his Cabinet. These gentlemen, it is well known, had strenuously contended, the one that Congress should "have a negative on all the State Laws, interfering with its own ;" and the other that " а Governor in each State, should be appointed by the General Government, with a negative upon the State Legislature," in order the better to prevent any such laws being passed in the first instance. There was in the Convention, at one time, a hot contest, whether (in one of Mr. RANDOLPH's resolutions) the word "United States," or the word 66 National," should be used. It is a truth not to be concealed, that even General WASHINGTON sided somewhat with those gentlemen in the Convention, and it certainly is not intended, to derogate an atom from his high fame, when it is said, that he was in favour of an energetic Government, and a strong executive armı. Nor am I disposed to blame Messrs. HAMILTON and RANDOLPH, for opinions, as I believe, sincerely entertained by them. Many of the best men in the Union, at that time, thought with them, and some of them from our own State. They had all been so sensible of the defects of the Confederation, that it was natural, that they should incline to the opposite extreme, and believe a National Government as best calculated for the exigencies of the Union. It appears, however, that they were all mistaken, and Gen. WASHINGTON amongst the number; and it is fortunate for us, particularly of the South, that all attempts to consolidate us all into one nation, failed in the Convention.

On the first question, therefore, which arose under the Constitution, respecting the powers of the Government, it was not to be expected, but that with the previous prepossessions of Gen. WASHINGTON on the subject, he should have decided in favour of a National Bank. But, amongst his followers, have been some, who had not his moderation, his prudence, and his sagacity, and hence it is, that during the last, and the present Administration, we have seen the Government administered in open violation of the Constitution, not by any act immaterial as to its effects upon public liberty, but by acts impairing important and vital interests of the States.

When a limited Government, like that of the United States, has passed all the necessary laws, for the collection and distribution of its revenue, and entered into all the arrangements, to provide for the public debt; happy at home, and respected abroad, it must soon find itself in need of more occupation, than the ordinary concerns of defence and commerce can furnish. Commerce once regulated, what else remains to be done, but to leave the rest to the industry and enterprise of our citizens. Our policy too, being that of friendship with all nations, and entangling alliances with none, and amply furnished as we are, with the means of defence, what has the General Government to do, but to make provision for its small army and navy, and to keep its forts and arsenals in repair. Can the mind of an American conceive a happier state of things for his country, than that Congress should sit only five or six weeks, and have as little employment as possible, and that to the local Legislatures, it should be left, to extend their care, to all the objects which con

cern the INTERNAL order and improvement of the States.When, in 1788, the people in most of the States, were jealous of the powers conferred on the Federal Government, and were hesitating, whether they would accept the Constitution, Mr. HAMILTON. by way of reconciling them to the Constitution, told them in his Federalist, (No. 45,) that the operations of the Federal Government would be most extensive and important in times of WAR and danger; those of the State Governments in times of PEACE and security." No exposition of the Constitution can be more true than this, and more calculated to shew, that in general, the State Governments, would have advantage as to legislation, over the Federal Government, the times of war in a country like America, bearing no proportion to the times of peace, But how stands the fact. Thirty years scarcely elapse, before, the General Government commences. a great plan of steady operations, by which it is to carry on a system of internal improvements, which will leave to the States, little or nothing to do on the same subject, drawing immense sums out of the pockets of the people by taxation, without a possibility, as already has been elsewhere observed, of its being expended amongst them, in the same proportion, in which it is taken from the several States. It is in PEACE then, as well as in war, that we observe! the operations of the General Government IMPORTANT AND EXTENSIVE, with a prospect, at the same time, rapidly opening upon us, that ere long, almost all the subjects of legislation, which the States now regard as exclusively belonging to them, will be gradually drawn towards Congress, under the powerful attraction of the words the "general welfare." Who could have believed, in 1789, that in less than forty years, that several State Legislatures, should even entreat that Congress would take under its consideration, measures to remove as an evil of the first magnitude, the FUNDAMENTAL POLITY of the Southern States-that even the subject of slavery, should be a fit object for the INDIRECT legislation of a Government, instituted for the purpose of attending to foreign relations.

