with its subject by practice -when, "he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed" (Jam. i. 25).

By information and intelligence of the actions and designs of other men, whether past or present, thus applied, we extend our own mental domain as it were with a slice of their consciousness; which may seem a great matter: but how much greater a matter must it be, to learn the ways of God; and, as St. Paul says, to "have the mind of Christ" (Cor. I. ii. 16): which may also be had indeed, as far as it is proper. For" the secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and unto our children for ever, THAT WE MAY DO ALL THE WORDS OF THIS LAW" (Deut. xxix. 29); and (it may be added) so fall or appertain as a welcome acquisition to Him whose knowledge, like His power, admits of no extension, being infinitely older than its rational objects with all their thoughts, works, and occasions; as the Psalmist felt when he said, "O Lord, thou hast searched me out, and known me: thou knowest my down sitting and mine uprising; thou understandest my thoughts long before" (Ps. cxxxix. 1). But what will he do with those shadows of intellect, which have not the substance of practice? whose goodness is as a morning cloud; and, as the early dew, it goeth away (Hos. vi. 4). Whatever will he do with all his refuse?

§ 9. Also the Rights and Expectations of a man, or of any other member of the whole kingdom of God, objectively considered, are a part of his and its incidental property: our rights and expectations being of two sorts, v. g. temporal and eternal; in the former of which we are joined by the brute creation, and in the latter by beings at present superior to ourselves. For brutes too have their preconceived rights and expectations as well as ourselves, and will not tamely allow their walks to be invaded: and if angels have not theirs, they have at least abundant room

for them between their own perfection and that which admits of no increase; but without the same room as inferior candidates, it may be presumed, for contention.

And hereupon another distinction of rights and expectations may also be conceived; v. g. into peaceful and litigious, corresponding with the eternal and temporal kinds before mentioned; the latter being one that men are always fighting and contending for, but the former never disputed, or never openly at least. For it cannot be denied, that men's eternal rights and expectations are also liable to be secretly undermined as well by intellectuals of their own order as by others of a more formidable description; any more than it can be said, that such eternal rights and expectations, or those who enjoy such blessings, are never envied by those who have lost them.

Our rights and expectations generally rank as personal property, and therefore a place is here assigned them among properties of that sort, rather than a place among others that will soon be enumerated, to which they also belong in another view. All the wrongs in the kingdom too are incidental property as well as the rights, if considered as these have been, wherever they may happen to alight; on some who are able to stand up for themselves, or on some who are not-on the rich, the powerful, the vindictive; or on the widow, the fatherless, the meek, and others; as many there are, who have no heart to stand up for themselves, nor any one to stand up for them lower than the great head of the intellectual kingdom or confederacy.

§ 10. Also every Duty and every Liability will be a part of our incidental property, with every sort of obligation and responsibility that may attach to the subject. For as on the one hand the kingdom will have its property and rights accruing, so on the other hand its obligation and responsibility proceeding, and as much incidental to itself as those, also just as due to their object on the authority of our Saviour's declaration "unto whomsoever

much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more" (Luke xii. 48). (Luke xii. 48). Whatever may have been given to some men, they do not seem to think that more will be required of them than of horses subjectively; i. e., considering themselves as the subjects or debtors: but objectively; i. e., considering themselves as the objects or claimants, they can find that there are such incidentals as are here spoken of, v. g., such as duty, liability, and the rest. And indeed it may be hard to mention any incidental, that is more pressing or harder to get rid of. For what is a liability to punishment but guilt? or what is liability to err generally, but human nature? or what is responsibility for the same, but a partnership debt that must needs be accounted for some how or other? For if an evil principle be the source of evil deeds, evil deeds have also a certain tendency to strengthen the evil principle: and how can any man hold himself innocent before God, who does what in him lies, to strengthen the hands of God's enemy by a series of uncongenial or ungodly deeds. Of guilt and responsibility of that sort we are not now to consider; but it may be said generally of the whole subject of liability, that it is nearly constituent: and still more so is duty, as standing in the place of that which would be a most valuable constituent, if we should be happy enough to enjoy it.

Being, however, so nearly constituent is one reason why the subject of duty does not need to be here particularly insisted on the same being well expressed in general by righteousness in substance; its practice, by fidelity; and its particulars by the particulars of the same, of which a deal may be said. And considering this agreement, it would not be impertinent to call such liabilities as duty, obligation, and such like, by the name of prospective righteousness: of which, as the liability or incumbency is more general, so is it more lasting than many may suppose. For it will survive its object in many cases, attach

ing to the remains and even to the memory of the deceased. And often when a friend or relative is departed this troublesome life, a survivor may feel himself bound in duties to the same, which before, to his present sorrow, he was not sufficiently aware of; he may find enough to look back on, enough to reproach him, enough to kindle an heart-rending flame of repentance: how much more hereafter towards the prime, the great, the general and ultimate object of every duty, and of every regret, for duty ill paid!

Liabilities of an official and commercial kind are also duties for the most part, but not always: e. g. whatever services a man may be justly liable to will be so many duties; and so are his debts, as much as his just demands to others, and all incidentals to him. Perhaps it may be questioned whether debts have not too decided a character to rank with essentials even of the incidental class or kind, and whether they should not be considered as even worse than poverty: but there are good debts as well as evil enough to shew their natural indifference. There is, e. g. the debt of love, a pleasing debt, which our Saviour teaches, and his apostles recommend, and our forefathers used to cultivate by short reckonings. "Owe no man any thing but to love one another" (Rom. xiii. 8), says one of the forementioned apostles: and his advice is highly appropriate not only to friendships, but to the commonest transactions in society; and would be particularly so in times like the present; when so many of us owe money and other things before-mentioned, perhaps as well as love, and do not think much perhaps of paying either.

§ 11. The three next properties which are here associated; v. g. Opportunity, Necessity, Impossibility, may seem very dissimilar, and are so in effect, the first being directly and the second indirectly opposed to the last mentioned: for impossibility is the very antithesis to op

* They say, "short reckonings make long friends "

portunity, and also the limitation of necessity. But this opposite relation is what intitles these three incidentals to a joint consideration. And besides that, between the two first mentioned there is also an agreement in the way of comparison which may be enough to warrant this association: necessity being a step beyond opportunity, and opportunity one towards necessity. For opportunity must concur with necessity, to make it real: without this no undertaking can be necessary; it is an impossibility, and impossibilities cannot be wrought by any compulsion.

Necessity is the voice of God: and as such should always be cheerfully obeyed, when he speaks in this manner. It is not to be supposed, that God should ever enjoin impossibilities, or any general incommodity either; except in the way of chastisement, and by the sufferer's own procuring: but with the divine favour it may prove an happiness sometimes to be urged and directed by necessity; as it not only saves us the trouble of deliberation, but (what is more) the chance of error too. And yet necessity is what few of us like while present; though we may afterwards own its divinity, judging by the consequence.

In one respect necessity is universal; in another, partial only; it is universal, inasmuch as all things have their limits; but partial, in that within the course of necessity there is a certain space allowed for the operations of its subjects. This is their loose latitude; to the extent of which they will be allowed to play the fool, and to injure others but no farther; as we may learn from that inspired apologue, the story or example of Job-over whose person the great lover of mischief was allowed a certain dominion, but none of any consequence over either his principles or his life (Job ii. 6). Necessity is a broad line; in which the human, and other orders of intellectuals likewise, perhaps, may wander as the planets wander in their common orbit; deviating from side to side con