70,000 men would require time, and give fufficient alarm to collect the ftrength of this country, and for our fleets to ie-, turn home. The embarkations must then be of vaft magnitude, and the operations of an enemy flow, and full of difficulties: But if a coup de main against the Docks is to be guarded againft, how are we to meafure fecurity? Works that can refift 10,000 men, (if a complete fyftem) may with little more expence be ftrong enough to refift 20,000 men, and if we are weak or expofed in any part, 10,000 men may as effectually destroy the Docks as 20 or 30,000; the prefent fyftem will be neceffary to be fecure against ro,coo men, and it will defend us against a much greater number. He went into fome detail to fhew that the French without additional expence in war, only by keeping 15 or 20,000 men upon the oppofite coaft, and when occafion required, by laying an embargo on their coafting veffels, would be at all times prepared in a war to push across the channel, under protection of their fleet, an expedition against our Dock Yards. If 40 fail of the line were to be kept in check by French troops, it allowed a French army virtually to operate as an increase of their Navy, becaufe a fuperior French fleet could force a landing, if our fleet should be inferior. Forty fail of the line at Breft would not oblige us to keep forty fail of the line to oppofe it, except in the cafe of French troops fo fituated as to force a landing near our Docks, if we fuffered our home fleets to be inferior to the enemy. Under this check of preparation for invafion we could not fend abroad reinforcements; and for the miferable economy of faving 500,000l. Jamaica, Barbadoes, Quebeck, or our most valuable poffeffions in the Eaft might fall a facrifice, and commerce and convoys be abandoned, owing to the inferiority of our fleet in thofe feas compared with the enemy's, and our home fleet being confined to channel fervice. ments He reminded Mr. Fox of his arguat the opening of the feffions, threatning us with alliances between the Dutch, the French, the Spaniards, and the Emperor, and a combination of Naval force against us, unparalleled in any former period of our hiftory. If it was true that money could be found to build as many fhips as all thofe powers combined, it was no increase of Naval ftrength to build more hips than we can poffibly man, and in the last war we never manned an equal number of fhips to France and Spain alone, and a very great increase of our feamen was by no means probable. We were told that the best way to fecure our Docks from invafion would be to meet the French upon the Rhine; he thought it would be wifer and better œconomy to meet them on the Ocean. We were told the French did not like to attack us, that they would not keep 15 or 20,000 men in the towns and ports of the oppofite coaft; but by what magic could any member of that houfe fet bounds to the ambition of France, or limit the number of their troops, where great objects in view must justify great expence, rifk, and great efforts. We were told a future war may be a war of alliance. The object of thefe Fortifications is to fet the Navy at liberty for offenfive war, as well as for the defence of our foreign dependencies; and of all wars, a war of alliance ought to be an offenfive war, because if each ally only acts on the defenfive, there would be no conquefts made by either to balance in the terms of peace the loffs which one of the allies, or more than one, might fuftain; and the peace, which could not partially be made for the benefit of the one, muft end in difgraceful and inglorious terms of peace for the whole. To relieve our Navy from local ftationarv fervice thefe forts were meant to be erected. If we are weak it is the more neceffary: but even if we could launch half our forefts, and cover the wide occan with our numerous flects, he wished them to go forth for offenfive war, for extenfion of empire, protection of commerce, and for the glory of the British arms, but ftrongly reprobated their being obliged to lie idle, flationary, and sheltered in our ports, a mere defenfive, inglorious, unprofitable force. Speaking of the bad confequence and imbecillity of the 'American war, he concluded by obferving, that although it had been faid the fun of Britain's glory was funk in our weftern hemifphere, we had the confolation to fee a glorious fun rife in our own horifon, which though accufed of not being yet in its meridian, had already fhed its happy influence on this ifland, fo as to restore vigour to the conftitution, and fuch ftrength to the roots of our refources as promifes the fairest profpect of growing profperity, and of the future happiness and welfare of the British Empire. He inferred that these were no grounds for despondency,, nor for profufion; but that to grant the necessary fupplies ftate economy, as well as found po fupplies for fo important a fervice, was, or inferiority of our fleets, but if we re-. ject that fecurity, and keep an equal home fleet with the enemy for our defence, he feared fuch a measure myft, in its confequences, naturally reduce our fovereign from being monarch of