ports, in order to protect our Dock Yards, and by that means we were obliged to do what Great Britain had never done before-carry on a mere defenfive war; a war in which, as in every other war merely defenfive, we were under the necellry of wafting our refources, and impairing our frength, without any profpect of benifitting ourselves but at the lofs of a great and valuable part of our poffeffions, and which at 14ft was terminated by a nary peace. He drew a melancholy picture of the situation to which we were reduced by the American war, and called upon the Houfe to anfiver, Were they ready to stand responsible to posterity for a repetition of fuch difgraces and misfortunes? Were they willing to take upon themselves the hazard of tranfmitting to the next generation, thofe dangers and thofe confequent calamities which they had themfelves fo bitterly experienced?-The fibject of Fortifications was not now for the first time to be difcuffed; it had been b.fore the Houfe in the courfe of the laft Seffion, and from what paffed then, together with what had been done in confequence of it, he thought there was very little room, compatible with confiftency of conduct, for that oppofition that he apprehended was intended to be given to the medure at prefent. The Houfe, in the laft Seffion, had feemed well aware, that fach an enquiry as was neceflary towards forming a proper judgment on the fubject, was by no means a proper one for it to go into. It had been on all hands agreed, that it was in a great meafure a queftion of confidence, and they had therefore acquiefced in his propofal of fending it to the arbitration of a Board of Land and Sea Officers, to be conftituted for that exprefs purpose.-That Board had of courfe been appointed, and confifted of every thing that was great and refpectable in the two profeffions; they had given the fubject a greater degree of confideration and refearch than had ever been known on fuch an occafion in any other age or country. The Report made by that Board was in itfelf fo direct, and fo conclufive, to the neceffity of the meafure, as ought in itfelf completely to determine the queftion, fould it even appear that the reasons of a collateral nature, advanced in oppofition to it, were entitled to the authority which fome perfons feemed inclined to give them. He explained the general fcope of the queftions that had been referred to the Board-"Whether the Dock Yards could properly and effectually be defended by a

Naval force alone, by a Military force, or by a Naval and Military force combined? or whether it was neceflary that Fortifications fhould be erected for their defence? and if fo, what fort of Fortifications were likely to be moft effectual?" To this they, had reported that neither a Naval or a Military force, nor even both united, could afford a fufficient fecurity for the nation to rely on; but that Fortifications were abfolutely neceffary, and that of all modes of Fortification, that fuggested by the Mafter General of the Ordnance was the most eligible, as being the most adequate to the defence propofed, capable of being manned by the finalleft force, requiring the leaft expence to erect, and particularly as affording an encreafing de gree of fecurity, as they were erected, infomuch as that if any given portion of them were completed, and the remainder unfinished, yet even that part that was fo completed would afford a great degree of ftreng h. He expatiated widely on the characters and abilities of the Officers who compofed that Board, and contended that it would be the highest degree of inconfiftency for the Houle, after having referred the various branches of the detail of the enquiry to a Board of Officers, to reaffume that duty which they had already decline ed as being out of their reach, and attempt to revife and correct the report of the Board. All that the House ought to attend to was the general refult of the report of that Board; for it was itself in▲ capable of inveftigating the fubject mi nutely, and by detail, much lefs was it capable of correcting or deciding on the Report of the Omcers, in order to diminifh the credit of the Report, for the credit of the perfons who framed it, could not be impeached. It had been attempted to be fhewn, that the inftructions given to the Board of Officers were fuch as confined them to the neceffity of coming to one certain refult, by means of data propofed for their confideration, which were all mercy hypothetical, and afforded no latitude to them to exercife their own judg ment. But how was it poffible this could have been the cafe, when to the two first data the whole Board were unanimous in giving their opinion, and their opinion on thofe data were entirely conclufive on the whole of the fubject, for they went, and that (he again obferved) unanimoufly to establish the neceffity of FortificationsWas it, he asked, to be believed, that a Board, confifting of fuch men, could pof* fibly be duped by chimerical and abfurd Mm hypothefes,

