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the members of the bar, and the audience at large | will praise the judge's charge, and forget it, and the grand jury will drink it in, and disregard it. The charge is just as much a dead-letter as the laws in question. It is requisite and proper and all that, just as going to church is, but it goes in at one ear and out at the other. The judge is paid for saying these things, among others, and does his duty, and that is the end of it. The jury listen respectfully, but no one appears to present any such offenses, and they are too busy or indifferent to hunt up cases of infraction, or call attention to those which have come to their knowledge.

There is a law in this State against "profane cursing and swearing." Few outside the legal ranks are probably aware of it. Otherwise there might possibly be less of this class of objurgation. The law is a very respectable one to have on the statute books. It will look well in history. But it is the most hopelessly defunct and embalmed of all deadletter laws a perfect mummy. Not even the large income which the State might derive from its enforcement seems to induce even an occasional airing of it. A dollar apiece for every profane oath! what an El Dorado is enveloped in that idea! In the city of New York the public authorities might speedily pay off the municipal debt by a rigid enforcement of the law for a few weeks. Put the police into the hotels, Wall street and the political head-quarters, and the thing would be done. Assuming that other States have similar laws, we doubt not that the penalties for the swearing over the result of the last Presidential election would have wiped out the national debt. Here then would seem to be a panacea for all our monetary troubles of State and nation. Why then is not this law enforced? Possibly because of the peculiar alternative punishment adjudged in case of conviction and non-payment of the dollar, imprisonment for not less than one day nor more than three days "in a room separate from all other prisoners." Lack of apartments for convicted and impecunious swearers, and the possibility that many would elect to be boarded at the public expense for one, two or three days, rather than part with the dollar, stand in the way of enforcing this law.

The law prohibits the discharge of guns, pistols, rockets, squibs, crackers, or other fire-works within a quarter of a mile of any building, on Christmas day, the last day of December, New Year's day, Washington's birthday, or the Fourth of July, under penalty of forfeiting five dollars for the poor. It may occur to some that it would be more sensible to prohibit these indulgences on every day except those specified, or, at least, to make the prohibition universal, but probably the law-makers knew best. We wish, however, that somebody would explain to us this peculiar tenderness for the last day of the year. Are ediâces more apt to burn on that day than on

any other? Is it a public occasion or holiday, within the meaning of the title of this act? We can hardly believe that this provision about the last day of the year is merely sentimental. It seems to us, moreover, that the most important day, so far as the liability of danger of fire is concerned, has been omitted, namely, the first of May, or "moving day," when the streets are full of goods of an inflammable character, and houses are open and exposed.

Our Sunday law is notoriously a dead letter. No man may lawfully travel on Sunday, except in cases of charity or necessity, or in attending church within twenty miles, and yet there is more pleasure-riding on Sunday than on any other day of the week, and railroad trains are, on some routes, regularly run for public travel, and steamboats ply our great river both for pleasure and business. No man may lawfully sell alcoholic liquors on Sunday, except to lodgers in his inn, or to persons actually and lawfully traveling, and yet there is more alcohol consumed on Sunday than on any other day, perhaps than on all other days of the week. We never could understand this exception in favor of travelers. Is it because they are "dryer" than other people, and the law, in its charity, makes allowance for this fact, or is it because the movement of travel is presumed to work off the effect which might be deleterious to one not traveling? No man may lawfully expose any wares or merchandise, except meats, milk and fish (not even fruit and herbs), on Sunday, but this does not prevent the untimely awakening of the citizen from his slumber on Sunday morning by the fiendish screaming of newsboys; an abuse which the law quietly ignores, although it forbids the proprietor of one of these newspapers to recover compensation for an advertisement in its columns.

Our statutes enact that "it shall be the duty of all officers concerned in the administration of justice, to attend at the place where they shall know, or be informed that any race is about to be run contrary to the provisions of law, and there give notice of the illegality thereof, and endeavor to prevent such race by dispersing the persons collected for the purpose of attending the same," etc. It is our belief that if the sheriff ever attends on such occasions, it is to run a horse himself, or to bet on some other man's horse. The same law absolutely prohibits all horse-racing in the town of New Utrecht, in the county of Kings, and punishes the infraction by fine and imprisonment, and the forfeiture, by the owner, of the value of the horse. Will some inhabitant of said town kindly step forward and explain why "this is thus ?" And at the same time will the said inhabitant inform us whether horse-racing is really unknown in the said town?

