will not be such a one as will be benefi-. cial to the public. I think the phraseology of this proposed amendment, perhaps, might be open to some objection; but the general scope and idea is good, and I am astonished that it should have met with any opposition at all. I trust it will be adopted by a large vote.

Mr. EWING. Mr. Chairman: After what has been already said, I do not think the gentleman from Clarion (Mr. Corbett) will make any objection to my stating anything that has been said in committee. We differed, and he and I opposed this section, but for different reasons; that is enough. I was not present in committee when any such discussions as he speaks of took place, in relation to the meaning of this section. I never heard in committee such an interpretation put on that section as is sought to be given it in the discussion to-day.

As I said yesterday, I do not care anything about this section being adopted as a whole. I will vote against it. That portion of the section which the gentleman from Clarion (Mr. Corbett) desires to strike out contains the only thing of value that is in the entire section. The gentleman to my right, from Crawford county, (Mr. Minor,) stated very properly and to me, satisfactorily, that it is useless to adopt the first portion of the section, that is, leaving the section as it would stand if the amendment now under consideration should be adopted. It is nothing more than a substantial copy of our statute in regard to bribery. I do not think it is any stronger than the common law would be. I do not see any necessity for incorporating in the Constitution the provisions of the common law upon this subject. If we do not go any further than that, we had better not do anything at all; and while the latter portion of this section the amendment offers to strike out, I look on as of considerable value, yet the whole section, with that provision in it, is so unimportant, and stops so far short of what ought to be contained in the provisions, that it matters very little whether it is voted up or voted down. It seems to me very common here to express surprise at the positions taken by gentlemen on this floor. Well, we have been in session a long time, and I have learned not to be surprised at anything.

I was slightly surprised yesterday, however, to find learned gentlemen discussing for two or three hours the question of the effect of certain sections of the Constitution

in regard to the vote upon the passage of bills, which is undoubtedly a matter that has been decided, over and over again, by competent courts in this country and well settled, and yet it was discussed as though there had been no decision at all upon the question. This section has been seriously discussed, and particularly by the learned and eloquent gentleman from Philadelphia, (Mr. Biddle,) who is, as a general thing, right on all questions. He argues that this provision would apply to any man who had any interest, eitheir directly or indirectly, in legislation. The learned gentleman from Montgomery (Mr. Corson) has told us that this section might interfere with the employment of the family physician, who might be a member of the Legislature, and a question of vaccination. These gentlemen overlook altogether the wording of this section. It is special or personal interests in legislation that is the test. I would prefer the word "private" to the word "personal," and in committee I have to say I never heard it suggested, although, probably, it was when I was not present, that this provision would apply to cases of general legislation. It never occurred to me-and 1 think it never occurred to any of those who were in favor of that particular amendment—that it would bear any other interpretation, and I suppose that some gentlemen who are in favor of it had some experience in those matters. There is an act of Congress, I believe, that prohibits a member of Congress, who has a special or private interest in the bill under consideration, from voting on such a bill. The precise words of that act I am not able to give, but I think it is very similar to the words of this section.

Now you, Mr. Chairman, are perfectly familiar with the construction of that act or rule which prohibits a member from having a special interest in any bill pending in that body from voting on the bill. I recollect a few days before the adjournment of Congress, recently, that this precise question came up in that body, and it was decided that a certain member had not the right to vote on a question involving the rights of the Union Pacific railroad because he was a stockholder, and because in that particular bill he had a special interest. Now, that would be the case here. On the other hand, it has been decided, and 1 recollect, as an illustration of the proper construction of the rule, given in the case to which I refer, that where the act under

consideration was a general law, affecting all similar institutions in the United States, the member had a right to vote; and the case of a member who was a stockholder in a national bank was given by the Speaker as a case in point, and the rule would not, in case of such member, being such stockholder, have a special or private interest that would prevent him from voting. I think that is the proper interpretation of this section, and Iam surprised to find that any gentleman should give it any different interpretation, and 1 do not think it is fairly capable of a different interpretation. I suppose this clause is a matter of very considerable importance, and my impression is that a very large amount of the actual bribery of members of Congress and members of the State Legislature occurs in precisely the way that is prohibited in this section-that is that members upon the floors of these bodies are the paid and retained agents of parties having a special interest in the legislation that is to be enacted.

