Графични страници
PDF файл
ePub

hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge

of it.

Method. It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Assent, and moderate our Persuasions. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:

First, I shall inquire into the Original of those Ideas, or Notions, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those ideas, and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of Faith or Opinion; whereby I mean, that Assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of Assent.

Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.-If, by this inquiry into the nature of the Understanding, I can discover the powers thereof, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy Mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension. We should not then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal Knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes, about things to which our Understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds

any clear or distinct perceptions; or whereof (as it has, perhaps, too often happened) we have not any notions at all.

Our capacity suited to our state and concerns.-For, though the comprehension of our Understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being for that proportion* and degree of Knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he has given them, as St. Peter says, "ávτа πpòs ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, “whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue;" and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their Knowledge may come of a universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments that they have light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. It will be no excuse for an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our Understandings aright, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our Faculties, and upon

* Some editions read "portion."-ED.

those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require Demonstration, and demand Certainty, where Probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve everything because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.

Knowledge of our capacity a cure of scepticism and idleness. When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate [of] what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; or, on the other side, question everything, and disclaim all Knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean; it is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put in that state [in] which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.

What "idea" stands for.-IDEA being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the

object of the Understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in Thinking.

I presume it will be easily granted me that there are such Ideas in men's minds.† Every one is conscious of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others.

Our first inquiry, then, shall be, how they come into the Mind.‡

[blocks in formation]

†This, it will be observed, is Locke's only Postulate.-ED.

The reasons for excluding the entire remainder of Book I. may be inferred from the preceding 'Preliminary Outline,' page xix. lines 5-12.-ED.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.

All ideas come from sensation or reflection.-Let us, then, suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters-without any Ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word-from EXPERIENCE: in that all our Knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of Thinking. These two are the fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

The objects of sensation one source of ideas.-First, Our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to [the] various ways wherein those

« ПредишнаНапред »