On this account it cannot be said, that because a man is ignorant of what is proper to be done to discharge his duty, his conduct is therefore involuntary. For this ignorance, in the choice of good and evil, does not constitute an action involuntary, but vicious. The same may be said of him who is unacquainted with the rules of duty, as this is blame-worthy, and not excusable." "Do not," says the Jansenist, "expect any support from this prince of philosophers, and no longer oppose the prince of divines, who decides the point in the following words "They who sin through ignorance, commit the action with the consent of the will, though they have not the intention of committing sin; so that a sin of this description cannot be perpetrated without the will; but the will induces the action only, not the sin, which, however, does not prevent the action being sinful, its contrariety to the interdicting precepts being a sufficient crimination." We shall not be surprised if a lax morality, ere long, will pollute the churches and community infested with the new Metaphysical Theology." Nay, we think we have already observed indications of its development. The views entertained and expressed by our author, on the subject of the "Foundation of Moral Obligation," cannot fail, in our judgment, to exert a pernicious influence on the interests of social morality, and not only to lower its standard, but utterly, in due season, to subvert the piety of the coming generation, among whom they shall be adopted, and carried out in their practical applications. 66 Having assumed that moral obligation extends directly only to the ultimate intention, and that this intention, to be intelligent, must have a reason, he affirms that reason to be "the highest well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences-in other words, the well-being of God and of the universe is the absolute and ultimate good, and, therefore, it should be chosen by every moral agent." This is the absolute goodthat which is "intrinsically and infinitely valuable," and whose intrinsic and infinite value, he says, constitutes the true foundation of moral obligation. He explains himself as follows: "To admit and affirm that a thing is intrinsically and infinitely valuable, is the same as to affirm, that every moral agent who has the knowledge of this intrinsically and infinitely valuable thing, is under an obligation of infinite weight to choose it, for the reason that it is intrinsically or infinitely valuable, or, in other words, to choose it as an ultimate end." This is not the law, but the end proposed and required by it. The moral law, according to our author, is not the will of God, nor His command proposing and requiring that end to be chosen. He utterly repudiates the thought. He says "The moral law is nothing else than the reason's idea or conception of that course of will1 B. I. of his Retr. ch. 15. B. IV. p. 66. 'p. 43. . 'p. 43. 66 It ing and acting that is fit, proper, suitable to, and demanded by, the nature, relations, necessities, and circumstances of moral agents."" "It is the law of nature-the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himself." is the rule imposed upon us, not by the arbitrary will of any being, but by our own intelligence."" "The will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation in created moral agents." Such being his idea of moral law, moral obligation. "is a responsibility imposed on the moral agent, by his own reason. The reason, the intelligence, is the lawgiver; and its judgment or idea of the intrinsically valuable, is the law of God. Of course "sin consists in being governed by the sensibility, instead of being governed by the law of God, as it lies revealed in the reason. "This," our author says, "is sin, and the whole of sin.""" 995 It is difficult to learn from our author what is moral law, what its source, what its authority, and whence it emanates. At one moment, it is the rule imposed on us by our own reason or intelligence. Then, again, it is the course of willing and acting, &c., which is "demanded"-another mode of expression to denote the imposing of a rule-by the nature, relations, necessities, and circumstances of moral agents. Reason, the nature, the relations, the necessities, the circumstances of moral agents, are, according to our author, all sources of moral law; but whether any, or which, is supreme, or co-ordinate in its legislative authority, we are not told. We gather up, in a few words, the leading features of the author's system, which we have endeavored to give in his own language. The "foundation of moral obligation," is the reason for doing what the law requires. The reason for doing it, is identical with the reason why the law requires it. That of which moral law especially takes cognizance is "intention," or ❝ the choice of an ultimate end." There can be no moral obligation to make choice of an end, unless there is something in that end which renders it deserving of being chosen for its own sake. In and of itself, it must be intrinsically valuable. This is "the highest well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences." The highest well-being of God and of the universe resolves itself, "in its last analysis," into "the satisfaction of universal mind, that results from having every demand of the being fully met." The ultimate source, then, ofmoral law is the public good of the universe, and the authority which demands it, the universal mind. Our author's great object, evidently, is to generalize and simplify, and thus to trace all moral obligation, invariably, to one and the same source. Moral law, and obedience to moral law, 1p. 45. 2 p. 6. 9 p. 25. p. 68. p. 25. 6 p. 287. ' p. 59. 1 sys he says, are, each," one and indivisible" the former requiring, and the latter consisting in," one choice, one ultimate intention." Edwards's definition of virtue, an imperfect psychology, and his own exposition of one or two texts assumed as philosophical or metaphysical truths, have contributed to the structure of his tem. But he has not been careful to distinguish things that differ. There is, we apprehend, a very appreciable difference between the ultimate obligation, its source, the best rule, and the immediate motive of virtue. The neglect of this distinction, as an accurate writer has remarked, has led to much confusion in moral investigations. The motive or consideration that induces the individual to act, determines, so far as the rational creature is concerned, the character and the value of the action. As moral law is the rule of action for a rational creature, it must commend itself, as the best and only proper guide of duty. In estimating its character, in this respect, it can lay no claim to be the best guide, unless it obviously is the most likely to lead to, or induce, those motives which just as they have an actuating influence in the mind, exalt it towards the highest point of human excellence. Of course, it will in itself furnish the best criterion of virtue, or, in other words, the best test to determine the moral character of an action. Our author, therefore, in estimating moral virtue, has very properly noticed the