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CHAPTER XX.

Accession of Volagases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescennius Niger.
Part taken by Parthia in the Contest between Niger and Severus. Meso-
potamia revolts from Rome. First Eastern Expedition of Severus. Its
Results. Second Expedition. Successes of Severus. His Failure at
Hatra. General Results of the War. Death of Volagases IV.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Σεβῆρος ἐκστρατεύει κατὰ τῶν Πάρθων
Οὐολόγαισος.-Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.

...

ἦρχε δ ̓ αὐτῶν

ON the death of Volagases III., in A.D. 190 or 191, the Parthian crown fell to another prince of the same name, who was probably the eldest son of the late monarch.1 This prince was scarcely settled upon the throne when the whole of Western Asia was violently disturbed by the commotions which shook the Roman Empire after the murder of Commodus. The virtuous Pertinax was allowed to reign but three months (A.D. 193, January-March). His successor was scarcely proclaimed when in three different quarters the legionaries rose in arms, and, saluting their commanders as Emperors,' invested them with the purple. Clodius Albinus, in Britain; Severus, in Pannonia; and Pescennius Niger, in Syria, at one and the same time claimed the place which the wretched Julianus had bought, and prepared themselves to maintain their rights against all who should impugn them. It seems

'Reimar and others have supposed that Volagases, the adversary of Severus, was the son of a Sanatraces, or Sanatruces, on the strength of a fragment of Dio

Cassius (lxxv. 9, ad fin.). But it is more probable that the fragment refers to a different Volagases, an Armenian prince, contemporary with the Parthian Volagases IV.

that, on the first proclamation of Niger, and before it had become evident that he would have to establish his authority by force of arms, either the Parthian monarch, or at any rate princes who were among his dependants,1 sent to congratulate the new Emperor on his accession, and to offer him contingents of troops, if he required them. These spontaneous proposals were at the first politely declined, since Niger expected to find himself accepted joyfully as sovereign, and did not look to have to engage in war. When, however, the news reached him that he had formidable competitors, and that Severus, acknowledged Emperor at Rome, was about to set out for the East, at the head of vast forces, he saw that it would be necessary for him, if he were to make head against his powerful rival, to draw together troops from all quarters. Accordingly, towards the close of A.D. 193, he sent envoys to the princes beyond the Euphrates, and especially to the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Hatra, entreating them to send their troops at once to his aid.2 Volagases, under these circumstances, appears to have hesitated. He sent an answer that he would issue orders to his satraps for the collection of a force, but made no haste to redeem his promise, and in fact refrained from despatching any body of distinctly Parthian troops to the assistance of Niger in the impending struggle.

While, however, thus abstaining from direct interference in the contest between the two Roman pretenders, Volagases appears to have allowed one of his dependent monarchs to mix himself up in the quarrel. Hatra, at this time the capital of an Arabian com

1 Herodian. ii. 31. The expres- | σατράπαι καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐπέστελλον, sions used are somewhat vague-...

οἵ τε ἐπέκεινα Τίγριδος καὶ Εὐράτου

2 Herodian. iii. 1.

munity, and the chief city of central Mesopotamia (or the tract between the Sinjar and the Babylonian alluvium), was a dependency of Parthia, and though, like so many other Parthian dependencies, it possessed its native kings, cannot have been in a position to engage in a great war without permission from the Court of Ctesiphon. When, therefore, we find that Barsemius, the King of Hatra, not only received the envoys of Niger favourably, but actually sent to his aid a body of archers, we must understand that Volagases sanctioned the measure. Probably he thought it prudent to secure the friendship of the pretender whom he expected to be successful, but sought to effect this in the way that would compromise him least if the result of the struggle should be other than he looked for. The sending of his own troops to the camp of Niger would have committed him irretrievably; but the actions of a vassal monarch might with some plausibility be disclaimed.