hypothefes, fo abfurd and fo extravagant, that he recollected the Hon. General had ftated them as tantamount to a convulfion of nature? Was it to be fuppofed they could be fo eafily mifled and drawn unanimoufly into an opinion on a fubject of fuch magnitude, and contrary to their own conviction?-But in fact it was impoffible to impute any fuch delufion in the prefent inftance, for the answer to the first data was abfolutely unqualified, and pofitive, and recognized the neceffity of fortifying the Dock Yards; the fecond enforced the fame neceffity, it was true, with a provifo;-but of what? the expense of their erection and our ability to furnish a force to man them. He farther observed, on the injuftice of arguing, that the whole refult of the Report was founded on data in themselves, improbable and ill-grounded, when, in truth, the principal data by which the feveral parts of the Report were governed, were not the original data te•. ferred to the Board, but fuch as they thought neceffary to fubftitute and adopt, as a foundation for their ultimate opinions. This idea, he faid, was in itself so abfurd, that the very words in which it had been - expreffed, and which he had before repeated, appeared as if the Gentlemen that had ufed them were in collufion with the Houfe, and endeavouring to put their own oppofition into the most ridiculous point of view. He fhould think it an infult to the Officers concerned in the Report, if he thought of faying any thing more in an fwer to a fuggeftion fo much to their difhonour, as that they had been fo egregi. oufly, and fo paipably duped and deceived by an artifice fo fhallow and eafily detected. Some reliance had been made in former converfations on the diffent of certain Members of the Board, with respect to their opinion, on particular parts of the fubject. The inftances of diffent, however, were not many, and they were fuch as he flattered himfelf could not ftand as an infuperable objection to the general refult. He felt himself rather in a difagree, able fituation, at being obliged, in arguing the fubject before, the Houfe, to attack the opinion and authority of any individual Member of the Board, but with refpe&t to one of the two very refpectable Land Officers [General Burgoyue], who had in any inftance diffented from the reft, his uneafinefs was the lefs poignant, becaufe the Hon. General was on the spot to explain and support his own judgment; though even till he felt for the Hop. General, who, he knew, would not think

himself at liberty to enter fo deeply into feveral of the more delicate parts of the question, as perhaps, were his own juftification alone concerned, he might wish to do. But with respect to the other Officer [Lord Percy], his feelings were more diftreffing, because he was obliged to canvafs his opinion in his abfence. Thofe two Officers had joined with the rest of the Board in their two first unanimous opinions, with respect to the neceffity of Fortifications towards the defence of the Dock Yards; but they afterwards, by a fubfequent propofition, declared, that notwithftanding fuch neceffity, yet they were uselefs, because we were not mafters of a fufficient military force to man them. He begged the Houfe for a moment to confider the conclufion that would follow from fuch premifes, if nothing but certain Fortifications could poffibly afford protection to our Dock Yards, and if we were unable to garrison those Fortifications when erected, what must be the confequence? Deplorable indeed! and lamentable in the extreme. It must be, that we were unable to protect them at all. The nation, however, need not defpond at the profpect thus unintentionally, he was convinced, held out to them by the noble Earl, for whofe character he had the highest veneration, and whofe noble difintereftedness, together with the brilliant example he fet to the nobility of the age, in the active fervice of his country, and the uniform tenor of his conduct, were fufficient to add lustre, even to the rank which Lord Percy already filled. They need not defpond, at this uncomfortable profpect, for the papers that had been laid upon the table, in consequence of the motions made by the ene mies of the measure, clearly proved, that we should by no means ftand in need of a greater force for the purpose of defending thofe Fortifications, than we could eafily afford to that fervice. It would appear from one of thofe papers, that in the year 1779, we had about 53,000 men in South Britain, who were conftantly and uniformly increafing, until the year 1782, to upwards of 71,000. There was also another paper on the table that had been demanded by the Gentlemen on the other fide, which gave an account of different cantonments in which thofe troops had been ftationed during that period; a paper which he could not think in any way material for the government of the prefenquestion, unless the Right Hon. Gentleman oppofite was ready to undertake to prove, that, like all the other arrange

