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any local knowledge of South Britain, which of course has the first ,claim to our attention. In the first instance let us consider that part of it that lies to the south of the Mersey and Humber, which may be regarded as the heart of Britain. The four great commercial cities of London, Hull, Liverpool, and Bristol are situated at the four angles of it on inlets of the sea, and the lines that may be supposed to join these points form a rectangle, each of which may be regarded as the base of a military position against the several quarters from which the enemy may come. Opposite to the middle of each of these sides, or at least to three of them, are places which either are at present fortified or seem particularly to require to be so; namely in the south, Portsmouth, Gosport, the island of Portsea, and the Isle of Wight, all which may be regarded as one position, which cannot possibly be too much secured; on the east, Yarmouth, which is become so essential on account of the North sea squadrons; on the north an intermediate point to connect England with Scotland, perhaps on the Tees, which appears from the map to be navigable as far as Bernard Castle; and on the west perhaps some point to connect with Ireland. It is generally allowed also that a fortified position is necessary in the centre of the country. These situations then might be found perhaps to answer the several purposes required from them as fortified positions, the substance of which is to afford different lines of operation to an army, or corps of an army, in the front, flanks, or rear of an enemy, in whatever direction he may present himself or advance. For if he attached himself to the place or places on the coast, or that on the north, then other places would be in his rear; and if he further advanced into the country, then the places on the coast would be in his rear; and if he further advanced, there would be places in his front, flank, and rear. But the great advantage in defensive war, and the means of prosecuting it offensively, consist in having such positions as afford several lines of operation to cross, and take in front and reverse every possible line of operation of the enemy, and in the shortness of these lines; and a great advantage of positions in themselves is to be capable of receiving the confluence of all, the resources of the country from as large a circle as possible, to be able to extend their influence as widely, and to be incapable of being easily embraced or invested. Now the positions on the coast evidently want the latter advantages, and on the contrary might under some circumstances be very improper for troops to act and retire upon, as they might prove to be a cul de sac for them; though on other accounts it seems essential to place them in security, in consideration of their wealth and population, and their intimate connection or identity with the sources of our military and maritime power, and more particularly that we may be able to succour and be succoured by the latter. In addition therefore to the maritime places, other places in the interior, I imagine, should be fortified, to answer altogether the

Being unacquainted with the ground about Hull, Liverpool, and Bristol, I cannot pretend to assert that they admit of being fortified.'

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several purposes to be expected from them. Supposing therefore that one were formed between each of the first positions mentioned, of London, Hull, Liverpool, and Bristol, they would then with that in the centre of the kingdom, form three successive lines of defence: which may be considered as corresponding to the sides, and to the two lines drawn through the centre, and parallel to them, of the rectangular figure before mentioned (independent of the places which subtend the sides on the coast, two of which are Portsmouth and Yarmouth), and they would also correspond, I think, to the natural lines of defence of the country, which should be identified with the artificial ones, as the natural strength of each particular situation and position should be reinforced by the artificial works. The position on the south side would fall upon the Isis, about Oxford or Abingdon; that on the east on the Nen, between Northampton and Peterborough, or on the Ouse, about Huntingdon ; that in the centre of the kingdom, about Rugby or Warwick, on the Avon; that in the north should be placed so as to command the Trent; and that in the west upon the Severn. They would thus all support the principal natural lines of defence of the country, which are the principal rivers. A more advantageous position however than Bristol might, I think, be found higher up the Severn, which should be upon both banks of that river, and form, with that in the centre of the kingdom on the Avon, and that in the east on the Nen, a chain of positions to correspond with a most remarkable natural division of the country, on which the Romans established their first chain of forts under P. Ostorius Scapula.'

Here Capt. Birch begins with declaring that he has scarcely any local knowlege of South Britain, and yet he proceeds to dictate chains of fortified positions for its defence.

When he says, the lines that may be supposed to join these points form a rectangle, each of which may be regarded as the base of a military position against the several quarters from which the enemy may come,' he does not seem to be aware that right lines joining London and Hull, Hull and Liverpool, Liverpool and Bristol, and Bristol and London, would not form a rectangle, but a trapezium, or quadrangular figure, of which the opposite sides are neither equal nor parallel; nor to be sensible that it is utterly impossible for right lines, supposed to be drawn through a central point within such a figure, to be parallel respectively to its opposite sides. Were two of the opposite sides of this figure to be bisected, and a right line be drawn joining the points of bisection, it would not be parallel to either of the other two sides. Moreover, though Hall, Liverpool, and Bristol are three of the author's four grand points in his proposed lines of fortified positions, he acknowleges that he is unacquainted with the ground about them, and does not know whether they are capable of being fortified or not.

Independently of this quadrangular or trapezoidal figure, which the author uniformly calls a rectangle, and the sides of which taken together with the lines drawn through the central point within it exceed seven hundred and fifty miles in extent, talks of sides along the coast: but of what figure they are sides he does not mention. If to these be added his proposed lines from Edinburgh to Stirling, from Stirling to Perth, and from Perth to Aberdeen, we shall have an aggregate of lines of fortified positions equal at least to eleven hundred miles. Now if these lines are to be secured by extensive works which mutually protect one another, (and if they be not, they will be liable to be penetrated without difficulty every where, and the troops placed in the fortified positions to be taken in detail,) the whole male population of the island capable of bearing arms, together with all the females in it, who might be sufficiently stout and robust for such duty, would not suffice for properly occupying them, and for furnishing only

one relief.

