great resources in provision, in forage, in materials, in workmen furnished by the suburbs and villages that we occupied. The inhabitants themselves (whose rising we sometimes feared) formed a good opinion of an army that was not hid within the walls of the place, and hence put more confidence in it; or at least were kept more to their duty by the idea that they had of its power. Let us suppose that an enemy endeavours to reduce the siege to a species of blockade, or small partial sieges, the defenders, having the advantage of a knowledge of the ground, can secure all their positions by fortifying only some points. In this manner they keep the enemy at a great distance, and force him to make such an immense developement as must render him weak. "It is desirable that we should seek more than we ordinarily do, to prevent the establishments of lines of countervallation,* or at least to oblige the enemy to construct them at a great distance. The more ground that is occupied, the more easy it will be to have some point to beat the enemy in detail, or to revictual the place. Let us hope that the example given at Dantzig will not be sterile, and that it will serve to confirm the excellent principles expressed by Mons. Carnot in his work on the defence of fortresses, where he recommends that the suburbs should be preserved and fortified for defence, in place of being destroyed on the approach of an enemy, which is too often the case. "Let us remark, that this is not in opposition to the adopted maxim to raze all that obstructs the view within the range of cannon; for after having held the suburbs, hamlets, isolated houses, &c. as long as possible, precautions can be taken to destroy such cover as may be favourable to the enemy, when necessary to abandon it: at least, when forced to take these painful steps, all that depends upon us has been done to avoid bringing such disasters on the inhabitants. This is what occurred at Dantzig, when we were obliged to abandon the suburbs of Ohra and Schidlitz, which were preserved whole as long as we could occupy them. By this distant defence we retarded the bombardment." "It appears clear to us, that in every respect it is right to keep the enemy as long as possible at a distance from the ramparts: to effect which, all sacrifices should be made, in order to increase the morale of the garrison and of the inhabitants, resources of all kinds, the facility of sorties, and the valuable retarding of those incalculable evils that necessarily overwhelm a city exposed to the fire of batteries of all kinds." How many even amongst military men have subscribed to the maxim expressed by Voltaire in his History of Charles XII. that— "Troops attacked in their retrenchments are usually beaten, because those who attack have always an impetuosity that those who defend themselves cannot have; and waiting for their enemies in lines, is a confession of weakness and of an enemy's superiority." A reflection arising from the successful assault made by Charles XII. on the Danish retrenched camp before Copenhagen; but it may be presumed that Voltaire's mind was not uninfluenced by the event which he very soon afterwards relates of the attack made by Charles with only 8000 Swedes on three Russian lines, the first of 5000, the second of 20,000, and the third of a retrenched camp defended by 80,000 men and 150 guns, all three of which he completely overthrew. Yet a calm examination of the circumstances accounts for this extraordinary success, (as much as it is possible to account for some of the To invest a place means to surround it in such a manner as to prevent its holding any communication with the country: the attacking army sometimes secures its camp by forming it between two sets of fortified lines; the one called that of circumvallation facing the country; the other, that of countervallation, facing the place. events of the military career of that extraordinary monarch): for such was the undisciplined and wretched state of the Russian army, that when they besieged Nerva in 1700 with 100,000 men and 150 pieces of artillery, and which was defended by Baron de Hoorn and only 1000 Swedish regular troops, the besieged resisted six weeks till relieved by Charles XII., whereas the little city of Nerva ought to have been reduced to cinders in one sixth of that time. As soon as Charles had taught his adversary, Peter the Great, the art of war, he was ruined in his attack upon the retrenched position of the Russians before Pultawa, in July 1709, although he then led 16,000 Swedes and 5000 Cossacks against the Russian lines defended by 70,000 men and 72 pieces of cannon; on which day Charles lost the fruit of nine years victory and of one hundred combats. That there is much truth in the maxiin just quoted from Voltaire, the page of military history fully proves; but it is not the whole truth, and no just maxim can be founded on partial truth. It would lead us away from our object, were we to follow the field that this subject opens to our view; but we beg to recommend the perusal of Colonel Jones's interesting and instructive memoranda relative to the lines of Torres Vedras, thrown up to cover Lisbon in 1810, as by far the most able work that has ever been written on the just use of field-works. If, as Napoleon said, "the principles of field fortification have need of being perfected, and this part of the art of war is susceptible of great improvement," there is no living