estate: he may be free in his material properties (body or person), and not in his spiritual (spirit or disposition); free in his spiritual, and not in his intellectual (mind or understanding); or vice versâ he may be free in this or that class of properties, and not in the preceding from the last mentioned to the first.

Also by the object towards which a man is either captive or free a lively distinction may be made; as we find it in different passages of Scripture: having there first an example of bodily captivity given by our Saviour, where he talks of " a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years" (Luke xiii. 16), and of bodily freedom examples enough, besides that of Samson in his prosperity (Judges xiv. &c.): also an example of spiritual captivity and freedom likewise intimated by St. Paul where he mentions some whom he had the happiness to reclaim, "being made free from sin, and become the servants of righteousness" (Rom. vi. 18). All which, being considered, may furnish some idea of the variety contained in this one article of freedom.

But these distinctions are not half: for the same property is also liable to be varied by other circumstances; as by department for one; into civil and political, temporal and spiritual, &c. It will be variety enough, however, for the present purpose, if we distinguish the subject of freedom, in the same manner as we distinguish its subject, the kingdom: and then the result will be as follows, v. g.

Which several kinds of liberty or freedom will all deserve

to be separately considered with the other good characteristics of different classes whereto they severally belong. It might be desirable to see the whole of so interesting a subject at once: but as this would be too independent a task, and yet all the premises deserve consideration, it will be a convenient medium to notice here one sort of freedom, which is that relating to incidentals, and hereafter the others which relate to constituents in their several classes or spheres.

The first mentioned sort of freedom then, which for want of a more specific appellation we will call Liberty, though it relates properly to incidentals, as proceeding from without, and being external in fact, i. e. not a constituent of the subject, has yet from the reciprocity of species above mentioned a paramount influence sometimes over the nearest constituents, whether material or spiritual. It is by the help of this blessing, that we continue to move and breathe upon the face of the earth, and enjoy its productions securely: no wonder, therefore, that so great an account should generally be made of the same by its inhabitants, and that not only rational, but irrational creatures, or all that happen to have the common appetite of self-preservation, will fly for it to the ends of the earth, or fight for it to the last extremity, choosing rather to return their spirit unbroken to God who gave it, than to own a slavish dependence on their equals. For a due subjection of each to other is not only tolerable, but really good for all, and even essential to an higher sort of freedom, as before observed; but slavery is such a beginning of evils, as no man would submit to who had not made up his mind to the worst. So that a man, if he have only the excellent characteristic of a free spirit, will sooner yield his life than his liberty to a sturdy ruffian, though he would surrender without hesitation to a very child at the sight of a warrant backed by lawful authority.

But the notion of liberty will, like most other notions, differ widely in persons of different characters. Some of the

weaker sort of persons, e. g. will think it liberty, to be allowed to call their souls their own, while others cannot think it any thing, unless they may be allowed not only to do what they will themselves, but also to dictate to others, to whom, to be free, they should rather be subject, as wives to their husbands, children to their parents, servants to their masters, and subjects to their prince. It is very seldom that we find any in either class who have a just sense of freedom; not too retiring on the one hand, nor too presuming on the other. Indeed our flocks and herds appear to understand the routine of freedom and subjection, and to appreciate their equal importance better than ourselves, with regard to individuals: and with regard to parts and properties, it cannot be said that mankind are very consistent in this respect. For while the importance of one species of freedom or subjection to another seems to be acknowledged by temporal governments, in their denying to idiots, or those who are bound in intellect, the common share of incidental freedom with regard to the disposal of property, they make no account of irregularities and captivity in the spiritual department, by any restriction or privation whatever. A man who is deranged in mind or understanding, must forfeit, according to law, the government of his own property and person; but a man of the most depraved disposition, or ever so badly bound in spirit to Satan, which influences the government of property no less than idiotism, is at perfect liberty to dispose of his property as he will. He may give away every thing at his death from those whom he is bound to maintain while he lives by the law of the land, as well as by nature and common sense! This is an anomaly in civil jurisprudence that deserves to be corrected, and most likely will be too some time or other, as the practice is not confirmed by instinct. The practice of alienation ought to be prohibited perhaps like that of intermarriage within certain degrees, or only allowed in such degrees with proper restrictions. It ought to be said "perhaps," as the question is rather out of our line.

3. And so it seems rather, likewise, to question much about a kindred incidental, Ease and Comfort in one respect, for all its modest appearance. The comfort of constituents, whether in body, which is a part of health; or in spirit, which is a part of virtue; or in mind, which is a part of wisdom,-may deserve a share of our attention, as much of it indeed as can be afforded in justice to higher objects: but comfort in incidentals, pecuniary, external comfort, or comfortable circumstances, are only to be regarded in an inferior a much lower degree, and as subordinate to the first mentioned comfort of constituents, which is also subordinate to greater good for the subject.

4. But if so modest an incidental good as comfort can deserve only a moderate share of the true Christian's attention, still less will be deserved by the more glaring, and at the same time, more precarious advantage of Wealth. Few good incidentals will stand wholly acquitted of the charge of precariousness, and almost indifference; but few, if any, are so liable to that charge as the incidental now mentioned. Indeed, the sort of wealth here alluded to, and which the world generally considers as the only sort of wealth, is not such as would be called the wealth of the kingdom in a Christian sense, although it be the true incidental characteristic. For true Christian wealth is constituent, being the same which our Saviour recommends to his followers, in that memorable precept, “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth; where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven; where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal" (Mat. vi. 19, 20): which may be rendered thus, Lay not up for yourselves the poor and precarious enjoyment of worldly wealth; but lay up for yourselves the enjoyment of heavenly peace, or the treasure of a good conscience. As may appear from the reflexion with which our Saviour accompanies this recommendation, "For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Ibid. 21).

The dearest possession in the world to any one who has the happiness to have it genuine will be the treasure of a GOOD CONSCIENCE which is only to be had in Christ. But of this sort of treasure or wealth it would be unseasonable to speak at present: we are now considering the good characteristic answering to the above named essential incidental, money, stock, &c., i. e., Goods and Property, as these things are commonly called, or more commonly called than proved. And even with respect to the simple acceptation of this characteristic; we observe, that it depends entirely on comparison; what is but a bare competency, or even mediocrity, or less than that-poverty and want, with one man being riches, wealth, and affluence with another; so that these properties are necessarily undefined, and so must remain. Notwithstanding which, it may be worth while to consider now the said properties according to our vague ideas on account of their moral and spiritual influence. For,

1, In a moral view our responsibility must be regulated in some measure even by our foreign means: in respect of which, as well as of nearer and more considerable, it may be said, "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more" (Luke xii. 48). Which saying from the highest possible authority, if it were rightly considered, might be enough to cool many a man's ardour in pursuit of what would be wealth in his possession, and reconcile him to the condition of medioerity, or even to a somewhat less. And in approaching such an object, before we rushed upon it with open arms like worldlings and unbelievers; we, Christians, not regarding the world as our oracle, should be apt to pause at the prospect of wealth, and look it in the face, to see how far we may venture to lay hold of it: or if wealth should happen to drop upon us in a manner almost unheeded, its charms at least might still remain so for us; as the Psalmist advises, "O trust not in wrong and robbery; give not yourselves unto vanity; if RICHES INCREASE, SET NOT YOUR