an empire, to be King of the fingle Ifland of Great Bri ; He entered into fome detail to justify the estimates for the Forttications. It admitted of a great degree of accuracy; fitt becaufs the um ft extent of the wo ks is afcertamed, and the declared obtain. jest of appointing the Military Board, and adopting a fyftem of defence complete in all its parts, was to guard again future alterations which might endanger the fafe, ty of the Docks, and lead Parliament to expences which they could not forelee: tie efore, without another Military Board being appointed, and a Parliament inclined to fortify b.yond what was fufficient to completely defend the Docks, the prefent fyftem could never be enlarged, and it was not likely this would happen, efpecully as the picfent Parliament may in five years foe the whole completed. Hon. G. Berkley faid, that fo much had been fpoken upon the fubject, and fo many abler perfons had delivered their opinions, that he should only trouble the Houfe with recapitulating what he had alerted in a former debate, long before the Board of officers had been appointed; but he could not help taking notice of what had fallen from a Right Hon. Gentleman (Mi. Fox) on a former day, which had again been echoed to day, viz. that the plan afcribed to a noble Duke was unconflitutional. He wifhed when he chofe to make a panegyrick upon his and his own noble relation, that he had stated to: the Houfe in that masterly language which made him the admiration of mankind, what he knew, and felt; that the noble Duke would be the last man in England to patronize, and would die fooner than propole any plan, which could militate agaift the conftitution of this country. He oblerved, the expences may fairly be confidered under three heads, namely, the Lind, the materials and the labour, that the land had been aff.ffed by a jury, and the remainder lay fo contiguous, that its value was easily eftimated; this head of expence must therefore be nearly perfect; that as to materials fuch as ftons, brick, timber, Stc. the prefent exifting contracts with the Board of Ordnance, gives the exact price and the measurement of the plans and fictions, the exac quantity except the calculation for foundations, which in some places might require mo.c, and in fome places lefs materials. But this head of expence mut he nearly accurate, and that with respect to labour it was the only head of expence which could not by any rule or regulation be calculated to a certainty, but upon this and all other articles, a great and liberal allowance had been provided, and one tenth of the calculated amount of the whole, added, that there might be no probability of the effinate before parliament being ex-, ceeded, and the whole amount of new works for Plymouth and Portmouth would be within the fum of 50,000l. the o her 200,000l. was for repairs and complering old works which must be done, whether the new works be erected or not. He remarked, on feveral other parts of the report, and concluded by infifting there were but two negatives (M'Bride and Graves) to fome additional fortifications being neceffary. That all admitted the noble Duke's fyftem, would complete ly defend the docks, in cafe of the abfence fliving faid this, he defired to be un dertlood, that like the Right Hon. Gen tleman, no ⚫es of blood nor any other confideration could induce him to give his vote for any thing, which he did not think perfectly right. As to his own idea of their being unconftitutional, he could not conceive they were more fo, than any others winch were alre adyl egun or fin fhed in England, and to make them fo, recourfe must be had to the Hon. General's (Burgoyne) Catalogue of Improbable Improba bilities. As to the neceffity of fome fortificati ons, especially at Plymouth, to which he begged to confine himself, he was enabled to fpeak with as much, and it would not be arrogance to fay, more certainty, than any man in that Houfe; and if they did not chufe to give him credit for what he afferted, they might call the general offi cers commanding there, and ask them their opinion of fortifications at the critical and important moment when the French fleet were off Plymouth, of which he was a fpectator, and he hoped not an idle one, and would be bound to fay, that not a foul there but wifhed for fortifications. He afferted that the enemy could have landed, and he would not go into fuppofitions like his Hon. Friend (Macbride) as to wind and weather, but that it could have been affected at any hour of the day or night of the time, the enemy remained there, at the very spot which thefe forts were meant to defend He thought the most strenuous opposers of the plan would not enfure us a permanent peace, nor would they enfure us in cafe of a war, the fame honour and abilities at the head of the admiralty, which the noble Lord now there, or his predeceffors poffeffed; he did not know, but if awar happened we might be curfed with the fame mifmanagement in that depart ment as we experienced during the laft war, when our fleets were fent fculking away, and our coafts, our convoys, and our docks left totally unprotected. Indeed when the