As the struggle between the two, pretenders progressed in the early months of A.D. 194, the nations. beyond the Euphrates grew bolder, and allowed themselves to indulge their natural feelings of hostility towards the Romans. The newly subjected Mesopotamians flew to arms, massacred most of the Roman detachments stationed about their country, and laid

1 Arab tribes from a very early period held portions of Mesopotamia. Xenophon calls the tract between the Khabour and the Babylonian alluvium ‘Arabia' (Anab. i. 5, § 1). Strabo assigns the same region to Scenite Arabs' (xvi. 1, $26). Arabs appear in Upper Mesopotamia about the time Pompey (Dio Cass. xxxv. 2). Os

of

rhoëné is reckoned as Arabian by
Plutarch (Crass. § 21), and Appian
(Parth. p. 140, A). Hatra, or
Atra (now el-Hadhr), is first men-
tioned in the wars of Trajan, and
is always said to be Arabian. (See
Dio Cass. lxviii. 31; lxxv. 10-12;
Herodian. iii. 28; &c.)

2 Herodian. iii. 1 and 27.
3 Ibid. iii. 1.

siege to Nisibis, which since the cession Rome had made her head-quarters. The natives of the region were assisted by their kindred races across the Tigris, particularly by the people of Adiabêné, who, like the Arabs of Hatra, were Parthian vassals. Severus had no sooner overcome his rival and slain him, than he hastened eastward with the object of relieving the troops shut up in Nisibis, and of chastising the rebels and their abettors. It was in vain that the Mesopotamians sought to disarm his resentment by declaring that they had taken up arms in his cause, and had been only anxious to distress and injure the partisans of his antagonist. Though they sent ambassadors to him with presents, and offered to make restitution of the Roman spoil still in their hands, and of the Roman prisoners, it was observed that they said nothing about restoring the strongholds which they had taken, or resuming the position of Roman tributaries. On the contrary, they required that all Roman soldiers still in their country should be withdrawn from it, and that their independence should henceforth be respected.3 As Severus was not inclined to surrender Roman territory without a contest, war was at once declared. His immediate adversaries were of no great account, being, as they were, the petty kings of Osrhoêné, Adiabêné, and Hatra; but behind them loomed the massive form of the Parthian State, which was attacked through them, and could not be indifferent to their fortunes.

In the spring of A.D. 195, Severus, at the head of his troops, crossed the Euphrates in person, and taking

1 Dio Cass. lxxv. 1.

2 Ibid. Οἱ μὲν Οσροηνοὶ καὶ οἱ Αδιαβηνοὶ ἀποστάντες καὶ Νίσιβιντ

| πολιορκοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.

3 Ibid.

up his own quarters at Nisibis, which the Mesopotamians had been unable to capture, proceeded to employ his generals in the reduction of the rebels and the castigation of their aiders and abettors. Though his men suffered considerably from the scarcity and badness of the water,' yet he seems to have found no great difficulty in reducing Mesopotamia once more into subjection. Having brought it completely under, and formally made Nisibis the capital, at the same time raising it to the dignified position of a Roman colony," he caused his troops to cross the Tigris into Adiabêné, and, though the inhabitants offered a stout resistance, succeeded in making himself master of the country. The Parthian monarch seems to have made no effort to prevent the occupation of this province. He stood probably on the defensive, expecting to be attacked, in or near his capital. But Severus could not afford to remain in these remote regions. He had still a rival in the West in the person of Clodius Albinus, who might be expected to descend upon Italy, if it were left exposed to his attacks much longer. He therefore quitted

1 Dio tells a story, which has a somewhat apocryphal air, to illustrate the sufferings of the army. An especially dry summer had, he tells us, caused the springs generally to fail, and the troops on their way through the desert were so parched with drought, and so choked with dust, that they could no longer converse, but could barely articulate Water, water.' At length they reached a well, but the water was so foul that at first none would drink it. Seeing this, Severus caused a goblet to be filled for himself, and in the sight of the troops swallowed the whole at a draught. The men then con

6

3

sented to drink and were refreshed. (Dio Cass. lxxv. 2.)

2 Dio says vaguely that Severus gave dignity' to Nisibis (lxxv. 3, ἀξίωμα τῷ Νισίβει δούς). The nature of the dignity appears from the coins, which give Nisibis the titles Οἱ ΚΟΛΩΝΙΑ and ΜΗΤΡΟΠΟΛΙΣ. (See Mionnet, Description, &c., tom. v. pp. 625-628.)

3 Dio Cass. 1.s.c. Compare Spartian. Sev. Imp. § 9. In commemoration of these successes Severus took the epithets of Arabicus and Adiabenicus, which are frequent in his inscriptions and on his coins. (See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 196.)

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