough in our perience.

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Take the systems first. Our eyes have been opened to serious blemishes in our military and civil administration. No doubt one cardinal error, of which we are now convinced is, the insane reduction, for it was little else, made in our resources for war, year after year, for the last decade. When it came, we were, indeed, a nation of shopkeepers, and not a military people. What has Lord Hardinge told us?

When hostilities commenced he sent ten thousand men to the East, and that number exhausted the troops this great empire had at immediate command for its purposes of defence! Subsequently, by great exertion, a second draft of the same strength was procured, and only after the battles of Alma and Inkermann did a third army of six thousand five hundred men arrive at the scene of conflict. Thus, after the contest had been waged fully four months, we contrived, by bringing regiments from the Colonies, by recruiting, and other means, to send out twenty-six thousand men a fifth of whom, or more, were raw levies! Such was the state of preparedness for war to which Manchester economists brought us. It would seem that their undue desire for peace, under every circumstance, was then on the point of unavoidable gratification, for we might soon, by their policy, be precluded from war, because totally imbecile, a ready prey to the most unscrupulous. What would have been our condition were our foe an invading one, or were the contest nearer our shores, and more intimately connected with our interests? We proceeded to fight Russia-it might have been France and Germany to boot with twenty-thousand men ! With such a force we could, acting alone, be expected to effect little more than the hero who—

"With twice ten thousand men, Marched up the hill, and then marched down again."

We hope the error of not maintaining our standing army at a proper strength, and in a proper state of efficiency, is now fully known, and that when the present war ceases, we shall have no cheese-paring economy, no suicidal parsimony, in voting the army estimates. It will be time enough to beat our swords into ploughshares when men "learn war no more;" but so long as our neighbours, friendly or unfriendly, sustain their military strength, the most vulgar wisdom dictates the same course to us.

Another remarkable defect in our military system, exposed to general view of late, is the want of education among our troops and their officers-scientific training we mean. Young Bobadil, who is a fast man, a great boaster, very proud of his red coat and epaulets, a favourite with the ladies, the gallant gentleman at parties, and a complete master of the frivolous in dress, man

ners, and conversation, is, by virtue of his good guineas, an ensign, a lieutenant, perhaps a captain in her Majesty's service. He may have this character, and be a colonel or more, for in the army (to reverse a common saying) we have often young heads on old shoulders. Of military education, in the enlarged sense of the term, he is as well informed as his Boots. He knows a few of the technicalities of his art: of the science of war, nothing. He is sent into the field-we admit his valour. Good blood flows in his veins; a sense of honour inspires him; the excitement of battle brings out any latent chivalry he may possess; he shouts to his steady band; they rush forward at his bidding. If impetuous courage can win what he hopes to gain, there is a victory, and we laud the heroism of the brave, as it deserves to be lauded; but, after all, we have seen the soldier but in one, and that the simplest, phase of his character. Place our friend Bobadil on the plateau overlooking Sebastapol. Bid him take measures to sustain his men during an inclement winter, on those heights. Tell him that their health, their efficiency, their lives depend on his exertions. He is quite at sea and rudderless. This is not his notion of war. He always thought of it, if he thought at all, as the poet

"Concurritur,

Momento cita mors venit, aut victoria læta."

Place him in the field, and the same want of training is evident. Neither he, nor the men he leads for, uninstructed himself, he could not instruct them know more than the first elements of military education. Courage they have among the soldiery of no country is there greater. Loyalty they have no man on God's earth is more loyal than a Briton, for he has institutions which claim his intensest love. Desire of triumph they have— for we are an ambitious race, ever striving to be foremost. But training in arms they have not. In spirit they are Romans, but rude in the arts of war. We are not about to declaim generally and without consideration against the system of purchase which admits to positions of military trust men unfitted for command, nor to censure the ludicrous system of promotion which puts a man in authority when he has perhaps reached the utmost verge of human life at least of the years of activity; but we do say that another great error

now discovered to us is the want of military education among our officers and men. The regimental system, as far as it goes, is excellent. It trains good soldiers and good commanders; but it will never organise an army, in the full panoply of its might for effective warfare, since it fails to provide for the acting together of more than a comparatively small fraction of such a body. Nor will it ever guarantee, as at present constituted, the proper instruction of officers or men in camp duties. Their education will be left very much to chance. Unless reform take place in this respect, the British soldier will still be helpless taken out of his mechanical routine, as unable to cook his rations in the field as to meet an enemy in untoward circumstances. The war has taught us this deficiency this grave error. Other nations are not so foolish in military matters; for what is the present fact? At this moment we are, by permission, investigating the arrangements in the French army for the purpose of modifying our own by them, or ingrafting the Continental on the English plans! Two years ago, or less, we boasted of our strength, as we talked of supposed imminent war with France, how vainly !

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Yet another fact strongly impressed upon us by our late history is the extreme folly of not making due provision for an Army of Reserve. Where had we to look to for men these last two years, either for the purpose of defending our shores or waging foreign war? Our 120,000 fighting men of the Line was a fiction a monstrous fiction-a phantom, and no more. countries where every man who has reached maturity capable of bearing arms has been trained to war, a reserve force is always ready; but in this country, where such a principle is unacknowledged, a special effort must be set afoot to secure that end. Gather a few thousand peasants from the different States of Germany-arm themthey are efficient soldiers. Take the same number from the west of Ireland, from the northern shores of Scotland, from the manufacturing or agricultural districts of England-arm them— they will not be soldiers, but the rudest material of soldiers; they will march in the most ludicrous irregularitythey will form a line as full of ins and outs as the winding Rhine or the Frith

of Forth; they will withstand the privations of a warrior's life a day, a week, a month the first severity makes them worthless. This being so, why should we not keep the Militia, the constitutional force of the country, in a state of semi-preparedness? Had we done this two years ago, we could have sent to the Crimea 70,000 trained soldiers, and while Prince Menschikoff was panic-stricken by the loss of Alma, have marched into the now giganticallydefended Sebastopol with little difficulty. We had, on the contrary, no Militia when the war broke out, and what is the consequence? Why, at the present moment, our good Government deem they have done a great deal in raising a home and colonial Militia force of about 50,000-just one-third of its strength, properly embodied!

But turn we from the Army to the Departments connected with military administration. Here a stupid division of authority and a practical irresponsibility in some quarters has worked immense mischief of late. It was a wise step to provide a Minister of War last year; but it was very unwise to permit his will to be frustrated, now by the Ordnance, again by the Admiralty, again by the Commissariat, and again by the Medical Board. A War Minister must be an autocrat. He must have full powers, and the highest responsibilities. This is evident. He is required to succeed-to fail is to be disgraced, to be superseded, to lose reputation, honour it may be, and respect for ever afterwards. His means, therefore, should be his own; if they be not, he is not accountable. The Duke of Newcastle was not a War Minister in the proper sense. He was

a kind of clever head clerk, who satdiligently enough, be it confessed— fourteen hours a-day in his office, and blundered everything notwithstanding. Lord Hardinge pulled one way, he another; Mr. Sidney Herbert frustrated him unintentionally, but very effectually; and Sir Thomas Hastings took his own course in spite of him. this shows how necessary is a consolidation of the military departments, and a complete re-organisation of the stupid system prevailing in them, which is as old as the Peninsular war. In everything but in military affairs have we improved these forty years.

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Add to the necessary reforms in the military departments, that some mode

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