of things. Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the nature of things as attention, study, and application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our words, too, when we use them as signs of real beings which yet never had any reality or existence.

How men's words fail in all these.-[How Language appears to fail in all these respects is instanced by the following illustrations proper to the three classes of our Complex Ideas:]

How in substances.-In our notions concerning Substances we are liable to [these] inconveniences: v. g. (1) He that uses the word 'tarantula,' without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means nothing at all by it. (2) He that in a newly-discovered country shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them as of a horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himself. (3) He that uses the word 'body' sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. (4) He that gives the name 'horse' to that idea which common usage calls 'mule' talks improperly, and will not be understood. (5) He that thinks the name centaur' stands for some real being imposes on himself, and mistakes words for things.

6

How in modes and relations.-In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable to the [following] inconveniences, viz.: (1) I may have in my memory the names of Modes, as 'gratitude' or 'charity,' and yet

hearing, perceives the falseho 'Humanity is animality' or ness:' and this is as evident maxims. All our affirmations, which is the affirming—not other, but-one Abstract i which Abstract ideas, in Sul in all the rest, are little e Substances the most frequ man is white' signifies th sence of Man has also i which is nothing but a whiteness in one whose jects; or, 'A man is r thing that has the Ess Essence of Rationality They show the differ of names shows us a if we observe them, have all Abstract a whereof is (to speal .stantive,' the othe sweetness, sweet.

Modes and Relat only with this names of Relat

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render a reas have very fo the School some othe

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241

ugh it be a defect that has its original in are not so conformable to the nature tention, study, and application might tit fails not to extend itself to our words, them as signs of real beings which yet ality or existence.

"ds fail in all these. How Language all these respects is instanced by the Tations proper to the three classes of our

nces.-In our notions concerning Subliable to [these] inconveniences: v. g. as the word tarantula,' without having nor idea of what it stands for, pronounces so long means nothing at all by it. (2) Dewly-discovered country shall see several

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not have any precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names. (2) I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them; v. g. I may have the idea of a man's drinking till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him, and yet not know that it is to be called 'drunkenness.' (3) I may have the ideas of virtues or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss; v. g. when I apply the name 'frugality' to that idea which others call and signify by this sound, covetousness.'. (4) I may use any of those names with inconstancy.

Figurative speech also an abuse of language.—Seventhly, Since Wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than Truth and real Knowledge, figurative speech and allusion in Language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or Abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarcely pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, [except] order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words [that] Eloquence has invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and, where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of the Language or person that makes use of them.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTION AND ABUSES.

Misuse of words the great cause of errors. He that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of Words, will find some reason to doubt whether Language, as it has been employed, has contributed more. to the improvement or hinderance of Knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there that when they would think on things fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such contemplations and reasonings about little more than sounds, whilst the ideas annexed to them are very confused, or very unsteady, or perhaps none at all-who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge?

Obstinacy. This inconvenience in an ill use of Words men suffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For Language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and Knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of Knowledge, which are in things themselves, yet he does, as much as in him