66 deed necessary, to calculate tables which are known by the rather uncouth name of " Tangent Practice Tables," similar to those given by Churruca,* and more lately by Sir Howard Douglas.+ Putting e for the elevation from Table IV., e' for the fixed elevation of the point-blank sight," d for the distance, and h for the height of the gun above the water, then the height above the enemy's water-line of the point to be aimed at x= d. tan. (e— e') + h. Aiming, therefore, at a point in one of the masts (the dimensions of which may be estimated pretty accurately) which is x feet above the water-line, the shot should strike h feet above that line. Should it be wished to strike higher or lower than that point by a few feet, the aim must be altered by nearly the same quantity. There is an additional advantage (already noticed by Sir Howard Douglas) in aiming by the enemy's masts, because even if the shot strike above or below the intended aim, the chance of taking effect is of course increased. Table VI. shows the values of x, in feet, the fixed sight being at an elevation of 0° 20′. TABLE VI. Showing the heights above the water-line to be aimed at, sight fixed at 0° 20. 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 13.3 16.7 22.2 30.6 41.5 55.5 72.8 93.1 115.8 141-4 172.0 204.6 From Table I. we learnt that the ratio of the depressions of round to double-headed shot was as 2: 3. Now, from the best published experiments, the range of the former to the latter is about as 3: 2. Hence it appears the depressions are inversely as the ranges. Following the same analogy, it is not improbable that the depression of grape-shot (by which is meant the depression of the centre of effect) is double that of round-shot, the ranges being nearly as 1: 2. Increasing, therefore, the values of x-h in these ratios, we may calculate the elevations for double-headed and grape-shot for various distances, by reversing the process given above. Therefore putting b b equal to the increased value of x -h; tan.(e~e)==" No use, however, can be made of these or any other tables of a like nature, unless we are provided with the means of measuring distances * Instruction sur le Pointage de l'Artillerie, &c. Treatise on Naval Gunnery, First Edition, p. 231. accurately at sea. Distance = h If the dimensions are known of the masts of the vessel, whose distance is required, the process usually employed is simple. Measure the angle a subtended by any known height h, then Many persons when measuring this angle bring tan. a down the reflected image to the water-line, and not to that part of the vessel corresponding in height with their own eye; and although this error needs only mentioning to be acknowledged, the fact that it is not unfrequently committed may serve as an apology for noticing it. It often happens that the dimensions of the distant vessel are unknown, and this inconvenience suggested the following method which is believed to be new. Measure the angle subtended by the space betwixt the horizon and the water line of the distant vessel; calling this angle a and the dip of the horizon d, it is plain that a+d is the angle subtended at the distant vessel by the height of the observer's eye, which is known. h Calling it h, Distance = A small correction is due for tan. (a + d) the spherical form of the earth, which for this purpose may be safely disregarded. It must be recollected that all the foregoing tables of ranges depend on the accuracy of the Brest experiments, and also, that as they were made with a different species of ordnance than is in use in the British service the results are not immediately applicable to our practice; the ranges too, although given for angles of elevations which are tabulated to minutes, have no pretensions to that degree of accuracy. It is often remarked, when attempts are made to introduce improvements in Naval Gunnery, that it is quite useless refining too much, as the errors arising from the ship's motion are so great as to render all others trifling in comparison. To reply to this we should recollect that we can only reach perfection by distinguishing between unavoidable inaccuracies and the errors arising from imperfect knowledge of the subject. In conclusion, I shall take leave to remark on the vast importance of the foregoing subject in a national point of view, and to venture to express a hope that before long, experiments may be instituted on a larger scale than heretofore, which may afford to naval officers some data on which they may regulate the practice of the various natures of guns with which men-of-war are armed. They themselves often have it in their power to make trials, which if recorded faithfully, with all the attendant circumstances (even those which may appear at the moment to have little or no connexion with the subject) might add materially to our stock of knowledge, the more so as these experiments would be made under circumstances similar to those in which their ships would be fought. D. REVIEWS AND CRITICAL NOTICES. COLONEL NAPIER'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA— * VOL. III. 66 IN the notices which we have been heretofore called upon to take of Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War, we have endeavoured, as far as possible, to divest ourselves of every thing like partiality, favour, or affection, and to speak of the performance in such terms as its merits alone seemed to require. Upon these grounds, and upon these grounds only, we have pronounced it to be by far the ablest and most eloquent account that has yet been given of any portion of the great contest. Clear in its details, animated in its descriptions, and abounding with marks of