[1799.] and nicely limiting its proportions; not reflecting, that this Temple is truly Catholic, the ample earth its arca, and the arch of heaven its dome." Looked over Gibbon's Vindication: a dexterous and masterly defence, undoubtedly; but I like his style and manner less than I used to do. It is too elaborate; wants ease, spirit, and flexibility; and seems adapted solely to the grave and stately march of history. Yet it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to change any term, or its collocation, for a better; so that " proper words in proper places" does not seem a sufficient definition of a good style. APRIL the 28th. Looked over that part of Parr's Sequel in which he introduces, in a strange and desultory way, his observations on French Politics. He combats the position, that what is true in theory may be false in practice, by maintaining, That truth consists in the relation of our ideas to each other, or in the conformity of those ideas to external objects; and wherever that relation or conformity exists, the ideas belonging to either are unalterably just, and the proposition expressing those ideas, must ever be true: That therefore a proposition true in theory, must be true in practice, where the practice corresponds to the theory: and, That where they appear to clash, we are not always to maintain that the theory is false, but that it does not apply to the particular case.-Of Burke's expression " metaphysically true, and morally and politically false," he observes, that "true and false" are expressions of the metaphysical, proper and improper" "just or unjust" of the moral, and "useful or pernicious" of the political properties of objects: but this rather tends to complicate than clear up the question; and a wider and deeper view of the subject, I suspect, is required, to obtain a simple and satisfactory solution.-Parr's style of composition, with all its excellencies, has one capital defect-it wants light and shade: every thing is sacrificed to force; each part appears to be uniformly and intensely laboured; and nothing has the air of being the natural and spontaneous effusion of a mind seriously and earnestly engaged in communicating its ideas and its feelings:-yet he writes, I am told, with fluency, and much in the same manner as he speaks. APRIL the 29th. Read Mackintosh's Vindicia Gallicæ. His style and manner in this piece are magnificent; but uniformly cumbrous, and occasionally coarse. He has infinitely improved both, in his Preliminary Discourse; though some of the ponderosity still re [1799.] mains.-There can hardly be a more express and full contradiction, than in two passages, p. 265 of the Vindiciæ, and p. 49 of the Discourse. In the former, he says, "It is perhaps susceptible of proof, that these governments of balance and control, have never existed but in the vision of theorists": in the latter, he affirms, that "The result of such an examination will be, that no institution so detestable as an absolutely unbalanced government, perhaps ever existed; and that the simple governments are mere creatures of the imagination of theorists."-Page 215-16-17, he maintains, that morality is founded on expediency, and that utility alone constitutes its obligation; but that the moment the moral edifice is reared, its basis is hid from the eye for ever the moment that general maxims, founded on an utility paramount and perpetual, are embodied and consecrated, they cease to yield to partial and subordinate expediency; and it then becomes the perfection of virtue, to consider, not whether an action be useful, but whether it be right. This is a very ingenious, (as not admitting the system I must not call it a successful,) attempt at extrication from a most importunate difficulty, involved in adopting the principle of utility as the basis of morals.-Had I been Burke, I could hardly have forgiven his comparison of me to Judge Jeffereys, p. 326. APRIL. the 30th. Read Cicero's Lucullus; in which he makes that character expose very forcibly the scepticism of the Academics, through the intervention of his master Antiochus. He afterwards, himself, takes up their defence with much address and spirit; and maintains, from the various deceptions of the senses, and the infinite diversity of opinion on all subjects, that though there is probable, there is no certain truth; and, to remove the obloquy of such a doctrine, that this probability is sufficient for all the purposes of life. There appears much of puerile subtlety in the argument on both sides. A sentence in the 9th c. struck me as comprehensively and concisely expressing the two great objects of antient speculation, "judicium veri et finem bonorum":-the latter of these is explained before, by "extremum et ultimum bonorum, quô omnia referantur."-How mankind have perplexed their enquiries by their expressions! The passage e. 41, beginning, "Neque tamen istas quætiones—” is wonderfully fine. MAY the 2d. Read Soame Jenyns' Origin of Evil. His grand solution of the introduction [1799.] of evil, is, that it could not have been prevented, by Omnipotence, without the loss of some superior good, or the permission of some greater evil. He divides it, with this view, into, 1st. evils of imperfection; which are only the absence of comparative advantages, essential to a state of subordination, and in truth no evils at all: 2dly, natural evils; which are the necessary consequence of the imperfection of created beings, the untractableness of matter, and some incomprehensible connection between good and evil; and, thus regarded, are the fewest possible: 3dly, moral evils; which are expedient, that natural evils may fall to the lot of guilt instead of innocence, -besides that they ultimately contribute to the general good: 4thly, political evils; which originate in the depravity of man, who, as he will never submit his private advantage to public utility, must be compelled by violence or bribed by corruption to do so and, lastly, religious evils; which result from the necessity, that religion must originally have been accommodated to, and will afterwards be vitiated by, the same depravity. The whole extremely ingenious, and wretchedly unsatisfactory.— In his 3d Division, after exploding all former criteria of virtue as superficial, he maintains, that moral good and evil is nothing but the production of natural good and evil; that this is the only solid foundation on which any system of ethics can be built, and the only just rule by which we can pass a judgment on our actions, as it not only enables us to determine which are right and wrong, but almost mathematically to demonstrate the proportion of virtue and vice belonging to each, by comparing them with the happiness or misery they occasion: but, that though such is the essence of morality, its end is probation, it having been properly appointed by God as a test of our obedience to his will, and on this account entrusted to our discretion, while every other important object in life is secured by adapted appetites; and that it is only as virtue is performed in conformity to the will of God, that it has any merit, it being otherwise nothing more than a part of prudential œconomy. All this he delivers in great pomp and form, as a new and most important discovery: and perhaps it may be regarded as the most clear, broad, and explicit statement, then known, of a theory since become so popular.