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the people! It is fit Sir John fhould be told, that the plant, or rather weed, of fervitude will not grow in this country. Sir Robert Filmer tried his endeavour, but with fo little fuccefs, that one might imagine no man would be again the advocate of flavery. Has Sir John Hawkins never read the hiftory of the republics of antiquity, which were all founded in freedom? Has he never heard of the majesty of the Roman people? Following this writer through all his wanderings is, we confefs, a ftate of flavery, which we are obliged to go through even in this land of freedom. The detection of Lauder, by Dr. Douglas, helps out a dull and tedious narrative, and he writes it, as he fays himself, for the use of pofterity: he means, moft probably, in ufum pofleriorum; but, if fo, he is a bad tranflator. The labours of Dr. Douglas in the cause of truth will not be eafily forgotten by the lovers of literature. The talents of that able writer will tranfmit his name to after-times, without the feeble aid of one, who does not promife to be of long duration.

We are forry to find that Sir John has ftill more ftories in referve. The perfon called Admirable Crichton, comes in his way, and of this man we have a large collection of wretched anecdotes. The Reader may fuppofe that he now has done with authors by profeffion; but more pages are ftill to be filled, without any reference to Dr. Johnfon. For this purpose, Ralph the hiftorian, Guthrie, and Paul Whitehead, are fummoned by Sir John, to be tried before him. The name of Paul Whitehead introduces that of Mr. Doddington (afterward Lord Melcombe), and the laft, of course, makes room for Dr. Thompson. Another lucky incident comes in his way: it happened that Johnson wrote in the news-papers about the arches of Blackfriars bridge. This, to a rambling genius, is an inviting occafion to display his fkill in architecture: he talks of proportions; in man, of the fefquioctave of the head, and in woman of the fefquinonal. All this we have in a work that profeffes to be the Life of Dr. Johnfon but biography is not the talent of Sir John Hawkins: Praconem facito, vel architectum.

The next point of view, in which Sir John prefents himself, is that of a politician: he praifes Sir Robert Walpole's adminiftration, and gives at full length Lord Hardwicke's speech against the motion for removing Sir Robert from his Majesty's councils. But he is not content to ftop here: Lord Hardwicke's argument, he says, turns upon a fallacy, which the Lords had not penetration to discover. This was referved for the fagacity of Sir John Hawkins, who is decidedly of opinion, that there was fufficient ground for the motion to remove the minifter. Having, in this manner, condemned the adminiftration which he admires, he proceeds to tell all England, that Mr. Pitt, whose eloquence and unequalled ardour raifed this country to a pitch of glory

never known before, oppofed Sir Robert Walpole with yelping pertinacity. The expreffion deferves no other notice, than to fay of it, that it was dictated by rank malevolence. Of Sir John's notions of civil liberty, the reader will find a fufficient fpecimen in the lines, which he cites from GUSTAVUS VASA, to fhew that no Government ought to fuffer a play fo full of fedition and republican fentiments. To prove this pofition, he felects the following lines, all as harmless as ever fell from the pen of a poet. Is it of fate that he, who wears a crown,

Throws off humanity ?"

There have been princes, whofe hiftory juftifies the remark.
Beyond the fweeping of the proudest train,

That fhades a monarch's heels, I prize these weeds.”
And if he is fo inclined, why fhould he not?

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Have oft been known to give the law to kings."

Every nation, not enflaved, does the fame in the power and the right of fo doing, confifts the MAJESTY OF THE PEOPLE! Divide, and conquer, is the fum of politics."

What is this but a tranflation of the old maxim, Divide et impera ?

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If thou think't

That Nature, in the proud behalf of one,
Shall difenfranchife all her lordly race,

And bow her gen'ral offspring to the yoke
Of private domination, &c."

Has Sir John drank fo deep of the dregs of flavery, as to think all made for one?

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Thou art the minister,

The Monitor of vice."

Whenever there is fuch a minifter, off or on the ftage, it is fit that he should hear of his iniquity.

There remains one fentiment more, which gives the alarm to Sir John:

"The fence of virtue is a Chief's best caution;

And the firm furety of my people's hearts,

Is all the guard that e'er fhall wait Gustavus."