Hon. General had moved for papers, he thought it was for the purpofe of investigating and probing into the errors of the laft war, and to make the noble Lord account for the loffes we had fustained in America, and those we were near fuffering at home. As to the language of the Hon. Member for that county, (Devon), he was aftonished; he was confounded to hear him affert as the language of his conftitu. ents, that they would not defend the country, or give their affiftance in cafe of - an attack, if this question was carried; furely, the bleflings of peace, und a few years, could not have altered their ideas fo much; for laft war he remembered that very gentleman heading fome hundreds at Plymouth, and fo far from thinking fortifications a wrong thing, they were employed in repairing and ftrengthening the wretched ones which were there already. He then apologized to the House for taking up fo much of their time, but he would conclude with begging them to take notice, that fo much had been faid of our weakness, and our true fituation had been laid fo open, that if these or fome works were not erected and a war to enfue, he trembled for the confequences; but thofe gentlemen who had opposed them, muft anfwer for the event. He wished they might not find an old but homely proverb verified, "That they had been penny wife and pound foolish." Commodore Bowyer pronounced himself a friend to the original motion, for which he ftated his reafons; but faid, juftice and a fenfe of his duty to his country, oblig ed him at the fame time to declare, that a greater degree of attention ought to be paid to the navy, when the fortifications If were going on, than ever, and that both ought to go hand in hand together. The Commodore reprehended the neglect of the navy, during the last peace, and particularly recommended it to minifters to take care that a number of young men were properly trained up and educated for the fervice, fo that in cafe of a rupture there might be a fufficient number qual fied for petty officers. The want of this he faid, was feverely felt at the commencement of the last war. This was one reason for his fupporting the plan; but another, and a stronger was, that as a failor and a well-wisher to the fervice, in which he would give way to na man, he wished to fee the fleet properly employed in war, in annoying the enemy; for he only agreed with the beft writers upon the fubject when he said, that England in a war with France ought always to act upon the offenfive, as in acting otherwife the gave up all her natural advantages, and infpirited the foe. this was true, the propofed fortifications would be of effential ufe, as inftead of cramping the operations of the fleet, it would affift them, as the commander in chief would act with more vigour against the enemy, when he knew our dock yards and our coaft to be fafe and protected. In this plan of war, he thought his friend (Macbride) would join him as he would have an opportunity to display that fpirit of enterprize in the petite guerre, for which he was fo diftinguifhed; but he found, that inftead of affifting, he had opened his lower tier against it; he knew, that he depended upon his conftituents for defending that part of the coaft; but he furely would have acted more for their fafety if he had voted a breaftwork for them to fire over, as he was fure they would have felt more comfortable behind that, and taken better aim, than if op pofed face to face with a French grenadier. Sir Charles Middleton faid, when the matter had been firft agitated a feffions or two fince, he had great fcruples upon the fubject; but he was now perfuaded that the propofed meafure was wife, prudent, and neceffary. The fecuring the dock yards was certainly a great object; but ftill a ftronger reafon operated in his mind in its favour, and that was, it would enable us to have the full ufe of our navy in cafe of a war. This was likely to be a most effential advantage; and had we pof felfed sessed it last war, he was firmly of opinion we should not have failed fo often as we had done. Sir Charles put a cafe in point, and reafoned upon it, to fhew that though we might not be equal to our enemy upon the whole in point of naval force, yet there occurred several situations at fea, in which we might make ourselves fo. Mr. Mofes Hawkins Browne in a fhort fpeech faid he was happy to find that a zeal for the Navy was univerfal on all fides of the Houfe, he hoped that would always be the darling service of this country, but he was aftonished to hear the importance of the Navy urged as an argument against thefe Fortifications, when it was the only argument for them; for they were not intended to fubftitute a new fpecies of defence for the kingdom in lieu of our Navy, but to protect our Dock Yards, and our Dock Yards only, which were our most vital and vulnerable parts, because they were the germe and fupport of our Navy. He obferved, in reference to what Colonel Barre had said, that magnanimity was the best publick virtue in times of vigorous enterprize, or in thofe moments of imminent danger we had experienced in 1779, and in 1782, but prudence was a national