itself, What faculties and what parts of the brain are mutually connected? This is the grand question remaining to be solved, in order to render our knowledge of the functions of the brain and the organs of the mind precise and practically useful. Let us inquire what progress the metaphysician and anatomist have made in elucidating this point. It is of importance to take a view of the past efforts of philosophers in the science of mind on this subject, that we may be able correctly to appreciate both what remains to be accomplished, and how far Phrenology presents means capable of attaining it.

The mind has been studied, by one set of philosophers, with too little reference to the body; and the laws of thought have been expounded with as much neglect of organization as if we had already "shuffled off this mortal coil." From this erroneous practice of many distinguished authors, such as Locke, Hume, Reid, Stewart and Brown, a prejudice has arisen against the physiology of man, as if the mind were degraded by contemplating it in connexion with matter; but man is the work of the Creator of the world, and no part of his constitution can be unworthy of regard and admiration. The whole phenomena of life are the result of mind and body joined, each modifying each; and how can we explain a result, without attending to all the causes which combine towards its production?

Another set of philosophers, in avoiding Scylla, have thought it necessary to dash into Charybdis, and have taught, that the mind is nought but a combination of matter; and have endeavored to explain its functions by supposed mechanical motions in its parts; but, as we shall hereafter see, this course of proceeding is equally erroneous as the other.

In surveying the phenomena of mind, we are struck with the variety of faculties with which it appears to be endowed. Philosophers and the vulgar equally admit it to be possessed of different powers. Thus it is by one faculty that it reasons; by another that it imagines, and, by a third, that it discriminates between right and wrong.

If, however, we inquire what progress has hitherto been made by metaphysicians in ascertaining the primitive mental powers, and rendering the philosophy of man interesting and practically useful to persons of ordinary understanding, we shall find a lamentable deficiency indeed. From the days of Aristotle to the present time, the most powerful intellects have been directed, with the most persevering industry, to this department of science, and system after system has flourished, fallen, and been forgotten, in rapid and melancholy succession. To confine our attention to modern times, Dr. Reid overturned the philosophy of Locke and Hume; Mr. Stewart, while he illustrated Reid, yet differed from him in many important particulars; and, recently, Dr. Thomas Brown has attacked, with powerful eloquence and philosophical profundity, the fabric of Stewart, and it already totters to its fall. The very existence of even the most common and familiar faculties of the mind is still in debate among these philosophers. Mr. Stewart maintains Attention to be a faculty, which these other philosophers deny. They, again, state Imagination to be a primitive power of the mind, while Mr. Stewart informs us, that "what we call the power of Imagination, is not the gift of nature, but the result of acquired habits, aided by favorable circumstances." (Elements, Chap. 7. § 1.) Common observation informs us, that a taste for music, and a genius for poetry and painting, are gifts of nature, bestowed only on a few; but Mr. Stewart, by dint of his philosophy, has discovered that these powers, and also a genius for mathematics, "are gradually formed by particular habits of study, or of business." (Outlines, p. 16.) On the other hand, he treats of Perception, Conception, and Memory, as original powers; while Dr. Thomas Brown denies them to be entitled to that appellation. Reid, Stewart, and Brown, admit the existence of moral emotions; but Hobbes, Mandeville, Dr. Paley, and many others, resolve the sentiment of Right and Wrong into a regard to our own good, into perceptions of utility, obedience to the laws, or to the Divine command. Thus, after the lapse and labor of more than two thousand years, philosophers are not yet agreed concerning the existence of many of the most important

principles of action, and intellectual powers of man. While the philosophy of mind shall remain in this uncertain condition, it will be impossible to give to morals and natural religion a scientific foundation; and until these shall assume the stableness and precision of sciences, education, political economy and legislation, must continue empirical in their principles and application. If, therefore, Phrenology could introduce into the philosophy of mind even a portion of the certainty and precision which attend physical investigations, it would confer no small benefit on this interesting department of science; and that it is fully competent to do so, shall be shown after we have attended to a few preliminary points requiring consideration.

In the next place, supposing the number and nature of the primitive faculties to be ascertained, it is to be remarked, that, in actual life, they are successively developed. The infant feels fear, love, attachment, before it is alive to the sublime or the beautiful; and it observes occurrences long before it reasons. A correct theory of mind ought to unfold principles to which these facts also may be referred.