It is true that the legislature, in 1851, enacted an elaborate and stringent law for the suppression of gambling, but so far as we know it is a complete

dead-letter. Occasionally the police authorities in our large cities make a descent on a gaming-place; occasionally, perhaps, one is broken up, but gaming goes on publicly and unrestrained. At the largest and most fashionable watering-place in the country, is a magnificent temple dedicated to chance, presided over by an ex-member of Congress, and frequented by the wealthiest and most "respectable" men in the State, many of them present or past legislators, including, likely enough, some of the very persons who enacted the law in question. The sheriff of the county is bound by law to inform and prosecute, and is liable to a fine of $500 for not doing so; but he does not seem to know the law.

sonal or individual, and social or political. Social life is essential to him, and society, as the school of his race, is divinely ordained for his use. In social life man finds protection, and self-development (his individual right and duty) in safety from external intru

sion.

Society combines all its members into an organic unity, and creates a social force, under whose protection the individual may achieve his destiny, in obedience to the law of God, and according to his conscience. This society, into which he comes with others for mutual assurance, is what is named the nation, people, State, Commonwealth, or body politic. Its powers are what we call sovereignty, including power over persons and the eminent domain, or the power over the property of its members. The social force, organized by society, we call government - the exwhich the legislature enacts, the judiciary applies to persons and property, and the Executive enforces.

pression of that force, we call law

Is it not notorious that pugilists train for prizefights within the State, without let or hindrance from the ministers of the law? Are not cock-fights common? But who ever heard of the instigators of the warlike chanticleer languishing in durance vile, visited with a fine. Yet the promoter of a cock-publica, of the Romans; the nation, State, body

fight or a rat-fight may be imprisoned a year or fined a thousand dollars.

It may be that some of these things are too trivial for the purview of the law. This is not for us to pronounce. But would it not be better to be consistent? Either enforce such laws or repeal them. There was a law, some years ago, against stockgambling, but it was found to be a dead-letter, and the legislature repealed it, and now stock gambling is not only common but not illegal. This is the better course. By adopting it, if we become wrong, we at least cease to render ourselves ridiculous.

THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO

EACH OTHER, AS MODIFIED BY THE WAR AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.

THE following paper was read by the Hon. J. Ran

dolph Tucker before the Social Science Association at its recent convention in Saratoga:

This Association of Social Science has honored me by its invitation to discuss "The Relations of the United States to each other, as modified by the War and the Constitutional Amendments." This involves a comparison of these relations before and after the war, and amendments.

This social or political problem demands scientific investigation, by the inductive method, into the facts of our history, with the candor due to its importance. That history has five eras:

1. The Colonial era, or the protoplastic period, from 1607 to September 5, 1774, when the first Continental Congress met.

2. The Continental Congressional era, from September 5, 1774, to March 1, 1781.

3. The Confederation era, from March 1, 1781, to March 4, 1789.

4. The Constitutional era to 1861.

5. The Constitutional era since 1861.

1. THE COLONIAL ERA.

A few preliminary observations will be needed.
Man has two classes of rights and interests-per-

The mods of the Greeks (a singular noun from #oÀUS many), the populus (same root), or civitas, or res

politic, or Commonwealth of modern times, is that body of human beings, who are united in one common society for internal peace and order, and for external protection. This accords with Cicero's definition: "Populus autem non omnis hominum coetus, quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus." De Rep. Lib. 1, 25. The vinculum juris is essential, and a community of benefits. Whatever authority, therefore, such society may rightfully exercise over its members, is called sovereignty.

But society can only act upon its members through its organic agency, government, to which it delegates certain powers out of the sum of its sovereignty, which powers, though sovereign powers, do not constitute the government, the sovereignty.

The sovereignty, the original authority in society, is unimpaired by the delegation to the government of powers, coupled with the trust duty to exercise them according to the will of society, and for its benefit, and that of its members.