Mr. LANDIS. Mr. Chairman: I desire to make a single observation in connection with the subject under discussion. I have not thought very much about the proposition in regard to whether a person who is the attorney of a railroad corporation or the employee of a railroad corporation, or becomes so after his election, or the agent or employee of a person who expects to have a personal interest in legislation, but, sir, it strikes me as manifestly improper, whether that be right or wrong, that this proviso should be annexed to the section proposed here for adoption. The section proposes to specify what shall constitute legislative bribery, and concludes by declaring that one who, after his election, shall become the attorney or employee of a corporation or person, knowing that such person or corporation expects to have a special interest in the legislation, shall be guilty of bribery. A person may occupy that relation to a "corporation" or "person" at the very time of his election, and not know that such " corporation" or "person" expects to have a special interest in the ensuing legislation, and though not guilty of bribery, he might be even more objectionable than the man who comes into the same relation after his election; and because the latter happens to occupy that position and is elected to this office, or rather comes unwittingly to occupy that position after his election, he becomes guilty of an offense which, in all

the history of judicial investigation, was never before known to be an offense.

Now, sir, as to whether this Convention ought to take cognizance of any such supposed irregularity, I will not now discuss, but certainly it strikes me as manifestly improper that this proviso should be appended to the section which defines what legislative bribery is. I conceive it to be a question solely of eligibility or of disqualification. It is a question that ought to be met by the Committee on the Legislature in determining who are eligible candidates forthat office, or how they may be disqualified. Certainly it is not a question to be determined here under the broad provisions as to what is a legislative offense and what is the offense of bribery.

Mr. EWING. I would like to ask the gentleman a question. If the gentleman will look at the section, I desire to ask him if he does not find that the section simply prevents a person from acting as attorney for a corporation after his election as a member of the Legislature.

Mr. LANDIS. I do not think that it matters at all. It does not meet the point 1 wish to make. 1 take it, whether he has been the attorney before his election, or becomes so after his election, it could not make any difference, unless his appointment of attorney or agent be made a consideration for future legislative services.

Mr. McVEAGH. I think the point of difference in the minds of many members is this: That if the people choose to elect a person who has antecedently sustained the relation of counsel to corporations, to represent them in the Legislature, they hove a perfect right so to elect them, and he would have a perfect right so to serve, if that fact were known, that it was a relation existing antecedent to his election as a member of the Legislature, because otherwise. it would narrow the right of the people to elect members of the Legislature.

Mr. LANDIS. I understand that to be the case, but I said at the outset of my remarks that I did not desire to discuss that part of the question. I said that question ought to come up in the shape of a separate proposition, and that I had not arrived at any definite conclusion as to the manner in which that branch of the subject should be treated, but I say that it is a question that looks more to eligibility and disqualification for the office than it does to the offense of bribery as we have understood the offense of bribery

under its legal definition, and ought not to be included in this section. That is the point I desire to make, and therefore I find myself forced to the conclusion of voting in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Clarion (Mr. Corbett.)

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman: It seems to me that the amendment made by the gentleman from Clarion (Mr. Corbett) ought to receive the approbation of the committee of the whole. The first part of this section seems to me to be an eminently proper provision, as it clearly defines what shall constitute bribery, but the second portion of the section seems to me to be objectionable in many respects. The section is properly divided into two parts, the first of which reads as follows:

"A member of the Legislature shall be guilty of bribery, and punished as shall be provided by law, who shall solicit, demand or receive, or consent to receive, directly or indirectly, from any corporation, company or person, any money, testimonial, reward, thing of value, or of personal advantage, or of promise thereof, for his vote or official influence, or with an understanding, expressed or implied, that his vote or official action in any way is to be influenced thereby."

This has within it a clear and explicit definition of bribery, and is a proper provision.

he is an agent or an attorney within the meaning and scope of this section.

To make the matter more comprehensive, however, the words "agent and attorney" are followed by the expression, "or other employee of." It does seem to me that the object of the section should be simply to prevent an agent or attorney, or an employee, employed in the matter or thing to which the legislation is to relate from participating in the legislation. But this goes much further than that, and says that all agents, whether general or special, all employees, however they may be employed, and all attorneys, whether their employment by general or special, are rendered incapable of taking part in legislation in behalf of their principals or employees. 1 think that this is too sweeping and broad.

And further, the language of this sec tion is, "knowing such corporation orperson has or expects to have any personal or special interest in the Legislation of the Commonwealth." A special interest, Mr. Chairman, is not an individual interest. Whilst all the people of the Commonwealth have a general interest in all general laws, I apprehend that all banking institutions have a special interest in a general banking law; all railroad companies have a special interest in a general railroad law; all men who stand charged with murder have a special in

"Or who shall, after his election and during his term of office, consent to become, or continue to act as the agent, attorney or other employee of any corporation or person knowing such corporation or person has, or expects to have, any personal or special interest in the legislation of the Commonwealth."