Let Congress be confined within the proper and the legitimate sphere of its action, and it is manifest, that it would not be occupied, half the time it now consumes in its sessions, nor cost the people half of the sum, that is annually spent at Washington. There have been periods, when it might be necessary that the sessions should be somewhat protracted. There was at one time much to do. A system of revenue laws was to be digested and perfectedthe Courts of the United States were to be organized-the public debt to be provided for-treaties of commerce to be entered into, and ratified with every nation. A Government in fact, was to be put into complete operation. But, in our day, the Government is settled and established,, and were the National Legislature occupied as it ought to be with its own business, and not in assuming the business of the State Legislatures, there would be little to do. But it is because the Senate and House of Representatives are without occupation, that instead of adjourning and going in proper time to their

homes, the members are disposed to meddle, with what is not their concern, and that they are constantly in search, for some new subject· for their legislation. This is the true reason, why they expend the public money in protracted sessions, and sow the seeds of discontent and jealousy amongst the States. But this is natural. These men feel power and forget right," and he must be an indifferent observer, who does not perceive, that unless some check be given to the usurpations of Congress, that there will be no end to the subjects, which, in time, it may not discuss and legislate upom.

NO. 22.

No general course of proceeding can be more destructive of the rights of the States, or of the people, than that adopted by Congress, when it is about to construe its powers. Where real doubts exist, as has frequently been the case, whether any particular power claimed by implication, is within those intended to be granted by the Constitution, this body does not condescend to solicit any aid from its constituents, who are represented in the State Legislatures, but it seizes at once upon the doubtful power. Certainly this is not the course which friendship and good feeling, and even policy would dictate The Government of the United States, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, by the Supreme Court, is not a Government of the people, in the sense in which the Supreme Court would have it. If it were, it would be responsible to the people alone, as its constituents, as is the case under every consolidated Government, and there would be no other security against usurpation, excepting the power of the people to change their rulers, in which case the minority must abide by the will of the majority. A doctrine such as is contended for, is subversive of the end for which the Union was formed. There is an inconsistency in admitting, that the people of the States, in their corporate capacities of States, have certain acknowledged rights under the Constitution, which are guaranteed to them, and also, that they are so clearly recognized in the instrument, as to be prohibited from exercising their sovereignty on certain subjects, and yet that they are not to be regarded as having the right to complain of the usurpations of the Government, as if it were ever before heard, that those who create a delegated Govern ment, have not lawfully the same power, to restrict it, within its limits, after it is created.

This doctrine, of the General Government being "truly and emphatically a Government of the people" which has been so often relied on, as excluding the right of the State Legislatures, to protect the States against the usurpations of Congress, was first suggested by Mr. PINCKNEY, Counsel for the Plaintiff in Error, in M'Culloch vs. The State of Maryland, and the Chief Justice, with his usual ability and eloquence, has placed the position in so masterly an aspect, as almost to command the universal assent of the Bar. But the position of the Court cannot be sustained. It is as unsound, as the other' parts of this opinion already noticed in previous numbers. The Counsel for the Defendants in Error, in speaking of the true nature

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of the Federal compact took this ground "That the terms of the grant, did not convey sovereign power generally, but sovereign power limited to particular cases, and with restrictive means for cxecuting such powers;" and further, that the powers of the General Government were delegated, not by the people of the U. States at large, but by the people of the respective States, and, that therefore, it was a compact between the different States." The Counsel here were certainly right, and the Court as clearly wrong in not admitting the position. The Constitution IS a compact between the States, and there are no parties to it, excepting the people of the different States, in their corporate capacities. The Court, it is true, cautiously disclaims the assertion, that the instrument "proceeds from the American people, as compounded into one common mass,' for that would be too untenable; but still, its reasonings do artfully carry us on to the conclusion, that the Constitution does not emanate from, and is not the act of sovereign and independent States, but on the contrary, is as much the act of the people of the United States, as if they were assembled in an aggregate society, to distri bute power between the Federal and the State Governments; and that all power derived from such a source, is as sovereign, as if it had remained in the hands of the people, and that all the incidental, as well as the direct powers, are a part and parcel of any sovereignty conveyed by the instrument. Let us examine this doctrine of the Government being a Government of the people.

