in our mouths the name 'eternity,' we are apt to think we have a positive, comprehensive idea of it; which is as much as to say that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea. It is true that he that thinks so may have a clear idea of duration; he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one with still a greater: but it not being possible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole extent together of a duration where he supposes no end, that part of his idea which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is that in disputes and reasonings concerning eter- . nity, or any other infinite, we are apt to involve ourselves in manifest absurdities. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are ALL finite, cannot bear any.

Divisibility of matter.-In [like manner, in] matter, we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses; and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum, though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility, and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by division, yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles or minute bodies so to be divided, when by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of is-[1.] of what division in general, or abstractly [considered], is-and [2.] the relation of totum and pars: but

of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think we have no clear or distinct idea at all.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.

Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes. Of our Real Ideas some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call Adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are such, [as] are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Simple ideas all adequate.-First, That all our Simple ideas are adequate: because, being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things fitted and ordained by GOD to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers; and we are sure they agree to the reality of things.

Modes [and relations] are all adequate.-Secondly, Our Complex ideas of Modes being voluntary collections of Simple ideas, which the mind puts together without referenec to any real archetypes, or standing patterns, existing anywhere, are, and cannot but be, adequate ideas; because, they not being intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes

made by the mind, to rank and denominate things by, cannot want anything; they having, each of them, that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should; so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. [So also] Relations, being archetypes without patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, everything being so to itself.

Modes in reference to settled names may be inadequate. -Complex ideas of Modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being, expressed by the names [that] we apply to them, may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate; because they [may] not agree to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern; in which respect only any idea of Modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account, our ideas of Mixed Modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other: but this refers more to proper speaking, than [to] knowing right.

Ideas of substances, as referred to real essences, not adequate.-Thirdly, What ideas we have of Substances, I have shown now, those ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed Real Essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in the mind of things that do exist, by ideas of those Qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these copies of those originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate.

First, It is usual for men to make the names of Substances stand for things, as supposed to have certain Real Essences, whereby they are of this or that species; and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds, they must consequently refer their ideas to such Real Essences as to their archetypes. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific Names they rank particular Substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific Real Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted whether he called himself 'man,' with any other meaning than as having the Real Essence of a man.' And yet if you demand what those Real Essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to Real Essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all.

Ideas of substances, as collections of their qualities, are all, inadequate. Secondly, Those, who neglecting that useless supposition of unknown Real Essences whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the Substances that exist in the world, by putting together the ideas of those sensible Qualities which are found coexisting in them (though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those who imagine they know not what Real specific Essences), yet arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances [which] they would thus copy into their minds: nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their arche

or making a part of it, or, at least, as properly called by that name as the other; and so keeps not that difference from that other idea, which the different names import.

Confusion [of ideas further considered]. This, I think, is the Confusion proper to ideas, which still carries with it a secret reference to names. At least, if there be any other confusion of ideas, this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses: ideas, as ranked under names, being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves, and always those which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are supposed two different ideas -marked by two different names-which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be confusion; and where any ideas are distinct, as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confusion. The way to prevent it is-[1.] to collect and unite into one complex idea, as precisely as is possible, all those ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and-[2.] to them so united in a determinate number and order [to] apply steadily the same name. But this neither accommodating men's ease or vanity, nor serving any design but that of naked truth-which is not always the thing aimed at— such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for. And since the loose application of names to undetermined, variable, and almost no ideas, serves to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, (which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge,) it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. [But] though