In the succeeding discussion, the words “civil bodypolitic" (taken from a celebrated paper hereafter cited), will be used, as the generic term for the "coetus hominum, sociatus juris consensu et utilitatis communione," rather than the word nation or people, State or Commonwealth, because better defining the political body of citizens - the moλis and the civis, diverse from the mandos oɩTwv of Aristotle, or the mass of citizens, or those who took part in the government.

It is not a mere conglomeration of men, but an assimilation of men, under the bond of law, into one body, for the purposes of the social state, in which is vested the sovereignty over persons and things for the common good of all.

Such a body may be nomadic, as the Hebrews in the Wilderness, or stationary, as the States (Stare) of Europe within fixed bounds. It may crystallize about the family nucleus, and hence be called a nation (nasconatus), or be brought into one by external force, or by pre-contract, or by fortuity and acquiescence or afterconsent, or by colonization of members from a parent State. The genesis of every civil body-politic has one or other of these sources. But each and all involve the common weal (Commonwealth), or the communion of many for one social life.

Colonization is as old as the race. The instincts of human nature lead men to better their condition by settling new countries with the overflowing population of the older ones. Seeds of the old stock are thus borne to other lands, and the colony is the proto-plasm of a new civil body-politic.

The principles of British colonization, and the relations of the colonies to the mother country, and inter se may be gathered from the decisions of the British courts.

There were three forms of colonization:

1. By conquest or cession from a Christian power. In these cases the prior laws prevailed until changed by the Crown of England. This was the case of New York, ceded by Holland. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 17, b; Attorney-General v. Stewart, 2 Merivale, 158; Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper, 211.

2. By conquest or cession from an infidel power. Here it was doubtful if any prior laws continued; certainly none contrary to the law of God. Same cases; Blankhard v. Galdy, 2 Salk. 411; 4 Mod. 222; Anon., 2 P. Wms. 75.

3. Colonization of an unoccupied country, or vacated by the original people.

Though in Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. 666, Lord Holt thought otherwise, yet in other cases the better opinion has prevailed, that the American colonies come under this form of colonization, and thus have been held to have brought with them the English law in force at the time of their settlement. Same cases; Rex v. Vaughn, 4 Burr. 2500; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves., Sr., 444; Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543; 1 Story's Com. on Const'n, § 152.

Each colony brought the liberties and the laws of England, as the settlers enjoyed them on leaving the fatherland. Each colony was a dependent dominion, but distinct from, and no part of the parent country. 1 Blacks. Com., § 4, p. 100; 1 Stephens' Com. 103-4.

In consequence of this, each colony was a dominion, distinct from and no part of any other, and though each was dependent on Great Britain, it was independent of every other. No colony took part in the British government, and a fortiori, exercised no influence upon the policy of the sister colonies.

The separateness of these colonial 'dependencies will appear from many considerations.

First. Take the first colony, Virginia. Named before its birth in Edmund Spenser's dedication of the Fairie Queen to "Elizabeth, by the grace of God, Queen of England, France, and Ireland, and Virginia," she settled under her charter of April 10, 1606, on the Powhattan River, in May, 1607. Two colonies, by this and later charters, were authorized, not to be settled within one hundred miles of each other. No person was to settle in either without the consent, in writing, of the council of the colony. 1 Hen. Stat. at Large, 57, etc. A later charter gave power to establish a government for Virginia, named a large number of corporators, made them a corporation or body-politic, gave power to take out any other colonists it chose, to admit or expel members, and keep out intruders, etc. 1 Hen. Stat. at Large, 91, etc., 98, etc.

In 1619 the first General Assembly met on the call of the Governor; and by ordinance July 24, 1621, a regular government was constituted composed of a Governor, a Council, and the House of Burgesses, elected by the people. 1 Hen. Stat. at Large, 110.

Thus was established the first embryo civil bodypolitic in America, dependent upon, but distinct from the parent country, with a nucleus about which, by its self-organism, it could aggregate the materials of population, or exclude such, as it pleased. This was a fatal Commonwealth -the seedling of a new State. This was the Old Dominion.

