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Inkermann, an engagement as mo- competent; and if such be the course mentous and memorable as any which which every man pursues, and pruis recorded in ancient or modern his- dently pursues, in his own instance, and tory. We must entreat our readers with regard to his own affairs, are we to follow us here step by step, in order to act otherwise when the lives of our that they may thoroughly understand soldiers and the character of the nation our argument and conclusion. It is are at stake? Are we to weigh the plain from what we have already said, inconveniences of a change against and from the dates given above, that the dangers arising from the notorious neither the landing in the Crimea, incompetency of the men in power? the battle of the Alma, nor the in- We care not of what complexion of choate siege of Sebastopol were con- politics their successors may be, so sidered by Ministers as of suffi- that they are true, and loyal, and cient importance to justify the assem- united; but we shall not befool ourbling of Parliament before the usual selves by affecting to put hoops round time. The battle of Inkermann, how- the tub of the Danaides, when we ever, altered their whole intentions. know that its bottom is perforated, And why? Because it demonstrated and that, under no circumstances to all the world the extreme jeopardy whatever, is it capable of holding of our position, and the miserable water. miscalculations of the Ministry as to the nature of the war in which the country is engaged.

There are times when it is the duty of every man, and of every organ of public opinion, to speak out their sentiments plainly and without reservation, and utterly to disregard the comments which, as a matter of course, will be made by their political opponents. Such is the present occasion; and we see no reason whatever for being fastidious in our remarks, or for abstaining from what Mr. Leveson Gower deprecated as hostile criticism. Our criticism, if it is to be a true one, must be hostile to the present Ministry. We have never reposed much faith in them; we now repose less than ever and being thoroughly of opinion that they are unfit for the station which they occupy, and that their continued occupation of it is dangerous for the welfare of Britain, we shall not conceal our sentiments. The rule which applies to private individuals, applies also to the body politic.

If a man discovers that the physician whom he has employed has mistaken his case, administered wrong medicines, and is otherwise an empiric, he dismisses him at once and for ever. The litigant, who has had one cause bungled by an ignorant attorney, does not give him a chance of redeeming his character by the opportunity of further employment. Life and property are too precious to be entrusted to the charge of those who have shown themselves to be in

Now, then, let us enter into particulars. We have shown that, but for the receipt of the news of the battle of Inkermann, Parliament would not have been convened before Christmas; that in fact, there existed no intention of convening it earlier, but directly the reverse; and that the call was a sudden thought, or rather arose from an unforeseen emergency. What was that emergency? Not, we suppose, the mere fact of the battle of Inkermann, gallant, glorious, memorable as it was. Alma had preceded it-so had the action of Balaklava. Thanks, under God, to the valour of our brave soldiers, whose constancy and courage, under fearful odds, transcended even Spartan achievement, and to the assistance of our brave allies, we suffered no defeat-nay, we drove back the Russians from the heights which they had so daringly scaled, and remained masters of the position. Our loss was heavy-grievously so; but not greatly heavier than it was at Alma-not nearly so heavy as in some of the Peninsular battles. Ministers did not assemble Parliament to tell them the story of the fight. That had already been done, much better than they could do it, through the medium of the press. What, then, was their object? Just this. To do what they ought to have done months before, and to obtain the sanction of Parliament for putting the nation upon an active war footing, many months after war had been formally declared,

We shall not inflict upon our readers any unnecessary retrospect. Let the conduct of the Aberdeen Ministry, in regard to Russia, almost from the day of their formation down to that when their Royal Mistress gave the formal intimation that war had commenced, pass without comment. Let us also omit all mention of the interminable diplomatic intercourse with the German States, and, in the mean time, be silent as to our dealings with Austria and Prussia. Look but to this; that, having declared war with Russia, we proceeded to invade her territory in the Black Sea, and to attack her strongest fortress with an army of twenty-seven thousand men. Portugal can bring more bayonets into the field-Saxony nearly as many; yet that was the amount which Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues deemed sufficient for the purpose, or at all events sufficient as the British contingent. It may be said that we could spare no more; and that no doubt is true. But why could we spare no more? Simply because the Ministry did not take steps in proper time to augment largely the regular force, to embody the whole of the militia, and to avail themselves of the means which the country, through Parliament, was eager to place at their disposal. Certainly there was no disposition on the part of the nation to starve the war, or to criticise the amount of the expenditure. Never was the public purse so freely and confidingly opened. Why, then, did Ministers not avail themselves of the opportunity, and give effect to the wishes of the nation? Simply because the Premier was an obstinate old man, trained according to the traditions of an antiquated school of diplomacy, and utterly unfit for the conduct of public affairs in a crisis such as this. In the Cabinet there were undoubtedly able men-or, if we are wrong in using the plural number, we may employ the singular, when we indicate Lord Palmerston. He, at least, was equal to the emergency, but he was no longer Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The House, or Cabinet, was divided against itself. The majority of them believed to the last that there would be no serious war; and hardly took the pains to conceal