deep (we wish that we could add always of) sober thought, no person, however unaccustomed to unravel the intricacies of military history, can find himself at a loss in following its narrative; while the professional reader discovers at almost every page some great lesson recorded, from the study of which he rises, if not a better," certainly " a wiser mar." This is very high praise we are aware,- -so high, indeed, that we could scarcely name a second work of the kind on which we should be disposed to bestow it, yet it is fully and richly earned by Colonel Napier. We do not say that he is the best narrative-writer of his day-we do not profess to go along with him in all his arguments, nor even to assent to the whole of the postulates on which his reasoning is founded. We do not acquit him of faults either in style or arrangement, for the former, though vigorous and clear, is not wholly devoid of affectation, nor is the latter always such as we imagine that it might have been, but we repeat, that take it for all in all, the History of the War in the Peninsula stands, and deserves to stand, at the head of all similar productions which have yet appeared, either in England or elsewhere. No doubt other accounts of the Peninsular war will be given,—some of them, (one of them at least,) advance still loftier pretensions to public favour, but we are greatly deceived if any other shall succeed in consigning Colonel Napier's elaborate volumes to the oblivion which must necessarily overtake the great mass of similar performances. Entertaining an opinion so exalted of Colonel Napier's work, and as a necessary consequence of the genius and talents of its author, it is exceedingly painful to us that we are compelled to notice in the volume now under review, proofs more and more glaring of the baneful influence of party and political prejudice over minds the most honourable and the most cultivated. If there lives the man whom we could have expected to triumph over such feelings, that man is Colonel Napier. Unconnected, as far as we know, by family or personal ties with any political faction whatever, and educated in a school from which the curse of faction is for the most part shut out,well read, moreover, in classic lore, and of course not unaccustomed to weigh the effects of party spirit both in public and in private, we cannot so much as divine a cause why he should descend from the proud eminence of impartiality, and surrender up a judgment naturally sound and clear, to the guidance of a principle for which we are at a loss to devise an appropriate name. It is to no purpose that Colonel Napier may assure us of his intention to advance no statement which shall not be fully borne out by facts. We do not doubt this-we are sure that he never wrote a line or uttered a sentence which he himself did not believe to be correct. We are convinced • History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814. By W. F. P. Napier, C.B. Colonel H. P. 43rd regiment, and Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences.-Vol. iii. that he is as far above the control of selfishness and envy, as any man living, and that the most uncalled-for assertions which he has hazarded, all spring from a determination not to sacrifice truth on any altar. But we must still charge him with making assertions which he was not warranted to make. It were very idle,-to use no harsher term, in Colonel Napier, to set himself up in array against all the most illustrious statesmen whom England has produced. Who can suppress a smile when he reads in the pages of this military history, a sweeping condemnation of the public conduct of such men as Pitt, and Canning, and the late Lord Londonderry,— not, be it observed, with reference to isolated acts performed by one or all of them, but applied to the whole of their proceedings as members of the King's Cabinet? Nor are the Whigs treated with greater mildness by this, their advocate elsewhere. My Lord Grey comes in for a few hard knocks, well merited doubtless, but bestowed in a temper the reverse of bland. Now, with all due submission to Colonel Napier's superior talents, we must be permitted to say, that such things done as he has done them, exhibit proofs of a very defective taste. They remind us of a silly body of a Scotch divine, with whom we were in our youth acquainted, and who used to threaten to favour the world with a volume of sermons, because Hooker, Barrow, and Warburton, were superficial writers. But it is not, we lament to say, while discussing political topics only, that Colonel Napier indulges a spirit which, for his own sake, we wish that he had stifled. His treatment of more than one brother soldier is unnecessarily harsh; his style of canvass when applied to the deeds of others is positively unjust. With Lord Beresford we have no more communication than Colonel Napier. We do not pretend to regard him as a rival to the Duke of Wellington, nor yet as a match in stratagem for Soult; but we must protest against the virulent tone which the historian of the Peninsular War has assumed while tracing his Lordship's career both in Portugal and Spain. With respect to the account which Colonel Napier has thought fit to give, of the causes to which Lord Beresford owed his advancement in the Portuguese army, we can only say, that it does not appear to be borne out by facts. Lord Beresford was not preferred, through the influence of his family connexions, to any officers possessed of stronger personal claims. He was not one of four rival applicants for the situation, nor did he know that the appointment lay within his reach till it had actually been pressed upon him; he was selected, as well in consequence of the reputation which he had previously acquired in arms, as on account of the knowledge which he was known to possess of the Portuguese language. In like manner, Colonel Napier's exposé of the proceedings of Marshal Beresford when in command of the Portuguese army, abounds with inaccuracies. He assumes data which he has no right to assume; reasons upon these data after a fashion peculiar to himself, and then jumps to a conclusion that Lord Beresford displayed neither talent nor decision, in any situation where an opportunity for such display was afforded. We could point out various passages both in the second and third volumes of his work, confirmative of these assertions, but it is unnecessary; for the author of a clever pamphlet, entitled "Strictures on certain Passages of Lieut.