ments

ments made in the courfe of the American war, the difpofition of the army through England was the very best and wifeft that could be devifed. It appeared, however, from this paper, that the number of troops ftationed in fuch cantonments, as might be confidered within reach of Portfmouth and Plymouth, was in 1779 above 16,000 men, and that it had in the year 1782 a mounted by a progreffive increafe to 21,300 in each cafe, including that moft invaluable refource of national defence, the Militia. Let Gentlemen judge from this ftate of our military force, whether it would, in cafe of an invafion, be a difficult matter to furnish a fufficient garrifon for the propofed works. But when it was to be confidered, that our forces in Great Britain bore fcarce any proportion to thofe which we were obliged to diftribute through our then extenfive dominions, and that from our prefent fituation it was not likely any fuch diftraction of our military power would ever again take place, it might be looked upon as indifputable and certain, that we fhould at all times be able to command a force fully adequate to the maintenance of the Fortifications, without in any degree derogating from the refpectable defence of all our other dominions. On this part of the subject, some Gentle men had thought proper to throw into derifion and ridicule the whole enquiry of the Board of Officers, as if they had proceeded to investigate the queftion of Fortifications, without having any ftate of the probable means of fupplying thofe Fortifications with troops for their defence laid before them. But he would defire the House to turn over the names of the Land Officers who fat at the Board, and then to fay, whether there was any foundation for fuch a reflection.---Was the Duke of Richmond !---Was Sir Guy Carleton !--Was Sir William Howe!--Was Sir George Lenox, who commanded at one of thofe places ---Was Lord Cornwallis, his respect for whom he should extenuate if he fhould attempt to exprefs !---Was Sir David Lindfay, who commanded in another of thofe places!--Was Sir Charles Grey, who commanded in a third, and who befides, ferved in the course of the war with the greatest brilliancy, in the remoteft parts of the globe !---Was Genç ral Roy, who at the time was QuarterMafter-General to the whole !--- Were all thofe Gentlemen to be fuppofed ignorant, of the general military ftrength of the kingdom? Or was it to be contended, that, to enable them to form an opinion on

fo broad and extended a queftion, it was neceffary that the returns of every regi ment fhould have been laid before them ♪ Surely Gentlemen would not perfift in such weak and unfounded arguinents!—There was, befides, in the Report, another in ftance of difagreement in opinion, that, however, he thought would be found not very difficult to prove, ought not, and could not be of any very great weight; not from the perfon, from whom the diffent came, being at all deficient in authority and confideration, but from' a circumftance ftanding on the face of the Report itself. The name of Captain Macbride appeared to a diffent to the anfwer given by the Board to the third datum. It was to be obferved, that this datum, toge ther with its anfwer, was omitted in the Report, as containing matter not fafe or prudent to be made public. This confideration rendered it impoffible for him, confiftent with his duty, to attempt to examine it in detail, and to combat the opinion of the Hon. Officer upon its own ground; but yet he had a stronger argument than any other he could be master of, and that was, the opinion of the Hon. Officer himfelf, who had, fix weeks be fore, as appeared from the minutes of the Board, given, together with all the other Members of the Board, his opinion directly in favour of the principle which that datum was calculated to establish. If he was miftating the Hon. Officer, he begged to be fet right; but he believed it would be evident to any Gentleman that would look at the Report, that he was perfectly correct.

Captain Macbride rofe, and admitted, that the Right Hon. Gentleman had correctly stated what he had faid on a former day. He, however must adhere to his former affertion, that the opinion of the naval officers was fully in the teeth of the fortifications propofed at Plymouth; this, Captain Macbride faid, he had Admiral Barrington's authority to cite, whom he had feen and talked the fubject over with on Sunday, and that forendon. The fact was, the naval officers were not permitted to have an opinion of their own manifested.