Farther, even after the full maturity of age is attained, how different the degrees in which we are endowed with the various mental powers. Admitting each individual to possess all the faculties, the assemblage of which constitutes the human mind, in what a variety of degrees of relative strength do they appear in different persons? In one, the love of glory is the feeling which surpasses all; another is deaf to the voice of censure, and callous to the accents of applause. The soul of one melts with softest pity at a tale of wo; while the eye of another never shed a sympathetic tear. One individual spends his life in an ardent chase of wealth, which he stops not to enjoy; another scatters in wasteful prodigality the substance of his sires, and perishes for want from a mere incapacity to retain. One vast intellect, like Newton's, fathoms the profundities of science; while another feeble mind scarcely gropes its way through the daily occurrences of life. The towering imagination of a Shakspeare, or a Milton, soars beyond the boundaries of sublunary space; while the sterile fancy

of another sees no glory in the heavens, and no loveliness on earth.

A system of mental philosophy, therefore, pretending to the truth of nature, ought not only to unfold the simple elements of thought and of feeling, but to enable us to discover in what proportions they are combined in different individuals. In chemical science, one combination of elementary ingredients produces a medicine of sovereign virtue in removing pain; another combination of the same materials, but differing in their relative proportions, brings forth a mortal poison. In human nature, also, one combination of faculties may produce the midnight murderer and thief; and another, a Franklin, a Howard, or a Fry, glowing with charity to

man.

If, however, we inquire at the philosophers on the mind, for rules by which to discriminate the effects upon the character and conduct of individuals, produced by different combinations of the mental powers, what information do we receive? Instead of light upon this interesting subject, we find in their works only disputes, whether such differences exist in nature, or are the result of education and other adventitious circumstances; many maintaining the one opinion, while some few advocate the other. This department of the philosophy of man, in short, is a perfect waste. Mr. Stewart is aware equally of its importance and forlorn condition. The varieties of intellectual character among men, says he, present another very interesting object of study, which, "considering its practical utility, has not yet excited, so much as might have been expected, the curiosity of our countrymen." (Dissert. Part ii. p. 198). The reason appears sufficiently obvious. The common modes of studying man afforded no clew to the discovery desired.

In thus surveying the philosophy of man, as at present exhibited to us in the writings of philosophers, we perceive, first, That no account is given of the influence of the material organs on the manifestations of the mental powers; that the progress of the mind from youth to age, and the phenomena of sleep, dreaming, idiocy and insanity, are left unexplained or unaccounted for, by any principles

admitted in their system: Secondly, That the existence and functions of some of the most important primitive faculties are still in dispute ; and, thirdly, That no light whatever has been thrown on the nature and effects of combinations of the primitive powers, in different degrees of relative proportion. It is with great truth, therefore, that Monsieur De Bonald, quoted by Mr. Stewart, observes, that "diversity of doctrine has increased from age to age, with the number of masters, and with the progress of knowledge; and Europe, which at present possesses libraries filled with philosophical works, and which reckons up almost as many philosophers as writers; poor in the midst of so much riches, and uncertain with the aid of all its guides, which road it should follow; Europe, the centre and focus of all the lights of the world, has yet its philosophy only in expectation."

:

While philosophers have been thus unsuccessfully engaged in the study of mental science, human nature has been investigated by another set of observers,-Moralists, Poets and Divines. These have looked upon the page of life merely to observe the characters. there exhibited, with the view of tracing them anew in their compositions and certainly they have executed their design with great felicity and truth. In the pages of Shakspeare, Addison, Johnson, Tillotson and Blair, we have the lineaments of mind traced with a perfect tact, and exhibited with matchless beauty and effect: But these authors had no systematic object in view, and did not aim at founding their observations on principles which might render them subservient to the practical purposes of life. Hence, although in their compositions we find ample and admirable materials for the elucidation of a true system of the philosophy of man, yet, without other aids than they supply, we cannot arrive at fundamental principles sufficient to guide us in our intercourse with the world. The charge against their representations of human nature is, not that they are incorrect, but that they are too general to be useful. They draw striking pictures of good men and of bad men, but do not enable us to discover, prior to experience, whether any particular individual with whom we may wish to connect our fortunes, belongs to the one class or the other, a matter of the first importance, be