INFINITY. 115 as clear an idea of infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration past? though, I suppose, nobody thinks it conceivable that anything does or has existed in that future duration. Nor is it possible to join our idea of future duration with present or past existence, any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow to be the same; or [to] bring ages past and future together, and make them contemporary. But if these men are of the mind, that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite space,-because it is past doubt that God has existed from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space:— yet those philosophers who are of opinion that infinite space is possessed by God's infinite omnipresence, as well as infinite duration by His eternal existence, must be allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of infinite duration; though neither of them, I think, has any positive idea of Infinity, in either case. For, if a man had a positive idea of infinite, either duration or All these ideas from sensation and reflection.If I have dwelt long on the consideration of Duration, Space, and Number, and what arises from the contemplation of them, Infinity, it is possibly no more than the matter requires; there being few Simple ideas whose Modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men than these do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full to my design to show how the m latitude; receives + it suff ire, from Sensation flection; and how even the idea we have of Infinity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense or operation of our mind, has nevertheless, as all our other ideas, its original there. CHAPTER XVI I I. OF OTHER SIMPLE MODES. Modes of Motion.—I shall, for method's sake, though briefly, give an account of some few more [Simple Modes], and then proceed to more Complex ideas. To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no sooner heard [than] every one who understands English has presently in his mind distinct ideas; which are all but [ideas of] the different modifications of Motion. Modes of motion answer those of extension: [save that] swift and slow are two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together; so they are Complex ideas comprehending Time and Space with Motion. Modes of sounds.-The like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of Sound; by which we see that, from the sense of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number. Sounds, also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds so put together silently in his own fancy. Modes of colours.-Those of Colours are also very various; some we take notice of, as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, shades of the same colour. But since we very seldom make assemblages of colours either for use or delight but Figure is taken in also, and has its part in it, as in painting, weaving, needle-work, &c., those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to Mixed Modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz., Figure and Colour, such as beauty, rainbow, &c. Modes of tastes. All compounded Tastes and Smells are also Modes made up of these simple ideas of those senses. But they, being such as generally we have not names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing; and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of the reader. Some simple modes have no names.-In general it may be observed that those Simple Modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea, though they are in themselves, many of them, very distinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no distinct names; nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men have neglected these Modes, and given no names to them, as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them; or because, when they were so distinguished, that know ledge would not be of general or necessary use, I leave to the thoughts of others: it is sufficient to my purpose to show, that all our Simple ideas come to our minds only by Sensation and Reflection; and that when the mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new Complex ideas. But though white, red, sweet, &c., have not been modified or made into complex ideas by several combinations so as to be named, and thereby ranked into species; yet some others of the simple ideas, viz., those of Unity, Duration, Motion, &c., above instanced, as also Power and Thinking, have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them. Why some modes have and others have not names.—' -The reason whereof, I suppose, has been this, that the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another—the knowledge of men and their actions and the signifying of them to one another was most necessary; and therefore they made ideas of action very nicely modified, and gave those complex ideas names, that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in without circumlocution; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men, in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another), is evident in the names which in several arts have been found out and applied to several complex ideas of modi fied actions belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction or discourses about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations. And hence the words that stand for them by the greatest part of men of the same language are not understood. CHAPTER XIX. OF THE MODES OF THINKING. Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.—When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, Thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies and is annexed to any impression on the body made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of Thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea which we call Sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the Understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is Remembrance: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is Recollection: if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is Contemplation: when ideas float in our mind without any reflection or regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call |