church of Rome have endeavoured to annihilate the authority of reason, and to fubvert every foundation of knowledge, in order to make way for an implicit faith in the decifions of their church. The impotence of reafon, and its natural incapacity to difcern religious truth, are also favourite tenets among many fanatical and bigoted Proteftants. This, it may be added, is always in fome degree the cafe with those who confider human fyftems as the ftandards of orthodoxy; and it is indeed a neceffary preparative for the reception of the myfterious doctrines which they have inculcated, as effential to the religion of Jesus. Thus,' to ufe the words of our Author, fcepticism, which originally seems to fly with peculiar averfion from the dogmatical fpirit, has, not unfrequently, like a perfon wandering in a labyrinth, returned to the place from which it fet out, and repofed in the arms of blind, ignorant, implicit faith.'

After giving a fuccinct account of the different kinds of scepficifm, or rather of the different views and motives by which it is actuated, Dr. Brown expofes its folly from a view of its nature and genius; as, by rejecting evidence, it defeats its profeffed end, the discovery of truth, and is the greateft friend to that prejudice and error to which it pretends to be an enemy. He alfo confiders it with relation to its caufes, its objects, and its effects on the minds of those who indulge it. Here we meet with much good fenfe, and many pertinent obfervations; among these the following is well introduced, and verified by experience:

Though obftinate to excefs, and averfe to conviction, fcepticism is, on fome occafions, of all tempers the moft credulous. Whatever feems to favour its own paffion, or prejudice, however improbable, nay, felf-contradictory, it admits without hesitation or fcruple, treats with the profoundeft refpect, and cherishes with the most indulgent fondness. Having been all doubt and diftrust in matters of a contrary complexion, it becomes, in this, all belief and certainty; having ftrained at a gnat, it fwallows a camel; and, having rejected the plainest truths, and fats the beft attefted, admits the most glaring abfurdities, and the most palpable falfehoods. Sceptics to excefs, in one inftance, perfons of this character feem to endeavour to compenfate it by being childishly credulous in another, and, having once forfaken the path of truth, vibrate continually between the two extremes of error.'

This obfervation, though not applicable to all feeptics, is frequently verified in those who are the moft fceptical. We have known men, who, though they doubt fome of the plaineft doctrines even of natural religion, give full credit to the pretences of judicial aftrology, and firmly believe that, by means of an accurate horofcope, future events may with certainty be predicted.

Thus does it appear, fays our Author, that fcepticism, though pretending to be a more rational procedure than any

other

other fpecies of philofophy, is the most irrational of all ;-that, though it affume the appearance of humility, it has more pride than Stoicifm itself; that, though it boafts of liberality, it faftens the mind in the fetters of prejudice ;-and that, though it inveighs against dogmatifm, it is frequently moft dogmatical.'

The fecond part of this Differtation is employed in fhewing the abfurdity of dogmatism. Here our Author first states the different fignifications of the term; which, in its primitive sense, meant no more than the holding fome particular tenet, or fyftem of opinions, and thus was applied to every fect of philofophers, except the middle academy, and the fceptics. Thus far, Dr. BROWN obferves, dogmatifm is not only free from blame, but even unavoidable; becaufe when a fubject is extenfive, or complicated, it becomes neceffary to make certain combinations of ideas, or to adopt thofe which have been made, with regard to it, by others; that is, in other words, a fyftem.

But from the abufe of dogmatifm, efpecially in religion, the term has acquired a fignification very different from its original import. It feems at prefent to have three principal fenfes. It fometimes fignifies the adopting of opinions without any adequate evidence, or the maintaining of them with fuch inflexible rigidity, as excludes further information and enquiry: fometimes it denotes that fond attachment to our own fentiments, which makes us confider them as the infallible standard of right and wrong, and reject those of others as criminal and abominable;' at other times, it is ufed to fignify that intolerant fpirit, which violently wrefts from others the rights of conscience, and impofes upon them our own fentiments, in an arbitrary, and, as it is called, dogmatical manner.'