that conviction. In the Ministry there are incapables, and there are also men who were not in earnest. We shall not specify those who appear to us entitled to rank in the first category; but we shall ask if Mr. Gladstone can be considered as really impressed with the full responsibility of his position, when, last Session, he took a vote of the House of Commons for the expense of conveying twenty-five thousand men to Malta and back? Did he believe that we were really going to war in grim earnest with the greatest military power in the world, when he proposed that the expenses of each year should be defrayed out of the ordinary income? To Malta and back! In that one phrase-in that one expression-may be found the true key to the whole dealings of the Aberdeen Ministry. They did not believe in the reality of the war, even after it was declared. They thought that it might be somehow tided over, just as gentlemen who have no mind to have recourse to the arbitration of the pistol, adjust their differences by means of an ingenious correspondence; and they were utterly amazed by the discovery that Nicholas was of opinion that he had gone too far to accede, and would not listen, to the advice even of the most friendly remonstrants. Is that simply an hypothesis or conjecture of ours? By no means. Witness the reiterated assertions of Lord Aberdeen, that he did not despair of a peaceable adjustment of the differences, long after the hour for energetic action had arrived. Witness the idleness, during the earlier part of the season, of our fleet in the Black Sea, and the sham semi-bombardment-for it was no better-of Odessa. The troops, it is true, were despatched to Turkey, about the end of April, but they performed no active service there, and encountered no enemy except the cholera. On the 22d of June the seige of Silistria was raised; and then, and not till then, was the expedition to the Crimea decided on. It may be that the abandonment of the siege of Silistria took Ministers by surprise. They may have calculated upon another result, or at least upon such protracted operations on Turkish ground, as would have rendered a sudden change of the theatre of war

impossible. Be that as it may, they found themselves compelled to do something; and the following is Lord John Russell's account of the result of the Cabinet's deliberation :

"In considering the question of the expedition to the Crimea, the Government had to consider the alternatives. England and France had sent an army into Turkey. If that army had been taken back to Constantinople for the winter, it would have been a great disappointment to the people of this country, as well as to the army itself. If the allied army had been ordered to advance across the Danube, and to attack the Russians, they would have had to encounter the immense armies of the Czar; and as there were no great fortresses in their way, a victory in the field would not have brought the Allies nearer to the place for which the war was undertaken. There, then, only remained the expedition to the Crimea, in the success of which he, in common with many high military authorities, both English and French, had felt the utmost confidence. He believed that there was great risk to be run, but that there was also a great object to be obtained; and that if Sebastopol, that stronghold of Russian power, were destroyed, its fall would go far to give to Turkey that security which was the object of any peace."

in September. The whole force of the invading army, both British and French, amounted to about 50,000.