After Captain Macbride fat down, The Chancellor of the Exchequer again rofe, and proceeded. He faid, that as he had invited any gentleman to correc him if he was wrong in his ftatement, it could not be fuppofed he could be hurt at the gentleman to whom he was particularly alluding to, rifing to corroborate, M m 2

in

inftead of to contradict his reprefentation. The Hon. Officer, then, had formerly united with the rest of the Board in an u nanimous vote upon the fubject of the third datum, and had after an interval of fix weeks, retracted that vote, and entered another on the minutes of the Board diametrically oppofite to it-thus each opinion had the authority of the name of Captain Macbride; and if any dilemma was to arife in forming a judgment between them both, it was cafily folved by referring to the report itfelf, in which it would appear, that, though cach opinion was equally fupported by the Hon. officer, yet the cafting voice between Captain Macbride's firft and fecond opinion was given by the whole Board, with which he acted, in favour of his former one, and of courfe there could be no room for the Houfe to hesitate a moment which of the two they ought to adopt. There was another circumftance which he thought neceffary to ftate under the head of the diffents, from the general purport of the report that he might anfwer it in order; although it did not arife out of the report itfelf, but had been taken up in that Houfe for the first time by the Hon. Officer, when he ftated, that the fortifications propofed to be erected on the lands adjacent to Whitefand Bay, were directly in the teeth of the opinion of all the Sea Officers. He begged the Houfe to attend particularly to the two diftinct branches into which that part of the queftion was divided; one of a naval, the other of a military confideration. That which more immediately demanded the judgment of the naval fervice was, the practicability of an enemy landing at all upon the coaft, together with the various circumstances of rides, winds, foundings, currents, and an-, chorage that might be neceffary, and the probability there was of all thofe concur ring fo as to enable an enemy to land at all, and to remain long enough off the coast to cover and complete their debarkation; the other fubject was for the difcuffion of the Land Officers fingly; and had for its object the moft effectual method of fo forti fying the coaft, as to prevent the enemy, Should they effect a landing, from penetrating into the country. The opinion of the Sea Officers was, that in certain circumftances it was poflible for an encmy to land; and he could only account for the objection of the hon. Officer againft fortifying a coaft on which an enemy might, (as it was admitted) land, but from that gallant spirit and bravery which would all times induce him to turn his thoughts

But

more to the animating and brilliant prof pect of attacking his enemy, than the iefs glorious, but till prudent duty, of providing for his own defence in furnishing the part of the country in queftion with forts, they ought not to confiue themfelves folely to the idea of an enemy's landing in Whiteland Bay. They should confider whether in would be practicable for him to land in any place to the weft of Plymouth; for if he could do fo, then were thefe forts abfolutely neceffary for the defence of that town and its dock yards; they were the very pofts which an enemy would moft eagerly endeavour to occupy, becaufe from them they would be able to bombard the dockyards. Every man that knew our coafts, and thofe, who to their own honour, and the glory of their country, were acquainted with thofe of our enemies, knew allo that it was abfurd to think of fortifying every part of them that could afford a landing place for the purpose of an invafion. The confideration was, where would an invafion be moft detrimental, and there fortify; fortify in fuch a manner, that not only an invafion by fea thould not be practicable, but, that if an enemy fhould have been able to land in another place, he might not alfo be able fuccessfully to attack them there. He hoped, he might hear no more of Whitefand Bay, for it was not the defence of that bay, it was the defence of the dock-yards of Plymou h that was intended; it was not a landing there alone that was to be prevented; it was a landing on any part of the coaft that was to be defcated, at leaft, as far as it had an attack on Plymouth for its object; and if White fand Bay were, furrounded by a wall of adamast, fill Plymouth could not be fafe, until those grounds were fortfied. He hoped, and believed, he had completely done away the whole force of the diffents of the feveral officers to whom he had alluded; and then proceeded to anfwer objections of another nature that had been made. It had been thrown out; and gentlemen feemed much inclined to build upon it, that the whole fyftem of fortifications was new, and unprecedented in this country; this idea he was prepared to combat in the most direct and pofitive manner. The fyftem of fortifications did always make a part of the general defence of England, and he would prove it by the moft inconteftible records of hiftory.