engineer more qualified than Colonel Jones to point out the means to effect this improvement; at all events this little volume serves to show that the troops waiting in their lines at Torres Vedras was no proof of their weakness or of the enemy's superiority. Detached Works. It is evident that a single work so situated as to render all approach to it difficult and dangerous, must be of great value in covering the front or fronts adjoining it. But it is difficult to give any minute directions respecting such works, as their construction and value must solely depend on their inaccessibility, either from being situated on a rock or surrounded by an inundation or a marsh. If in low marshy ground, the principal faces of such a detached work should, if possible, be directed either on the main works or upon some obstacles, so as to prevent an enemy aligning himself with their prolongations to enfilade them; and while the guns of such a work should command all the approaches to it, the embrasures should not admit of enemy's batteries firing directly into them to dismount the guns. Detached works (usually) are necessarily small, consequently good bombproof cover is absolutely requisite to prevent their being readily reduced by bombardment; but, above all, it is of the utmost importance to be able to carry succour to the advanced work by a sure and covered communication. We have examples of detached works open at the gorge, and enclosed all round; depending on their distance from the main works of the place. If open at the gorge, the whole of the interior should be exposed to the fire of the place: generally, however, detached works are redoubts or forts, that is, works enclosed all round. On a flat dry space in the middle of a marsh at Menin, there are two horn-works, the one placed beyond the other. At Namur, the heights are occupied by strong redoubts within the range of each other's fire. Fort Christoval occupies the summit of a rocky height at 500 yards distance from the fortress of Badajoz, from which it is separated by the river Guadiana, (it is an irregular square fort, see Jones's Sieges, plate 1, vol i.) This fort offered a good and successful resistance when defended by the French against the Allied army under the Duke of Wellington: First, from the 8th to the 12th of May 1811, when the besieging army marched out to meet Marshal Soult, who approached with the intention of relieving Badajoz, and which brought on the sanguinary battle of Albuera on the 16th of May; secondly, on the return of the army to resume the siege of Badajoz on the 29th of May, when twenty-three pieces of artillery were placed in battery against Fort Christoval (its figure occupying only a square of 300 feet): it was partially breached and unsuccessfully assaulted on the night of the 6th of June. On the 9th of June, the Allies were again foiled in a gallant attempt to storm the breach; and on the following morning the siege was raised. Here we see the importance of a well-situated detached work, difficult of access; for Christoval is constructed on such rocky ground as to afford little or no earth to cover the besiegers; its good defence greatly hampered the means of attack on the main-works of Badajoz. The detached lunette of Picurina at Badajoz (see vol. i. plate 4, Jones's Sieges,) offered a good resistance by the same garrison in 1812, in the successful attack by the Duke of Wellington's army. The attack commenced on the 17th of March, and the Picurina was gallantly carried on the night of the 25th March. Picurina is a work shaped like a bastion, having two faces of 200 feet each, and two flanks of 70 feet each; also a covered-way and glacis, and closed at the gorge by a slight earthen breast-work well palisaded: it occupies a height about 400 yards from the main-work, from which it was then separated by a temporary inundation of the stream Rivillas. It is of importance to dispute with an enemy every post capable of defence without the place; and even strong buildings often afford the means of doing so for instance, the French garrison that defended St. Sebastian in 1813, occupied the convent of St. Bartolomeo at about 700 or 800 yards in advance of the works of the town, and on the isthmus, which they strengthened by a small redoubt: when besieged by the Allies under the Duke of Wellington, a period of six valuable days was occupied in reducing it, causing an expenditure of 2505 18-pound round shot, 19 18-pound grape, 331 8-inch shells, and 143 6-inch spherical shells. Remarks. It appears from the foregoing properties of retrenched camps and detached works, that an inferior army on the defensive can seldom fail to find a formidable position on which to defend a town or place of consequence: no doubt a fortified place will afford better support to such a position than an open town; but still it appears that much may be done by a zealous and intelligent co-operation of the civil and military authorities of a nation when united against an aggressor. So far has this opinion been carried, that it has been asserted that it is quite needless to expend such immense sums of money on the construction of the regular works we have described as constituting the defences of a fortress; and that it will suffice to throw up strong forts around a place, (as shown in Fig. 72,) and connect them by lines of field-works in the day of need. Like most novelties, this has been pushed too far. To defend extensive positions