If we admit, as Ministers now contend, that it was at object of importance to proceed without delay to the attack of Sebastopol-if we allow that the capture of that stronghold, and the destruction of the Russian navy within the harbour, was a prize which it was worth while incurring extraordinary risks to obtain, and that the time for the expedition was opportune-we need hardly discuss the question whether a force of 50,000 men was sufficient for the purpose. This much is apparent, that we could send no more at the time. 27,000 men was our modest quota-the utmost we could furnish; but they were men of whom, alive or dead, Britain has reason to be proud, for they were a phalanx of heroes. In fairness to the Ministry, who are now virtually on their defense before the country, we must not forget that it is no easy matter to furnish transports for 50,000 men, and therefore we shall not maintain that the force originally sent to the Crimea was too small for the opposition which was expected upon landing. But in many respects it was deficient. We had hardly any Mark well the words that we have cavalry; our artillery was notoriously quoted in italics; for they contain, weak; and our men, when they were unconsciously perhaps on the part of landed, found themselves without the utterer, a full confession of that tents for shelter. The soldier must shameful and slavish truckling to pub- expect many and grievous hardships lic opinion which has always been the in a campaign, but it is undoubtedly characteristic of the party of which the part of those who direct his movethe noble Lord is the leader. Is it ments to take care that he shall not possible that this can be a true state- suffer any privation which ordinary ment? Is it credible that the Cabinet forethought could prevent. Ministers should have decided against the win- admit that they determined in June tering of the army at Constantinople, to attempt the occupation of the for no better reason than that such an Crimea. The expedition did not sail arrangement "would have been a from Balchick Bay until the 7th of great disappointment to the people of September, consequently there was this country?" Is it the function of ample time for preparation. But we an "army" to determine its own mo- shall not criticise matters of deficient tions, or to regulate the scheme of a arrangement. We keep our eyes upon campaign? Yet such were the state- the fact that the allied powers sent ments deliberately made to the House 50,000 to the Crimea, for the purpose of Commons by the "great constitu- of investing, and if possible reducing, tional authority!" Sebastopol, and that of these 27,000 were British troops.

Well, then, this movement being decided on, the army, considerably reduced by the ravages of pestilence, was SO far reinforced that 27,000 British troops landed in the Crimea

Now, admitting this force to be sufficient for the purpose-admitting that it was the utmost which could, in the first instance, be transported

to the Crimea-admitting that we had no great reason to believe that it could be suddenly overmatched in numbers or in weight-the question immediately arises, in what way could it be reinforced in order to meet the losses which war and pestilence occasion? Pestilence was unfortunately not a hypothetical nor imaginary evil. The cholera had been raging at Varna; it accompanied our brave fellows to the ships; and many a gallant soldier, whom the shot of the enemy left untouched at the Alma, died after the battle in the agonies of this cruel disease. We knew that in the event of an engagement with the Russians, we must expect great loss of life; and it was not expected that Sebastopol could be reached without more than one bloody and desperate engagement. The Russian soldier may be liable to the criticisms of civilisation, but no one can deny him the attributes of hardihood and dogged courage. Our preparations and designs were not so secret-thanks to the cackling of Lord John Russell, and the entire confidence which certain of his colleagues repose in the discretion of the press that the enemy was unprepared for our coming. The Czar was made aware in ample time of the point where he was menaced, and being, unlike her Majesty's advisers, a man of prompt and decided action, he took immediate measures to prepare himself for the visit of the Allies.

It is incredible that any man, or any body of men, should have expected that our troops could fight one or more battles against a foe at least numerically equal, and having the advantage of intrenched positions, and then proceed to the reduction of one of the strongest fortresses in the world, without suffering tremendous loss. In war no decisive advantage can be gained without a lamentable sacrifice; and we are far from urging that any such considerations should have withheld Ministers from making the attempt, and ordering the expedition to the Crimea. But they were bound to take care that they had a reserve ready and within reach to supply the inevitable losses. They were bound, in duty to the nation, to do this for the army belongs to the

nation, not to them, and the nation will not suffer it to be wronged. Did they perform that duty did they exercise that care? No to their eternal shame and infamy be it written-no! They had no reserve available, or within reach. Had the battle of Inkermann gone otherwise than it did, we should have lost the flower of our army; and where then would have been our hopes of German co-operation? We implore the country, we entreat all honest-hearted and patriotic men, whatever be their political creed, to think over and ponder this. We have been brought by the improvidence, negligence, and divided councils of this precious Coalition Ministry, with the old acquaintance of Nicholas at their head, to the very verge of ruin. They staked the whole credit, power, and position of Britain on a single throw-not necessarily, but because they had grossly failed in their duty, and omitted to provide a reserve in case fortune should be against us. And by so doing, or rather neglecting to do, they have prolonged the war, changed the attitude of our army from a besieging force to that of one partially besieged, and lessened the probabilities of the capture of Sebastopol. These are not accusations to be made lightly. It would be shameful, it would be unpatriotic, it would be scandalous to hazard them if the proof were not lying before us. But it would even be a deeper defalcation, if, with the convictions we entertain, we should hesitate to point out the imminent danger to which the country has been exposed by the wretched administration of this Cabinet.

