wise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against him upon any criminal investigation, proceeding, or trial: Provided, That immunity shall extend only to a natural person, who in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under oath or produces evidence, documentary, or otherwise, under oath: Provided further, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

Agreements in Restraint of Trade

Sec. 28.61. Contract not to engage in business; illegality.—All agreements and contracts by which any person, copartnership or corporation promises or agrees not to engage in any avocation, employment, pursuit, trade, profession, or business, whether reasonable or unreasonable, partial or general, limited or unlimited, are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void. (C. L. '29, sec. 16667; C. L. '15, sec. 15033.)

Sec. 28.62. Combination for monopoly; illegality.-All combinations of persons, copartnerships, or corporations made and entered into for the purpose and with the intent of establishing and maintaining or of attempting to establish and maintain a monopoly of any trade, pursuit, avocation, profession, or business, are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void. (C. L. '29, sec. 16668; C. L. '15, sec. 15034.)

Sec. 28.63. Same; corporation organized to maintain; illegality. Any corporation organized under the laws of this state for the purpose of establishing and maintaining, or attempting to establish or maintain, any combination of persons, copartnerships, or corporations with intent to establish and maintain or of attempting to establish and maintain a monopoly of any trade, pursuit, avocation, profession, or business, is hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void. (C. L. '29, sec. 16669; C. L. '15, sec. 15035.)

Sec. 28.64. Foreign corporation for monopoly; right to do business.—Any foreign corporation organized for the purpose and with the intent of establishing and maintaining or of attempting to establish and maintain a monopoly of any trade, pursuit, avocation, profession, or business, is hereby prohibited from doing business in this state, and any permission or authority heretofore obtained by any such corporation to do business in this state is hereby declared to be illegal and void. (C. L. '29, sec. 16670; C. L. '15, sec. 15036.)

Sec. 28.65. Applicability of act to existing contracts and combinations. This act shall apply to agreements, contracts, and combinations in restraint of trade or commerce heretofore entered into

or made, and which are sought to be enforced or maintained after this act takes effect; and all contracts and agreements in violation of this act heretofore made, expressly or impliedly, continuing in force after this act takes effect, are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void. (C. L. 29, sec. 16671; C. L. '15, sec. 15037.)

Sec. 28.66. Contracts in restraint of trade; exceptions.-This act shall not apply to any contract mentioned in this act, nor in restraint of trade where the only object of restraint imposed by the contract is to protect the vendee, or transferee, of a trade pursuit, avocation, profession, or business, or the goodwill thereof, sold and transferred for a valuable consideration in good faith, and without any intent to create, build up, establish, or maintain a monopoly; nor to any contract of employment under which the employer furnishes or discloses to the employe a list of customers or patrons, commonly called a route list, within certain territory in which such employe is to work, in which contract the employe agrees not to perform similar services in such territory for (himself or) another engaged in a like or competing line of business for a period of ninety (90) days after the termination of such contract or services. (C. L. '29, sec. 16672; C. L. '15, sec. 15038.)

Sec. 28.67. Effect of act. This act is declared to be supplementary to, and declaratory of, and in addition to act number two hundred fifty-five (255) of the public acts of eighteen hundred ninety-nine (1899), page four hundred nine (409). (C. L. '29, sec. 16673; C. L. '15, sec. 15039.)

The foregoing seven sections constitute the Act of June 20, 1905, No. 329.

Judicial Decisions

GENERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

Application of the Common Law.

Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade are illegal at common law. Thus a contract with a village for exclusive control of a public market was held illegal in Gale v. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 343 (1871). This doctrine was also expressed in Niles Water Works v. City of Niles, 59 Mich. 311, 26 N. W. 525 (1886). However, franchises by municipalities, conferring practical monopolies, have been subsequently upheld. Ludington Water Supply Co. v. City of Ludington, 119 Mich. 480, 78 N. W. 558 (1889); Lewick v. Glazier, 116 Mich. 493, 74 N. W. 717 (1898).

A contract to furnish money for the purchase of stock, in a corporation formed to monopolize the match industry, is void. In a suit to recover a share of the dividends on the stock purchased, the court, on its own motion will take notice of the illegality of the contract and dismiss the suit. Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N. W. 1102 (1889).

With respect to a contract with the State for construction of a road, the lowest bidder contracted to withdraw and allowed the next lowest to be substituted as the successful bidder in consideration of the latter's promise to surrender part of the profits earned in carrying out the contract. Enforcement of the agreement was refused as an unlawful conspiracy against the State. Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich. 172 (1873).

Constitutionality of Statutes.

L. 1889, art. 225 (repealed by L. 1931, act 228, and reenacted in substance as part of the present Penal Code, c. 286a, secs. 28.348 to 28.354), was held constitutional. Bingham v. Brands, 119 Mich. 255, 77 N. W. 940 (1899). Its unconstitutionality was hinted at in Merz Capsule Co. v. U. S. Capsule Co., 67 Fed. 414 (1895), and in A. Booth Co. v. Davis, 127 Fed. 875 (1904), affd. 131 Fed. 31 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904), cert. den. 195 U. S. 636, 25 Sup. Ct. 793, 49 L. Ed. 355 (1904). However, a conviction based upon a violation of this act was sustained without question of its validity. People v. Butler, 221 Mich. 626, 192 N. W. 685 (1923). Cf. People v. Farrell, 263 Mich. 669, 249 N. W. 26 (1933), where the court appears to concede its unconstitutionality because of section 6 (sec. 28.353), which exempts from application of the antitrust laws combinations of producers of agricultural products. A similar Illinois act was held unconstitutional because of a like exemption in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679 (1902), later distinguished in Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 72 L. Ed. 473. (1928).