In 1623-4, the House of Burgesses, by law, asserted its exclusive power of taxation in the colony. 1 Hen. Stat. at Large, 124. This was the key-note of British liberty the prophetic announcement of the American Revolution. It was repeated with more emphasis in 1645-6. Id. 320.

In March, 1651, a treaty was made between the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, and the Colony of Virginia, by which it was agreed that the freedom of the colonists was such as belong to the free people of England; that the Grand Assembly should transact the affairs of Virginia; that the people of Virginia should have free trade to all nations, as the people of England have; that no taxes of any kind be

As to the power of the parent country, several opin-imposed, nor forts be erected, nor garrisons maintained ions prevailed. In all it was conceded that the King could not legislate for these American colonies.

Lord North and his adherents held that the Parliament could legislate in all cases whatever, and so declared in 6 Geo. III, c. 12. Many others (Burke among them), and many Americans conceded the power of legislation upon all subjects affecting the interests of the British Empire and its general commerce, while others denied all power of legislation whatever.

Looking to the supervision reserved in many of the charters, that colonial legislation should not be "contrary to the laws and statutes of our realm of England;" to the general commercial regulations, acquiesced in by the colonies; to the practice of Parliament, since our independence, with respect to her other colonies (1 Stephens' Com. 106; 18 Geo. III, c. 12, 1778), and the abolition of slavery in the colonies by the act of 3 and 4 Wm. 4th, c. 73, candor compels the admission of some legislative power in Parliament over the colonies. But justice demands, that in 1877, we should repudiate with our forefathers the right of taxation claimed by the Parliament in the colonies, and that the sole power of taxation for each colony was in its own distinct colonial assembly.

in Virginia, but by the consent of the Assembly. 1 Hen. Stat. at Large, 363, etc.

During the period of the Commonwealth of England, Virginia elected her own Governor, and on the death of Richard Cromwell, her Assembly declared "the supreme power of the government of this country shall be resident in the Assembly," and all writs should issue in its name, "until such a command and commission come out of England as shall be by the Assembly adjudged lawful." Id. 526.

Thus Virginia asserted her supreme and independent power, during the interregnum of regular government in England, and acknowledged her conditional dependence when it was restored.

Take now the most illustrious of the northern colonies. The Mayflower pilgrims on the 11th of November, 1620, signed a written compact, by which they undertook to plant the first colony in the northern parts of Virginia, and covenanted and combined themselves "into a civil body-politic, and to make laws for the general good of the colony," etc. 1 Pitkin, 32-3.

In 1636 they declared against taxes, but "by consent of the body of associates, or their representatives legally assembled;" thus distinguishing between the

people, as the civil body-politic, and their government as the delegated agency. 1 Pitkin, 89.

In 1643, four northern colonies confederated under the name of "The United Colonies of New England." Id. 423.

In 1722, Massachusetts enacted that no tax could be imposed but by the consent of the governor, council and representatives of the people assembled in General Court, and like action seems at some time to have been taken by each colony. Id. 89, 90-1.

All the colonies were in like manner settled under different charters and authorities, and with like exclusive rights of self-government. New York, once a colony of Holland, became an English colony, under patents to the Duke of York in 1664 and 1674 by cession or conquest, under the treaty of Breda in 1667. Second. The colonial distinctness is shown by the diverse forms of their governments.

1. The provincial governments in New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

2. Proprietary or feudal governments for Maryland, Pennsylvania and Delaware.

3. Charter governments for Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut.

The diversity of these may be seen. 1 Blacks. Com. 109; 1 Story on Cons'n, § 159, etc.

Third. The fundamental laws of each differed. Each had the English law existing at the date of its settlement. New York had, and perhaps still retains, Hollandic institutions and laws, superseded or modified by the English government.

Then, each colony made its own statutory changes in the common law, as it was when the colony was settled.

No Parliament, and a fortiori, no other colony could or did intrude its voice in the enactment of these statutes of each colony.

Besides, each colony had its own quarantine laws; its rules of naturalization; its own suffrage qualifications; its own coin, to counterfeit which was treason against the colony and his majesty; emitted its own bills of credit; levied troops; imposed duties on imports from other colonies; established its own lighthouses; laid duties on slaves and other articles deemed injurious from other colonies, thus regulating commerce; and made treaties and formed confederacies with the other colonies.