Now, an agent may have a general employment or authority from his principal, or he may only be delegated and empowered to execute some special matter; and it is not stated here that his agency must appertain to the business to which the legislation relates. He may be an agent in one direction, whilst the legislation proposed lies in another. The same may be said of an attorney. A man may have a general employment as an attorney for a corporation or an individual, and thus be interested, as such attorney, in all the affairs of his principal, and in all that he does. Or he may be an attorney, specally employed for some single case which his client has in hand. In either case, however,

crime or prescribes its punishment. The word "special," I believe, has its origin from species, as general has from geuus; while genus denotes the whole of a kind, and species a class, so a general law applies to the whole community, and a special law to a class of the community. That is, in some respects, a special law which defines the rights and duties of a banking company; that is a special law which defines the status of a railroad company; that is a special law, too, in the same sense, which relates to a specific offense, or to any special thing, or class of interests, or persons. Just as genus and species are relative terms, so are their derivations general and special; and the general law appertains to everybody throughout the State, whilst a special law has application to a particular class.

Now, look at the effect of this: "Knowing such corporation or person has, or expects to have, any personal or special interest," &c. Why, the attorney of a banking institution of the Commonwealth must resign his seat in the Legislature

the people and the people alone, he shall not then become an agent of anybody else but the people, especially any person of persons who have an interest in legislation. Now, sir, if that is the meaning or this, if that is the meaning and intent of this, who can say there is anything wrong in it, or who should object to it?

Mr. CUYLER. Mr. Chairman: May I ask the gentleman how he disposes of the words, or continue to."

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Mr. C. A. BLACK. Mr. Chairman: do not think that has reference to previous employment. I am willing, however, to strike it out. I had some hesitation about that, but am willing to omit it, and merely say that after his election he shall not become the agent of any other party than the people. I agree that the people have the right to elect an attorney of a corporation to the Legislature if they choose to do so. They then know all about it. They know who they are voting for, and should take the responsibility,

Mr. MACVEAGH. Mr. Chairman: Is the gentleman willing to strike out after the word "become," the words, "or continue to act?"

Mr. C. A. BLACK. Yes, sir; I will strike that out, and then there can be no objection to the latter part of this section. I was going on to speak as to the policy of electing an agent of a corporation to the Legislature, that the people have the right they are doing, and act understandingly.. to do, if they so desire. They know what But a person who is elected without such previous keowledge, a man who has not been the agent or attorney of any person or corporation, ought under no circumstances to become agent or attorney of of any company or individual seeking, or having an interest in legislation. To amend it is utterly destructive to the purity of legislation.

Mr. CUYLER. Mr. Chairman: Is a further amendment in order?

Mr. BIDDLE. That has been offered this morning.

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Mr. BUCKALEW. Mr. Chairman : I shall vote for this amendment to strike out this clause. I think, sir, it would look very badly on the face of the Constitution to make the mere fact of attorneyship, continued after the election of a member of the Legislature, under the incorporated law of the State, bribery. Think of it. A mere appearance before a justice of the peace in some case where a corporation might be interested, an argument in the Supreme Court upon some question haying no relation at all to anything pending at the Legislature that session, or likely to come before it, that that should be the deep and infamous offense of bribery. think, sir, it is one of the most astonishing provisions I ever heard of. I would be willing to vote for a clause of this sort if the Committee on Legislation will bring it in, that is: That no attorney of any incorporated company shall be permitted to speak or to vote on any question in which his corporation was concerned while a member of either House. That would apply a familiar principle. If we put in the paramount law the doctrine that no member shall act upon any measure in which he is personally interested, that is a yery proper regulation. I consider that it would be a good extension of that rule or principle to apply it to agents of incorporated companies, and say that they shall not represent their corporation by their own vote or their own speech. But I would not disqualify them from acting as agents of the people in the general business of the government of the State. Certainly the section which I have indicated would be amp le, and it is the only reasonable one which we can impose, if we are to impose any, in the fundamental law.

Mr. MACVEAGH. Mr. Chairman: Is it in order to move, as an amendment to

Mr. CUYLER. I was about to suggest, sir, that we extend this principle a little further, and provide that nobody who has any interest in property shall be a member of the Legislature, and if an amendment to the amendment is in order, I will submit what I have embodied in a few sentences.

Now, shall any individual, owning any property whatsoever, real or personal, be elected to the Legislature, lest he participate in legislation affecting property?