virtue as well as magnanimity, and the moft fit to be exercifed when we had a profpect of long continuance of peace, as he hoped we now had, and when we might contemplate to advantage our former dangers, and purfue the wifeft means to prevent the return of them. Fortifications, he obferved, were not new in this country, large fums had been lavished upon them in every former war, but this was the firt time a regular plan had been laid before that Houfe, not dictated by the pref fure of immediate neceflity, not dependent upon the opinion of any Minifter, or the caprice of any Mafter General of the Ordnance, but approved by the firft military and naval characters in this country. This was to him, and must be to moft members of that Houfe, in a great mea fure, a queftion of confidence. But, in whom were we to place confidence, if not in the executive Government calling upon us for the publick defence, and fupported by the names which appeared in the Report, a Report to him perfectly fatisfac. tory, and in the most effential parts unanimous; he concluded with preffing strong ly upon the Houfe that if by their rejection of this plan, by their refuting this confidence they should live to fee our Dock Yards deftroyed, and the seeds and fources of our future Navies annihilated, how could they ever forgive themselves or make atonement to their constituents and the publick? Mr. Courtenay faid, he hoped for the attention of the Houfe on this very important comprehensive question, as he would endeavour to compress what he had to say in as few words as poffible, and would neither trefpafs on their patience by prolix ity or repetition. At the fame time be begged leave to declare, to prevent all poffibility of misconstruction-that in oppofing the prefent fyftem of fortifications, he acted from no perfonal spleen to the noble Duke at the head of the ordnance department. He had always been treated with great civility and flattering attention by the noble Duke, and should ever efteem the approbation, he (Mr. Courtenay) had received of his official conduct from fo accurate and difcriminating a judge, as a fingular honour. Mr. Courtenay then adverted to the very peculiar circumftances under which the Board of Land and Na val Officers was conftituted. It certains ly never was understood, when the House of Commons repofed that unbounded confidence in the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he would appeal to gentlemen on both fides of the House, whether they enter tained the moft diftant ideas at the time, of any intention to make the noble Duke President of fuch a Board, whofe fole obe ject and exprefs purpose it was, to investid gate, and report on the merits of a plan of fortification, projected by the noble Duke himself. If there was nothing reprehenfible but the indecorum of fuch an appointment, he should take but little noë tice of it, but when by this management the country was deprived of the abilities and affistance of some very able and experienced officers, it deferved the fevereft animadverfion. He did not profess to give any invidious preference to one military man over another, not being a judge of the competent merits of military officers but this he begged leave to fay, that in a general view, age, experience, and long fervice, gave a decifive fuperiority in the military profeffion. Still he acknowledg ed there were fometimes, but rarely, il luftrious exceptions to be met with; there were extraordinary characters who maftered every science, rather by intuition than ftudy. But furely the most partial of the Duke's friends would fcarce venture to rank him among beings of this very uncommon and fuperior class. He would therefore fubmit it to the House, as he 00 & was fure it would excite indignant feelings hundred thousand pounds were flated as No; Why was not. Sir Henry Cline ton's name placed on the lift? Early diftinguished for his military skill and fpirit; the friend and favourite of the Hereditary Prince Would it be fufpected that he had adopted the fentiments of the Duke of Brunswick, on the expediency and utility of fortifying Portmouth? Did the Houfe know the opinion the Hereditary Prince gave on that fubje&t? What he did fay probably did not apply to the noble Duke, for he only faid (after viewing the works and posts with a military eye) that no officer who knew how to manœuvre and itation a corps of troops properly, would dream of defending Portsmouth by fortifications. Let us now contemplate the noble Duke President of the Board, declaring ex cathedra, laying down his hypothetical fyllogifins, proving his own data by the modus ponens, and confuting al' objections by the malus tollens, andit the applaufe of his own Engineers, amidit the roar of his own artillery. The noble Duke judiciously attacked tem with the only fpecies of weapons weh which they were unacquainted, and obtained an eafy, decifive, and glorious victory, Suppofe we now revert to the probable expence of thefe projected forti canonsy and obferve their progreffive in creafe, even on the noble Duke's own eftimate. In the year 1783, four or five 1 69,621. was ftated as the prob.ble for |