covering large towns, great bodies of disposable troops and a national interest in the war, are requisite: and when such a position is forced at any one point, what impediment is there to the destruction, pillage, and ruin of the town it was intended to cover? History attests the value of good fortresses, which have been, in many cases, the salvation of a state. In our insulated position, as a great maritime nation, it may be remarked, that our great dock-yards and arsenals being our most valuable depôts and positions, this mode of keeping an enemy at a distance from them is of vital importance. The range of shells thrown from mortars averages from one thousand yards to upwards of two miles. An enemy, therefore, who can establish a number of mortars within that distance of a dock-yard or arsenal, would very soon totally destroy it, without any other proceeding. Hence the absolute necessity of constructing strong posts within range of each other arcund depôts of a nature so easily destroyed; a system of defence that we see has been partially followed at our first great naval depôt and dock-yard. THE THIRTY-FIFTH REGIMENT. LETTER OF KING CHARLES OF SPAIN TO QUEEN ANNE. MR. EDITOR, I herewith send you the following interesting letter I have lately found, which was written by Charles King of Spain to Anne Queen of England, respecting the gallant behaviour of the 35th regiment of foot, and the death of its Colonel, Earl Donegal, in 1706. It appears that the 35th was raised at Belfast, in Ireland, in the year 1701, at the sole expense of the then Earl of Donegal; and made a present of to King William, (their facings are orange,) who appointed him Colonel of it, and sent the regiment out to Spain, to defend the rights of the House of Austria, and the Earl, with twelve of his grenadiers, was the first who set foot on shore. His Lordship was made Major-General of the Spanish forces in the year 1704. The regiment was for many years called the Belfast Regiment, and the ground in Belfast where they were first drawn up, is to this day called the Parade. 27th June 1831. (COPY.) B. “Madam, my Sister,—It is always with the utmost satisfaction that I do justice to those worthy persons who signalized themselves by their conduct and valour in your Majesty's service and mine. My Lord Donegal was remarkably so when alive, and his brave regiment the 35th of foot, and more particularly at the last siege of my city of Barcelona, both in his quickness in succouring it from Gerona, and the long valiant defence he and his brave regiment made in Fort Montjuic, where he lost his life in the assault; and it is in a great measure to his memory and gallant regiment, that I am indebted for the preservation of that capital, and it may be for all the possessions I now hold in Spain. "I shall injure your Majesty's usual generosity, by offering to recommend to your favour the family of so worthy a gentleman, and also the officers of his brave regiment; for I know your Majesty's inclination to it; I will only add, I will place all the marks of favour and acknowledgment which your Majesty will please to bestow on the family and the regiment to my own account, as well as the remaining obligation. 66 Madrid, April 15th, 1706. "I am, with sincere gratitude and love, RIFLE CARTRIDGES, WITH OBSERVATIONS ON RIFLE PRACTICE. BY COLONEL MACERONE. I PRESUME it will not be denied that the efficacy of light infantry, in skirmishing, mainly depends on the effect of each individual shot. It has been sufficiently demonstrated, that a smooth barrel, such as the common musket, will not propel a bullet with any degree of accuracy even the short distance of fifty or sixty yards. Hence in most European armies, the light troops or skirmishers have been armed with rifles, which giving to the bullet a rapid rotation on the axis of its flight, its unequal friction in the barrel, and the unequal resistance of the air to its unavoidably imperfect spherosity, are continuously rectified during the whole course of its flight. The only objection to the use of the rifle, as hitherto managed, and which has been held sufficient to exclude its use from the French armies during the whole of the late war, is the inconvenience and loss of time experienced in loading it the powder and ball having to be introduced separately, and it being indispensable, that the latter should be enveloped in a piece of greased tissue, to facilitate its descent into the barrel with sufficient constriction to force its substance into the spiral grooves from which it receives its rotation. After various experiments, I have found that with the cartridge I am about to describe, a rifle may be loaded with, at least, the same precision and efficacy as by the present inconvenient practice, but, at the same time, with very nearly the ease and rapidity of a common musket. I also exhibit a method by which common carbine or musket cartridges, (provided they are of the proper caliber,) may be expeditiously converted into rifle cartridges. Fig. 1. Represents the common paper case, made on a mandrin,* which has its end well hollowed out. Upon the paper being rolled, turned down and touched with glue, the concavity is perfected by pressure upon a bullet. Fig. 2. Is a bit of cotton tissue, of a thickness analogous to the more or less precise agreement of the calibers of the bullet and the barrel. It is a * Mandrin is the French name of the stick upon which cartridges are made. |