I think no small part of the confusion to be found in the notions of men might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it everywhere wilful. Some ideas are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it. From the first of these follows confusion in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself— from the latter, frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others.

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Complex ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.—Our complex ideas, being made up of collections (and so [of a] variety) of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, scure and confused in another. In a man who speaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thousand sides, the idea of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very distinct; so that he, being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number, he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain he has no precise idea of its figure, so as to distinguish it from one that has nine hundred and ninety-nine sides: the not observing whereof causes no small error in men's thoughts, and confusion in their discourses. For being satisfied in part of the idea, and the name being applied to the whole, we use it for the confused part, and confidently draw deductions.

Instance in eternity.-[For instance] having frequently

types. Because those Qualities, and Powers of Substances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are so many and various, that no man's complex idea contains them all. That our Abstract ideas of Substances do not contain in them all the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any Substance all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it. Because, endeavouring to make the signification of their specific names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific ideas of the sorts of Substances, for the most part, of a few of those Simple ideas which are to be found in them: but these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific idea more than others that are left out, it is plain that [in] both these ways, our ideas of Substances are deficient and inadequate.

[This] would be so also in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex ideas of them only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellips[e], if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas, having in our plain idea the whole Essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

Simple ideas, ExTUTTа, and adequate. Thus the mind has three sorts of Abstract ideas, or Nominal Essences. First, Simple ideas, which are "EKTUTTа, or copies; but yet certainly adequate: because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in

the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power: and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power, that simple idea is real and adequate.

Ideas of substances are exTVTa, inadequate.-Secondly, The Complex ideas of Substances are Ectypes-copies too; but not perfect ones-not adequate: [for] if we would have, and actually had in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the Secondary Qualities or Powers of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an idea of the Essence of that thing. For since the Powers or Qualities, that are observable by us are not the Real Essence of that Substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the Real Essence of that thing.

Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.-Thirdly, Complex ideas of Modes and Relations are originals and archetypes-are not copies; nor [are they] made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such collections of Simple ideas, that the mind itself puts together-and such collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends it shouldthey are archetypes, and Essences of Modes that may exist; and so are designed only for, and belong only to, such Modes, as when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex ideas. The ideas therefore of Modes and Relations cannot but be adequate.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

Something unreasonable in most men.—There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives.

Not wholly from self-love.—This proceeds not wholly from self-love. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the overweening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy, of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as day-light.

Nor from education.—Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from; and so explain it as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

A degree of madness.—I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness, when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it but that [he] would be thought fitter for bedlam than civil conversation if he should always-on all occasions—argue or do as in some cases he constantly

does. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion; but in the steady, calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind, is-that [on] inquiring a little into the nature of madness (Chap. xi.), I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of.

From a wrong connexion of ideas. Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and to hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom: ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole [group], always inseparable, show themselves together.

This connexion, how made.—This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either [1.] voluntarily, or [2.] by chance: and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, educations, interests, &c. Custom settles habits of thinking in the Understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, ideas seem to be thus produced in our minds; or if they are