Fourth. In 1695 the British government proposed a plan of Union for general defense, and for a general "Congress"-the first use of the word in our history. The several colonies rejected it. 1 Pitkin, 141-2; 2 Burk's Hist. of Va. 322.

Fifth. In 1754, Dr. Franklin suggested "a plan of proposed Union between the several colonies of Massachusetts," etc. (all being named), and in which Parliament was asked to form one general government in America. Commissioners from seven colonies adopted the suggestion, but the several colonies rejected it. 1 Pitkin, 142, etc., 429.

that of each to Great Britain. 1 Jour. of Cong. 27-8-9. They declare:

"That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the following rights:

"Resolved, N. C. D. 1, That they are entitled to life, liberty and property; and they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their consent.

"Resolved, 4, That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative council; and as the English colonies are not represented, and from their local, and other circumstances, cannot properly be represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right of representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed; but, from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament as are bona fide, restrained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country, and the commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America, without their consent.

66

Resolved, N. C. D. 5, That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by the peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.

Resolved, N. C. D. 7, That these, his majesty's colonies, are likewise entitled to all the immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal charters, or secured by their several codes of provincial laws.

Resolved, N. C. D. 9, That the keeping a standing Army in these colonies, in times of peace, without the consent of the legislature of that colony in which such Army is kept, is against law.

"All and each of which the aforesaid deputies, in behalf of themselves and their constituents, do claim, demand and insist on, as their indubitable rights and liberties; which cannot be legally taken from them, altered or abridged by any power whatever, without their own consent, by their representatives in their several provincial legislatures."

Eighth. Conclusive authority upon this point is not wanting.

Grotius says: "When a people, by one consent, go to form colonies, it is the original of a new and independent people, for they are not sent out to be slaves, but to enjoy equal privileges and freedom." De Jure belli et pacis - Lib. 2, c. 9, § 10.

*

In a letter supposed to be Edmund Burke's, dated May 19, 1774, he says, speaking of the colonies, the crown, "by most solemn compacts, did form them into separate civil States, with all the powers of distinct legislation and government." that it was manifestly the royal intention "to form those colonies into distinct States * * * dependent on the crown, but not on the Parliament of England.” Their history "fully demonstrates that they were Sixth. In 1765, a Congress of Commissioners from really and intentionally created distinct States, and exnine colonies, convened on the suggestion of Massa-empted from the authority of Parliament, and nothchusetts, for a meeting of the "committees from the legislatures of the several colonies." It resolved against taxation of the colonies, "but by their respective legislatures." Id. 442, 446.

Seventh. But the declaration of the first Continental Congress, October 14, 1774, is the most comprehensive statement of the inter-colonial relation, as well as

ing but an act of Union, made with their own consent, can annex them to the realm, or subject them to its legislature." Amer. Arch. (4th series, vol. 1), 337.

Judge Story says: "The colonial legislatures, with the restrictions necessarily arising from their dependency on Great Britain, were sovereign within the limits of their respective territories: * * * all the

colonies considered themselves, not as parcel of the realm of Great Britain, but as dependencies of the British crown, and owing allegiance thereto, the King being their supreme and sovereign lord." 1 Story on Const., §§ 171, 175. And again, § 177, he says: "Though the colonies had a common origin, and owed a common allegiance, and the inhabitants of each were British subjects, they had no direct political connection with each other. Each was independent of all the others; each, in a limited sense, was sovereign within its own territory. There was neither alliance nor confederacy between them. The assembly of one province could not make laws for another. They were known only as dependencies," etc.

Judge Curtis (Hist. of C. U. S., p. 7, 8), says: “The colonies had no direct political connection with each other before the Revolution commenced, but each was a distinct community, with its own separate political organization, and without any power of legislation for any but its own inhabitants," etc.

Both Story and Curtis state these doctrines, with this qualification:

"But although the colonies were independent of each other in respect to their domestic concerns, they were not wholly alien to each other. On the contrary, they were fellow-subjects, and for many purposes one people. Every colonist had a right to inhabit, if he pleased, in any other colony, and as a British subject he was capable of inheriting lands by descent in every other colony." 1 Story on Const., § 178; 1 Curtis' Hist. C. U. S. 9.