Capt. B.'s proposed method of fortifying his positions sets every received principle of engineering at defiance. The bastioned system with flanks is to be laid aside; and a construction in straight lines, without any regard to flanking defences, is to be made of the projected works, which are to be defended by a reverse fire from case-mates on the counterscarp of the ditch. The glacis of each, too, is to be countermined, and these case-mates are to serve as places of arms to the countermines. The new works round the Common and the Dock-Yard at Portsmouth have casemated-galleries in the counterscarp: but government has not yet proceeded so far as to make countermines in their glacis, although they have already cost ten times the amount of the original estimate of the expence of erecting them. Captain Birch does not appear to be aware that, if his proposed lines of fortified positions are to form three successive lines of defence against the enemy, on whatever side he may make his attack, each work ought to be con structed exactly in the same manner throughout its whole enceinte; nor to know that, if the works are to be without flanks, and to be defended by a reverse fire from the counterscarp, it would be much better to make both them and their ditches perfectly circular than in right lines; because such a construction would give a much greater area within the same extent of rampart, and also distribute the fire from the inside of them much more regularly and equally. To shew that his schemes are visionary and impracticable, it is only necessary to mention that his projected line of fortified positions is in point of extent to the line of fortresses which secured the REV. MAY, 1808. frontier

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frontier of France under the monarchy on the sides of Swisserland, Germany, and Flanders, in the ratio of at least 110 to 47 for from Basil to Landau along Alsace, the distance is about 130 miles; from Landau to Sedan on the Moselle along the electorate of Treves, the dutchies of Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limberg, about 190; and from Sedan down the Meuse to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, about 150; in all about 470 miles; whereas, as we have already shown, the lines of Capt. B. extend over 1100 miles.

As to the author's chimerical project for protecting London by means of fortifications and inundations, how long could the inhabitants of our metropolis subsist if an enemy's army were to occupy the avenues to it, and to cut off its supplies ? In one week they would be reduced to the necessity of either surrendering, or of eating their horses, dogs, and cats, or perhaps one another.

Even Captain Birch's phraseology serves to shew that he is unacquainted with military science. 'He talks of narrow instead of acute angles; of the flanks of hills, as if conical bodies had flanks; of sides subtended by places; of faces flanked by a reverse fire, as if a flanking fire was a reverse one; of a close modification of a principle of construction, &c. &c.

Captain B.'s observations respecting our cavalry and' horseartillery have no tendency to prove that this country is not naturally strong, but rather shew that both establishments are in a great measure useless; and that therefore nine-tenths of the enormous expence of supporting them might be saved to the nation, without any real diminution of its defence.

To the second edition, the author has subjoined an appendix, which is full of mis statement, particularly respecting the late ingenious General Lloyd: who both thought and wrote like an engineer and a soldier, and manifested an illumination of mind on every subject which he discussed. Captain Birch roundly declares that Lloyd's book was evidently written against his better judgment, to obtain his pardon and a pension.' This assertion, however, is not founded on fact; since the General had made his peace here, and had obtained a pension on the Chelsea establishment, some years before his "Political and Military Rhapsody" was printed, which first made its appearance at the critical moment when the combined fleets of France and Spain rode triumphant in the channel, in 1779; and that he had weighed the subject with the most mature deliberation, and thoroughly digested his ideas respecting it, must be manifest from this circumstance, that the Rhapsody was published just 39 years after he had first taken

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the invasion of this country into his consideration, and sketched out a plan of it :-which plan was, however, abandoned by the French ministry, in consequence of a report made by him. after he had particularly and minutely examined the coast of England.

Čapt. B. also says that General Lloyd supposes the enemy to land in Devonshire. He does not, however, confine the landing exclusively to that county, but shews that Plymouth and Portsmouth are the only places along the whole coast that could answer an enemy's purpose; who could not promise to himself success if he were to land to the northward of Portsmouth, because he could not in that case have any secure roadstead or harbour for his shipping, nor any safe place of arms for a dépôt.

The author moreover asserts that Gen. L. prescribes that an invader should always choose as short a line of operation as possible, and in order to that end debark near the capital.' Not such, however, but the following are the Ger eral's words on that subject: "When a coup de main only is intended, you must debark as near the object you have in view as possible, because the success depends on secresy and surprize: but when you propose to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view."

Captain B. next ascribes to General Lloyd the remark, "that were the enemy to land an army in England, the enterprize might be decisive:" but all the observations of that able writer on the subject are inconsistent with this assertion: for he never once supposes a serious invasion of this country to be practicable, while we are superior or even nearly equal to our enemies at sea. He therefore earnestly recommends it to our rulers to direct their attention particularly to our naval establishments; and he points out in strong terms the inutility, while we maintain a pre-eminence afloat, of augmenting our army for the purposes of national defence,-advising the conversion of a very considerable part of it into a marine force. In page 51 of his Rhapsody, he observes: "from what we have said, it seems evident, that no invasion can take place, until our fleet entirely driven out of the sea is forced to hide itself for a considerable time in some harbour; and that such an invasion cannot be prosecuted with any probability of success, unless the enemy is master of Plymouth or Portsmouth."-At page 64 he remarks that "it is needless for him to prosecute this description any further, because he is persuaded that no army,

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