The general Scope of these Ethick Eflays is as Mr. Pope exprefly declares, to vindicate the Ways of God to Man, which to do he afferts, that whatevtis, is right: All are but Parts of one ftupendous Whole: Ceafe then, nor ORDER Imperfection name: Secure to be as bleft as thou canst bear. And fpight of Pride, in erring Reafon's Spight, And tho' it does not appear fo to us, the Reafon he gives gives for that is, that we only fee Parts, but not the Whole: Refpecting Man whatever wrong we call, And thus Mr. Warburton fays: Partial Evil is univerfal Good, and Providence fairly acquitted. But foon after, he fuppofes an Objector to put in and fay: "You tell us indeed, that all Things " will turn out for Good; but we see ourselves fur"rounded with prefent Evil; and yet you forbid us "all Inquiry into the Manner how we are to be ex tricated; and in a Word, leave us in a very dif"confolate Condition." Not fo, replies the Poet [from 1. 86 to 95.] you may reafonably, if you please, receive much Comfort from the HOPE of a happy Futurity; a Hope given us by God himself for this very Purpose, as an Earneft of that Blifs, which bere indeed perpetually flies us, but is reserved for the good Man hereafter. What future Blifs he gives not thee to know, Now the Reason why the Poet chufes to infift on this Proof of a future State in Preference to others, I conceive is in order to give his Syftem (which is founded in a fublime and improv'd Platonism) the utmoft Grace of Uniformity. For we know this HOPE was Plato's peculiar Argument for a future State; and the Words here employ'd, The Soul uneafy, &c. bis peculiar Expreffion: We have feen the Argument illuftrated with great Force of Reasoning, by by our most eminent modern Divines: But no where ftronger urged than by our Poet, in this Efay He fays here, in exprefs Terms, that God gave us Hope to fupply that future Blifs which he at prefent keeps hid from us. In his 2d Ep. 1. 264. he goes ftill farther, and fays, this Hope quits us not even at Death, when every Thing mortal drops from us. Hope travels thro', nor quits us when we die. And, in the 4th Ep. he fhews how the fame Hope is a certain Proof of a future State, from the Confideration of God's giving Man no Appetite in vain, or what he did not intend fhould be fatisfied; (which is Plato's great Argument for a future State.) For, defcribing the Condition of the good Man, he breaks out into these rapturous Strains. For him alone Hope leads from Gole to Gole, And opens ftill, and opens on his Soul; "Till, lengthen'd on to Faith, and unconfin It pours the Blifs, that fills up all the Mind. He fees why Nature plants in Man alone Hope of known Blifs, and Faith in Bliss unknown: Nature, whofe Dictates to no other Kind Are giv'n in vain, but what they seek they find. 1. 331, & feq. It is only for the good Man, he tells us, that Hope leads from Gole to Gole, &c. It would be ftrange indeed then, if it should be a Delufion. But it hath been objected, that the Syftem of the beft, weakens the other natural Arguments for a future State, because if the Evils, which good Men fuffer, promote the Benefit of the Whole, then every Thing is here in order; and nothing amiss that wants to be fet right: Nor has the good Man any Reason to expect a Reparation, when the Evils he fuffer'd fuffer'd had fuch a Tendency. To this we reply, that the Syftem of the beft is fo far from weakening those naturrl Arguments, that it ftrengthens and fupports them. To confider it a little, if those Evils to which good Men are fubject be mere Disorders, without any Tendency to the greater Good of the Whole, then, tho' we muft indeed conclude that they will hereafter be set right, yet this View of Things, reprefenting God as fuffering Disorders for no other Purpose than to fet them right, gives us a very low Idea of the divine Wisdom. But if those Evils (according to the Syftem of the beft) contribute to the greater Perfection of the Whole, a Reason may be then given for their Permiffion, and fuch a one as fupports our Idea of divine Wisdom to the highest religious Purposes. Then, as to the good Man's Hopes of a Retribution, thofe ftill remain in their original Force. For our Idea of God's Juftice, and how far that Juftice is engag'd to a Retribution, is exactly and invariably the fame on either Hypothefis. For tho' the Syftem of the best supposes that the Evils themselves will be fully compenfated by the Good they produce to the Whole, yet this is fo far from fuppofing that Particulars fhall fuffer for a general Good, that it is effential to this System, to conclude that, at the Completlon of Things, when the whole is arriv'd to the State of utmost Perfection, particular and univerfal Good fhall coincide. Snch is the WORLD's great Harmony, that springs From Union, Order, full Confent of Things; Where fmall and great, where weak and mighty made To ferve not fuffer, ftrengthen not invade. Ep. iii. 1. 296, & feq. Which Coincidence can never be without a Retribution to good Men for the Evils fuffer'd here below. And And this is the Commentator's Support of this Argument in his own Words; for, that I may not make any the leaft Shew of Partiality, I fhall myfelf take no Part in the Argument. So that all being Order as it is, no Perfon ought to repine at suffering for the Good of the Whole: All this dread Order break? For whom? For thee? Vile Worm! O Madness! Pride? Impiety! Mr. Dryden fays, who gives into the fame Way of Argumentation, only his is confefs'd a religious System: Darft thou poor Worm! offend Infinity? As to final Retribution to compenfate for what they call partial Evil, he makes a Deift acknowledge his Belief of it; but how far that proves that it is. right that there fhould be Bad to meet with lafting Punishment for the Good of the Whole; I with Mr. Dryden had made his Deift fay: God is that Spring of Good; Supreme and Best; Elfe God were partial, and to fome deny'd. That |