This passage is justly subject to criticism. For it is not pretended that the law of inheritance was fixed by any other authority than that of each colonial legislature for its own lands. A Briton may now inherit land in Virginia (act 1867), but he inherits by Virginia law, and his power to do so, does not make Britons and Virginians one people. The right to inherit land depends on the lex loci rei sitae, and heirship must be traced by that law. Thus a Scotchman, though no alien in England (since Scotland and England are now one kingdom), cannot inherit land of his father in England, though legitimate by Scotch law, if illegitimate by English law. Birth-Whistle v. Vardill, 7 Clarke & Finnally, 825.

The capacity to inherit or hold land in a colony, was due to the tie of allegiance. In Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, therefore, when Scotland and England were two separate kingdoms, under James I of England, who was James VI of Scotland, and had no political ligament but the common crown, and whose peoples were not one people, it was held that Calvin, a Scot, could hold land in England by virtue of his allegiance to the person of the King of both countries.

So that the test applied by these eminent jurists to establish that the colonies were in this sense one people, fails utterly. It is no test at all. It depends on a fact, having no relation to the oneness of the people of the colonies. In the one case above cited, inheritance did not follow from the oneness of a people, and yet in the other it resulted, because of the common tie of allegiance when there is no oneuess.

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For I find in 1779, Virginia defined citizenship, and gave "to the free inhabitants of every of the States, parties to the American Confederation, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted," all rights of citizens within this Commonwealth. 10 Hen. Stat. at Large, 129, 130. The privilege, as well as the exception, proves that the oneness of the colonies deduced by these eminent jurists from the freedom of inhabitancy and inheritance, grew only out of the common allegiance which, when broken, left the colonies and the people of each, separate and distinct. But whether a previous right to inherit land was taken away by the severance of colonial allegiance may be doubted, in view of certain dicta in Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 20 b, and of the cases in respect to the ante-nati in England and America. Doe v. Acklam, 9 E. C. L. R. 779; R. v. Sevva, 61 id. 53; Blythe v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535; Inglis v. Trustees, 3 Peters, 99; McIlvaine v. Coxe, 4 Cr. 34.

But upon this point the provisions of the subsequent articles of confederation (§ 4), and of the Constitution (art. 4, § 2), securing citizen rights to the people of the several States in every other, would seem to conclude the question against the views of Judges Story aud Curtis.

But the whole difficulty is in the meaning of the words "one people," as used by Justice Story. If he means one people, in the sense that all were Britonsthat all were under one King, etc.—there is no controversy. But the question we are discussing is, what political relation did they hold to each other? Were they one civil body-politic? It is conceded neither had any authority over or within any other; that neither was a part of the mother country, and was, therefore, no part of any other. Non-alienage of the inhabitants of one in every other has been explained. Where then was there a shadow of political unity?

In fact, as each was sovereign (by Judge Story's concession), except as the crown or Parliament held supremacy over each, the overthrow of their supremacy left the colony with absolute sovereignty. Its colonial sovereignty was conditioned upon its dependency to Great Britain. Independency of Great Britain determined the condition, and left its sovereignty absolute.

Each colony, by a separate ligament, was bound to Great Britain as a dependency. That distinct ligament being severed, each fell from the parent stem, a separate Commonwealth independent of the mother country, as of every other. The acorus hanging from an English oak have several ties to the sturdy tree, but falling to the earth, each is the germ, the proto-plasm of a new and distinct life, each independent of its parent, as of every other. There is a moral brotherhood and sympathy between children of a common mother. But each has his distinct faculties, his own will, his separate and independent life, free from the control or legal influence of his brethren.

While, therefore, conceding in full force the affinities and sympathies between the colonies, the philosophic historian must deny all political bonds between them, and maintain their absolute political independence as civil bodies-politic.

This point has been more dwelt upon, because a primordial unity between the colonies, being assumed or conceded, has led to radical errors in the subsequent history of the colonies, emerging into their condition as States.

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