also to the Roman historian before adverted to. In his works we think the soldier predominates; and the reverse in that of Captain Pasley, who, though an officer of established reputation, refers to recent expeditions and campaigns only with a view to illustrate his principles, or to point out defects which he proposes to remedy; but he is never betrayed into details, which might have exhibited his knowledge and science, without strengthening his argument. He was not writing a military history; but was engaged in the far more important task of pointing out to his country the means of present safety, and of future glory.

The work forms a large octavo volume, of more than five hundred pages, divided into nine chapters, replete with observations no less profound than interesting: to the most important of these we shall confine ourselves, and endeavour to compress, within a moderate compass, such specimens of the work as we may think worthy of being submitted to our readers, together with certain strictures which appear to us to be necessary.

Captain Pasley's principal objects seem to be-to rouse the nation and its rulers, whoever they may be, to a just sense of our military means with a view both to offensive and defensive war, and to point out the danger of neglecting them ;-to shew the folly and hazard of an exclusive reliance on our naval superiority;-to prove that systems are better than expedients;

to point out the absurdity of coalitions, as usually formed, and the impolicy of subsidies, as generally granted ;-to maintain, that our principal reliance should be on our own strength, properly called forth and applied; that we should pursue one object at a time, taking Roman policy for our model in this respect;-to ridicule a purely defensive system ;—to condemn, generally speaking, insular conquests; and to reprobate the practice of hastily abandoning conquests of any sort when once made. In frequently enforcing these several topics, he supports his respective propositions by ample and able references to ancient and modern history, as illustrative of them; and is copious in his remarks on some recent transactions, particularly those connected with the Peninsula and Sicily. From a frank avowal of his political principles, by which we mean his general principles of policy, he never shrinks. The point which he most strenuously urges, and with a degree of enthusiasm which we cannot but admire, is the capacity of Great Britain to face Bonaparte successfully, on what has been vulgarly considered his own element, and the duty which she owes to herself, to Europe, and to the world, to enter into the contest with vigour; undertaking to shew, that by pursuing such a course, she has in

her own hands the means of delivering the continent from its state of thraldom, and to secure to herself the proud station of pre-eminence amongst the nations of the world.

In the first chapter Captain P.protests against being considered an alarmist, and fully obviates the charge that may be brought against him, of "filling the minds of men with notions of a gloomy and desponding nature." In mentioning the possible inferiority of our navy, some few years hence, as an irresistible argument for an improved military system, he says:

"If we do not improve our system of defence, either from a supposition, that as our little island is now superior by sea to the whole world, it is always to continue so; or from a hope, that although the royal house of Bourbon, the republic of France, and now its self-made emperor, have all successively attempted our destruction, and out-done each their predecessors in their efforts for that end; yet if we can be so happy as to maintain our independence during the life of Napoleon, we may see him succeeded in his government by a set of mild unambitious rulers, who will preserve perpetual peace with us; or if we trust, that when his presiding genius shall no longer guide that vast empire, it is to fall to pieces, and be divided among his generals, as amongst so many successors of this new Alexander, instead of remaining consolidated like the conquests of the Romans; we shall confide our dearest rights, that glorious constitution, that sound liberty, and those proud national honours, which we have inherited from our ancestors, to such a combination of improbable chances in our favor, as the most desperate gamester would scarcely venture to act upon."

The justness of these sentiments and the spirit with which they are expressed are so striking, that we shall not stop to comment upon them. They are shortly followed up by others of a similar character, in a passage which we cannot avoid presenting to our readers. Supposing the day to be arrived when the fleets of Europe may block up those of Great Britain in its own harbours, and that, our military means of resistance having been neglected, the formidable armies of the continent were disembarked on our shores, Captain P. observes,

"Gloomy as such a prospect would be, still it would be our duty to push our exertions for meeting the storm to the utmost, in hopes that Divine Providence, which has so often interposed in favour of nations, that have not abandoned themselves to despair when reduced to the very brink of destruction, may work some unexpected change in our favor, or at least to have the satisfaction of falling with arms in our hands, in a manner worthy of the ancient renown of the British nation, and of the sacred cause in which we should fight, for the last remains of liberty to be found in the world. But it appears to me that our case is by no means so hopeless."

These extracts stamp the character of the author at least, if not of the work. They breathe the lofty spirit of a Burke or a Windham, and must be sufficient to bespeak, indeed to command, the interest of a British reader in all that follows. In the whole book there is not a passage in which we more cordially concur than that which closes the last extract, that " Our case is by no means so hopeless" as that previously described; and this, for reasons in addition to, and differing from those given by our author. Hitherto his observations have been confined to defensive war, though in subsequently developing his plan, he shews that the same measures which would establish our security at home, would be calculated to render us formidable and triumphant abroad. "A great object of this essay," he says, “ shall be, to endeavour to prove, that, by certain new measures, and by certain additions to our means of defence, supposing we had not a single ship on the ocean, we might still hope to maintain our independence." And he afterwards goes on to say, "I shall also attempt to trace the grand causes of the general success of our arms by sea, and of our almost universal failures by land; which will involve not only a consideration of our military institutions, but of the policy with which we have conducted our wars." We think it may be convenient to take the division of the subject, which he has thus chalked out; and as his reprobation of a defensive system occupies many pages in the subsequent chapters, we shall endeavour to concentrate here such of his remarks on its impolicy as may appear most material. In entering into an examination of this important question of military policy, we enlist under his banner as steady and faithful soldiers, prepared by his side to combat those mischievous and shallow doctrines, which we have heard broached in high quarters, and which, if acted upon, would augment the dangers, degrade the character, tarnish the laurels, and blast the hopes of a great and high-minded nation.