In a former number, has been stated, the obvious distinction, between the case of a people without any regular Government, forming a Constitution; and that of a people already associated in so many separate sovereignties, who design to part with power to a common head; the Legislators, in the one case, possessing all power not reserved by the people, and in the other, possessing nothing, but what is delegated. Situated as were the citizens of America, at the close of the Revolution, there were but two ways, in which the people, could have formed a Government. The first, was, by being as sembled in the relation to each other, of individuals of one great political society. The second, as associated in separate sovereignties. Under one, or the other of these situations of our community, was the Constitution formed. If the powers of the Government, are not derived from the people of the United States, as individuals ag gregated in a general society, they must then be created by the people in their corporate capacities, and so vice versa. From no other sources than these, can they be claimed. Now, it is immaterial to me, which of the two modes, the Supreme Court shall decide as having prevailed, in 1788. If it chooses the last, we agree. If the first, it is in its own language, "a political dreamer, who is wild enough, to think of breaking down the lines, which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass." The Chief Justice, however, thinks, he avoids a dilemma of this nature, by giving the idea, that though the people on this occasion, were not actually compounded into one mass; yet, that in dispensing power to the new Government, they did it as effectually, as

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if they had constituted one great community, for on no other principle, than this, can he establish the doctrine, that as to any particular power conferred on Congress, it is as supreme, as the people themselves would be on the subject; a doctrine which has been denied in these numbers. As if aware, that the assemblage of the people in their States, would imply, that the ratification in this way of the Constitution, was the act of the States, and not of the people, he justifies this mode of ratification as the most proper, under the circumstances. "They acted upon it, in the only manner, in which they could act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in Convention." It is true, adds he “ they assembled in their several States, and where else should they have assembled ? If they act, they must act of course in their States. But the measures they adopt, do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people, or become the measures of the State Governments." The answer to be given here, is, that the Constitution might have been ratified, (if the Convention had so chosen) in two other ways; but neither of them, would have comported, with the general sentiments, in and out of the Convention, that the new Government should be Federal, and not national in its creation. What, for instance, could have prevented the Convention, from proposing, that the State Legislatures should divide their States into election districts, upon some equitable plan agreed upon, and that each district should send a deputy to a General Convention, or that the people in the different States, should give their assent, or dissent, by voting in districts by a general ticket, and that'in either case, the votes of three fourths of the whole, should be an acceptance of the Constitution. To these last modes there could be no objection, because the Constitution, whether the subject of debate, or not, was to be accepted, or rejected in whole. After NAPOLEON had assumed the imperial purple, he was desirous to know, whether his subjects regarded him as an usurper, and he opened books in every part of his dominions, that Frenchmen might inscribe their assent or dissatisfaction of his conduct. This was voting by general ticket, though not by ballot.

It would be no answer, to say, that either mode here proprosed,would have been impracticable,because the very fact of its being impracticable to obtain the assent of the people at large, would be conclusive to shew, that the assent, if given in any other way, could not possibly be the act of the people, but of the States. That the people of the United States, were regarded, as acting in their sovereign capacities, as separate States, when they ratified the Constitution, clearly appears,} from the rule laid down in the instrument itself, for its ratification.. The assent of a majority of all the inhabitants of the United States, was not made indispensable, which certainly would have been the case, had the design been that the Constitution should not emanate from the States. Under such a view, it might have so happened, that the ratification might not have been complète, though nine States should have assented. Four large States, rejecting the Constitution, might have had a greater population than the other