CHAPTER IV.

ARISTOTLE.

THE

HE views of Aristotle with regard to the foundations of human knowledge are very different from those of his tutor Plato, and are even by himself put in opposition to them. He dissents altogether from the Platonic doctrine that Ideas are the true materials of our knowledge; and after giving, respecting the origin of this doctrine, the account which we quoted in the last chapter, he goes on to reason against it. "Thus," he says, "they devised Ideas of all things which are spoken of as universals: much as if any one having to count a number of objects, should think that he could not do it while they were few, and should expect to count them by making them more numerous. For the kinds of things are almost more numerous than the special sensible objects, by seeking the causes of which they were led to their Ideas." He then goes on to urge several other reasons against the assumption of Ideas and the use of them in philosophical researches.

Aristotle himself establishes his doctrines by trains of reasoning. But reasoning must proceed from certain First Principles; and the question then arises, Whence are these First Principles obtained? To this he replies, that they are the result of Experience, and he even employs the same technical expression by which we at this day describe the process of collecting these principles from observed facts;-that they are obtained by Induction. I have already quoted passages in which this statement is made. The way of reasoning," he says, "is the same in philosophy,

2 Hist. Ind. Sc. b. i. c. iii. sect. 2.

1 Metaph. xii. 4

3 Analyt. Prior. i. 30.

and in any art or science: we must collect the facts (Tà váρɣovтa), and the things to which the facts happen, and must have as large a supply of these as possible, and then we must examine them according to the terms of our syllogisms."..." There are peculiar principles in each science; and in each case these principles must be obtained from experience. Thus astronomical observation supplies the principles of astronomical science. For the phenomena being rightly taken, the demonstrations of astronomy were discovered; and the same is the case with any other Art or Science. So that if the facts in each case be taken, it is our business to construct the demonstrations. For if in our natural history (Kara Tηv iotopíav) we have omitted none of the facts and properties which belong to the subject, we shall learn what we can demonstrate and what we cannot." And again', "It is manifest that if any sensation be wanting, there must be some knowledge wanting, which we are thus prevented from having. For we acquire knowledge either by Induction (emaywyn) or by Demonstration and Demonstration is from universals, but Induction from particulars. It is impossible to have universal theoretical propositions except by Induction: and we cannot make inductions without having sensation; for sensation has to do with particulars.'

It is easy to show that Aristotle uses the term Induction, as we use it, to express the process of collecting a general proposition from particular cases in which it is exemplified. Thus in a passage which we have already quoted', he says, "Induction, and Syllogism from Induction, is when we attribute one. extreme term to the middle by means of the other." The import of this technical phraseology will further appear by the example which he gives: "We find that several animals which are deficient in bile are long-lived, as man, the horse, the mule; hence we infer that all animals which are deficient in bile are long-lived."

• Analyt. Post. i. 18.

5 Analyt. Prior. ii. 23, πeρì tŷs èraywyrs.

We may observe, however, that both Aristotle's notion of induction, and many other parts of his philosophy, are obscure and imperfect, in consequence of his refusing to contemplate ideas as something distinct from sensation. It thus happens that he always assumes the ideas which enter into his proposition as given; and considers it as the philosopher's business to determine whether such propositions are true or not whereas the most important feature in induction is, as we have said, the introduction of a new idea, and not its employment when once introduced. That the mind in this manner gives unity to that which is manifold, that we are thus led to speculative principles which have an evidence higher than any others, and that a peculiar sagacity in some men seizes upon the conceptions by which the facts may be bound into true propositions,-are doctrines which form no essential part of the philosophy of the Stagirite, although such views are sometimes recognized, more or less clearly, in his expressions. Thus he says", "There can be no knowledge when the sensation does not continue in the mind. For this purpose, it is necessary both to perceive, and to have some unity in the mind (αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἕν τι' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ); and many such perceptions having taken place, some difference is then perceived: and from the remembrance of these arises Reason. Thus from Sensation comes Memory, and from Memory of the same thing often repeated comes Experience: for many acts of Memory make up one Experience. And from Experience, or from any Universal Notion which takes a permanent place in the mind,-from the unity in the manifold, the same some one thing being found in many facts, springs the first principle of Art and of Science; of Art, if it be employed about production; of Science, if about existence."

• Analyt. Post. ii. 19.

7 But the best reading seems to be not ev i butëri: and the clause must be rendered "both to perceive and to retain the perception in the mind."

This correction does not disturb the general sense of the passage, that the first principles of science are obtained by finding the One in the Many.

I will add to this, Aristotle's notice of Sagacity; since, although little or no further reference is made to this quality in his philosophy, the passage fixes our attention upon an important step in the formation of knowledge. "Sagacity" (ayxívola), he says, "is a hitting by guess (evoтoxía Tis) upon the middle term (the conception common to two cases) in an inappreciable time. As for example, if any one seeing that the bright side of the moon is always towards the sun, suddenly perceives why this is; namely, because the moon shines by the light of the sun :-or if he sees a person talking with a rich man, he guesses that he is borrowing money;-or conjectures that two persons are friends, because they are enemies of the same person."-To consider only the first of these examples; the conception here introduced, that of a body shining by the light which another casts upon it, is not contained in the observed facts, but introduced by the mind. It is, in short, that conception which, in the act of induction, the mind superadds to the phenomena as they are presented by the senses and to invent such appropriate conceptions, such "eustochies," is, indeed, the precise office of inductive sagacity.

At the end of this work (the Later Analytics) Aristotle ascribes our knowledge of principles to Intellect (vous), or, as it appears necessary to translate the word, Intuition". "Since, of our intellectual habits by which we aim at truth, some are always true, but some admit of being false, as Opinion and Reasoning, but Science and Intuition are always true; and since there is nothing which is more certain than Science except Intuition; and since Principles are better known to us than the Deductions from them; and since all Science is connected by reasoning, we cannot have Science respecting Principles. Considering this then, and that the beginning of Demonstration cannot be Demonstration, nor the beginning of Science, Science; and since, as we have said, there is no other kind of truth, Intuition must be the beginning of Science."

What is here said, is, no doubt, in accordance with the doctrines which we have endeavoured to establish respecting the nature of Science, if by this Intuition we understand that contemplation of certain Fundamental Ideas, which is the basis of all rigorous knowledge. But notwithstanding this apparent approximation, Aristotle was far from having an habitual and practical possession of the principles which he thus touches upon. He did not, in reality, construct his philosophy by giving Unity to that which was manifold, or by seeking in Intuition principles which might be the basis of Demonstration; nor did he collect, in each subject, fundamental propositions by an induction of particulars. He rather endeavoured to divide than to unite; he employed himself, not in combining facts, but in analysing notions; and the criterion to which he referred his analysis was, not the facts of our experience, but our habits of language. Thus his opinions rested, not upon sound inductions, gathered in each case from the phenomena by means of appropriate Ideas; but upon the loose and vague generalizations which are implied in the common use of speech.

Yet Aristotle was so far consistent with his own doctrine of the derivation of knowledge from experience, that he made in almost every province of human knowledge, a vast collection of such special facts as the experience of his time supplied. These collections are almost unrivalled, even to the present day, especially in Natural History; in other departments, when to the facts we must add the right Inductive Idea, in order to obtain truth, we find little of value in the Aristotelic works. But in those parts which refer to Natural History, we find not only an immense and varied collection of facts and observations, but a sagacity and acuteness in classification which it is impossible not to admire. This indeed appears to have been the most eminent faculty in Aristotle's mind.

The influence of Aristotle in succeeding ages will come under our notice shortly.