careless, loose use of their Words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use for the improvement of Knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying or intending they should be laid aside, as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths-self-evident truths-and so cannot be laid aside. As far as their influence will reach, it is in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt, to abridge it. But yet, without any injury to Truth or Knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them, and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them for the confirming themselves in errors.

Their application dangerous about complex ideas.— [Again], when these principles, viz. 'what is, is,' and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' are made use of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing for complex ideas, v. g. 'man,' 'horse,' 'gold,' 'virtue,' there they are of infinite danger, and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for manifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: upon which follow error, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning. The reason whereof is not that these principles are less true, or of less force in proving propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas, but-because men mistake generally, thinking that where the same terms are preserved, the propositions are about the same things, though the ideas they stand for are in truth

different. Therefore these Maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions; as is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things, as usually they do, these Maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions: as shall yet be farther made manifest.

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Instance in man.-For instance: Let 'man' be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything; and we shall see that so far as demonstration is by these principles it is only verbal, and gives us no certain, universal, true proposition,—or Knowledge of any 'being' existing without us. FirstA child having framed the idea of a 'man,' it is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the painter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a complication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single complex idea which he calls man;' whereof white or flesh-colour in England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a 'man,' because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls 'man:' and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle, ‘it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' that 'a negro is not a man;' the foundation of his certainty being-not that universal proposition which, . perhaps, he never heard or thought of, but-the clear, distinct perception he has of his own simple ideas of 'black' and 'white,' which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake, one for another, whether he knows that Maxim or not. And to this child, or any one

who has such an idea which he calls 'man,' you can never demonstrate that a 'man has a soul,' because his idea of 'man' includes no such notion or idea in it: and therefore to him the principle of 'what is, is,' proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called 'man.'

Secondly, Another, that has gone farther in framing and collecting the idea [which] he calls 'man,' and to the outward shape adds 'laughter' and 'rational discourse,' may demonstrate that infants and changelings are not 'men' by this maxim, 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be:' and I have discoursed with very rational men who have actually denied that they are 'men.'

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Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls man,' only out of the ideas of 'body' in general, and the 'powers of language and reason,' and leaves out the 'shape' wholly. This man is able to demonstrate that a 'man' may have no hands, but be quadrupes, neither of those being included in his idea of 'man;' and in whatever body or shape be found 'speech and reason joined,' that was a 'man:' because, having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that what is, is.'

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Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations, there is little need-or no use at all-of these Maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge.Whether the Maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of [such] use to Real Knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are Universal Propositions which-though they be certainly true-yet add no light to our Understanding-bring no increase to our Knowledge: Such are,

As identical propositions.-First, All purely identical Propositions: [by which] I mean such wherein the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself. These obviously and at first blush appear to contain no instruction in them: for when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contain any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to, us.

When a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole. Secondly, Another sort of Trifling Propositions is--when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole: a part of the definition [predicated] of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species; or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms: for, what information, what knowledge, carries this proposition in it, viz. 'lead is a metal,' to a man who knows the complex idea the name 'lead' stands for?

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all the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term 'metal' being nothing but what he before comprehended, and signified by the name 'lead.' Indeed, to a man that knows the signification of the word metal,' and not of the word 'lead,' it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word 'lead' by saying, ‘it is a metal,' which at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him, it is a body very heavy, fusible, and malleable.'

As, part of the definition of the term defined.-A like trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined; or to affirm any one of the simple ideas, [composing] a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea, as, 'all gold is fusible.' For, fusibility being one of the simple ideas that go to making up the complex one [which] the sound 'gold' stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds to affirm that of the name 'gold' which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely as a truth of moment, that 'gold is yellow;' and I see not how it is any jot more material to say, 'it is fusible,' unless that quality be left out of the complex idea of which the sound 'gold' is the mark in ordinary speech. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing 'sense,'' motion,' 'reason,' and laughter,' were united, that thing had a notion of GOD,' or would be cast into a sleep by opium,' made indeed an instructive proposition; because neither having the notion of GOD,' nor being cast into sleep by opium,' being contained in the idea signified by the word

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