On referring to dates, we are willing to hope that between Captain P.'s opinions and our own there may now be but little difference. It appears by the preface, that the two first chapters were written in the spring of 1808. Since that period two defensive measures, of the very first importance, have been adopted by the legislature; the one in the summer of the same year, the other during the last session of parliament. We refer to the local militia bill, and the bill for allowing the interchange of the English and Irish militias. Before the year 1808, Great Britain, in a considerable degree, owed her security to the volunteer system established (we mean, on the extended scale) on the renewal of tlie war in 1803, a splendid and glorious ara, when

VOL. II. NO. III,

the public spirit of the nation burst forth with a blaze, of which history affords no parallel, and which can never cease to astonish and animate future generations. It was no partial flame; it displayed itself in every city, town, and hamlet. The government of the day, which had been instrumental in exciting it, turned it to its proper account; and in the course of a few weeks 400,000 men were, in this island alone, in a state of military training for its defence. The attempt at invasion was not made, though long threatened, and certainly intended. And we shall never cease to believe, that the country derived incalculable advantages, if it were not saved from real danger, by this signal display of universal zeal and patriotism. But as, from the formation of new continental confederacies, all domestic alarm subsided; as from that and other causes, into which we shall not now enter, the public ardor cooled; privations began to be felt; the service slackened; discipline became relaxed; and the numbers of our voluntary defenders gradually diminished. Under these circumstances, Captain P.'s second chapter was written; and had we read it at the time, considering the increased power and preponderance of France on the continent, we should have been of opinion, that our situation would become perilous indeed, unless some new means, of a permanent nature, were resorted to for our protection. To rely exclusively on our naval superiority, would be little better than to anticipate the væ victis!

Strengthened then as our internal security has since been, by the two invaluable measures to which we have just adverted, we could hardly bring ourselves to entertain any apprehensions for the preservation of our independence, were those suggestions which Captain P. so strongly recommends entirely disregarded; and were even those results in the prosecution of the war to take place, the possibility of which he so providently anticipates. If properly maintained and enforced, we are of opinion that conjointly the two measures have rendered the country invulnerable. The first of them, of which the original vastness of the volunteer system had laid, and was, as we believe, intended to lay the foundation, has permanently secured to the country an auxiliary defensive force of 400,000 men. About one half of these now constitute our local militia; gradually increasing, infinitely improved in discipline, and, when embodied, subject to martial law. As their service is only for four years, the whole active population of the country is becoming military by rotation; and our late campaigns have formed excellent officers to lead them on in the defence of their country.

The other measure, scarcely inferior to this in value, had been

long called for, but had perhaps been necessarily delayed. Exclusively of other obvious recommendations, it renders the whole of the old militia of either island available with their own consent for service in the other, in the event of invasion; and, by the additional security thus given to Ireland, either in case of domestic commotion or foreign attack, leaves at liberty a larger portion of our regular army for foreign operations, than it might otherwise be safe to spare.

Perhaps Captain P. will admit the justice of these remarks, and that they establish a material difference between the years 1811 and 1808 as to home defence. In drawing a comparison between the volunteers and a regular army, he forcibly asks (speaking of the former when called into real service); " Where would be that habitual contempt of danger and of death, so foreign to the feelings of civil life? Where would be that implicit respect, and that unbounded obedience to the will of superior officers? Where would be that ardent spirit to attack, that unconquerable firmness in defeat and calamity, derived from the mutual confidence which all ranks have in each other? Where would be the minds broken in and prepared to bear all the e tremities of hardship, wounds, and disease, often without shelter, attendance, or even pity?"

These questions are strictly applicable to such a force, if it were proposed to employ it on foreign service. But in fighting for their homes and their altars, we do not see how they could ever be placed in the predicament described in the last line of this extract; and as to, "the contempt of death, the ardent spirit, and unconquerable firmness," we cannot but hope and believe that these high feelings would in no small measure be supplied by that enthusiasm, an exclusive reliance on which Captain P. afterwards so justly deprecates, by that spirit of loyalty which he so warmly extols, by the love of that free constitution which he so eloquently inculcates, and by that pride of independence and passion for freedom, of which he is at once the pattern and the panegyrist. But let him speak for himself in one of his most splendid passages,

"For these disadvantages, which at present attend our warlike measures, we may perhaps console ourselves in the superior spirit and patriotism of the people of this country. Independent of the generous feeling of national spirit and pride, which has often been seen to animate to great exertions the people of a state which has held a reputable rank among the nations of the world, under a native government, however bad, we have a still more sacred and durable principle of action, which scarcely any other nation can boast: I mean that noble spirit, that additional incentive to loyalty and pa