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the Romans; see Wealth of Nations, Book V. Chap. I.: but, had he been much acquainted with the best military historians among the antients, he would not have been induced to rely on the support of these passages. With all due deference to Dr. Smith, we must venture to hint that his observations respecting standing armies and militia, as applicable to antient states, are not only founded on error, but are also in some respects inconsistent.

The Romans had no other armies than their legions, which were all formed in exactly the same manner, and were merely a well regulated national militia, composed of themselves and their allies. Each of these bodies, even on first taking the field, was better qualified for military operations than the troops of other states; and certainly much more so than the Gauls of Annibal's army at the battles of Trebia and the Thrasymene Lake: both of which he won by his own skill, by the greater number of his cavalry, and by so working on the foibles of Tiberius and Flaminius, as to turn them to his own advantage, rather than by any superiority in his troops or in their armour. Indeed, after these two battles, he gave to his Africans the arms which he had taken from the Romans, and never again allowed them to use any other. Of the twenty-six military tribunes appointed to the four legions annually enrolled, sixteen were taken from the citizens, who had carried arms in five campaigns; and the others from those who had completed ten. The four captains, or centurions, appointed to each company, were also persons experienced in warfare: a great proportion of the legionary troops were so likewise; and all of them had been previously trained to the use of arms. Even their freshest levies, therefore, were better prepared for warlike operations than any part of our standing army, or of any other perhaps in the world: for every citizen was obliged, before he arrived at the age of forty-six, to serve either ten years in the cavalry or sixteen in the infantry; those only excepted who were rated by the censors below four hundred drachmæ, and were reserved for the service of the sea;-and no citizen was permitted by the laws to sue for any magistracy before he had served ten campaigns.

As to the Roman army which Annibal engaged and almost destroyed at the battle of Cannæ, it was not only the most numerous but perhaps the finest that Rome ever sent into the field. It was chiefly composed of troops who had served several campaigns, had therefore frequently encountered their enemies, knew how they were armed, were well acquainted with their manner of fighting, and, during the course of two whole years previous to that action, had daily engaged them

with equal forces in partial but sharp combats, from which they generally returned successful. As troops, then, they were at least fully equal to their enemies, and on the whole they were better armed; for, though Annibal had armed the Africans after the Roman manner, the Gauls and Spaniards wore the same kind of buckler, which was inferior to that of the Romans; while the Gallic sword, instead of being calculated for pushing as well as striking, was fit only for making a falking stroke, and at a certain distance. The consul Emilius, who had not long before rendered essential services to his country by his brave and skilful management of the war against the Illyrians, harangued the legions before the engagement; telling them that it was highly improbable, or rather impossible, for them, who had almost daily returned with success for the space of two years from little combats with the enemy against equal forces, to fail with more than double numbers of obtaining the victory in a general battle; and that, as all circumstances afforded the stongest assurances of their being victorious, nothing was wanting but that they themselves should in earnest resolve to conquer. After having observed that it was unnecessary to enlarge much to them on that topic, in order to shew in what contempt he held the mercenary troops, who chiefly composed the only standing armies that existed among the antients, and an army of allies, whose interests are not intimately interwoven with and inseparable from those of the people with whom they are in alliance, he made use of the following words: "Were I speaking indeed to mercenary soldiers, or to an army of allies engaged in the defence of some neighbouring state, this kind of exhortation might perhaps be necessary: for the worst that can befall such troops is the danger to which they are exposed during the time of action, since they have scarcely any thing either to apprehend or to hope from the issue of it."

Annibal's victories, therefore, were not in any respect owing to the superiority of his troops over those of the Romans, but chiefly to his own wonderful dexterity and skill, and partly to his advantage in cavalry: for the Gauls, who composed a great proportion of his army, were much inferior to the legionary troops in discipline and warlike preparation, were much worse armed, were actuated solely by revenge and a thirst of booty, were fickle and unsteady, impatient of hardship and fatigue, and so treacherous that Annibal found it necessary to disguise himself sometimes daily to avoid being assassinated by them. That his own extraordinary abilities. were the principal cause of his success is evident from these words of Polybius:

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"With

"With regard to the battles that were fought by Annibal, and the victories which he obtained over the Romans, we need not on this occasion enter into a long discussion of them: for it was not his arms nor his order of battle which rendered that General superior to the Romans, but his dexterity alone, and his admirable skill. In the accounts given by us of those engagements, we have very clearly shewn that this was the cause of his success; and the remark is still more strongly confirmed, in the first place, by the final issue of the war for as soon as the Romans had obtained a General, whose ability was equal to that of Annibal, they immediately became the conquerors. Add to this, that Annibal himself rejected the armour which he first had used; and having furnished the African troops with arms that were taken from the Romans in the first battle, he afterwards used no other." Book XVII. Chap. II.