-Colonel Napier's History," has saved us the trouble. With respect, again, to the narrative of the operations which preceded the battle of Albuera, and the account of the battle itself, we can only say, that we deeply deplore the temper in which they are given. Not one movement was, according to our historian, made aright. There were delays, hesitation, ignorance, gross carelessness, all exhibited by the General-inChief; nay, the very officers commanding brigades and regiments, if they come not in for their own share of reprobation, obtain, at least, no renown from the chronicler of their deeds. God knows how it happened that the English were not annihilated, for if we may trust this account of the business, scarcely a man did his duty. If we be asked whence this disposition to general censure arises, we must confess our inability to answer the question. We can understand why Lord Beresford should find little favour in Colonel Napier's eyes; but what the commanding officers of corps have done to offend the gallant historian we are ignorant. Nor is it only when discussing the demerits of the Albuera corps, that Colonel Napier is liberal of half praise. We are assured that neither Picton nor Crawfurd were officers of a very high order,—that Colborne possessed merely a "natural aptitude for war;" and that others, of whom the world has hitherto been accustomed to think favourably, have scarcely earned its praise. So far we have written under the influence of profound sorrow, not unmixed with mortification; for it is truly distressing to contemplate the diligence with which an accomplished and able historian has laboured to detract from the high character of his work. Had Colonel Napier succeeded in mastering this single enemy to his own greatness, had he overruled his prejudices, given somewhat more of kindliness to his general tone, and where he could not praise, abated as far as possible his censure, he would not have lowered the station of his performance one iota, while he would have gained for it a far more extended approval than it ever can obtain, even among such as give implicit credit to its assertions. It is a great mistake to suppose, that the truth of history may not be preserved, yet contemporary feelings spared. There are many delicate ways of telling men that they are not heroes, besides the blunt statement delivered in its plainest terms; we wish for his own sake, not less than for that of others, that Colonel Napier had selected any one of them. The portion of the war embraced within this third volume, extends from the autumn of 1809 up to the month of June 1811. Of the three books which compose it, the first (the IX.) and a part of the second, are occupied entirely with a detail of the operations in different provinces of Spain. The marches and skirmishes, the attacks and defence of posts in the Asturias, Gallicia, Arragon, Catalonia, &c. are all described with characteristic force and perspicuity, while full justice is done, in more than one instance, to the gallantry and skill even of the Spaniards. We notice this part with the more pleasure, because Colonel Napier has been accused, (most unjustly as we know,) of underrating the exertions of the people of the Peninsula in their own cause; but we cannot pause to do more,-for the defence of Portugal calls for all our spare time and space. The readers of Colonel Napier's History will recollect, that the second volume closed with a brilliant description of the battle of Talavera, and a summary of the retrograde movements consequent on that battle. By this proceeding, forced upon him by the imbecility and misconduct of his Állies, the British General separated himself entirely from the Spaniards; and after resting his overwrought columns for a space along the banks of the Guadiana, assumed more healthy cantonments in the north-eastern portion of Portugal. Here he employed himself during the winter months in arranging those gigantic plans, on the accomplishment or frustration of which the fate of Europe may be said to have depended. He demanded such reinforcements from home as should enable him to take the field with 30,000 British troops; he required that full authority over the military force of Portugal should be given to him; and he insisted that such orders as he should find it necessary from time to time to issue, should be obeyed both by soldiers and civilians. It was not without a great deal of difficulty, and after repeated exercise of that firmness which forms so marked a feature in his intellectual portrait, that Lord Wellington succeeded in obtaining a compliance with these requisitions. The British Cabinet, indeed, came forward to the extent of its disposable means, both with men and money, -though the unhappy expedition to Walcheren had reduced both to a low ebb; but Portugal, a prey to faction, and scarcely true to herself, endea |