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Pittsburgh district, thus releasing the Baltimore & Ohio lines for eastward-bound traffic, principally coal from the Fairmont district to seaboard. Or again, traffic which formerly had moved from the Baltimore & Ohio lines in the West Virginia coal regions and the Pittsburgh district via Baltimore and Philadelphia was routed via Rutherford and the Philadelphia & Reading road, thus keeping such traffic out of the congested districts at Baltimore.*

Between Pueblo and Denver, a distance of 118 miles, and between Wells, Nevada, and Winnemucca, Nevada, a distance of 185 miles, the single tracks of two separate railroads were operated as the double track of one railroad, thereby increasing their combined capacity. A similar arrangement on a smaller scale was applied to paralelling tracks of the Boston & Maine and the Central Vermont in the upper valley of the Connecticut.

Between Oakland and San Francisco separate ferry services had been operated by the Southern Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the Western Pacific roads. As the ferry facilities of the Southern Pacific were ample to serve the traffic of the three roads, the passenger trains of the Sante Fe and of the Western Pacific were brought into the Oakland Mole, and their passengers used the ferries of the Southern Pacific. I

The utilization of motive power was made much more effective through unified control. Surplus power on one road or in one region was quickly transferred to another road or region where a shortage existed.* When the shop facilities of one road were inadequate, or were overtaxed by locomotives in need of repairs, some of these locomotives were taken to other roads with greater shop capacity and there repaired. Baltimore & Ohio locomotives, for example, were repaired in shops of roads in the Northwest region.

*1918 Annual Report, Regional Director, Allegheny Region. Ibid., Division of Operation. Ibid.

In the case of freight cars, which had practically been pooled under the operations of the Railroads' War Board, the pooling under federal control was made much more complete. During the greater part of federal control the payment of car hire (per diem charges) as between roads in federal control was waived, and each road was instructed, as regards running repairs or shop repairs, to give the same care to cars of other roads as it gave to its own cars.t

The Car Service Section had complete control over distribution, and shifted the cars without regard to ownership to where they were most needed. In the process of distribution of empties, the cars were often dispatched in solid train lots as, for example, when they were urgently needed in the West early in the spring of 1918 for the movement of food for export. These trains of empties were arbitrarily routed via the roads which could handle them most expeditiously and with the least interference with loaded car movement. The normal car service rules, which provide that the burden of the empty movement shall be assumed by the road or roads which received the revenue from the loaded movement, were set aside. This policy naturally resulted in a somewhat higher percentage of empty car-miles to total car-miles, and caused distortions in the car performance records of individual carriers, but the losses were counterbalanced by a reduction in car shortage at the points where the traffic of vital importance originated.

*The practise of transferring locomotives from one road to another road had been inaugurated by the Railroads' War Board.

+ This plan did not work satisfactorily. It will be discussed further in reviewing the results of 1919.

Mention should here be made of the policy of dispatching solid trains of foodstuffs and other freight of similar character from the West intact to the seaboard. Though this is not an economical method of transportation (because the maximum economical weight of the train varies with the rate of the grades and the power of the locomotive, and these differ widely on individual railroads) the practise did much to expedite the movement of supplies then badly needed on the battle fronts.

The first general order issued by the Director General (No. 1, December 29, 1917) directed that shippers' designation of routes should be disregarded when freight might be moved with greater expedition or more efficiently by other routes. It provided also that traffic agreements between carriers were not to be allowed to interfere with expeditious movement. This has been called the policy of short-routing of freight. It was frequently referred to by Mr. McAdoo in reports and public statements as an important reform instituted under federal control. In the writer's opinion the importance of this factor has been much overestimated. It is true that the annual reports of the regional directors contain references to large savings in car-miles. These, at very best, are estimates, and even if they were correct, the estimated savings were but a fraction of one per cent of the total car-miles. In practise it was found that the traffic suffered least delay when moved via the normal routes. A shifting of the load from the longer to the shorter route frequently found the latter under-equipped for the overload, and resulted in congestion. Savings based on estimated reductions in carmiles were in many cases entirely neutralized by the higher costs of moving the cars via the shorter and more congested routes.

To some extent the strain caused by the unusual volume of export freight traffic was lessened by the work of the Exports Control Committee. It consisted of a representative of the United States Railroad Administration, a major general representing the army, a rear admiral representing the navy, a steamship executive representing the Shipping Control Committee, and a traffic expert representing the Allies. This committee was created on June 11, 1918, for the purpose of determining the probable amount of freight to be exported for war purposes and to work out a plan for its most effective distribution through the several ports. As a result of its conferences, and in cooperation with the Railroad Administration and the Shipping Board, a substantial portion of the export freight, principally for the Allies, which normally would move through the North Atlantic ports, was diverted to the South Atlantic and Gulf ports.

Another phase of unification, familiar to the public, was in the consolidated ticket offices. In more than 100 of the important cities in the country the “up town” selling of tickets, both railroad and Pullman, was concentrated in one office which took the place of a number of separate ticket offices in each city. In New York and in Chicago more than one consolidated office was found necessary, but in the other cities the single central city office was substituted for the separate offices of the local and off-line" roads. At the same time all arrangements between the railroads and tourist or similar agencies were canceled. In all, 101 consolidated ticket offices were established. They took the place of 564 passenger offices which were in existence prior to federal control. In his report to the President, for the seven months ended July 31, 1918, the Director General estimated that the closing of the off-line agencies and the consolidation of ticket offices represented a yearly saving of $16,566,633, to which he added an item of $7,000,000 to be saved by the practical elimination of advertising, making a total estimated saving in the three items of $23,566,633.

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