He went back as far as the reign of King Henry the Eighth, obferving that there

was

was from an act of 22d Geo. II. for providing fortifications for the dock-yards, and the fecond was, for a fortification for fome more infignificant place (Milford as well as he could remember) in which the very grounds of the policy now inculcated and recognized. that by procuring adequate means for domeftic defence, the nation would be more at liberty to fend its fleets abroad either for the purpofe of defending her foreign fettlements, or carrying on the operations of offenfive hoftility into the center of the enemy's poffeflions.

was a provifion made by ftatute at that early period, for fortifying certain parts of the coafts. The flatute he would not take upon himself to read, becaufe the terms in which it was couched were become obfolete, and almost unintelligible. The fame policy was obferved by Queen Elizabeth, and formed a confiderable part of the defence provided by that great and glorious Princefs, against the expected attack of the Armada. In the lefs profperous reigns of the Stuart Princes, the fame fyftem was occafionally continued, and again adopted by our illuftrious deliverer William the Third. In the reign of Queen Anne, at the time when the victones of the British arms were forming an era in the hiftories of Europe, at which England looked back with pride, and other nations with amazement: did our ancestors then think it incompatible with their glory, with their liberty, or their conftitution, to fortify the most vulnerable parts of their coafts, as it was now propofed to do? No, he said, there was a refolution of the Commons, not even at the defire of the crown, laying down the neceflity of fortifying the Dock-Yards against any poffible invafion, and thofe refolutions were founded upon eftimates of plans that had been made in the reign of King William. The eftimates of those fortifications amounted to a fum which, confidering the difference between thofe times, and the expenfive times in which it was our misfortune to live, gave no great room for a charge of prodigality against those who had digefted the prefent plan. The money then voted was 300,000l. which, when compared with the value of money at this day, would appear to be no very trifling fum. To come down to a later period, a period to which it might be fuppofed he was fomewhat partial-the laft war, (here Mr. Pitt corrected himself) the latt war! would to God, he faid, we could call it the laft warNot, indeed the last war, but the last on which Britons could reflect without a figh or a bluh-the war of contraft with the laft! the war in which the name of Britain was exalted above the higheft and the proudest of nations; by fucceffes as flupendous, and conquefts as glorious as our late mifcarriages and defeats had been calamitous and difgraceful. What he the policy of adminiftration at that day? That it was exactly fimilar with what was now recommended, he would prove, by one or two fhort extras from the Statute Book. The first

afked was

Thus it might be feen, that in the very best days of this country, the fyftem of Fortifications was uniformly practised and encouraged; but even in a later period, during the Adminiftration of the Right Hon. Gentleman oppofite to him, the very identical plan of Fortifications then under difcuffion had been confidered, and an estimate for carrying them into execution had been prefented to that House. He fuppofed, the Right Hon. Gentleman who fo lately contended for the propriety of Minifters being always ready to make up their minds on every subject that related to the force of the country, and who had himself, it appeared, made up his mind on the fubject, was now ready to give his reafons, for that change of opinion, it was to be feared, he intended on the prefent occafion to avow. For his own part, notwithstanding the great abilities and uncommon verfatility of talents which the Right Hon. Gentleman was well known to poffefs, he was apprehenfive that he would not be able to reconcile to any principles of confiftency, his practice of making up his mind when in Adminiftration, and unmaking it with fo much facility when out of office. He should, however, expect to hear that particular circumftance fully explained, as far as fo extraordinary a change of opinion in fuch a peculiar variety of circumstances could admit of explanation. As to the neceffity that had been fuggefted, would be created by this meafure of augmenting the ftanding army, nothing could be more void of foundation. It had been unanimously reported by the Board of Officers, that the plan of Fortifications propofed, was the best calculated for the defence of the

Dock Yards of any other that could be devifed, and that it was fuch as was capa ble of defence by the fmalleft number of troops. Would any perfon then contend, that a fmaller number of troops, independent of Fortifications, were able to

defend