Such are the reafons, for which the play of Guftavus Vafa is held to be inconfiftent with any fyftem of civil fubordination. Out of Siberia we could not expect to find so abject and fo willing a flave. He laments the decifion which pronounced General Warrants illegal, because he thinks they would be of ufe in hindering artificers from quitting the kingdom. At any rate he is willing to be in a ftate of flavery.

Sir John next difplays himfelf in the character of a rigid moralift: it may not be improper to view him in this capacity. He lays, There are three fchools of morality among the moderns:

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derns: ft, That of Lord SHAFTSBURY, who places virtue in a courfe of action conformable to the moral fenfe. 2dly, That of WOOLASTON, who calls it, acting in all cafes according to truth, and treating things as they are. 3dly, The school of Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE, who places morality in acting agreeably to the relations that fubfift between rational creatures, or the fitness of things' Of these three fyftems, Johnson, we are told, adopted Dr. Clarke's. He agreed with him in this, and moft of his opinions. Now let Johnfon fpeak for himself. In his review of a Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil, Dr. Johnfon fays (Vide his Works, vol. x. page 246.) "the author offers an account of virtue and vice, for which I have often contended, and which must be embraced by all, who are willing to know why they act, or why they forbear, in order to give any reafon of their conduct to themselves or others."

The account, which he admires, is then given at large: we fhall here felect as much of it as will fhew what was Johnson's idea of virtue and vice.

"Various have been the opinions of various authors on the criterion of virtue: fome have placed it in conformity to truth, fome to the FITNESS OF THINGS, and others to the will of God. But all this is merely fuperficial: they refolve us not, why TRUTH, or the FITNESS OF THINGS, are either eligible or obligatory; nor why God fhould require us to act in one manner rather than another. The true reafon can poffibly be no other than this, because fome actions produce happiness, and others mifery. They who extol the truth, beauty, and harmony of virtue, exclufive of its confequences, deal but in pompous nonfenfe; and they who would perfuade us, that good and evil are things indifferent, depending wholly on the will of God, do but confound the nature of things, as well as all our notions of God himself. It is the confequence of all human actions that muft ftamp their value; fo far as the general practice of any action tends to produce good, and introduce happiness into the world, fo far we may pronounce it virtuous: fo much evil as it occafions, fuch is the degree of vice it contains. But though the production of happiness is the effence of virtue, it is by no means the end. The great end is the probation of mankind, or the giving them an opportunity of exalting or degrading themselves in another ftate, by their behaviour in the prefent. And thus it answers two most important purposes, the confervation of our happiness, and the teft of our obedience. Nothing could have been so justly rewarded with happiness, as the production of happiness, in conformity to the will of God. It is this conformity alone, which adds merit to virtue, and conftitutes the effential difference between morality and religion. Morality induces men to embrace virtue from prudential confiderations; religion from thofe of gratitude and obedience. The Chriftian is the only religious or moral inftitution in the world, that ever fet in a right light thefe two material points, the effence and the end of virtue. So artificially is the nature of all human virtue and vice contrived, that their rewards and punishments are woven, as it REV. July, 1787.

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were,

Jenyns's

were, in their very effence; their immediate effects give us a foretate of their future; and their fruits, in the prefent life, are the proper famples of what they muft unavoidably produce in another. We have reafon given us to diftinguish these confequences, and regulate our conduct; and left that should neglect its poft, confcience alfo is appointed as an inftinctive kind of monitor, perpetually to remind us both of our interest and our duty."

The whole paff ge at length deferves to be feriously perused: we have here contracted it, in order to fhew the idea of virtue for which Johnfon fays he always contended. Doctor Clarke's FITNESS OF THINGS is here pronounced to be merely fuperficial; and after this, are we to be told that the man, who fides with the doctrine here advanced, was a follower of Dr. Clarke? Virtue would, perhaps, be better referred to the MORAL SENSE of Shaftsbury, than to the FITNESS OF THINGS, and for this plain reafon; because few are fpeculative enough to investigate all the relations that fubfift between reasonable beings; and the MORAL SENSE, which, when referred to ourselves, is another word for CONSCIENCE, is planted in all. To Soame account of virtue, Johnfon fubfcribes, and always contended for it: it follows, that he did not embrace the fyftem of Dr. Clarke. Under the fanction of Johnfon's opinion, Sir John fancies that he has eftablished a certain criterion of virtue: he is determined, therefore, to combat another fyftem, which, he fays, was introduced by Richardfon, Fielding, and Sterne. Of the firft he fays, He was the introducer of fentiment and fentimentality, from which sprung up Sentimental Journies, Sentimental Letters, and a world of trafh, which, but for this filly epithet, would never have attracted notice. The fuccefs of this author occafioned a craving for more of the same stuff.'

