last wars, therefore, do not depreciate the art, but those of previous ones afford abundant testimony, that an enemy who was skilful in manoeuvring, has often postponed the commencement of, or avoided a battle altogether.

Reverting to the present period, it is hoped that the circumstance of the comparatively large peace establishment of ships of the line recently stationed in the Mediterranean, has afforded opportunities in reference to this matter, that have not passed unheeded: and in justification of the individuals who are alluded to in the former part of this paper, it may be urged, that from whatever cause, and to whatever extent the alleged ignorance may prevail, it is really less imputable to them as a fault, than to the absence of an initiatory system of instruction in periodical operation, and easily available to the wants of the service. The recent revival of the Rodney and Clerk controversy, having excited an unusual interest, renders the present an appropriate juncture for originating such a system. Through this medium, the principles and miniature practice of naval manoeuvres might be imparted methodically to young officers, whose minds would thus become so deeply imbued with this kind of knowledge, as to place its (at least) partial retention in the memory beyond the oblivion to which half pay condemns so much useful professional acquirement. That some of the active-minded officers, whom the peace has placed in this vegetating position, would readily embrace the proposed means of instruction, may be inferred from the facts, that the prescribed number of pupils in the Senior Department of the Naval College continues complete; and also from similar alacrity having been shown with respect to the gunnery instruction on board the Excellent. It is suggested therefore, that at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, naval manoeuvres should be taught at appointed periods of the year, by officers selected for their competency, and attached to the respective flag-ships at those ports. For this purpose, not fewer than twenty of the finest boats of the ships in port should be assembled under the above superintendance, and should proceed to practise the evolutions that are necessary for the guidance of and preservation of order in fleets, these are few and simple. The French, who were the first people in modern history that reduced this art into a connected form, have swelled their books with a variety of manœuvres, some of which are more ingenious than useful, except as mental exercises, which tend to create a quick conception of resource in situations of difficulty. Every officer, of whatever rank, who had charge of a boat, should in his turn lead a line and direct the proceedings. As combined movements of this nature are simplified in their execution by uniformity of size, and of rate of

in their elementary parts, it might be advantageous to employ ts of the Ordinary for this purpose: as they are of the same rig, there is probably a greater equality in their sailing than the boats of commissioned ships, and besides they work reater certainty than the latter, which are various "s: being, however, for the most part lug-rigged, ing, unless their sails are dipped very smartly, an any others to miss stays, and to gather that in the exercises might create confusion, ntageous employment for these boats, to appro

priate them for this use, solely to the half-pay officers, who should be directed to repair on board the depôt ship to take charge of them. Officers who reside at the above ports, and keep sailing-boats, should be invited to join the exercises in them. Upon foreign stations the same end may be attained whenever a sufficient number of ships meet in port, and their other duties will permit. The expense of executing this project would be limited to the supply of a few copies of printed manoeuvring instructions, diagrams, and signals: and some sets of boats, flags, and pendants, besides a little more wear and tear of the boats.

The harbours above mentioned, and the anchorages in their immediate vicinities, include such a variety of hydrographical features, as would enable the little fleets not only to practise every description of manœuvre, but also to repeat and elucidate all those that are celebrated in naval history. An interesting employment would thus be supplied for the young officers of guardships and others, that would usefully occupy some portion of the time that is now too often wasted, and a foundation might be thus laid for future individual distinction, resulting from the performance of eminent national services.

Since the foregoing observations were written, the guard-ships have been assembled, and report states, for the purpose of sailing upon a cruise of evolution: if this should prove correct, the measure seems to recognise the policy of giving the peace-formed officers some practice in that part of their duty; and the writer would finally remark, with a feeling of sincere respect for the officers who command the ships of the squadron, that the cruise may not prove valueless to them either, for a naval historian of Lord Howe's battle states, that some of the captains, from having been long unemployed, showed an ignorance of manoeuvring."

66

PROTEUS.

THE EFFECTS OF INEXPERIENCE IN NAVAL AFFAIRS ON THE PART OF THE ARMY-WITH A REMEDY.

TO THE KING.

SIRE,-As an officer of long standing in your Majesty's service, and having observed frequently in my humble services during the late war, where I felt, and witnessed in others, the awkwardness of a total ignorance of naval affairs, with its consequent inconvenience and ill effects upon the army generally, I am induced to call the circumstance to your Majesty's notice, and at the same time most humbly to point out a remedy.