In whichever of thefe fenfes dogmatifm be confidered, it is equally abfurd, as it is founded in prefumption. No man can be without his opinions, and his fyftem: but these opinions, and this fyftem, may be profeffed with modefty, and maintained with candour. They fhould be held, as the refult of our best enquiries, not as the dictates of infallibility. They may be maintained as recommended by their fuperior evidence: but others must be allowed the fame liberty we take to ourselves, that of adopting fuch opinions as we like beft. Nothing, but infallibility, can juftify dogmatifm; and, as dogmatism refts on felf-conceit, whatever be the fubject, this foundation of it is doubly confpicuous in religion, because the nature and fublimity of the object may the more eafily expofe us to mistake, at the fame time that its importance renders it more incumbent upon us to guard againft being deceived.'

Dogmatifm alfo leads to injuftice, as it violates the rights of confcience and private judgment. What Tacitus (when he fays, Rara temporum felicitas, ubi fentire quæ velis, et quæ fentias, dicere

licet) deems the characteristic of times uncommonly happy, fhould, as our Author juftly obferves, belong to every period, and to every fociety. He adds, that to reftore this liberty was one main end of the Chriftian revelation; but, fuch is the perverfity of human nature, fuch its propenfity to dogmatism and fpiritual tyranny, that the inftrument of deliverance was again converted into an inftrument of flavery, infomuch that fpiritual ufurpation, and the oppreffion of confcience, have been carried to greater lengths among Chriftians, than perhaps they ever were in the Heathen world.'

Dr. BROWN further confiders dogmatifm with refpect to its effects it obftructs religious improvement, and thus deftroys the very effence of religion; it has produced all the corruptions which have difgraced Chriftianity.

Under the former of these heads, he very juftly confutes the abfurd plea, which has fo often been urged by bigots among Proteftants, as well as in the church of Rome, that religious knowledge, being derived from a divine revelation, is already perfect, and admits of no improvement. He obferves that this is indeed true with refpect to the genuine dictates of divine revelation, which all will allow to be perfect and incontrovertible; but the question is, What is to be received as fuch, and what is to be rejected, and what is the juft fenfe and meaning of fuch doctrines as are acknowledged and adopted?

In the third part of this Differtation, Dr. BROWN endeavours to ftate the proper medium between the two extremes of fcepticifm and dogmatifm. This part of the queftion refers, either to the best way of avoiding thefe ourfelves, or to the moft effectual method of difcouraging their prevalence in the world. With refpect to the former, our Author's anfwer amounts to this; That the only fure prefervative against both a dogmatical and a fceptical fpirit, is the knowledge of the principles of pure religion, unfophifticated by the comments and inventions of men. With regard to the latter of thefe views, he recommends great attention to the ftudy of natural religion, and of the Scriptures; in explaining which, a diftinction ought always to be made between fundamental doctrines, and others which are either indifferent, or of fmall confequence: let thofe doctrines, which Scripture unequivocally reveals, be laid down as fundamentals: let every other be propofed with those marks of doubt, with which the word of God has characterized them, by leaving them in a certain degree of fhade and obfcurity, and infifting upon them as little as pofiible. The very words of Scripture, tranflated as nearly as the genius of each language will admit, fhould be ufed. Even with regard to fundamental truths, great care fhould be taken not to think of impofing them. violently upon others, or even to load thofe who reject them

with opprobrious epithets.' I am convinced,' fays our ingenious Author, and we moft cordially join him in the affertion, that Chriftianity will never appear in its native luftre, till the moft perfect unequivocal toleration be every where established ; because this alone will allow religion to exert its natural energy, and enjoy the fame advantage with every other fcience, and, by means of free enquiry, extracting fresh light and evidence, bring it nearer and nearer to the pure ftandard of divine truth."

The fecond Differtation, which obtained a filver medal, is by the Rev. GERRIT HESSELINK, A. L. M. & Phil. Dr. Profeffor of Divinity in the Baptifts Congregation in Amfterdam. This is alfo an excellent differtation. Profeffor Heffelink, has confidered the fubject in a lefs abstracted, and lefs general view; and from the different manner in which he has difcuffed the fame points, the two Differtations become valuable fupplements to each other.