ultimate choice or intention, as an important part or element. But what is ultimate intention? He defines it to be the choice of an end for what is valuable in the end itself. This resolves itself into two things, first the object or thing chosen or intended, and, second, the reason or motive which induces the choice. These he identifies. "That in the end which imposes obligation to choose it as an end, must be identical with the end itself."" "This reason is the end on which the choice ought to, and must, terminate, or the true end is not chosen.""2 Thus the immediate motive, the best rule, or ultimate obligation, are confounded; and the author leaps out of all embarrassment, by one dexterous effort; saying, "It is a first truth of reason, that whatever is intrinsically valuable should be chosen for that reason, or as an end." But we must not allow ourselves to be imposed upon in this way. It may be very convenient to fall back upon a first truth of reason, and attempt, by its aid, thus to escape from all perplexing interrogatories and objections. We, however, acknowledge no such supremacy. We worship not human reasoning; nor will we be deterred, by any imputation of sacrilege if we should pursue our author here to the very horns of his altar, regardless of any cries of absurdity, nonsense, and contradictions, by which he sometimes dogmatically attempts to silence a troublesome objection. We must, in all cases, see well 'p. 42, 3 p. 43. 1 p. 42. to it, that it is a first truth, and not a conclusion arrived at by reasoning. If our author's language, quoted above, when applied to his theory, means anything, it means this, that we must choose the well being of God and of the universe, as being our ultimate obligation, because they are intrinsically and infinitely valuable in themselves. This is the demand of universal mind-the rightful legislation of the sovereign democracy of the universe of sentient existences. Of course we must know correctly in what consists that well being of God and of the universe, which this sovereign authority of universal mind demands, before we can choose it as an ultimate end. It is one thing to be convinced or to know, that, "the happiness" of God and of the universe, “the satisfaction of universal mind," is in itself intrinsically valuable; and another and a different thing to know in what way we are to seek to promote it, or, in other words, what we are specifically to will and to do, in order that all the demands of the universe of sentient existences may be met and satisfied. To will good to the universe indefinitely, is like opposing sin in the abstract,-a thing easily done by a little aid from the imagination,—a sort of poetic illusion, indulging in which, we may flatter ourselves on account of our disinterested benevolence, and yet it be too lofty, too grand, too immensely extended, to be conversant with, and to be employed in particular details of actual, intelligent, welldirected effort to glorify God, or to benefit our fellow-men. There are, and must be, some specific acts and ways, in which benevolent intention shall be accomplished; and these must be known, or benevolence is of little efficiency and worth. If ignorant as to these things, not knowing how or in what the demands of universal mind, in its endless and complicated relations, necessities, and circumstances are to be met, our choice would not be intelligent; yea, would be impracticable; and, according to our author's admissions, we could be under no moral obligation whatever to choose them. "Until the end," he says, "is apprehended, no idea or affirmation of obligation can exist respecting it." The end cannot be a mere abstraction-a vague ideality. It must in all cases be something definite, distinct, intelligible, and practicable. How is that end to be ascertained? Whence is the knowledge, essential to its existence, to be obtained? Has "the reason" a self-sufficient power to reveal it? Is its authority final and supreme? Neither the word of God, nor the experience of mankind, sanction the idea. What can we know of the satisfaction of God, and of the best interests of the universe, in the complicated relations of universal mind? Nothing, but as God Himself has made them known. He is our sole and rightful p. 33, 34. sovereign lawgiver. We recognize no such vast democratic legislative authority, as universal mind. The Bible proclaims, "Jehovah is our lawgiver." We therefore rejoice that he has given us His law, made known His will. Mind and conscience feel bound to yield obedience to this. It is just as obviously a first truth, that God is to be obeyed, as that the demand of universal mind must be satisfied ;-yea, much more distinct, definite, intelligible and practicable, and better adapted to men's constitutional convictions and common sense. The moral law comes to us commended as His law, bearing the impress of His own character. God being infinitely wise, just and good, and His law being the transcript of His own perfections-the reflection of His own excellence,-it is obviously apprehended, and felt to be the best guide, the proper rule of duty. Nor care we to look further. Our author will perhaps reply, that this is what he meansthat by a first truth of reason in this case, he understands nothing more nor less, than the instinctive, intuitive perception or conviction of the mind, that the well-being of God, and of the universe is in itself a thing infinitely valuable, and therefore should be chosen. It must be obvious, however, we think to every intelligent reader, that this is not, according to his own showing, "a first truth of reason." For it unquestionably resolves itself into another, which is a mere abstraction, that the valuable must always be chosen for its own intrinsic value. He admits that "the idea of the intrinsically valuable is the condition of moral obligation." On this perfect abstraction, which he calls a "first truth of reason," rests his foundation of moral obligation. As he presents it, it amounts to this, viz: that because we have the idea of the valuable; because also, we are so constituted that we instinctively judge in all cases, the valuable should be chosen for its own sake; and because, still further, the well being of God and the universe are in themselves of infinite value, therefore, we are obliged to make it our ultimate choice. We do not see in all this, that stamp of unity, nor that air of simplicity, which this theory claims for itself. Much less do we discern any practical value to commend it. Human consciousness does not universally bear its attestations to such analyses of moral obligation. But even were it admitted, it leaves still a great gap to be filled-the very thing which we have shown is essential to its existence-the knowledge of those acts and duties on our part, by which the well being of God and of the universe is to be promoted, and sought by us. Our author thinks it sufficient, in answer to the question, in what the well-being of God and the universe consist, to say, in the mind of God and of the universe being satisfied. But still the question recurs, how are we to contribute to this satisfaction? By what means 1 p 34 |