Here I beg leave to remark, that in giving army officers a knowledge of naval affairs, I do not mean that they should in any respect infringe upon, or usurp the naval officers' profession, which should, and must be, held whole and entire. I should qualify the expression "ignorance of naval affairs," and rather term it " a want of knowing how to act promptly with the navy." My object will better appear when I remind your Majesty of the helpless state of our battalions

during and after a disembarkation, and the danger of such a state of things in the vicinity of an enemy; all owing to the want of practical experience in the officers, not one of whom, perhaps, in fifty, ever served with a floating armament; even field officers, commanding regiments, not knowing how to place their own persons in a boat. This deficiency must be familiar to those who served on coast operations in America, more particularly at New Orleans, and in Holland, &c. &c. &c. I need not take any further pains to establish the truth of my position; the thing is notorious, and is acknowledged by all my military acquaintance.

When it is recollected that our military operations are almost always combined, is it not evident that the army officers, or a portion of them, should be so far acquainted with the sea and the ship, as to be enabled to attend to their men, to the interior economy, and the several important duties connected with the arrangement of their battalions, instead of being, as has been seen too frequently, solely occupied with their own persons and baggage, all owing to the helplessness we feel when embarked on a new element?

To obviate this dangerous inconvenience is the object by which I am induced to offer these remarks, and for which purpose I beg leave most humbly to state to your Majesty, that having lately visited Chatham, I there witnessed the combined duties of the troops of the line with those of the marines: there they take the duties of the garrison, and act together in brigade; and there it at once occurred to me how easy it would be to invest the one branch of your Majesty's service with the practical experience of the other, and that all this may be done without working any great change in long established systems, or of causing the least occasion of jealousy in the minds of the most tenacious for the honour of their several departments or branches of service, and without any other alterations than that of allowing an interchange of commissions between the army and marine officers, as at present exists between the officers of one regiment of the line and those of another. It is clear that this may be effected without any other change whatever in the systems at the Admiralty or Horse Guards. It requires no change of private men, no change of discipline, no giving up or change of authority in either department; and as to the patronage usual in the disposal or interchange of commissions, a satisfactory arrangement may be made without difficulty, to prevent any inconvenience on that head.

It may not be necessary or practicable that all officers should serve at sea, but when the field officer is called upon to consult with the naval commander, a twelve-month's previous service at sea would in many cases enlighten and render him more capable of giving his opinion. Did the present severe duties of the army permit, how desirable would it be that a portion of intelligent men were serving in your Majesty's ships, visiting other countries, and practising on a small scale measures so necessary to be acquainted with in time of war and armaments; such officers returning to the army, either by exchange or promotion, would carry to their messes a fund of useful information, which is at present confined to a branch of the service, whose members have no inducement or opportunity of imparting it. Sire, much, very much more might be urged in favour of this measure, and I firmly believe if

cavalry are usually held in reserve, to charge lines, columns, or squares of infantry, or bodies of cavalry, as opportunities for their acting may offer. It must be apparent enough to every man who has served in the field, that the cavalry, especially the hussars and light dragoons, are always on the qui vive, and that they are much harassed in guarding from surprise thousands of their comrades who repose in camp or bivouac, relying on the activity and alertness of those in their front. The duties of light infantry are much on a par with those of the light cavalry, the former being at hand, (although it often happens otherwise,) to support the latter, and generally intermixed with them in outpost duties of all kinds, advance and rear-guards, &c. &c. &c.

It would consequently be absurd to deny, that on the light cavalry and light infantry devolve the most arduous, active, and trying parts of campaigning, when two armies are put in motion, when they commence manoeuvring, and when they approach each other with a view of giving battle. The particular nature of the duties allotted to the light troops, bringing on an infinity of skirmishes that count for nothing in the Gazette, but in which many a good fellow gets a broken head, and is never mentioned or thought of after, because affairs of posts, (as they are styled by those rearward,) do not come under the head of general actions. Let it not be forgotten that in general engagements also the light troops take a very prominent part; and those who fancy, (as I have known some theorists declare,) that as soon as an army has concentrated, taken up its position, and offered battle to its antagonist, the business of the light troops has principally ceased, betray a woeful ignorance of the actual state of affairs in such cases.