This passage sufficiently shews that the reason assigned by Adam Smith for Annibal's successes against the Romans, on the ground that the troops of the latter were militia opposed to standing armies, is erroneous, and contradictory to historical facts; and his subsequent observation respecting the standing army, which Annibal left with his brother Asdrubal, when he intrusted him with the government of Spain, is equally mistaken. That army did not enable Asdrubal, with all his abilities, experience, and skill in war, to "expel the Romans almost entirely from that country." Instead of expelling them, he was himself expelled from it: for after having been worsted by them both at sea and on land, and defeated by Publius Scipio in a general engagement, he collected together the remains of his army, and passed the Pyrenean mountains in order to join his brother in Italy: but on entering that country, he was intercepted by the consuls Livius and Clau dius, and forced to engage them also in a general battle, in which he fell, displaying the utmost courage and conduct. That great commander, as long as any hope remained of his performing actions not unworthy of his former glory, paid all 'due attention to his own safety: but, when fortune had deprived him of every prospect, and reduced him to the last desperate extremity, he determined either to conquer or to die like one of the sons of Amilcar Barcas.

Dr. Smith's remark also, that, " the African militia composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal at the battle of Zama," is not founded in truth. The Carthaginians and subject-Africans together formed only his second line; and all of them, a few excepted, fell nobly fighting in the field of battle. It was not owing to them that Annibal was defeated in that engagement, but to the circumstance of Scipio having left proper intervals in his order of battle through which the elephants night pass, and to his great superiority in cavalry. After Annibal's

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nibal's third line, which was composed of the troops that he had brought with him from Italy, and was formed at the distance of a stadium or furlong from the second, came to be engaged, Polybius tells us that, " as the numbers were nearly equal, as the sentiments, the courage, and the arms on both sides were the same, the battle remained for a long time doubtful; and so obstinate was the contention, that the men all fell in the place in which they fought: but Lælius and Masinissa, returning from the pursuit of the routed cavalry, arrived most providentially at the very moment when their assistance was chiefly wanted, and attacked the rear of Annibal." It was this circumstance that chiefly decided that action, which gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world.

It is curious to observe that Dr. Smith in one sentence calls the Roman legions militia, and in another standing armies. They had no bodies of troops that bore the smallest resemblance to standing or mercenary armies, till after they had lost their liberty; and it was by their national militia, or legionary troops, that they conquered the world in a short period after they first visited the adjoining island of Sicily, and sent assistance to the Mamertines. A militia so con.ituted as theirs was must be allowed to have been much more efficient than any standing army, for the purposes both of defence and conquest, as well as infinitely better calculated for the preservation of liberty; and were ours similarly organized, we might very properly dispense with our standing army, and all its enormously expensive appendages. It was by her standing army, though chiefly composed of Africans, that the Carthaginians, after the first Punic war, were brought to the brink of destruction, from which they were with difficulty saved by the transcendent abilities of Amilcar. The whole of antient history, indeed, militates against the positions laid down in the passage which Captain Birch quotes from Adam Smith; and we have examined it the more particularly, because it has the sanction of that celebrated writer's name, and on it therefore Captain. B. has laid great stress in his condemnation of our militia and volunteer systems: which, though they certainly stand in need of alteration and improvement, we cannot help regarding as the two principal checks that exist in this country, at present, against the conversion of its government into a military despotism.

The first cause which the present author assigns for the final success of our revolted American colonies is the extent of the country which they had to defend; a position than which nothing can be more extraordinary, since the power of resistance in any country must, cæteris paribus, be in the inverse ratio of the space occupied by those who are employed in its defence.

We

We cannot follow minutely this advocate for fortified positions through all his extraordinary dogmas, tenets, and assertions; such as that we ought not to count on our navy defending our army, but on our army defending our navy, in case of an attack; that the Irish militia should not be suffered to remain in Ireland; that the present system of militia should be abolished, by changing them into regulars, and giving them officers from the line; that the volunteer corps (which seem to excite much uneasiness) are the worst species of militia; that Agricola defeated Glgacus on the Grampian hills, though they did not engage on them, but only near the foot of them, &c. &c. &c. We must, however, exhibit one or two specimens both of the author's style and of his knowlege in the science of national defence:

I shall propose a mode or plan of construction for accomplishing in a very short time that which we have in view. I think that . our fortifications should be similar to intrenched camps, on ground naturally strong, situated on a river, or covering a great commercial or maritime town, which supposes their back to the sea, which in a great measure fortifies naturally one half of them, and enables them to receive supplies from shipping (some of these natural positions have been observed to be stronger than any fortresses); that they should be strengthened or fortified by means of detached, independent, permanent works or forts in the best situations that could be found for them, each requiring a particular attack to reduce it; and that they should flank and be connected by a deep intrenchment of earth, which might be levelled when the army wished to go and combat the enemy, having besides some works in an advanced line; those in the second line to be opposite the interval of those in the first line; those of the first order to be able to cover from 30 to 50,000 men, and those of the second a lesser number. It is a similar principle on which Alexandria and Cairo were fortified by the French, each of which could have covered any number of men, and which enabled their corps there to exact such favourable terms of capitulation; which sufficiently manifested what an excellent defence they might have made, though unsupported by the people of the country, and without any communication with the sea.'

What does Capt. B. wish us to understand by the back of fortifications? or by asserting that our fortifications should be fortified by means of detached, independent, permanent works or forts in the best situations that could be found for them?' and that they should flank (one another, or what?) and be connected by a deep intrenchment of earth'?-Again:

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The necessity of fortified positions in Britain, I am convinced, cannot admit of being questioned, and I am equally certain they must be formed on the principle I have proposed, or on some close modification of it. The number and situation of them will admit of much discussion, and it is with extreme diffidence I submit my opinions on this part of the subject, particularly as I have scarce

any

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