Fielding is alfo plentifully abufed: TOM JONES was intended to fap the foundations of morality. The author of it refolves virtue into good affections: he was the inventor of the cant phrafe, goodness of heart, which means little more than the virtue of a bore or a dog. Let Sir John remember (if he does not already feel it) that Fielding has made the hypocrite drop his mask, and has exhibited to ridicule the plaufible formalift, who talks of the FITNESS OF THINGS, without fentiment, and without that virtue which confifts in good affections. Goodness of heart, whatever Sir John may fay, will always be preferred to the cant of him, who talks of morals with rancour and malignity. STERNE alfo wrote Sentimental Journies. Writers of this clafs,' Sir John fays, fuperfede all moral obligation: they are a law to themselves, and having GOOD HEARTS, are above those confiderations that bind men to that rule of conduct which is founded in a fenfe of duty. Of this new school of morality, Rousseau, FIELDING, and STERNE are the principal teachers, and great is the mischief they have done by their doctrines.'

To these profound obfervations, our answer is, it would be well if Sir John had been their pupil. That root of bitterness, which has put rancours in the vessel of his heart, would have been eradicated; and though the impulse of genius might not have been communicated, the man, if not the writer, would have been improved. Good affections are of the effence of virtue : they are the will of God in the heart of man, implanted in our nature to aid and ftrengthen moral obligation they incite to action. A fenfe of benevolence is no lefs neceffary than a fenfe of duty. Good affections are an ornament not only to an author, but to his writings. He who fhews himself upon a cold scent for opportunities to bark and fnarl, may, if he will, talk of virtue, but GOODNESS OF HEART, or, to ufe Sir John's polite phrafe, the virtue of a horse or a dog, would do him more ho

nour.

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We are, in the next place, to estimate Sir John's talents in the office of a critic; for this we fear he is little qualified. An acquaintance with the beft authors, and an early tafte, are neceffary; but thofe qualifications are not ufually acquired at an attorney's defk. Ariftotle and Longinus are better preparatives than the Statute Book, or the Inftructor Clericalis. MILTON, the Knight fays, was a political enthufiaft, and, as is evident from his panegyric on Cromwell, a bafe and' abject flatterer. He was acquainted chiefly with men of that crack-brained affembly, called the ROTA CLUB, all republicans; and his domeftic manners were far from amiable; he was neither a kind husband, nor indulgent parent.' Thus fpeaks the cold phlegm of Sir John Hawkins: But nothing, he fays, can apologize for that harsh and groundless cenfure, which clofes the firft of Johnson's dif courses on the SAMSON AGONISTES, viz. that it is a tragedy which ignorance has admired, and bigotry applauded.' (Vide Johnfon's Works, vol. vi. p. 436). It may be afked, Does Sir John know the effential beauties of a juft and regular tragedy? Johnson fays, after Ariftotle, and found reafon, "A tragedy 1hould begin where it may be intelligible without introduction, and end, where the mind is left in repofe, without expectation of any farther event. The intermediate paffages must join the last effect to the first caufe, by a regular and unbroken concatenation. Nothing must therefore be inferted, which does not apparently arife from fomething foregoing, and properly make way for fomething that fucceeds it. This is required to the perfection of a tragedy, and is equally neceffary to every fpecies of regular compofition." Thefe requifites are not to be found in the Samfon Agonistes. The fcenes follow one another, but are not produced by any thing that preceded. Manoah, Samfon's father, Dalilah, the courtezan, and Harapha, the giant of Gath, enter fucceffively, without any apparent caufe, and without any consequential

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