The general divifions of this, are the fame with thofe of the former differtation. The first part is introduced with some obfervations on the degrees of certainty of which different truths will admit; and the abfurdity of fcepticism is expofed by vindicating the certainty of the principal doctrines of natural religion, and the evidence of the New Teftament, confidered as the hiftory of a revelation. He alfo proves, that, with respect to all the most important and effential doctrines of Christianity, the New Teftament is fo explicit, as to leave no juft excufe for fcepticism. His vindication of the Gofpel in this particular, and the arguments by which he fhews the abfurdity of requiring a greater certainty of its truths, are excellent for their philofophical accuracy, as well as for the elegant and forcible manner in which they are urged.

In the fecond part, the Profeffor traces dogmatism up to its fources in the heart, and points out the various accidental circumftances which contribute to confirm and encourage it. Here he displays an amiable candour of difpofition, and great knowledge of the human mind.

An exceffive attachment to fyftematical theology is so obvious a promoter of dogmatifm, that it could not well escape our Author's animadverfion. Thefe fyftems, he obferves, are generally composed of a great number of articles, fo artfully complicated, that not one of them can be left out, without opening a chafm, and deftroying the connection of the whole feries of truths. The fyftematical divine does not, indeed, look upon all the doctrines, which compofe his fyftem, as of equal weight, when abftractedly confidered; but the leaft important become indifpenfably neceffary, because he has connected them with more effential truths, which, in his opinion, they illuftrate and confirm. Hence he defends them with the fame zeal as he does the fundamental

fundamental doctrines of religion; becaufe he confiders them as giving a confiftency to his fyftem, without which it would foon fall into ruins.

Thofe fpeculative doctrines, which have divided the profeffors of the Gofpel into fo many fects, are not only ufelefs, but even prejudicial, to practical Chriftianity. So far from having a falutary influence on our temper and conduct, they often stifle the good feed, and prevent its ftriking root in the heart. If the truth of this be doubted (fays our Author), let the perfon, who is accustomed to act from religious principles, feriously ask himfelf, whether, when excited to a duty of religion, or an act of virtue, the doctrine of original fin, of the imputed righteoufnefs, or two-fold nature of Chrift, or any fuch fpeculative articles, were uppermoft in his mind, or even occurred to his thoughts? Or let him examine whether, when in the hours of fickness or adverfity he fought the confolations of religion, he had recourse to his complicated fyftem, and the vain refinements of fcholaftic theology? No; it is a firm conviction of the exiftence of the Deity, of an all-directing Providence, of a future ftate of recompence, of the love and mercy of God in Chrift, and of other truths of a nature fimilar to thefe, which has a direct influence upon our conduct, arms us against the affaults of temptation, and cheers the heart when drooping under the burden of affliction.

Among the directions for avoiding the two extremes of fcepticifin on the one hand, and dogmatifm on the other, we have fome useful obfervations on the method of lecturing on theology commonly adopted in Holland, which tends not fo much to enlighten and enlarge the mind, as to contract the views of the fludent, and to make him addictus jurare in verba magiftri. The Socratic method of teaching is recommended, as it accuftoms the learners to exercife their own faculties, and to examine the fubject themselves, inftead of blindly acquiefcing in the dogmatical dictates of their inftructor.

Our limits will not permit us to enlarge farther on this excellent Differtation, nor to take into our prefent confideration the

following difcourfe, which terminates this volume. Mis Vicar.

ART. XIV.

Inftituts Politiques et Militaires de TAMERLAN, proprement appellé TIMOUR, Ecrits par lui-même en Mogol, et traduits en François, fur la Verfion Perfane d'Abou-Taleb-Al- Hoffeini, avec la Vie de ce Conquérant, d'après les meilleurs Auteurs Orientaux, des Notes, et des Tables, Hiftorique, Géographique, &c. Par L. Langlès, Officier de NN. SS. les Maréchaux de France. i. e. Political and Military Inititutes of Tamerlane, properly called Timur, written by himfelf in the Mogul Language, and tranflated into French, from the APP. Rev. Vol. LXXVII.

Rr

Perfian