an insurance company of the acts of one who solicits for it a risk and fills up an application for in- surance, establishes his relation as- agent of the company, in respect to such acts, and any errors or omissions of the agent in the course of such acts are the errors and omissions of the company. Mowry v. The World Mutual Life Ins. Co., 321
4. Where the principal clerk of an incorporated fire insurance com- pany, whose duties were to receive applications, fill out policies and renewals, and to "generally at- tend to whatever was transacted behind the counter," made at the place of business of the company a parol contract of insurance with an applicant, held that the com- pany were bound by the act of the clerk. Cooke v. Etna Ins. Co.,
1. The plaintiff purchased from the defendant the right to exhibit at a fair held by it a certain article manufactured by her and known as an "abdominal supporter," and also the right to an allotment of space in the defendant's building for the purpose of such exhibition, such rights purchased by the plaintiff being subject to the con- dition of a right in the board of managers of the defendant to re- fuse admission to any one whom they might consider an improper person, and to remove the goods of such exhibitor, and also to ex- clude any article they might deem objectionable, and the plaintiff, in connection with the exhibition of her manufacture, exposed and cir- culated a circular in relation there- to-part of the circular being in capital letters-in which it was stated that the article was espe- cially adapted "to the treatment of the various displacements of the uterus, and a relapsed state of the abdominal parts," and "for causing the womb and other or- gans to assume their natural posi- tions," and that "ladies would find great comfort in wearing them before and after confinement," and that "in cases of pregnancy or very large abdomen No. 2 should be ordered," and that "they can
be washed," and that orders should be accompanied with measure around the largest part of the hips." When the character of this circular was brought to the attention of the board of man- agers of the defendant they di- rected its suppression, and notice of their action was given to the plaintiff, and she was notified that if she did not suppress the circular or modify it her privileges would be withdrawn and her goods re- moved from the exhibition. After she had persistently refused to do either, and after the amount paid by her for her privilege of exhibition had been tendered her, she was excluded from admission as an exhibitor, and her goods re- moved from the exhibition. Held, that the character of, the circular and the plaintiff's refusal to sup- press or modify it justified such exclusion and removal under the conditions on which plaintiff pur- chased her privilege to exhibit. Per ROBINSON, J. Smith v. The American Institute of the City of New York, 526
1. Qaære, whether an admission of service of an order to show cause why a receiver should not be ap- pointed of a corporation, in pro- ceedings by the attorney-general to dissolve it, made by the attor- neys of the corporation, is suffi- cient to give the court jurisdiction to make the order appointing the receiver. Bedell v. North Amer- ica Life Ins. Co., 273
A referee appointed by the court in a referable action to hear and de- termine the issues where he is not willing to act for the statutory compensation, and one of the par- ties is unwilling to agree to pay a higher rate, should not declare that he will go on with the refer- ence, and expect to be paid such higher rate, and look to the pre- vailing party therefor, and hold his report as security for such pay- ment unless ordered to give it up without such payment, and where
the counsel for the party objecting to such increased compensation in such a case, thereupon refused to proceed, and withdrew. Held, that they were justified in refusing to proceed with the trial under such conditions, and that the ref- eree should be removed and an- other appointed in his place. Dev- lin v. The Mayor, 466
REMOVAL OF SUITS TO UNITED STATES COURTS.
1. Under the act of Congress of March 3d, 1875, which provides that any suit of a civil nature at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any State court, when the matter in dispute exceeds $500 and in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States, may be removed by either party into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district. Held, that the defendant could remove a suit in this court for a balance of ac- count brought against him by an assignee of it, who was a citizen of a different State, though his as- signor in whose favor the debt was contracted was a citizen of the same State as the defendant. Leutze v. Butterfield,
1. Where the defendants agreed to sell and deliver to the plaintiff oil of a specified quality, and in ful- fillment of that contract tendered certain oil which the plaintiff, after an actual inspection and examina- tion of it, accepted and shipped to Havre, where a certain portion of it was discovered to be of an in- ferior quality, but the plaintiff did not offer to return any of it to the defendants but sold the entire quantity and received the proceeds. Held (following Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358), that the plaintiff could not make any claim for dam- ages on account of the inferior quality of the oil. Heydecker v. Lombard,
2. Where the plaintiff, upon discov- ering that certain oil that had been delivered to him under an execu- tory contract of sale, was of a quality inferior to that called for by the contract, notified the de- fendants of the fact and asked them for directions about it and was told to do every thing that the claim might be well established against whom it might concern. Held, that this did not amount to an offer to return the oil and a re- fusal to accept it. ib.