-With all its paradoxical ingenuity, there appear to me only two truly original thoughts in this work :-one which Johnson has so successfully ridiculed in his review of it :-and another, of which I cannot sufficiently praise the acuteness, "That, in politics, most principles speculatively right are practically wrong, because they are founded on the plausible but false presumption, that mankind in general act on honest and rational principles". MAY the 7th. Looked into Gibbon's "Extraits de Journal." In Page 214 he observes, very justly, [1799.] "Jamais les principes et les actions des hommes, ne sont plus différents, que lorsque les principes sont opposés aux sentimens naturels de l'humanité : le cœur corrige les erreurs de l'esprit".-In Page 301′ he remarks of Bayle, " que les deux Lettres sur l'amour paternel et sur la jalousie, sont d'une philosophe profond; il y développe une chaine de préjuges liés à notre être, nécessaires à notre bonheur, et destinés par l'Etre Supreme à nous tenir lieu d'une raison trop relevée pour le commun des hommes, et qui n'auroit jamais eu le degré de vivacité propre à nous faire agir". The observance of moral distinction, whatever Soame Jenyns may imagine, is unquestionably secured, like every other purpose of our being, by appropriate instincts.-On Middleton's Enquiry, Gibbon very justly remarks, p. 283, "Il voyoit bien jusqu'où l'on pouvoit pousser les conséquences de ses principes, mais il ne lui convenoit pas de les tirer". MAY the 12th. Finished the perusal of Cicero's Treatise " De Finibus". The three grand Divisi ons of antient Philosophy, appear to have been, Physics, Dialectics, and Morals; in the last of which they sought, with reference, I think, to the individual solely, Quid sit finis, quid extremun, quid ultimum, quô sint omnia benè vivendi rectè que faciendi, consilia referenda". In the Treatise in question, Cicero expounds, with much spirit and force, in the way of Dialogue, the sentiments of the principal Schools of Philosophy on the latter of these subjects. In the first Book he provokes Torquatus to an eloquent defence of Epicurus' opinion, "Omne animal, simulatque natum sit, voluptatem appetere, eàque guadere, ut summo bono; dolorem aspernari, ut summum malum, et quantum possit, a se repellere: idque facere nondum depravatum, ipsa naturâ incorruptè atque integrè judicante;" and therefore, that pleasure (naturâ ducente) is the chief good, and pain the chief evil, of life: which opinion he principally vindicates, by insisting on the virtues and vices as being merely modes of action conducive, and valuable or pernicious solely as they are conducive, to these ends. Epicurus despised dialectics as of no assistance, and cultivated physics as of important service, to morals: and he insisted on the veracity of the senses, as the sources of all our knowledge; which if deceptive, all art and science must be fallacious too. In the 2d. Book, Cicero powerfully attacks this sensible but obnoxious system in its weak point, by lowering the "voluptas" of Epicurus (an unfortunate term certainly" happiness" would have been clear of all suspicion) to animal gratification; and then setting it up as opposed to the "honestum":-a principle, of which it appears from the 14th. chapter, how imperfectly he knew the origin, how [1799] incapable he was of defining its nature, and how forcibly he felt its operation.-In the 3d. and 4th. Books, Cato expounds, and Cicero, as before, in person attacks, the doctrine of the Stoics. Zeno and his disciples having placed the "summum bonum" in the "honestum", and the "summum malum" in the " turpe", seem to have been driven to great straits in reconciling to their system the necessary preference of objects which certainly fall within neither of these descriptions; and it is on this ground that Cicero assails them, maintaining that they ought not to have separated from his sect-the Peripatetics and Old Academy-who held, that those intermediate objects were "bona et mala", though immensely subordinate to the " honestum et turpe". Certainly Aristo and Pyrrho, who, adopting the same principle as the Stoics, obstinately held, that there was no difference in these objects, nor any ground of preference between the acutest pain and most exquisite pleasure, were at once more consistent and absurd.-In the 5th. Book Piso undertakes the cause of the Old Academy; and accordingly, after a long and intricate deduction and exposition of the origin and Grounds of the other systems of philosophy, proceeds to maintain, That the "summum bonum" or " finis bonorum" consists in living " secundum naturam”, in possessing that state of body and mind to which nature primarily and instinctively invites, and of which reason enlarges and corrects our view, teaching us to estimate the relative importance of the various "bona et mala" of life, from the free use of the meanest member of the body, to the command of the most exalted and diffusive virtue; That the seeds of the virtues composing in conjunction the "honestum", are implanted in our common nature; That these virtues are valuable on their own account, and without reference to any advantage beyond themselves; That the most illustrious of them, are those which relate to and tend to promote social intercourse, though they contribute to the "summum bonum" solely as they respect the individual possessing them; and, finally, That, such is their transcendant excellence, the wise man must be happy in their possession, though he may be rendered happier still in the accession of other advantages. This system, in its spirit, seems to have approached very near the purest and highest form of Epicureanism. I do not observe the shadow of an attempt, in any quarter, to deduce the virtues from utility, in its modern sense of general good; or even to refer them to that end. Wherever the word "utilitas" is used, it seems to relate solely to the advantage of the individual. With respect to the term "honestum", though sometimes rather loosely and vaguely employed in their theories, it appears properly and emphatically to include, and whenever they speak naturally and from the heart, it always denotes, those sentiments and actions which excite our moral approbation; the grounds of which approbation, they do not seem to have explored, but to have taken the feeling |