Infantry of the line on many occasions during a campaign, are obliged to take a proportion of outpost duty, and they must unavoidably do so when an army occupies an extended line of position, and when each division is pushed forward near its enemy, as was the case with most of ours in the Pyrenees in 1813. The same observation is applicable to heavy cavalry, which is very commonly necessitated also to take a share of outpost duty.

That by far the greater portion of hammering, milling, and downright hard fighting, has fallen on the shoulders of the infantry in every action fought by the British army for the last thirty years, the following battles will fully attest:-Alexandria, Maida, Roliça, Vimiera, Corunna, the passage of the Douro, Talavera, Gen. Crawford's action on the Coa in 1810, Busacco, the various actions during Massena's retreat out of Portugal, terminating with that at Sabugal, Barossa, Fuentes d'Onore, Albuera, the surprise of Gen. Gerard's division by Lord Hill, Salamanca, Vittoria, the various battles in the Pyrenees, the passage of the Bidassoa, and the storming of the entrenched position in the pass of Vera in October 1813, Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, Tarbes, Toulouse, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo.

I must not omit to mention the thousands of infantry that perished at the sieges of Rodrigo, of Badajoz, at the fortified convent in Salamanca, a short time previous to that memorable battle, at the assault of the forts of Almarez, at the defence of Tarifa, at Burgos, at San Sebastian, and at the blockade of and sortie from Bayonne. If those are not conclusive, I have no farther proofs to adduce in support of my creed.

Let me not be misunderstood as wishing to insinuate that the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, did not take an extremely active part in many of those operations; but the best proof, perhaps, to those who may be disposed to doubt the accuracy of my statement, will be a reference to the returns of killed and wounded in all the above-mentioned engagements, and the numerical strength of each arm in the field at the time. The hardships, privations, and dangers of campaigning, must not be considered as consisting only in fighting one, two, or more battles in a year, but in the unceasing nightly watching, and the consequent want of rest, which falls so particularly on the cavalry and infantry; I repeat that those harassing duties devolve exclusively on them, because neither artillery nor engineer, strictly speaking, ever take any share of the very advanced posts. Indeed, from the nature of their service they cannot possibly be supposed to do So. At the conclusion of a march, the guns are parked, the horses picketed, and the gunners encamped for the night; the whole well guarded by posts of cavalry and infantry far advanced in their front.

I served many years with a part of the army to which a troop of horse artillery was attached, and had, therefore, innumerable opportunities of knowing, that even horse artillery belonging to an advanced corps, have comparatively an easy time of it. Sometimes a couple of guns are sent forward with a squadron or two of cavalry, or with some companies of infantry, when it is intended that the picquets should make a stand at a bridge, ford, or defile; but even in such cases, the guns are necessarily covered and protected by parties of cavalry or infantry in front, and the artillery man can, therefore, repose for the night, whilst the light troops keep a sharp look-out for their safety. If this is the case with light artillery, how much more so must it be with brigades of heavy guns in the rear!

Let me ask my old horse artillery friends with whom I served in the last war, if any of them are still in the land of the living, whether (independent of being exempt from the multiplicity of pickets and other outpost duties, and from the eternal skirmishing which, either in advancing or in retreat, occupied the time and attention of the cavalry and infantry from year's end to year's end,) they had not at all times and in every situation in which it was possible for the army to be placed, the advantage of transporting with them, inside or outside the carriages belonging to the guns, certain little comforts and conveniences for man and horse which the cavalry and infantry very frequently indeed wanted for days together, when the proximity of the hostile armies rendered it necessary to send away the baggage to the rear, whereby the officers, of infantry in particular, having nothing with them, except what they stood upright in, were, not unfrequently, prevented from having access to razor, comb, clean linen, &c. &c. for a week at a time; nor did they know the taste, during that period, of any thing but a short allowance of mouldy ship biscuit, or half rations of tough lean beef, grilled on the lid of a soldier's tin kettle?

I am not ignorant of the fact, that it is contrary to the strict letter of the law to affix one iota of private baggage to the gun-carriages; yet I am inclined to believe that many crimes and offences of a far more heinous nature go every day unpunished than that of transporting with the field-pieces a small portmanteau, a bell-tent, a few feeds of