We are not, in the sense of the term as understood by other European countries, a military nation. We make no parade of arms. For many years our standing army has been barely sufficient to do duty at home and in the colonies; but the number of these latter possessions has been of infinite service in accustoming our troops to alternations of climate; and our system of change of quarters, before regiments become domesticated in any one locality, is an admirable one for the breeding and training of the soldier. Of late years various attempts have been made, by a school of politicians now put to silence, and

whose voices we do not again expect to hear for a considerable period, to reduce our army even below the effective point; and the individual who hereafter shall undertake the biography of Lord John Russell must necessarily, if he adheres to truth, record that the indefatigable concocter of representative reforms-more numerous, varied, irreconcilable, and heterogeneous than the schemes of Jeremy Bentham-did at one time yield to the Manchester howl, and attempt to commence a series of retrenchments similar to that which, in the end, left poor King Lear without the service of a single knight. That, however, was speedily put to rights; and, as we are willing to believe that the noble lord is now considerably ashamed of the part which he then found it convenient or politic to act, we shall not comment further upon this rather equivocal passage in his history. Other nations have their militia, or regularly-trained landwehr; we, trusting to our insular position, have neglected that arm of the service. The social changes which have been the result of a long period of peace, of internal improvement, and of commercial prosperity, have not been favour able to the military spirit. In the last war the Highlands of Scotland presented an unrivalled recruiting field, for the population was then greater than the capital expended in those districts could employ, and the warlike spirit of the people, kept alive by their heroic traditions, inclined them to the military profession. That source is no longer available. There is no redundant population now in the Highlands to swell the ranks of the army. No other portion of the British territories has, within the last forty years, experienced so remarkable a change. The clansmen have been expatriated; and sheep, not men, are now the staple produce of the country. The change may have been inevitable, but it is not the less striking in its results, when the services of men with strong arms and stout hearts are required. In like manner, the Irish exodus has deprived Government of a ready and formerly abundant resource; and all over the United Kingdom the tendencies of free trade have been to thin

the population of rural districts, and to augment the industry of the towns. Notwithstanding these changes, we are of opinion that there would be no want of able-bodied men to enlist as recruits, provided there was an adequate inducement for them to enter the service. But how is it possible for us to expect that young men who are earning in some peaceful occupation sixteen, eighteen, or twenty shillings per week, will accept her Majesty's bounty, and take the field with the certainty of fearful hardship, and the prospect of death before them, for the miserable pittance of one shilling per day? In this respect we thoroughly agree with the observations contained in the leading article of the Times of 15th December, condemnatory of the Government proposal to embody a foreign legion, and to prepare it for service in this country; and we beg the attention of our readers to the following extract :

"If, in spite of the reports as to the number of recruits who volunteer into the line, the enlistment does, in fact, go on slowly, we have only to say that take as to the proper remedy. The great Government have made a very sad misobject is to raise the estimation of the service, whether it be regular or militia, by all manner of lawful means. This is an age of free trade, of supply and demand; and free trade there will be in the traffic of military service. Improve the commodity, and you will be sure to have purchasers. What is it that we want? What is that home-produce of which the Duke of Newcastle apprehends a scarcity, and therefore wishes to supply its place with a foreign ingredient? He cannot get enough of the British soldier; at least he would seem to fear for the future shortness of the supply. Now, to introduce into the army foreigners, adventurers, outcasts, nameless, unknown people, who may or may not be exiled for their crimes, is the very way to degrade the service, and make it the refuge of immorality and rebellion. But it is quite as easy to raise the appreciation of this service as of any other. Raise the wages of the soldier. Raise not only his money wages, but his whole condition--his road to honour, his chances of promotion, his comforts, if necessary his luxuries. There is no lack of gentlemen wanting com

missions. Never were there so many on the list. The more there are killed, the more there are to take their places; while the dreadful hardships suffered by officers

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