YORK LEGAL RECORD. ministration de bonis non cum testamento annexo should be issued.

2

and assets remaining in their hands, due and belonging to the estate of the decedent. This right of the administrator de bonis non is exclusive; Com'lth v. Strohecker, 9 W. 479; Montgomery's Estate, 7 Phila. 504.

The facts in the case of Lantz v. Boyer,

Admin. d.b.n.c.t.a. 31 P.F. Smith 325, are very much like those that exist or that are suggested in the case at bar. There as here, the testator made a common fund of his estate, real and personal, a life estate given to the widow and absolute direction

to the executors to sell if she should desire

it and the proceeds of the sale to be invested, the interest to be paid to the widow for her life, &c.

When the wife's life estate should expire, the distribution is to be made by the executors certainly, and that virtute officii. This duty of distribution then devolved of necessity upon the administrator de bonis non cum testamento annexo. If so he must be entitled to receive and invest the fund and hold it so invested until the period of final distribution shall arrive. This case must be considered as decisive of the very question now before us and which was raised and discussed by the counsel in that case. See also Olwine's Appeal, 4 W. & S. 492, although determined before 1846. Where by the will the trust for the widow is annexed to the office of the executor, on his death it can "only be exercised by an administrator de bonis non;" also Com'lth v. Barnitz,9 Watts 252. For above reasons the prayer of petition refused.

O. C. of

Lafferty's Estate.

Philadelphia.

Death of a widow three days after filing petition for ex

death of her husband, notified the admin-
istrator that she claimed the benefit of the
Act of April 14, 1851, and elected to re-
tain as part of her exemption, household
goods, etc., and claimed the balance in
cash, "whenever the same comes into the
hands of the said administrator." Anap-
praisement of the household goods was
accordingly made by the appraisers, certi-
fied under the Act of Assembly, and with
the petition of the widow filed in accor-
dance with the rule of Court. The goods
included in the inventory and appraise-
ment comprised the entire personal estate
of decedent, but it appears he was the
owner of a single piece of real estate, a
This, however,
small dwelling house.
was not appraised, nor was any request
therefore made by the widow. She died
three days after the filing of her petition,
and prior to the approval by the Court of
the appraisement af the personal property
retained by her as before stated.
now objected by the administrator of the
deceased husband that as the widow died
before the approval of the appraisement,
it is too late for confirmation, and the
household furniture remains the property
of her husband's estate. And, further, as
to the real estate, this never having been
appraised, no allowance can be made out
of its proceeds when sold. It is to be ob-
served, no objection is made by any credit-
or of the deceased husband. In view of
the facts stated we are of opinion that so
far as respects the claim of the widow to
retain the personal property duly inven-
toried and appraised, in the absence of
any valid objection by creditors of the
deceased husband, the occurrence of her
death before the approval of the appraise-
ment, is of no consequence. There was

It is

emption, and before the approval of the appraisement by nothing to prevent the approval of the

the Court, does not invalidate the claim.

Sur exceptions to widow's exemption.

February, 3, 1883. HANNA, P. J A novel question is raised by the exceptions, and as far as we can ascertain, without precedent. The widow of decedent within a reasonable time after the

appraisement, the day of its filing, except

by rule of Court, notice must be given by advertisement, to creditors and others interested, to object thereto, if they so desire. No objection was made, except by the administrator, and he is not affected

by the claim to the exemption. If the claim had never been made by the widow, by was presented by her executor, the case would be far different, and clearly could not be allowed. It is a personal privilege, and if not claimed, is presumed to be waived. In this case, the widow

promptly availed hereslf of the provision for her benefit, complied with the require

ments of the statute, and we fail to discover any sufficient reason why the appraisement should not now be approved. The appraisement comprising only the household goods, etc., claimed, there being no money or other personal assets out of which to pay the balance to which the widow was entitled, and the real estate not having been appraised: (Hufman's Appeal, 31 P. F. S. 329; 2 W. C. 635; Nixon's Appeal, 6 id. 496; Somers' Estate, 38 Legal Intell. 95: Andress' Estate, 38 Legal Intell. 5.) it will therefore be ap

proved as to the goods and chattels therein mentioned.

Exceptions dismissed and appraisement approved nunc pro tunc.

Q. S. of

QUARTER SESSIONS.

Lancaster Co.

Road in West Cocalico Township.

Roads-Public-When

cently certain.

termini suffici

The 2d is that: "The public road as laid out does not show that it begins in a public road."

of this Court did not insert in the order, In this proceeding it appears the clerk the exact words, as used in the petition to describe the road. That was a censurable omission and should not again occur. The order, however, in this proceeding on its face sets forth that the petitioners and divers inhabitants labor under incon

venience, for want of a public road, and The law requires that the definite points then states its beginning and ending.The law requires that the definite points where a road, public or private, shall begin or end, should be set out with a reasonable certainty: (9 Smith 358). Unless it the order for opening the road cannot be so appears on the face of the proceeding, sustained. That requisite has been complied with in the proceedings before us.—

The termini of the road proposed appearing in the order and in the report, are manifestly reasonably certain.

Had the road petitioned for been asked as for a private road, the two exceptions above recited would have been fatal to the report in question and to these whole proceedings. For by the very terms of the road law of 1836, a petitioner for a private road must ask for a road from the respective dwellings or plantations of the petitioner or petitioners, "to a highway or place of necessary public resort, or to any

It is not requisite in an order to viewers, that it shows private way leading to a highway."

that the public road to be laid out is to begin in a public road, and to end in a public road, but is sufficent when the points of termini are set forth with reasonable certainty.

Exceptions to report of viewers.

January 13, 1883. PATTERSON, A.L.J.Notwithstanding the numerous exceptions filed to the report of viewers, there are but two, the 1st and 2d, which were argued before the Court by counsel, and which require our attention.

The 1st is that: "The order to the viewers does not show that the public road to be laid out is to begin in a public road and to end in a public road.”

But

the provision made for public roads by the said Act, does not prescribe any specific termini in terms. Section 1st says: "The Court of Quarter Sessions of every county of the Commonwealth, on being petitioned to grant a view for a road, within the respective county, shall have power and are hereby required, in open Court to appoint, as often as may be needful, six persons, &c." The Act, it will be seen, does not require the petition to state that it is for a public road even. The 3d section of the Act, however, directs that the viewers shall make report, and specifies