safely watched, whilst preparations were made to attack his entrenchments in due form,* and our troops would have been fresh, and ought not to have been without ammunition in case of being suddenly brought into action. The Merut reserve force, with the 9th and 16th Lancers, H. M. 10th Regiment, and four regiments of Native Troops, accompanied by three troops of Artillery and the elephant battery of twelve pounders, would, by using despatch, have arrived in less than ten dayst had an order been forwarded from Bussean, and such a force would have been beyond the reach of any coup-de-main of a detachment from the enemy's camp. Then, with properly constructed batteries, (for the fort at Ferozepore contained some heavy guns) and with regular approaches, the Sikh position would have been * The batteries at Ferozeshuhur were attacked in front. Had they been taken in flank or reverse many heavy guns in fixed positions could not have been brought to bear readily against the assailants. †That is, they might have reached Moodkee by the 28th of December. The advanced guard of the reserve were within hearing of the cannonade of Ferozeshuhur. advantageously assailed, and there is little doubt that a well directed fire of artillery, poured into such crowded works, would have been severe in its effect, and would ultimately have compelled the enemy to evacuate them. When the Sikhs should have been once compelled to take to the open ground, their heavy siege guns would have been too unwieldly to manœuvre, whilst our light artillery would have been on advantageous ground, and, with an effective force of cavalry, the victory ought to have been speedy, and the enemy's retreat to the ford not altogether unmolested. To all this, perhaps it may be objected that the Sikhs would assuredly not have awaited a concentration of our forces, and these preparations for attack. In reply, it must be borne in mind that the choice of battle rested with the British, unless the enemy vacated his post, when the advantages to be derived in the open plain would have been ours, and rendered a much easier victory a matter beyond a question with an army like our own, whose whole "materiel" were expressly qualified for action in the open plain, where superior dis cipline and rapidity of movement, with a fresh and well appointed army of sixteen thousand men, ought to have ensured success upon easier terms than when storming the same enemy in a strong position. With an effective British force of 16,000 or 20,000 men in the open plain, I conceive it to be a matter of unimportance whether a native enemy be double or treble that amount; for when confusion once ensues amongst a half-disciplined multitude, it doubtless is greater in proportion to the number. In the battle of Ferozeshuhur, the fate of the day was committed to the gallantry and bull-dog qualities of the British soldiers, and the issue proved that they had not been over-rated; but as these were resources which would always have remained in reserve, and ready for action when called upon, a question may be raised as to the policy of employing this reserve before the advantages of strategy had been employed. The result of this action would hardly answer to establish a precedent for the repetition of similar measures under similar circumstances; |