3. It is a defense to an action by a vendee for damages for non-deliv- ery, that the vendee and a confed- erate were engaged in the attempt to obtain the sale and delivery of the goods for promissory notes of a third party known to them to be worthless, although the vendor, who discovered the fraud during the attempt, allowed the sale but not the delivery to be consum- mated, and with the intent only of securing possession of the notes as evidence of attempted fraud;—if such vendor at the trial tenders back the worthless notes. v. Watrous,
4. The plaintiff took a bill of sale of goods, paying the price named therein, and executing a written agreement to return them at an advance specified, if the former Owners desired to repurchase within two months, and, in that event, to pay over the proceeds of those sold meantime, less ten per cent. commission, and the testi- mony of the parties to the trans- action was conflicting as to whether it was an absolute sale or a transfer as security for the sum advanced. Held, that on the face of the instruments, in the absence of evidence going to show fraud on the part of the buyer, or undue inadequacy in the price paid, the transaction was in effect an abso- lute sale with a right to repurchase, and valid as against creditors levy- ing on the goods under execution against the vendor, and that on the conflict of testimony, the jury should determine the character of the transaction. Mahler v. Schloss,
In an action for slander the defen- dant may show in mitigation of damages that the slanderous words complained of were spoken by him in the heat of passion, occasioned by recent conduct of a provoking character on the part of the plain- tiff, and therefore Held, that in mitigation of damages for having called the plaintiff a thief and a Scoundrel; with having made false entries in the defendant's books, and having sold goods for the de- fendant and collected more than he returned or accounted to the defendant for, the defendant might show that the plaintiff had been discharged from the defendant's employ about two months previ- ous to the time when the slander- ous words were spoken, and that after his discharge the plaintiff had gone about among the defen- dant's customers warning them against him, saying that he would charge them usurious interest, sell them out, and break them up. Palmer v. Lang, 33
1. A defendant, upon the commence- ment of an action against him by an infant, is entitled to an appear- ance by such infant by a guardian ad litem who is pecuniarily re- sponsible for his costs. But if the defendant does not raise the ques- tion of the guardian's responsibility as soon as apprised of the person appointed, he acquiesces in his sufficiency to act in that capacity,
3. Where there is a conflict of evi- dence as to an essential issue, it is error for the court in effect to it- self decide that issue from its own view of the evidence, and while allowing the case to go to the jury on the question of damages to re- fuse to allow the question of fact involved in that issue to go to the jury. Banks v. Carter,
4. Where, at the close of the case, counsel made requests to charge several propositions of law appli- cable to the case, and the court af- terwards in its charge did not include or refer to the points re- quested, and subsequently on its attention being called to the omis- sion, refused to alter its charge,- Held, that exceptions then taken to each refusal to charge as before requested were specifically taken and were to be considered on ap- peal. Betz v. Conner,
1. When a patentee in an agree- ment for the formation of a corpo- ration, for a valuable considera- tion, transfers to the corporation his patent, and agrees that any ex- tension of the patent shall be for the benefit of and belong to the corporation, and afterwards, while a trustee of the corporation, ob- tains a reassignment of the patent for the purpose of obtaining an ex- tension, obtains an extension, but before doing so secretly grants to a third party a license to use and make the patented invention under the extension, and then assigns
the extended patent to the corpo- ration, such a grant is a violation of trust, a fraud upon the corpora- tion, and the use of the license by the grantee with notice may be restrained by injunction. Consol- idated Fruit Jar Co. v. Mason, 64
2. A trustee who has taken lands under a deed from a husband in trust to convey to his wife, or her appointee, cannot, after having conveyed to the appointee, and after the appointee has conveyed to the wife, obtain any right, by forci- bly taking those deeds from the wife's possession, to hold the prop- erty until he is repaid by the wife expenses incurred by him as trus- tee, nor is he entitled to a person- al judgment against the wife there- for. Such a trust is executed, and ceases when a proper deed has been executed and delivered to the appointee, although the deed may not have been recorded. Kreke- 152 ler v. Thaule,
UNLAWFUL COMBINATION. See CONSPIRACY.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
1. A purchaser at a foreclosure sale is not obliged to bear the loss oc- casioned to the premises by a fire occurring intermediate the time when the premises are bid off by him and the time at which he be- comes entitled to a deed; but he is not entitled to be relieved from his contract of purchase in conse- quence of the damage to the prem- ises occasioned by such a fire, where the damage is comparatively slight, and a full and adequate compensa- 200 tion for it is offered to him. Aspin- wall v. Balch,
Where premises were situated on Broadway in the city of New York, and had been bid off for $62,500, and the value of the prem- ises consisted chiefly in the value of the land, the building upon it being old and dilapidated, adding very little to the value of the land, and intermediate the day of the sale and the day when the purchaser was entitled to a deed, the building was
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