L. 1889, act 255 (secs. 28.31 to 28.40), was upheld as a separate act. The court rejected the contention that, by section 28.37, it was only supplementary to Act 225 of 1889 (secs. 28.348 to 28.354) declared unconstitutional. People v. Farrell, supra.

Section 28.33 authorizing the ouster of foreign corporations violating sections 28.31 to 28.40 was held valid as against the contention that the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution limited the State to punishment or prevention of unlawful acts by such corporations. Atty. Gen. ex rel. Wolverine Fish Co. v. A. Booth Co., 143 Mich. 89, 106 N. W. 868 (1906). A literal interpretation of the

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act would seem to authorize the secretary of state to act on his own administrative determination of the facts, but an attorney general has ruled that a prior judicial determination of a violation is essential to a valid revocation of a certificate to do business. Op. Atty. Gen., 1909 p. 183.

Application of Statutes.
In General.

A corporation, assignee of contracts of sale of several businesses, technically becoming the combination itself, may be proceeded against under L. 1899, act 255 (secs. 28.31 to 28.40), although it is not literally "two or more persons" as stated in the act because the object of the suit is to prevent carrying out of a plan in restraint of trade. Atty. Gen. ex. rel. Wolverine Fish Co. v. A. Booth Co., 143 Mich. 89, 106 N. W. 868 (1906). But cf. A. Booth Co. v. Davis, 127 Fed. 875 (1904), aff'd. 131 Fed. 31 (C. C. A. 6th 1904), cert. den. 195 U. S. 636, 25 Sup. Ct. 793, 49 L. Ed. 355 (1904).

Although L. 1899, act 255 (secs. 28.31 to 28.40), does not apply to combinations fixing the price of labor as such, yet, where goods are sold and installing labor is furnished under one contract, the prices of both being fixed by the combination, a decree enjoining the pricefixing of labor in conjunction with the sale of goods is proper. Hunt v. Riverside Cooperative Club, 140 Mich. 538, 104 N. W. 40 (1905).

The Michigan anti-trust laws are not applicable to a stock pool formed and operated in New York. Shambleau v. Hoyt, 265 Mich. 560, 251 N. W. 778 (1933). Cf. Erpelding v. McKearnan, 143 Mich. 409, 107 N. W. 107 (1906).

L. 1899, act 255 (secs. 28.31 to 28.40), cannot operate retroactively. A. Booth Co. v. Davis, supra.

In an action for the purchase price for the sale of goods by a member of a "trust," the court held that acts done or contracts made which are otherwise lawful are not made illegal so as to preclude recovery in suits brought thereon or to prevent their use as defenses, by the fact that they are done or made by the member of a "trust." International Harvester Co. v. Eaton Circuit Judge, 163 Mich. 55, 127 N. W. 695 (1910).

Evidence that a contract of carriage was assigned by the shipper for the purpose of eliminating competition between shippers was held inadmissible in a suit by the assignee against the carrier for refusal to transport. C. H. Little Co. v. Cadwell Transit Co., 197 Mich. 481, 163 N. W. 952 (1917). See also Baker v. City of Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 687, 106 N. W. 208 (1906).

In an action to recover the fair value of goods sold, evidence that the current market price has been controlled by a combination of which the vendor is a member was eliminated as a factor in determining the current market price as the standard of fair value. Lovejoy v. Michels, 88 Mich. 15, 49 N. W. 901 (1891).

The owner of half the stock of a corporation that had sold out to another company sued to make the vendor's manager disgorge a secret personal profit received in the deal. Evidence that the parties were privies to an illegal contract to sell out to a furniture "trust" was held erroneously excluded. Erpelding v. McKearnan, supra.

In one of a series of similar contracts, defendant agreed to buy all salt produced by plaintiff. They also agreed that in payment of a certain stipulated sum, plaintiff would retire and cease to engage in production. In a suit for money alleged to be due on the contract, the court held this evidence sufficient to establish a violation of the antitrust law, and directed a verdict for the defendant. Detroit Salt Co. v. National Salt Co., 134 Mich. 103, 96 N. W. 1 (1903).

A proposed contract between car-lot receivers of produce and wholesalers thereof, by which the former agreed not to sell directly to retailers, was a sufficient basis for a prosecution for conspiracy in restraint of trade. People v. Butler, 221 Mich. 626, 192 N. W. 685 (1923).

Agreements between members of a "club" of master plumbers and wholesalers of plumbing supplies fixed the prices of supplies, limited sales to an approved list, and provided for price discriminations between members and nonmembers. On contract work, bids were to be based on certain price and profit schedules, including the price of labor supplied. The bidding arrangements were enjoined as a violation of the antitrust laws, the remaining portions of the plan having been abandoned after institution of the suit. Hunt v. Riverside Cooperative Club, 140 Mich. 538, 104 N. W. 40 (1905).

Intimidation and obstruction of rival salesmen, interference with the customers, interference with contracts made and to be made, multiplicity of infringement suits, use of "knockout" credit cards and "knockout" machines were acts which, when done with the declared intention of driving out competitors and monopolizing the cash register industry, were sufficient to establish a violation of L. 1905, act 329 section 4 (sec. 28.64) Atty. Gen. ex rel. James v. National Cash Register Co., 182 Mich. 99, 148 N. W. 420 (1914). Specific prior acts of the above nature and acts of agents and statements of officers of the corporation are admissible to show the intent of the corporation to create and maintain a monopoly. Ibid.